Russia’s foreign policy in Light of the Ukrainian crisis: action or reaction

Abstract

The thesis examined the factors causing Russia‘s aggressive foreign policy in the framework of neorealism theory. NATO‘s expansion policies towards the Eastern European countries and ambitions to develop the BMD system in these countries are identified as major factors that initiated Russia‘s growing assertive stance in global politics. Membership invitation to Ukraine in the 2008 Bucharest Summit was not received well by Russia. To Russia, this move by NATO meant an intentional weakening of Russia. Even though the direct cause of the crisis was Yanukovych‘s decision not to sign the DCFTA with the EU, the prospect that any step taken by the Ukrainian new pro-Western government that will bring Ukraine closer to the EU will also create the favorable conditions for Ukraine‘s membership in the NATO. Moreover, the ambitions to develop BMD system in the European soil fueled the tension between Russia and NATO. The inability of finding common ground on the establishment of joint control over the BMD system and US's refusal to provide legal security guarantees against the use of the missile weapons against Russia further angered Moscow. Seizure of the Crimean peninsula and modernization of the military capabilities were driven by Russia's sense of insecurity and for stopping further humiliation by the West. As Simens argues, after the fall of the Soviet Union West treated weakened Russia as a defeated enemy and became used to having a "free ride." Thus, Russia risked losing its prestige in the international arena for guaranteeing its own security interests. In the framework of the neorealism theory, annexation of Crimea was done for balancing against NATO. Russia‘s ambitions to regain power and influence in the area of former Soviet countries was for the insurance of its security. As offensive realists argue, states will try to become the hegemon of the region until they feel secure. Acting offensively, Russia‘s intentions were rather defensive for stopping NATO's further expansion. The claims that Russia had planned the seizure of Crimean peninsula months before the crisis in Ukraine is unfounded. This step was rather a reaction than an action by Russia. Thus, the hypothesis that Russia's actions are driven by its security concerns is accepted.