A study of constitutional oversight mechanisms of the Republic of Armenia

Abstract

The comprehensive study of international experience is of utmost importance for the effective functioning of the democratic processes in the newly independent states in order, in the first place, to avoid possible mistakes and take into account approaches that have already become a common value, and in the second place, to reveal one's own peculiarities and bring them into conformity with common solutions. Constitutional oversight, as an important public and government function ensuring the dynamic development and inner stability of the society, is closely linked to the nature of the given public relations and to the basic principles and aims of the Constitution. Peculiarities of the formation of the institutions of constitutional oversight, problems facing them, forms of constitutional oversight, objects and subjects of such oversight, the nature of court resolutions and several other questions have been studied. Special attention has been paid to the problems of providing guarantees for the independence of the institutions of constitutional oversight. Special importance has been attached in this work to the analysis of the mechanisms of constitutional control of human rights protection in terms of the implanting of a reliable system of guarantees for the protection of human rights in the newly independent states. The study has led to certain general conclusions, to the revealing of the main tendencies in the further development of the systems of constitutional oversight and to the understanding of the main lessons of the past. All these can be summarized in the following: Special or specialized bodies of constitutional oversight become one of the exceptionally important institutions of state power, contributing to balance and stability of the State Power. The trend in already functioning systems is towards the improvement of the forms of organization; a clearer definition of powers; the improvement of principles, forms and methods of constitutional oversight; the enlarging of the list of subjects who can appeal to the court, the definition of the objects of control; and the raising of the role of preliminary control, etc. The system of constitutional oversight is incomplete and defective until the control of human rights protection has become its inseparable part. The comparative analysis of the internationally accumulated experience of constitutional oversight, apart from the above mentioned reasons, is also conditioned by the fact that the corresponding European systems of constitutional oversight, in particular, that were established in the post-war period, currently undergo active reforms. Hence, the study of new solutions and the creation of reliable guarantees to ensure the Constitutional order acquire greater importance. In this work the concept of constitutional oversight is interpreted and defined as a system.