Independent directors as a remedy for corporate agency problem

Saribekyan, Nare

dc.contributor.advisor	Baghdasaryan, Adelaida
dc.contributor.author	Saribekyan, Nare
dc.date.accessioned	2021-11-02T13:00:58Z
dc.date.available	2021-11-02T13:00:58Z
dc.date.created	2019
dc.date.issued	2019
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.aua.am/xmlui/handle/123456789/2047
dc.description	Thesis	en_US
dc.description.abstract	The core issue of this research paper is understanding the place of a board comprised of solely or majority independent directors in agency problem solution. The research reveals the essence of agency problem and agency costs, the role of monitoring board, the level of impact of social ties, structural bias and financial compensation on the independence of the outsiders, and the liability of independent directors.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en_US	en_US
dc.publisher	American University of Armenia	en_US
dc.subject	2019	en_US
dc.subject	AUA	en_US
dc.subject	American University of Armenia (AUA)	en_US
dc.subject	Independent directors	en_US
dc.subject	Corporate law	en_US
dc.subject	Inside directors	en_US
dc.subject	Companies	en_US
dc.subject	Structural bias	en_US
dc.subject	Management	en_US
dc.subject	Liability of directors	en_US
dc.title	Independent directors as a remedy for corporate agency problem	en_US
dc.type	Thesis	en_US