Compliance and Non-Compliance of International Norms

Abstract

While it may appear that states do the rational thing when they sometimes choose not to comply with international norms, we argue that it is rational to comply with them. We propose a contrarian theory of compliance for states, which grounds on the key argument that non-compliant states will be excluded from the regimes of cooperation. State would usually be motivated with a utility maximizing incentives to join such regimes because they offer benefits of collective action to their members. However, the compliance with the norms of any collective plan is a rather complicated issue. Some states might want to take the benefits from collective action but refuse to pay the costs for it. The non-compliant behavior is exhibited when it comes to sharing the burdens. The non-compliant states would seem to be maximizing their utility better than the compliant states because they receive the same benefits but pay nothing for it. Contrary to this hyper-rational account, compliant states would find it rational to resist the desire of individual utility maximization by means of adopting a cooperative policy and following through it as long as the mechanism exclusion non-compliant states works.