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NATO AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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(Text provided by the author)

When a NATO official is given the opportunity to speak, he usually spends his time praising the virtues of his organisation -- why NATO is important, and why the many things NATO is doing are so crucial. It is tempting to talk about NATO -- and only NATO. After all, NATO has contributed significantly to enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and has more to offer.

I will of course talk about NATO, but I would like to first look at things in a broader context based on three questions:


First, what will be the major challenges that determine our security in this new 21st Century -- and by "our" I mean all the countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, including, of course, your own.

Second, what kind of security approach do we need in order to cope with the challenges ahead?

And third, what must our security institutions, including NATO, do in order to manage security effectively?

Let me start with a general reflection on the way we should look at security today. The 21st century is still a new century with a lot of symbolism attached -- mostly optimistic notions of making a new start, of entering a new era. But some approach this new century with scepticism noting that there was also a widespread optimism at the beginning of the last Century -- optimism that proved unwarranted as we saw two World Wars, concentration camps, and mass expulsions, the worst man could inflict on his fellow man.

But I think we can be optimistic at the beginning of this century. History does not repeat itself, unless no one was listening the first time. And we have listened, and we have



learned. We have created instruments that our predecessors lacked. And we have changed our mindset as well. Today, we no longer regard security as a Darwinian struggle of nation against nation. We increasingly see security as a joint product that no state can achieve in isolation. And when you look at the integration process that is going on in the Western half of Europe, you can see how far some states have gone in taking cooperation seriously. For example, two years ago, eleven states within the European Union agreed to abolish their national currencies in favour of a common currency. In other words, these nations were willing to give up what in the past would have been regarded as indispensable symbols of their national sovereignty. They were willing to do this because they have learned from their own troubled history: cooperation and integration are the only way forward.

All this gives us reason to be optimistic. Yes, our continent is still struggling with the remnants of its past division. And, yes, young states are still struggling with many daunting challenges of political and economic transition. But

we all share a basic idea about where we are going. And that makes for a much better start than Europe had a century ago.
Security Challenges

With this fundamental point in mind, let us now look at the first question: What will be the security challenges of the 21st century? What are the dominant characteristics of our new security environment?

Clearly, our emerging security environment will be far more complex. Globalisation, for example, offers our societies the opportunity to become more creative and more prosperous -- but it also makes our societies more vulnerable. The rapid spread of technology and information offers entirely new ways of economic progress -- but it can also bring the spectre of more states developing weapons of mass destruction. Regional conflicts will confront us with a cruel choice: a choice between costly indifference and costly engagement. And the scarcity of natural resources will give projects such as oil pipelines or water dams major economic and political ramifications.

And that is not all. An economic downswing, or a regional conflict can turn migration into an entirely new challenge. And, especially since the Chernobyl disaster, we know that the effects of an environmental catastrophe will be felt far beyond the country in which it originates. In short, our security environment will be marked by growing complexity, and by a much stronger need for forward-looking, pro-active policies.

What kinds of tools do we need?

If our security environment is growing ever more complex, the next question that poses itself is clear: What kind of security approach should we adopt in order to cope with the challenges ahead? Simply put: What kind of tools do we need?

One thing is clear: The breadth and diversity of

these challenges can only be addressed properly once we adopt a broad concept of security, a concept that moves beyond military matters alone and includes political, economic, and social elements. Only such a broader approach enables us to move beyond just dealing with the symptoms.

In the centre of this broader approach must be the idea of humanity and human rights. A security policy that does not take as its point of reference the need of man and humanity will miss the mark. Indeed, most of the conflicts we see today are between or within states that disregard fundamental human needs. It is thus no accident that the last years have seen an increase in humanitarian actions, beyond the level of the individual nation-state.

Advocating a human security approach should not be mistaken for a crusade. As NATO's Kosovo campaign has shown, the moral imperative to stop an inhuman policy of ethnic cleansing can collide with the need to respect other states' sovereignty. We acknowledge that there is a dilemma. And we acknowledge that national sovereignty is a precious achievement. Not only for Armenia, but in all countries, including all NATO member states. That is why our decision to intervene in the Kosovo crisis was not taken lightly. In a way, it was the lesser of two evils. Because letting "ethnic cleansing" continue unabated would have undermined the very values on which the new Europe should be built. That is why we decided to take on the risk of a military campaign -- and why we decided to take on the burden of sustaining a long-term presence in the region afterwards.

Kosovo was, of course, an exceptional case, not a model for the future. Still, in whatever we do, wherever we can influence events, we should never lose sight of humanity as a guiding principle.

We can see this principle at work in the efforts of the

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His graduate studies in Political Science took place in various universities: New York University, Free University (Berlin), University of Freiburg, and Yale University.

From 1961-1964 he was a US Naval Officer on Johnston Island, San Diego, the Philippines, and Newport.

He started his diplomatic service in 1970 as an Executive Assistant to the Ambassador at the US Embassy in Buenos Aires. In 1972, he was Political Officer at the US Embassy in Bogota and in 1974, he served as an International Relations Officer at the Policy Planning Office, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State. In 1974, he was Adviser of Political and Security Affairs at the US Mission to the United Nations. He worked with the Multilateral Affairs Training Program at the School of

International Affairs, Columbia University from 1978 to 1979. From 1979 to 1983, he was a Political Officer of the US Delegation to UNESCO and from 1983 to 1986, Mr. Kriendler was the Political Officer and Acting Political Counsellor at the US Embassy in Caracas. From 1986 to 1990 he served as Deputy Counsellor, Political and Security Affairs, at the US Mission to the United Nations. Over the next three years, he worked as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, NATO.

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OSCE and the Council of Europe to establish common norms of behaviour between states. We can see it at work in their efforts to establish norms of behaviour in the way governments treat their citizens. We can also see this principle reflected in the international community's efforts to re-build Bosnia -- as a democratic, multi-ethnic state. We see it in our efforts to bring a newly democratic Yugoslavia back into the European mainstream. And we see it in the way the European Union and NATO both insist that future new members have impeccable democratic credentials. In short, in the 21st century security and humanity will be closely intertwined.

Economics is another key element of a broad security approach. The reason is clear: economic stability is a prerequisite for political stability and, hence, for security. Many conflicts are rooted in economic failures. Yugoslavia's collapse was not least due to the economic stagnation of the late 1980s. Moreover, the more our national economies become part of the "global economy", the more we

become vulnerable to what is going on elsewhere. The ups and downs of the international stock markets are a powerful reminder of this. In the era of globalisation, we all are each other's neighbour. Only a sound market economy is flexible enough to master the challenges of economic globalisation. A state that clings to a centralised command economy is committing economic suicide.

In a similar vein, a state that maintains oversized and ineffective armed forces will add an additional burden on its economy. That is why military reform has become an economic imperative in today's environment. Sound and cost-effective defence management is not just a value in its own right. It is also an essential part of a government's overall management of the economy.

But sound economies are more than a good security investment for our own nations. Economic measures can also be used as a political tool in managing our wider security environment. Whether we talk about applying economic sanctions in a crisis, or offering economic support for the reconstruction of the Balkans, the importance of economic instruments as a tool in managing security will increase.

Renewed emphasis on political and economic instruments does not diminish the relevance of military instruments. Even if many security challenges might be non-military in nature, others, such as regional conflicts, may require the use of force. Indeed, we have seen in Bosnia and Kosovo that the use of economic sanctions or moral condemnations availed to little without the credible backing by military power. In Kosovo, it took a sustained NATO air campaign until the government in Belgrade acceded to the demands of the international community -- until it finally stopped its policy of ethnic cleansing and allowed an international peacekeeping force into Kosovo. In short, effective military means remain a precondition for security in the 21st century.

But the way we use our military forces is changing considerably. As regional conflicts are replacing the large-scale scenarios of the Cold War, we need a different approach. We now have to contemplate peacekeeping operations -- operations that may involve dozens of countries, from all over Europe, and even from beyond Europe. To

enable our forces to act together smoothly, our military forces need to change. They need to become smaller, but more flexible, and more mobile. We must be able sustain them in a crisis region, possibly for years. This requires a common basis of shared doctrines, shared procedures -- even a shared language -- all across the militaries in the Euro-Atlantic area. In today's world, an army that is still structured to meet Cold War requirements is becoming useless -- a dinosaur unable to adapt to the world around it.

How to implement a broad approach?

We now have established the basic parameters of a comprehensive security approach: shared democratic values, economic consolidation, and military cooperation. And here now comes the "\$64,000 question": how can such a broad approach to security be put into practice?

Clearly, a true security architecture requires the cooperation of all major institutions. For it is only in a comprehensive framework that any crisis

can be addressed in a timely manner or, better still, prevented before it even erupts.

The key elements of such an architecture are already in place: the European Union, NATO, the OSCE, the United Nations, and not least a host of regional frameworks. Individually, each of these institutions and frameworks reflects a distinct approach to security. Together, they offer the chance to establish a new quality of security in the 21st century.

Key elements of NATO's agenda

In the remainder of my remarks, I would like to explain what specific roles NATO is playing in this concert of institutions. How does NATO fit into the broader picture of an evolving European security architecture? And how seriously does NATO take the idea of a broader approach to security -- an approach that goes beyond military means?

In answering these questions, I will let NATO's current agenda speak for itself.

Enlargement

Let us first take a look at NATO enlargement. Like the enlargement of the European Union, it erases old dividing lines, and it projects confidence to the new democracies to NATO's East. For those who want to join, and the impetus to join has come from them, it creates incentives to continue on their path of reform -- to undertake the necessary political, economic and military reforms. And for those who join, it helps consolidate their reforms -- it "locks in" reform. In short, NATO enlargement, like EU enlargement, is an important part of healing the wounds of Europe's former division.

The decision on who the new members will be is, of course, for NATO's member states, and NATO Heads of State and Government will be gathering in Prague next year to consider issuing further invitations for NATO membership. Between now and then, we are seeking to ensure that all the issues are debated fully, by all the interested parties. It means giving the nine applicant countries as much feedback as possible, through our Membership Action Plan. It means reminding those aspirants that they will have to make difficult decisions, and tough decisions, if they are to meet NATO's standards, in particular on defence reform.

In the centre of this broader approach must be the idea of humanity and human rights. A security policy that does not take as its point of reference the need of man and humanity will miss the mark.

Needless to say, the final decision on enlargement remains fundamentally political. But one thing should be clear: every democratic country must have the free right to choose its own security arrangements. Europe can never be fully stable and secure if countries are not in control over their own destiny, but have that destiny decided for them by others. For NATO, adhering to this principle means that when a European democracy is able and willing to make a real contribution to Euro-Atlantic security, then the Alliance has an obligation to consider its application for membership. In the 21st century, geography can no longer be destiny.

Cooperation

Let us now take a look at NATO's broader cooperation efforts. It is part and parcel of the logic of an "architecture" that everyone should be "in", and no one should be "out". Every state should be given an opportunity to participate in the management of Euro-Atlantic security -- whether it is in NATO or not, whether it is a member of the EU or not, whether it has a security tradition of neutrality or not -- everyone should be part of the team. In order to create such a "team", NATO developed two distinct frameworks: Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Within these frameworks, the 19 NATO members and almost 30 non-NATO countries, including Armenia, cooperate and consult on Euro-Atlantic security matters.

Partnership for Peace is essentially about military cooperation. NATO members and Partner countries work together on peacekeeping issues, and even on defence planning. But there is more to PfP than the preparation for future joint crisis response operations. In line with the broader security approach I described earlier, PfP also has democratic and economic dimensions. For example, we discuss how best to ensure the democratic control of armed forces. And we discuss how defence reform can be managed in ways to diminish the military burden on the economy.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is essentially about political consultation. In the EAPC, NATO members and Partners discuss Balkan security issues, regional cooperation in the Caucasus, or arms control among many other topics. Like Partnership for Peace, the agenda of the EAPC also includes non-military matters. For example, we discuss questions of economic reform. In the face of natural disasters such as floods, the EAPC acted as a means of coordinating individual national relief efforts. In short, through PfP and EAPC, NATO is helping to plant the seeds of a new security culture across the Euro-Atlantic area.

Russia

In addition to PfP and EAPC, we have also developed distinct relationships with two nations we believed require special attention -- Russia and Ukraine. Both are very different, yet they have, among others, one thing in common: they are of pivotal importance for Euro-Atlantic security.

In fact, when you talk about NATO enlargement, as I did a few minutes ago, you always end up talking about Russia. Because much of the debate about NATO enlargement is in important ways a debate about the future of Russia. And the NATO-Russia relationship, very obviously, is a work in progress that needs continued attention.

We are familiar with the ups and downs of the NATO-Russia relationship over the past decade, and Kosovo was the most obvious low point. Relations are, however, once again back on track. Russian forces are working very well with NATO forces in the Balkans. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council meets regularly, most recently on 8 June at the level of Ministers of Defense, and discusses cooperation on a wide range of the most serious security issues. These include: a review of the situation in the Balkans, defence reform, arms control, problems of proliferation, retraining discharged military personnel, combating international terrorism and ways and means to improve cooperation in the EAPC and PfP. And there is a general feeling on both sides that we can and should deepen our relations further.

One of the most important ways in which we can deepen our relations is through better communication. NATO needs to be more effective at conveying to Russians what the Alliance is, what it does and why -- because Russians need to understand more clearly that NATO is not, nor does it want to be, any threat to Russia's security. That is why the Secretary General went to Moscow earlier this year and opened the NATO information Office there. This office will provide accurate and timely information to anyone interested in NATO and NATO issues and help eliminate some of the myths and illusions that sometimes get in the way of practical cooperation -- including the myth that enlargement is about encircling Russia.

Ukraine

The NATO-Ukraine relationship follows a similar logic. We discuss matters of common concern, such as peacekeeping in the Balkans, or civil emergency planning. And in line with the notion that healthy economics are a good investment in security we are cooperating on defence reform. Indeed, we have created a Joint Working Group on Defence Reform, in order to address this critically important issue in a more systematic way.

Balkans

Because it is so much the topic of the day and because of its importance, let me say a little more about NATO's role in the Balkans. What we are doing is in part a military-technical and humanitarian job of creating the conditions for self-sustaining peace in Bosnia and Kosovo. But it is also much more than that. It is the successful containment of two regional conflicts that threatened to engulf a wider area; the breaking of the fateful logic of great powers always supporting their traditional client states in the Balkans -- for we managed to rally even Russia behind our common operations. By making a long-term commitment to the rebuilding of these regions, NATO -- together with the European Union -- creates the basis for bringing all of volatile South-eastern Europe, including a newly democratic Serbia, back into the European mainstream.

But let us be clear: for this progress to continue, we must remain steadfastly committed to the task. Neither in Bosnia-Herzegovina nor in Kosovo do we have a truly self-sustaining peace yet. That day will eventually come, but it won't be tomorrow. So we must sustain the positive momentum -- by staying the course, by keeping up the pressure on the parties to get back to normal, but also by reminding them that international support is neither infinite

Economic stability is a prerequisite for political stability and, hence, for security.

nor unconditional. And we must continue our efforts to support political progress in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well. With patience and persistence, we can help the Balkans turning the corner, we can help to defuse the proverbial "Balkan powder keg" for good.

That is why the Balkan region, despite continuing challenges, will eventually regain the peace and stability it lost: because NATO and non-NATO nations are there to make sure that this region will get back on its feet.

Indeed, in the efforts of all our major institutions in the Balkans today, we can see the beginning of true security architecture of the 21st century which I referred to in my introduction: Through KFOR, NATO and its Partner countries provide the secure environment for other organisations to do their job. The United Nations provides the civil administration. The OSCE supervises democratic elections. The European Union is a major economic donor in the region. And many non-governmental organisations work on the reconciliation of the former adversaries.

ESDI

The final item on NATO's agenda I wish to address today is the development of the European Security and Defence Identity. Much of the recent media coverage of ESDI has missed the point about why it is happening; and has missed the point on what is happening.

Why is Europe developing a stronger capability? The answer is simple: because Europe has to make a greater contribution to security. Within NATO, the United States still has to do the lion's share of the more high-tech operations because Europe can't pull its weight at that end. And even for the lower-level ground operations, Europe has great difficulties using the troops it has. For Kosovo, Europe had to scrape to provide 40,000 troops -- which represents 2% of the 2 million troops Europe has on paper. And if we can't use them, the rest might as well exist only on paper.

By improving Europe's capabilities, we can balance burdens more fairly within NATO, and overcome any complaints on the other side of the Atlantic about burden-sharing. At the same time, a stronger Europe will be able to handle the security crises in or around Europe that do not engage the strategic interests of the United States and NATO -- which means that we will have more options than just

"NATO or nothing".

The EU is preparing itself to take on a range of missions, called the Petersberg tasks, which comprise: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping; and crisis management operations, including peacemaking. The EU is not planning to assume responsibility for the collective defence of Europe -- that remains exclusively NATO's job. And of course, the Alliance will continue to retain the mandate and the capability to take on the full range of missions, from conflict prevention to crisis management.

For all these reasons, stronger European capabilities are no threat to relations with North America. We are not losing any options - we are simply gaining one more tool in the toolbox of crisis management.

Both the EU and North America have therefore agreed that, where NATO is not in the lead, but the EU does wish to be, NATO will support the EU with Alliance capabilities. This arrangement will ensure that the EU has the capacities it needs -- but that NATO and the US don't always have to be in the lead. It is a more flexible and efficient way of using, and improving on, Euro-Atlantic capacities for crisis management.

We have already broken ground on this project. NATO and the EU are now working out how to share information, how to share equipment, and how to cooperate in peacetime and times of crisis. Which means that we are on the way to putting in place the kind of NATO-EU relations we will need to manage crises in the 21st Century. But the road is long, and we have to ensure that NATO-EU relations are based on transparency and cooperation, and that all Allies are included in the process. If we do -- and I am confident it will happen -- it will benefit all concerned: NATO, the EU, and wider Euro-Atlantic security.

Conclusion

Ladies and Gentlemen,

My conclusion is clear: a broad concept of security, implemented within a cooperative security architecture, remains our best bet in organising security in the 21st century. All nations and all institutions have to work towards this common goal. And they do: because there is no alternative to cooperation.

Questions and Answers

-How can you support NATO's goals in the areas of human rights and humanity when your ally Turkey, repeatedly violates the very principles you allege guide NATO's actions.

- I think that it is absolutely clear that NATO has made extraordinary contributions, not just to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, but to the furthering of human rights as well. The North Atlantic Treaty, the Treaty signed in Washington in 1947 which is the basis of NATO's operations, makes very clear that our ally nations have gathered together to defend the democratic systems which they all have, as well as the democratic values of human rights, the rule of law and democracy. I was struck, I suppose most forcefully, with the way NATO has been doing this in 1990, when in September I made a visit with the Secretary General to Prague. The first visit ever by a NATO Secretary General to Czechoslovakia. The President made a toast to him at lunch. He toasted the organization that along the long

years of the Cold War had protected freedom, democracy, and human rights. NATO is an alliance of 19 democratic nations. That does not mean that all of them have the same system. They have different democratic systems, but they are supportive of the values that I have just mentioned and that is very much the emphasis, the driving force for much that NATO has done since it was formed in 1947.

-One of the key members of NATO - Turkey - is the main destabilizer in the Balkans; has tensions with Greece, gives military support to Bosnia, tortures and represses dissenters at home, is led by an anti-democratic, corrupt, and virulently ethnocentric military dictatorship, annexes northern Cyprus, actively collaborates with Albanian and Chechen terrorists, and commits Genocide in Armenia and Kurdistan. How can European Union membership of Turkey, which is backed by NATO, impact on Turkey's activity?

-Let me be very frank and honest with you. I think I have already said to you that I work for all 19 allies. I work for the United States government, I work for France, I work for Greece, I work for Italy and I work for Turkey. I categorically reject the statement that you have just made that Turkey is a major force for destabilization in the area. I don't think that's an accurate statement, I don't think it's correct, and I don't accept it.

-The Incirlik base is used by Turkey to continue its genocidal policies against the Kurds. All the other NATO allies use the same base to protect the Kurds against Iraq. How do you explain this conflicting use of the base?

-I'd like to turn to some other issues that are more directed to the kinds of things that I have addressed in my concern. There seems to be a very central focus to your questions, and I can understand that. But they are not the questions, which I believe would be useful to spend more time answering.

-A guarantee of worldwide security and stability is the Missile Treaty of 1972 between the USSR and the US. How does NATO approach the US tendency to abandon the Treaty and establish a national system?

-Thank you. That's a question I am very happy to address. It is going that way- it was addressed by NATO Heads of State and Government on the 13th of June, by NATO and Ministers of Defense on the 8th of June. What we are in the process of doing- is looking very carefully at the views that the United States is presenting on this issue. The briefing in NATO had been at the Heads of State and Government level, the level of Ministers of Defense, to give a clear indication of the trends that they perceive and some of the ways that would be useful to consider when dealing with those trends. I think it is fair to say, first of all, that we are still in the process of considering these issues. We haven't reached the stage at NATO of taking decisions and the Secretary General made this very explicit himself in his statement following the Summit meeting. I think it is also fair to say that there is widespread appreciation on the part of allies of the fact that these very detailed briefings and consultations are being held. There are assurances that the views of the other allies will be taken into account. So, it is difficult to give you a definitive answer at this stage, but this is clearly a set of very important issues, which are under very active consideration now.

-Would you care to comment on President Putin's negative attitude towards NATO's enlargement?

-I think that there is an old issue that needs to be taken into account. It is the right of every sovereign nation to determine what kinds of security relationships it has. For instance, in the case of your country, you have the security relationship with Russia. That's your business. This is very much something that you can do within the sovereign rights that you have. It is not correct for anyone else to criticize that, or tell you that you cannot do it. The same thing is true for membership in NATO. I think I have made this point already in my presentation. If there are countries within the Euro-Atlantic area, who wish to become members of NATO, who have the capacity to contribute to the values of the organization, who are democratic states, who do not have problems with their neighboring states, then they will be given a serious consideration. They will be given consideration by 19 sovereign nations, by the 19 allies that I keep talking

about. Clearly, it is of interest to us to know the views of Russia on these issues. I have already said that Russia is an extraordinarily important member of the Euro-Atlantic community whose cooperation, whose progressive involvement, is very much to be desired and encouraged. But in the final analysis, the decision on who to invite to membership is the one that NATO allies will take.

-Do you see any connection between the resolution of the Kosovo conflict and the future resolution of the conflict in Karabagh?

-The connection that I see is that I believe there are two things that are in common, that in my opinion are applicable to both. One is the clear wish of the entire international community that both of these issues be resolved as quickly as possible and on a permanent basis. It seems to me that this is something that they have very much in common. But there is the second thing that they have in common as well. It seems to me that the resolutions of these issues or problems are very much to the advantage of all the countries in both of the regions that you have discussed. From the humanitarian standpoint and also from the standpoint of security issues and economic development issues. So it seems to me that this is something that they have very much in common.

-If Artsakh persists with its desire for self-determination, as a means to protect its citizens from Genocide, will NATO use its bases in Turkey to bomb Stepanakert into submission?

-I was taught as a young diplomat, (that was quite a long time ago, by the way), never to answer hypothetical questions. It seems to me that hypothetical questions of this nature, which are so far removed from any reality that I know or can imagine, are not worth an answer.

-Caucasia is in a kind of divided situation now. Armenia is in the Russian power block. Georgia is self-directed, including its military blocks. Azerbaijan is in a very complex situation. What would you say is your evaluation of this, and what will be the future of the Caucasus after three years -and after ten years?

-I am always happy to be asked questions about the future, because I can quote a famous American baseball catcher, who plays for one of the big teams. He said that the future is just like the past, only longer. Obviously it is very difficult to predict anything for you but I will comment on the question, it's a good one. First of all, I think that you are using the wrong term when you talk about "blocks", if you apply it certainly to NATO. NATO is not a block. It's an alliance of 19 sovereign nations and 47, if you include the partners and Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. It's not a block in any sense of the term, at least as I understand. In addition, let's just talk about NATO relations with the three countries in the Caucasus. In each case, our desire is the same: to have the most cooperative and productive relations with you as we can, to do things that encourage regional cooperation and confidence which is to the benefit of the individual countries and also to the region as a whole. So it seems to me that it is more important to look at the things that are common than the things that are different in these relationships.

-Do you consider the fact that NATO's enlargement towards GUUAM (Georgia-Uzbekistan-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) has weakened (especially) Ukraine and Moldova?

- I don't think I can really answer the question, because, in fact, there is no information available to make it possible to answer. We are not at that stage yet, and we won't be for some time, till decisions will be taken, or even very actively discussed about what will happen in Prague in November of the next year. Because that's where the decisions will be taken to invite new members into the Alliance. By the way, there was an important development related to this at the Summit meeting of June 13, which is worth mentioning. What the Alliance had agreed to previously, was that they would address the issue of enlargement at their Summit in 2002. They said something different, something that went beyond that as a result of the summit in Brussels a few days ago. They said that they expected and hoped that the enlargement process would continue at that stage. This is, in essence, an acceleration of the process, if you will. At least this is my interpretation of it. So I can't really answer the question very well at this stage. I don't think that anyone can make a good guess for you about which of the nine aspirant countries are likely to be invited to join the Alliance.

-What is your opinion about the prospects of multi-dimensional security cooperation inside the Caucasus region?

-There is already a certain amount of regional cooperation in practical areas that is going on. I know that there is an interest in a variety of countries in the Caucasus region to increase this. This is certainly something, that from NATO's prospective, seems very useful to us. So, therefore I think that there are some good prospects for increasing such cooperation. Remember that the areas that we have talked about were civil democracy, planning, information activities, economic, security, environmental and science activities.

-Do you think that the creation of European Joint Forces is something to counter-balance US power?

- I feel badly because I cheated you a little bit. I was in fact going to talk about NATO support for the European Union and the kinds of things that we are doing. But I didn't get through until this really good opportunity to address it. Based on decisions taken by ally NATO Heads of State and Government and also European Union Heads of State and Government, we are now in the process of developing the procedures, the consultation arrangements, and the modalities. NATO can support European Union-lead operations using NATO capabilities. This would be in the case when NATO itself chooses not to be engaged. There are a wide variety of possible activities that the European Union could undertake: from search and rescue to peace keeping, where they could use such capabilities. One of the things that we learnt from Kosovo and also in other wars as well is that there is a need to enhance military capabilities of the European members of the Alliance and of the members of the European Union. There are a variety of initiatives on the way to do that, the initiatives on the side of the European Union and the initiatives on the side of NATO. One of them is called Defense Capability Initiative. It is designed to assure that in some future operation, (to make it absolutely clear, the hope is that there won't be any future operation) European forces would be able to take on a greater and a more proportioned share of the burden as in Kosovo. Because they did not have the capabilities on a lot of the high-tech kinds of things, these had to be done by the United States. So there is very clear support by NATO for the enhancement of the

European Union's capabilities and also to develop a relationship so that we are not involved. If they ask us for help, we'll have everything in place so that we can provide that help for them. That means assured access to NATO assets and capabilities. It means access --including operational planning capabilities. It means having in place the security agreement so that we can give them secure and right information. It means adopting our defense planning system, so that it can take into account the possible needs of the European Union forces. All of these things are very complicated, they are very complex. They are under discussion at NATO Headquarters. We made substantial progress but there is a lot more that still needs to be done.

-You stated that one of the principles of NATO is to create open and transparent relations with its partners. In this regards what would NATO's decision be if Russia, one of the key partners of NATO, were to continue rejecting the process of enlargement?

-As I said, the viewpoint that Russia takes concerning enlargement or any other security issue falls within its sovereign preview. It can take any decision it wants to. We are dedicated to building the most cooperative relationship that we can with the Russian Federation. But that does not mean that (and now I begin to answer your question) we are going to agree or expect to agree on every issue. In fact, many allies don't agree on every issue. There will be differences. Sometimes there will be differences that are important for one party or for the other, or for both. But we have in place the institutions, the Permanent Joint Council for example, where we can resolve these differences if we wish to. So obviously it is better to agree on everything, but it seems very unrealistic in the complex world in which we live today.

-What can NATO's cooperation be, in the field of disaster management, with post conflict rehabilitation? What kind of partners would NATO look for? Who and what department can be contacted for cooperation proposals?

-NATO is able to respond to three categories of crisis: collective defense - an attack on an airline. But nobody sees that as likely in the present or perceivable future. Secondly, crisis response operations, such as those in the Balkans. Third, and I will answer your question, certain emergency disasters -- natural, technological, and humanitarian disasters. We have in fact, because of 19 powerful and wealthy countries, a substantial capacity to do things when there are such problems. We have established a section that deals explicitly with this, the Civil Emergency Planning Directorate, and in addition, an institution in which the partners participate, called the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Center. This allows us to have coordinated assistance, always supporting the UN, which has the primary responsibility when there is a natural, technological, or humanitarian disaster in a partner country. I mean the EAPC or PfP or any ally country, and whether there is a request for such assistance. There is, in fact, a very elaborate, well-practiced machinery to deal with these kinds of disasters. The role of post-conflict rehabilitation is a lesser one for NATO than for the European Union. You see that in the Balkans and you see that in Kosovo. NATO is not an economic assistance organization. Its primary expertise is not economic. There are certain kinds of things that NATO can do in post-conflict rehabilitation. You see this in terms of the security that we are

seeking to assure in Bosnia, in Kosovo. So that the other international organizations, which are dealing with the other facets of the process, have the kind of environment that they need to operate in.

-Turkey has invested a large amount of money in the sphere of the military of Georgia. Do you consider that Turkey assists the interests of NATO in Georgia?

-How can Turkey not assist the interests of NATO? It's an integral part of NATO. But I should tell you that I am not an expert in the Caucasus. I do not have any detailed information about what is happening in Georgia. So I can't really comment in an intelligent way on the basis of your question.

-What can you say about the stereotypes of the relations between NATO countries and the countries of Former Soviet Union? How did they change?

-They changed in the most radical, drastic, and dramatic way that I can possibly imagine. I am an ex-US diplomat. I used to deal with the Soviet Union at the United Nations. They were the enemy, and they were what we were worried about. They were the one we spent most of our time dealing with, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Alliance

. All of that came to an end. I remember in the early days of the process of the cooperation that we were talking about, we used to refer to former "adversaries". We did so for a year or two, and then we realized that that term was outdated as well. "Enemies" was outdated and "adversaries" was also outdated. Now we are ready to talk about partners in the process of trying to enhance our common security and stability. I noticed that one of the things that President Bush said in his press conference on Saturday, following his meeting with President Putin, was that we don't regard the Russian Federation as the enemy or as a threat. That's certainly the attitude, which characterizes NATO's approach. There are no enemies out there anymore. There were certainly some during the Cold War. There are in fact no threats out there anymore. There were certainly some during the Cold War. NATO does not consider itself to be preparing to deal with the threat posed by any single nation. In fact we have adopted our structure, our terminology, and our exercises to reflect this. The stereotypes simply don't apply anymore.

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