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American-Turkish Relations In Transition From Cold War Era To Present

Day

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ABSTRACT

This Master’s Essay examines the American-Turkish relations from the Cold War period up to the invasion into Iraq in 2003 and the bilateral relations after 2003 up to present day. Many geopolitical events in the region of the Middle East and in both countries have been shaping the relations in the recent years. The paper has the aim to examine changes in relations between the United States and Turkey and all the possible factors at domestic and international levels responsible for them. Democratic and Republican administrations have been changing each other in Washington and a party with a new vision of Turkey’s future and present has been in power in Ankara for the recent years. The main objective of the paper is to show that clashes of interests between the two countries caused by the geopolitical situation the region of Middle East and by different needs and agendas of the United States and Turkey may lead to cooling of the tight relationship between a major power and a regional power.
INTRODUCTION

The American-Turkish relations have for years been a vivid example of staunch alliance and strategic partnership. The years of the Cold War period were the period the American-Turkish relations were the tightest throughout history. The following years of the 1990s were quite productive for the cooperation despite difficulties (e.g. the Cyprus conflict and the temporary deterioration of the relations). The period from the Cold War up to 2003 was a period between the two countries when the mutually beneficial cooperation reached its peak. A new chapter of relations opened in 2003 with the United States invasion into Iraq. The relations from that event on up until present day is observed, discussed and compared with the preceding period. With the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s “No” vote to opening a military front from the Turkish territory for the success of the American operation in Iraq, a change in relations is observed at military, diplomatic and political levels. The reasons that led to such step of Turkey and all the consequences Turkey and the United States came across to are discussed in detail. The American-Turkish relations started to cool down in 2003 with the Iraqi operation. But besides this operation and Turkish refusal to assist American military initiatives there are also other possible reasons responsible for the deterioration of relations. Those reasons are examined and discussed in the third chapter by observing political, economic and military developments in Turkey and the United States as well as the region as a whole. The American and Turkish diplomats, new administrations and new parties in power, current American and Turkish national needs are all causing change in relations, and it is not always for the better. The forth chapter examines and analyzes the United States role in Turkey-European Union and Turkey-Israel relations. It is hard to speak about the American-Turkish relations without mentioning another key strategic partner of the United States, Israel. And it is hard to overestimate the American
input in Turkey-European Union relationship. Finally, the fifth chapter, concludes the recent developments in the Turkish-American relations, analyzes comparatively the relations before and after deterioration, all the reasons that caused it, and discusses the future perspective of these bilateral relations. The reference list, consisting of the American, Turkish, European and Israeli authors, scientific articles and academic materials is given in the end. The work is summarized and the answers to research questions and support for the hypothesis are provided in the conclusion. The methodology and the literature review are presented before the chapters.

This Master’s Essay has special importance as the relations of a world major power like the United States with a key player in a troublesome and important region like the Middle East influence the world politics in general. The relationship has relevance for the world political, military and energy domains, and has definite implications for all the members of the world political community at top level and for the players of the Middle East region in particular. Although it does not constitute a part of this Master’s Essay, the Turkish-American relations and the Turkish new foreign policy has relevance for the Republic of Armenia. A country like Armenia, blockaded by two of its four neighbors, sharing historic aggression and troubled relations with its more powerful neighbor Turkey, needs to understand and evaluate the new Turkish approach towards other members of the region. The new foreign policy of Turkey may have implications for the members of South Caucasus region and for Armenia in particular. For its own need and vital interest, Armenia should also play special attention to the American-Turkish relations, current developments and trends, as it is quite often when the issue of the “Armenian genocide” is touched between the two countries.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The topic of the American-Turkish relations from Cold War period to present day is of great interest for many contemporary analysts and political scientists. The bilateral relations are observed in the context of the Iraqi war and the change in relations is widely discussed. The American-Turkish relations were characterized by all the researchers as strategic and, with a strong alliance of partners with common interest in military organizations like NATO, common enemies like USSR and common policy in the Middle East. However after 2003, after United States invasion into Iraq the situation is changed. The relations have changed, cooled down, sharpened at times.

Turkey’s failure to support the United States in its war against Saddam Hussein put this strategic alliance into doubt. Turkey has its own needs and national issues to be solved after the collapse of the Soviet Union and her actions are dictated from these very needs, as well as from the geopolitical situation in the region. On the other hand, the same issue is observed from the American corner. The United States had its own military and monetary policies in domestic and foreign policy, which radically differed from those during the Cold War era. The United States shifted from soft power to overwhelming hard power that eliminates any country considered a threat. And this policy, especially in place during George W. Bush presidency, dictated its own rules of games in all regions, including the Middle East and relations with Turkey. A rich conceptual and theoretical framework was provided behind the arguments of this author. (Vassilis K. Fouskas, 2003)

As a reaction to this new interventionist policy of the United States, anti-American moods in Turkey arose. Turkey, still an ally of United States, deals with anti-Americanism within its society, as the latter regards the American policies towards the Kurds in Iraq to be
against Turkish interests which are supposed to be protected by its strategic partner. Though the geopolitical situation is regarded by the author from the Turkish point of view, detailed knowledge of American and Turkish diplomacy provided in the article sheds light on many historical events. (Omer Goksel, 2005) As to anti-Americanism arising in Turkey, this problem is raised by another author as well (Soner Cagaptay, 2004) when he provides the results of public polls on the matter of attitude towards the United States of America. The Turkish attitude towards the United States is viewed as having worsened sharply at both public and governmental levels. The United States is regarded as a strategic partner who doesn’t take into account its ally’s crucial interests.

Now one thing is clear, the Iraqi war has changed the relations. But the question is how much? Are the two countries still important for each other? Tensions between the two countries were regarded as the consequences of poor diplomacy and mistakes made by both sides. For the mutual well-being the alliance could be reinforced as both countries will profit from the strong partnership. The relations are very much tied to tendencies and developments in Middle East, particularly to the status of Irkuk in Iraq. Turkey would continue to be a key country for United States taking into consideration its size, location, historical liaisons and secular system of governance. Both countries have common interest with NATO and the European Union. However the relationship perhaps wouldn’t be the same as in the 1990s. The Turkish membership in NATO and possible membership in the European Union is obviously one domain where the two countries can share common interests. Energy resources are another area where interests coincide, specifically the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan gas pipeline. (P. Gillis, 2004) The United States-led foreign policy needs Turkish presence in many regions: the Middle East, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Caucasus, the Balkans, and as well as in the anti-Russian
communication and in increasing influence in post-Soviet Middle Asian Muslim countries.(D. Macwillie, 2002)

Some analysts see alternatives to the close partnership in regard to both countries. Turkey has the option to play with the so-called “two Wests”: Europe and the United States. Since Ataturk period Turkey’s main political agenda has been engagement with the West, both the United States and Europe. But Cagaptay offers now a game of alternative options: either to come close with the United States or with the European Union, each time showing preference to one of the political entities, depending on the needs of Turkey. The United States has a vital interest in South Caucasus and Middle East, such that with or without Turkey’s help, it should stay engaged in the region. These regions cannot be ceded to other countries. Turkey this far has been an excellent partner, but any partner is replaceable, while interests are not. An interesting argument was provided when mentioning Israel as a key country for the bilateral relations.(Çevik Bir and Martin Sherman, 2002)

Israeli-Turkish relations can be beneficial for both countries in regard to many spheres of cooperation and to third countries of the region. Israel and Turkey, non-Arab countries both with strong state apparatus are key players in the region and both have very close relations with the United States. However, the authors were not able to envision the possible clash of interests between the two countries and even the sharpening of bilateral relations after the Turkish-American relations deteriorated.

As to Israel, another analyst (H. Brackman, 2011) related the tensions within the American-Turkish relations to the Turkish attitude towards Israel. With the new Islamist government in power Muslim Turkey cannot accept the United States helping Israel, the enemy of the Muslim world. Moreover, the deterioration of the American-Turkish relations is not a
consequence of the Iraqi war, but it is rather conditioned by Tayyip Erdogan’s government coming to power and changing Turkey from Ataturk’s Western nation to an enemy of Israel and its allies. The methods used in all the articles are observation, examination and analysis of historical events in the two countries, history of their diplomatic, military and economic relations, developments and processes in the region. Examination and analysis of secondary data, provided through public polls and nation-wide survey on the matter of Turkish attitude towards the United States is another part of the used methodology. Some articles can be regarded as subjective and neglecting either the United States own national interests (Gillis, 2004), assuming total support to all Turkish initiatives, or Turkish national interests, (Macwillie, 2002) assuming Turkey acting in a fully American way, disregarding its relations with the Arab states. However all in all, mostly objective reasons beyond deterioration of bilateral relations between the two countries and objective assumptions in the envisioning of the future of the relations are discussed and analyzed by the researchers.

**METHODOLOGY**

This study is based on the analysis of secondary data, e.g. scholarly literature, research, journal articles, survey results as well as Internet and media sources.

**HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

For the purpose of this study the following research questions were formulated:

**Research Question 1**

Is the invasion to Iraq the main reason for change in relationship between Turkey and the United States?
**Research Question 2**

Is the new government of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan going to stay the American strategic partner or it has intention to join the anti-American alliance?

**Research Question 3**

Are Anti-American moods in Turkey leading to loss of the American influence and prestige in the Muslim world?

**Hypothesis**

The American-Turkish relations will continue to cool down if the clashes of interests between the two countries increase.
Chapter I. The era of staunch alliance

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed greatly the geopolitical situation in the whole world. From a bipolar arena of Cold War the world shifted into a stage where mostly American national interests were preserved. The United States enlarged its influence in the East, when NATO changed from a defensive pact into a military force spreading American dominance on many former pro-Soviet countries. The United States shifted its foreign policy also in the Middle East and Europe, from power deterred previously by another power (USSR) into a dominant power, having no equal rival in the world. The American-Turkish relations, however, before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, were quite close. During the Cold War Turkey was a country bordering the Soviet Union with an American military presence, an ally of the Western team against the “Soviet empire”. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Turkey continued supporting the United States in asserting its dominant power in many regions including the Middle East, where Turkey played a key role. (Fouskass, 2003)

After World War II the American military and economic help to Turkey supported the latter greatly in its withstanding against the Soviet Union. The Truman doctrine was very useful for Turkey’s economy that needed American help. In its own turn, Turkey proved to be a very useful partner for the United States in the Cold War. The cooperation reached its peak when the Turks participated in the Korean war side by side with Americans. The Turkish brigade, called “North Star” by the commander of the United States Army Gen. D. MacArthur, numbered 25,000 soldiers, 10 % of whom fell in the battlefield. The climax of their common strategic partnership was Turkey’s entering into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952 which enabled the United States to locate air bases, armed forces and solid military equipment and
facilities on Turkey’s territory, serving in those times as a safeguard against Soviet enlargement to South. (Turkmen, 2009)

The United States also treated Turkey as a model democracy for other Muslim countries. The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) was signed in 1980s and allowed Turkey to become the third largest aid recipient from the United States after Israel and South Korea. In 1999 Turkey captured Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, who had been causing trouble to Turkey with the Kurdish issue for years. It was not without the American diplomatic pressure that Ocalan was refused political asylum in many countries. The Turkish President in those days Suleyman Demirel personally acknowledged in the mass media that the United States made a big contribution in bringing Abdullah Ocalan behind bars. The White House was protecting Iraqi Kurds from Saddam Hussein, accusing him of discrimination against the ethnic Kurds, meanwhile keeping silence about Turkey’s regular attacks on Northern Iraq in search of the PKK leaders. The American-Turkish relations have been described as a close strategic partnership starting from the Cold War period. Even the American temporary arms embargo of Turkey (due to Turkish aggression in Cyprus) didn’t spoil the relationship. They were suspended but later strengthened as soon as the embargo was lifted. With the end of Turkish-Iranian intelligence cooperation (due to Iranian Shah exile and the Islamic Revolution in 1970s) a new period of the American-Turkish intelligence cooperation and close alliance was launched. (M. Gunter, 2005)

The political vacuum which emerged in the Caucasus and Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union could be filled by Turkey in the eyes of Washington. An era of “Enhanced Partnership” between the two countries started. It meant building trustful relations in various domains based on mutually beneficial interests. Ankara gave its full military and diplomatic
support to the Operation Desert Fox, it accepted all UN resolutions against Iraq in 1990s and acted against Saddam Hussein’s regime and its invasion into Kuwait, thus acting as a “Western bloc” partner. During the 1990s Turkey’s policy was quite predictable. It was in good relationship with Israel, it stayed away from Iran and was enthusiastically supporting the American policies in the Middle East. Turkey has been asserting a pro-Western (anti-Soviet), non-Muslim influence, normalizing relations between the Muslim world and Israel, supporting more Israel than Palestine in the Israeli-Palestinian resolution of the conflict. It was also serving as an alternative to Russian and Iranian energy resources, counterweighing fundamentalist Iran, showing a good example of Muslim nation but with a secular and stable country. The Gulf War had its important contribution in making the ties between Turkey and the United States specifically close. Ignoring the opinion of his advisers Turkish president Turgut Ozal allowed the American military forces to use Turkish bases to attack Iraq. Such involvement into the Middle East affairs backing the American policies brought Turkey into the United States inner security circle. (M. Macwillie, 2002)

Turkey participated in many peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia showing readiness to share the responsibility in the American initiatives and in long-term reforming of its armed forces preferring American weapons. Besides being a NATO ally, Turkey was an exemplary exception of a Muslim country holding good relations with Israel, traditionally considered hostile to the Muslim world. That was obviously beneficial to the United States that wanted to see cooperation between its key strategic partners. (Brackmann, 2011)

As the American-Turkish cooperation in the military sphere increased, the number of the United States soldiers in Turkey reached 30,000 by late 1950s. Despite some tensions in relations between the two countries, e.g. the Turkish invasion into Cyprus, and the following American
embargo on Turkish weapons, the alliance still was firm and mutually supportive through out the 1990s and even the 2000s. The United States was backing Turkey in its efforts to enter the European Union, favoring Turkish candidacy at all diplomatic levels. Turkey, in its own turn was supporting the American initiatives in the Middle East against international terrorism, especially after the attack on September 11. Within a month Turkey’s Grand National Assembly voted for sending troops into Afghanistan fighting against terrorism side by side with the Americans. For Turkey it was a nice opportunity to start anti-terror initiatives and develop a reactionary policy against terrorism from which it has suffered during PKK activity. Thus the period from Cold War up until 2000 can be briefly described as a period of tight cooperation and common policy, with a mutually beneficial strategic partnership for both the United States and Turkey. At military, operational and political levels the partnership was quite fruitful. From 2003 a change in relationship is observed and will be discussed in the following chapters. (Gillis, 2004)
Chapter II  Patterns of Change

On January 29, 2002, the United States President G.W. Bush made a speech during which he called Iran, Iraq and North Korea the “axis of evil”. After the September 11 attack, the United States was determined to fight terrorism even alone. The United States Congress declared war on Iraq having large public support. Thus the decision to start the war was taken without UN Security Council resolution. Before the operation started the United States had officially requested Turkey to open the northern front. The United States military personnel in Turkey, the United States diplomats and politicians, NATO European allies and the whole world were waiting for Turkey’s answer. The American air bases and all the military equipment was ready to be used as soon as the front was opened. At last, on March 2003, the answer came from Turkey’s Grand National Assembly that refused to permit the United States military on Turkey’s territory to assist in the American invasion into Iraq. That decision greatly displeased United States military circles regarding Turkey as a loyal ally. Turkey later allowed the United States military to use its air corridors for American flights to Iraq, but that was permission given by other NATO allies as well, which also gave consent to usage of their air corridors. Turkey was given a grant in the amount of one billion dollars with her name listed among coalition countries but obviously Turkey didn’t act as expected. American military circles were deeply displeased with the National assembly’s decision, regarding it as letting the United States down on a very important issue. Interestingly enough the one billion dollar grant to Turkey was given on condition that the latter would support all coalition action and not act alone during and after the operation. American Secretary of State Powell didn’t want Turkey’s army to invade deeply in Iraq leading its own operations. The Americans agreed to the Turkish military prevent Kurdish secession but put some limits on Turkish operations not giving too much space for action to the
Turkish Army. The United States President Bush later accused Turkey for the Iraqi operation’s failure. The final opinion about Turkey’s decision to refuse the opening of the northern front was clear and the United States, at both public and government level, was displeased. Their strategic partner for so many years didn’t show support at the needed time. (Goksel, 2005)

The American government was sure that the deal made with Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s government would be implemented, meanwhile the latter was soon replaced in elections by Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s moderate Islamic AKP party (Justice and Development Party). The AKP’s coming to power coincided with the rise of anti-American moods in Turkey. The population’s fears to see activism from the Kurdish side with the beginning of the Operation Freedom resulted in polls showing public reluctance to support the American initiatives in Iraq. Almost 90 percent of Turkish citizens were against their country’s participation in the operation. The Turkish military always active in decision-making processes, reacted neutrally to the American call for Turkish participation in the Iraqi operation. A possible reason for the passive attitude of the military circles might have been their desire to see a failure of the new Islamist party in dealing with the Americans.(Gunter, 2005)

Another matter of concern for Turkey during the United States invasion in Iraq was the control over oil-rich Irkuk and Mosul areas. Turkey was afraid that Kurdish control over the territories would provide finances for the emergence of Kurdish autonomy. The Kurds were afraid that Turkish control would result in a Turkish economic boom and prevent creation of any kind of autonomy. In fact both scenarios were not desirable for the United States which preferred a compromise of Turkish and Kurdish interests leaving each of the parts dependent on American military and political might. The Turks under the excuse of terroristic PKK persecution regularly
crossed the Turkish-Iraqi borders. The Kurds enjoyed a status in Iraq they could not aspire for during Saddam’s regime. (Hughes, 2003)

Turkey’s “No” vote had clear consequences. At diplomatic level, the American administrations’ task to persuade UN Security Council members to legalize the resolution favoring invasion into Iraq, became much harder. At popular level, the American media’s aggression and anger against Turkey’s decision, its accusation that Turkey was responsible for the Iraqi operation’s failure was perceived by the Turkish public as arrogance and disrespect towards Turkey’s national interests. (Parri, 2003)

The most ironic consequence of the decision was that eventually Iraqi Kurds became American allies and occupied oil-rich Kirkuk and Mosul regions. These actions would not have been possible had Turkey fully participated in the operation and had it been the guard on the northern front. Future developments worsened the relations even more. On July 4, 2003 the United States arrested 11 Turkish military servicemen in Iraq’s territory. Turkish military circles were insulted, Turkish public opinion became even more anti-American. The relations had not been that cool and tense for decades. (Gillis, 2004)

Americans arrested this Turkish special operation group on the grounds of an attempt to kill newly elected officials in a large city of northern Iraq, Sulahmaniyah. But whatever be the explanation, in Turkey’s eyes the disarmed and dishonored Turkish servicemen were considered an outrageous insult, showing American preference of Kurdish minority activity over its strategic partnership in NATO. Americans refused to apologize officially for the Sulahminayah incident despite Turkish firm demands. The Turkish population was so ferocious about the arrest of their military that leftists, rightists, Islamists and ordinary citizens joined univocally in burning American flag in front of the American Embassy in Ankara. (Cagaptay, 2004)

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To examine the situation in Iraq, the viewpoints of both countries on this issue should be regarded. Both, the United States and Turkey stand for territorial integrity of Iraq. Turkey was a part of the policy preventing the emergence of Kurdish state, or even an autonomous and semi-independent entity on Iraq’s territory and preventing future engagement and activity of the PKK on Iraq’s territory. Turkey is also for restarting of large trade with Iraq, a very good export market for Turkey. Turkey wants to see the Kurds in Iraq reintegrated within their country and rid of nationalistic aspirations. The United States wanted to weaken Iraq by separating and segmenting it from within, whereas Turkey supported a strong, united neighboring country, whose Kurdish minority would not create problems on Turkish territory or in the future cooperate with the Turkish Kurdish minority in its aims for nationalistic aspirations. Turkey was also very much concerned with PKK activity in Northern Iraq, as the famous Kurdish party has caused Turkey many problems with its aggressive defense of Kurdish interests and its final goals of creating a Kurdish state what would ignore the territorial integrity of Turkey, Iraq and Syria, countries with Kurdish populations. (Macwillie, 2002)

As the Turkish Ministry of Foreign affairs mentions, Turkey has two concerns regarding Iraq: the issue of Iraqi territorial integrity which is of strategic importance for Turkey and the security issue. The second issue is related to the first issue, that is the threat coming from PKK acting in the beneficial conditions created in Iraq. To concretize the matter is not so much with Iraq but rather with Kurds living in Iraq. The Kurdish issue has long been a real headache for the Turkish governments. It started yet in 1920s when the Treaty of Sevres backed in those years by the West implied creation of Kurdistan as it had the aim to disintegrate the former mighty Ottoman Empire. These plans were later suspended with the help of another more beneficial Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed by the efforts of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Later the
Kurdish movement for independence emerged and continued for several decades transforming into a socialist movement in 1960s and 1970s and turned separatist in 1980s. Episodic attempts on behalf of the Turkish government were made to come to an agreement with different parties representing Kurdish interests such as the Democratic Party of Kurdistan led by Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani. However no result came out and the Kurds continued the insurgency under the leadership of Ocalan, the founding member of PKK. When years later Americans intend to invade Iraq and change the status quo there including the condition of Kurdish minority, naturally it implies revival of hopes for not only resumption of PKK activity but even some kind of authority if not full independence for the Kurds. (Turkmen, 2009)

For these reasons the American initiatives in Iraq are in the eyes of Turkish government seen as actions going counter Turkish vital national interests. This was the case not only in the eyes of the government. According to a poll results which took place in July 2005 the attitude toward Americans on behalf of the Turkish population has dramatically changed. Almost half of the population had an “absolute negative view” of the United States. A representative of Turkish Parliament, Mehmet Elkatmis, in the winter 2004 called the American policy in Iraq “conduction of genocide”. Thus, the developments since 2003 brought a change in the American-Turkish relations. The change in relationship between the two countries is obvious but the existence of other factors besides the invasion into Iraq and the National Assembly’s refusal to open the Turkish front responsible for the deterioration of ties is also apparent and will be discussed in the chapters below. (Rubin, 2005)
Chapter III. Other Factors of Change

AKP’s ROLE

In November 2003, a party with Islamic roots, moderate Islamic Conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish) won the elections and formed a new government. It put an end to the era of weak coalition governments. Muslim parties in Turkey have been traditionally critical of its westernization, of its supportive attitude toward American policy in general and in the Middle East, specifically. And naturally most military circles and elites in Turkey consider political Islam a threat to the secular order of the country. When coming to power, AKP had one major goal: to enter the European Union. The main condition for that was the compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey’s imperfect democracy was not satisfying the European Union, particularly mentioning the issue of military dominance in state affairs and abuse of human rights (more precisely Kurdish minority rights). AKP took the necessary steps to improve the situation: military influence in political affairs was significantly decreased, Kurdish rights were increased. A number of legislative reforms were taken such as elimination of death penalty. Amnesty was given to PKK members, cultural rights of the Kurds gained unprecedented high level: Kurdish education, TV and radio broadcasting and even electoral campaigns were no longer banned. Given the fact that two-third of Turkish population supports entrance to the European Union, AKP’s success, if it happens, will increase its popularity. (Gillis, 2004)

AKP’s popularity also gives help to the steps the Erdogan’s government has taken in the social sector. For example a decision was made and implemented to provide schools in poor regions with free textbooks. The government was also determined to cut some kinds of taxes.
Obviously such socialist steps of the Prime Minister cannot leave the population indifferent. A very important person, having his own input in government’s new vision is Ahmet Davutoğlu, foreign Minister of Turkey and former chief foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan. In his vision of Turkey, Davutoğlu, a neo-Ottoman himself, considers as the best way to see Turkey not rejecting and refusing its rich history of the Ottoman empire by rather combining the diverse historical past and experience with the new Republican principles. He calls for cooperation and integration with other regional countries, for a new multi-dimensional, dynamic and diverse foreign policy that will result into zero problems with neighbors instead of the previous static and one-direction policy. (Turkmen, 2009)

American diplomacy’s failures

American diplomacy bears the blame for the negative perception of the country among the Turkish population and the Turkish political elite. The Turkish participation in the Iraqi operation was, putting it lightly, desirable for the United States that needed their partner’s support in both military and diplomatic fields. However American high level diplomats didn’t make the necessary efforts to ensure Turkey’s participation. The backing from Turkish side was taken for granted. In comparison to the State Department of previous administrations, the Bush team didn’t take seriously the necessary steps for persuading Turkey. The Secretary of State in 1990s Baker visited Turkey four times between the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait and the start of the famous Operation Desert Storm. Whereas State Secretary Collin Powell under President G.W. Bush visited Turkey only once in 2001 and after that a month after the National Assembly’s final voting. He didn’t find time for visits to Turkey during American preparations to the Operation
Freedom. The time from the September 11 attack on United States Twin Towers up to the commencement of operations of the invasion into Iraq in 2003 he spent on visiting countries of Africa and Latin America. Another failure on Powell’s part was the appointment of Marisa Lino, to lead negotiations with Turkey and to organize the American-Turkish cooperation in operations held in Iraq in 2003. Lino had experience in other Middle East countries but little experience and knowledge of Turkey. Plus to that the leader of the Turkish team Ambassador Bolukbasi, famous for his nationalism, was as skeptical of successful cooperation as was Lino. Although the parties finally came to an agreement Lino was the wrong person for the wrong task. (Rubin, 2005)

Marc Grossman, a former American Ambassador to Turkey identifies three mistakes Washington made in its pre-operation preparations. First, it didn’t have or share any plans of PKK’s later elimination, second it didn’t share its post-war plans in Iraq and the role Turkey might play there, and third it took Turkey’s participation for granted. The United States didn’t pay attention to the changed geopolitical situation with Turkish national interests. Washington didn’t make enough efforts to persuade Turkey of the benefits of the new democratic Iraq liberated from the Saddam’s autocratic regime. (Turkmen, 2009)

The Rise of Anti-Americanism

Anti-Americanism in Turkey reached unprecedented levels from 2003 for several years. Books, articles, TV channels were all full offensive and negative attitudes toward Americans. One of the most popular best-sellers in Turkey presented the invasion into Iraq in 2003 as Turkish-American war over Irkuk. The population’s vast majority, from whatever party, became anti-American, not only refusing to call Washington a strategic partner of Turkey but moreover seeing animosity between the two nations. The polls were showing that the population sees the
United States as a threat to their national security, the same population that a few years ago perceived America as a reliable NATO ally, strategic partner and supporter of Turkish national interests. The Turkish people were too concerned and offended about American disregard of their vital national interests in Iraq, related to the troublesome Kurdish minority and much hated PKK. Being an American political and military satellite was not what the Turks, with their rich history of victories over Europe and memory of being a mighty Empire not in the far past, perceived of their nation and their state. The Sulayminayya event only sharpened the emotions and excitement. Political leaders didn’t stay apart either. During the tense debates in the parliament before the March 1 vote, some deputies referred to the American ships near the Turkish coastline as to “enemy ships”, others considered the American activity in the neighboring country “genocide of Iraq”. In the heated extremism suggestions were heard to dissolve the Grand National Assembly’s Turkish-American Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Group. The presence of American representatives sent by the American Embassy on March 1 to the parliament to follow the developments on spot didn’t help much. Many American diplomats tried to persuade the Ambassador that American presence at the moment of voting will be accepted as control action in order to ensure the desired votes and would result into nationalist reaction, just like it eventually happened. (Turkmen, 2009)

Generally, anti-Americanism today can be defined as refusal to accept the “uneven power distribution” created by the United States political and military might, not only in the Middle East region but the whole world. It is also a protest against values promoted and exported by Americans, against the spread of the western culture. To understand the phenomenon of anti-Americanism one might perhaps need to look deeper into the history. With the end of the Cold War two serious problems emerged for Turkey: Kurdish nationalism and political Islam. During
the Cold War when the Soviet Union existed and the communist threat was very real to Turkey both Kurdish nationalism and political Islam found themselves ideological niches. Kurdish nationalism was trying to find solutions to the Kurdish minority’s problems by joining the socialist, whereas political Islam was having an anti-communist struggle seeing communism as a threat to any religion. Islam and Kurdish nationalism were opposing Kemalist nationalism, an ideology and political vision that was present in Turkey since its emergence in 1920s and 1930s with the help of Kemal Ataturk’s authority and popularity. Kemalist nationalism was seen as the only guarantee of the Republican and secular order of Turkish state and its way to progress. The way to keep intact the ideology of the “Father of Turks” (Ataturk translation from Turkish) was to ensure the territorial integrity, secularity and stability of Turkey to which Kurdish nationalism and political Islam were seen as direct threats. So logically, American policies in Iraq that might lead to some degree of Kurdish autonomy and American reference to Turkey as to a “moderate Islam” cannot leave the public and the elites in Turkey indifferent. With the collapse of the Soviet Union Kurdish nationalism opposed Turkish nationalism and political Islam opposed secularism. Both of these values Turkish nationalism and secularism were guaranteed by Kemalism. So Turkey with the end of the Cold War found herself in a mess of ideologies, disguised before but now opposing the traditional Kemalism which had been present since 1930s. Kemalism was in its foreign policy pro-Western and pro-American but it is now challenged by political Islam putting under doubt the secular order of the state. Other components of it, like Turkish nationalism versus Kurdish nationalism and pro-Western politics versus pro-Muslim politics are also questioned and put on agenda. At present anti-Americanism is shared by both leftists, with their old tradition of opposing the West, and radicals, with their strong emotion-based hatred towards the Jewish and everything connected to Israel. This is
particularly true with such a unique and strategic partner and mighty supporter of Israeli government as the United States. The liberal pro-EU, pro-European democracy circles stay a little far from the excited movements. Nevertheless they also put the protection of Turkish national interests above all beneficial strategic partnerships. (Taspinar, 2005)

Present day anti-Americanism in Turkey was a blow to the United States prestige in the Muslim world, as Turkey and her relations with Washington were perceived as a model for the Muslim Arab world. Turkey was considered an exception among Muslim countries being democratic, secular and pro-American. However anti-Americanism was the reaction of the Turkish population to the American policies unpopular in Turkey, and it most probably bears a temporary character. If the American attitude to Turkey is softened, and especially if Washington shows willingness to support Turkish state interests (specifically in regard to the Kurdish issue), anti-American moods might decrease and not spread to other Muslim countries. The relations between Turkey and the United States are for the first time in its history deprived of a common enemy and common danger. During the Cold War the very idea of a common Soviet threat created an atmosphere of mutual indispensability and cooperation. Nowadays it is hard to find a common problem that both countries want to deal with. Interests in the region differ, and the so-called “global war” on terrorism doesn’t in fact create common target of activity. The term “terrorism” is too vague to create a concrete goal shared by both countries. The American war on terror is against Al-Qaida, the Turkish war on terror is specifically against PKK which is suspected to be supported from time to time by the United States. So as all politics is local, each country has its own perception and planned activity to deal with the terrorism that is undermining their national security but which is seen differently in each of the countries. Turkey looks forward for help in counter-terrorism against PKK, which is not regularly provided by the
United States but moreover the issue is used by Washington to push on Turkey when needed. In its own turn Turkey doesn’t care much about the negative consequences the terroristic attacks of Al-Qaida might have on the United States as long as its busy with its domestic problems of a Kurdish minority. (Taspinar, 2005)

Thus, we may conclude that the invasion into Iraq is not the only reason responsible for deterioration of relations between the two countries. A whole range of factors, like AKP in power with new ideology and foreign policy, Turkey’s new domestic policy, President G.W. Bush military policies in the Middle East caused deterioration in the relationship. The changed since the Cold war era interests and needs of Turkey and the United States are also responsible for the deterioration of relations between the United States and Turkey. However, despite this cooling in relations, American-Turkish ties will probably be kept at a certain level. No matter how harsh sometimes Erdogan’s anti-American rhetoric is, the AKP government can hardly afford to turn its back on the United States. Aspiring a leadership position in the region and gaining in the eyes of its Muslim electorate and neighbor Muslim countries, he proves to be leading an independent policy according to the vision of a stronger and more assertive Turkey. But that will not necessarily lead to joining an anti-American alliance. Turkey still aspires for acceptance to the European Union, still needs American support and still considers itself part of the Western civilization. Joining anti-American alliance would mean isolation from world Western community and sharing policies only with Iran, North Korea and radical organizations possessing some power in Pakistan, Afghanistan and other developing countries. Turkey, in its ambitions, demands authority and equality with major powers and respect in the region, not a limitation of its activity to sharing policy with only a couple of totalitarian countries.
Chapter IV The United States Role in Turkey- Israel and Turkey- the European Union Relations

Turkish-Israeli relations have been warm for decades since the Cold war and have been conditioned by the Turkish-American relations. One can hardly speak about Turkish-Israeli ties without mentioning the United States major role in keeping those ties strong. As a strategic partner of Israel the United States takes all the necessary steps to ensure the good relations of the former with Turkey. The Arab world often blames the United States for its help to Israel and puts America in one track with the “enemies of the Muslim world” just because of its support to Israel, a country historically in fight with the Arabs. Turkey’s role in this triangular relationship was especially important as it was a chance to show that a country with a Muslim majority can be not only a NATO ally but also in good relations with Israel, not having anti-Semitic emotions.

In 1949 Turkey was the second Muslim country (the first being Iran, in those days ruled by the secular pro-American Shah) to recognize Israeli’s newly independent state on a land Arabs consider to be theirs. In the 1990s memorandums were signed to warm up the newly established relations and the two countries were “reconstructing the Middle East” for the “balance of power in the region”. In 1996 Turkey and Israel signed two military agreements and deepened their cooperation. For America these triple relations between her, Israel and Turkey could work as a stimuli for other pro-American Arab countries like Jordan to join the camp and thus create a secure Middle East team. The negative consequence of that initiative might be a joint opposition of other Arab countries traditionally standing against the very existence of a Jewish state. A Turkish-Arab friction was inevitable. Despite accusations of betrayal on behalf of Muslim countries Turkey stood loyal to its partnership with Israel. Israel was fully satisfied with
the new dimension of relations with Turkey. Since the Cold War it aspired to have good relations with this non-Arab Muslim country and succeeded. Turkey was at first not as enthusiastic as Israel about a close partnership but later came to improve the relations and even reached strategic partnership. As long as Turkey was in the same boat with the United States she kept her ties strong with Israel. The latter was in triumph. At least one country in the hostile to her Middle East, a country with Muslim majority and a serious political player in the region not only was not in the anti-Israeli camp but moreover was signing agreements with her in numerous domains: from cultural to military. Especially after the religious revolution in Iraq, Turkey became an indispensable partner. Iran, from being a friendly country and the first to recognize Israel’s independence, it turned into a vital threat to Jewish existence, expressing its religious views in political spheres as well, as showing sincere hatred to the Jewish state. Although to keep objectivity, it should be mentioned that the feelings of the two states were quite mutual. The strong relations with Turkey were the realization of Israel’s first Prime Minister, Ben-Hurion’s political aspirations. In his vision of the future of Israel he perceived the military and political prosperity of his country on condition of compensating the isolation of Israel imposed by neighbor Arab states with creating relations with more remote non-Arab states of the Middle East. (Sherman, 2002)

In the 1990s Turkey and Israel had much in common: they both looked forward to acceptance in the European club, they were pro-Western, non-Arab, non-Christian, Middle East countries. Both countries shared the feeling of “otherness” when compared to the Arab non-democratic regimes neither accepted nor looking up for acceptance by the Western civilization. And yet their liaison was not limited by common sense of “otherness” but was also warmed up by mutual interests. Turkey presented geostrategic importance for Israel with its limited
territorial dimension and hostile entourage. Israel presented for Turkey a source for purchasing contemporary high-class military equipment which the Western countries refused to provide Turkey with. For the United States their partnership represents a steady foundation on which American policies in the Middle East could rely on and even invite other countries of the region to join the pro-Western key regional players under American protection. (Pipes, 1998)

The trade between the two countries was also quite beneficial to both parties and reached one billion dollars in 1999. Civilian exchanges at many levels, from academic to job seeking, increased. Turkey became number one tourist destination for the Israelis. An attempt was made by Prime-Minister Erbakan, the leader of the religious Welfare party in 1996, to arise Islamist feelings and shift Turkish foreign policy in an anti-Israeli direction. But the secular circles in the country under the leadership of the powerful National Security Council Secretary General reaffirmed the supremacy of the secular order in the country. It was done with the help of an influential military elite and referring to the authority of Ataturk, founder of the Kemalist legacy in Turkey. (Sherman, 2002)

Things changed radically after Turkey’s condemnation of Israeli military operation in Gaza in 2008. That was a three week armed conflict which official Jerusalem claimed to have the aim to stop arms import to the Gaza Strip and stop firing rockets at Israel’s direction. The relations became tense after the public meeting in Davos of PM Erdogan and Israeli President Peres. Two years later, in 2010, Israelis boarded the ship belonging to an NGO, that sailed to Gaza to block Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza. Eight Turkish citizens were killed. Turkey’s reaction was quite quick and sharp. It recalled its ambassador, demanded public apology, compensation to victims’ families and lift of the blockade. After long discussions in the United Nations, mediations on behalf of the United States and report writing in concern to the event,
Turkey proclaimed unacceptable the UN report and Israel’s attitude towards countries in the region and downgraded its relations with Israel from ambassador to second secretary level, expelling the Israeli ambassador in Turkey and using harsh anti-Israeli rhetoric. Ankara went further by suspending the military agreements with Israel and claiming to give the necessary help to the victims of the Israeli raid in Gaza. Erdogan also promised to liberalize navigation in the Mediterranean from Israeli domination, to prevent exploitation of national resources by Israel and to support Palestinians in their just struggle for independence and statehood. As a proof of the latter promise Erdogan meets with Palestinian leader Abbas in Egypt and calls Arab countries for solidarity with Palestinians. (Aliriza, 2011)

Two-thirds of the Turkish population believes nowadays that their government should support Palestinians and only 3% of the survey participants cared for Israel. Erdogan often refers to acts of the Israeli government towards Hamas leaders, an organization recognized as illegitimate and terroristic by the United States, as “terroristic acts”. The Turkish Prime-Minister accused Israel of “state terrorism”, meanwhile the Turkish press in its anti-American articles calls Israel a “Terrorist-Zionist state, under the United States protection”. (Cagaptay, 2005, p.47)

The United States finds itself in a difficult situation when it tries to improve the relations between its key strategic partners. Whatever be the persuasion on the American side neither of the countries is ready to cede its position. Some senators from the United States Congress addressed President Obama for a harsher policy towards Turkey’s arrogant and undermining policy in the Middle East. They see Turkish initiatives as destructive and wish to push the country’s political leader to recognize the “Armenian genocide”, a historical event, massacre in 1915 that happened to the Armenian minority living in Turkey, which official Ankara refuses to categorize as genocide. This issue is used every time the United States attempts to pressure
Turkey. But despite the pro-Jewish lobby the Obama administration doesn’t sharpen relations with Turkey calling both Ankara and Jerusalem for peace. At the same time the administration is not in a hurry to implement the President’s pledged solution to the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Erdogan is an active initiator and supporter of the Palestinian claims for statehood in UN. He often reminds Obama of his promised intent to support two-nation solution which implies creation of Palestinian state as well. The Turkish Prime-Minister sees only the existence of the two states of Palestine and Israel as serving as a compromise in the long lasting Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nevertheless the United States President is not looking forward to spoiling relations with the Israeli leader Netanyahu, which will inevitably lead to his support of the Turkish backed solution. Erdogan in his turn, backed by an overwhelming support at home at both public and political levels, as well as sympathy of the Muslim Arab countries, refuses to soften his policy towards Israel, which he calls “the spoiled child of the West”. (Aliriza, 2011)

To sum up, Turkish-Israeli relations changed when Turkey’s foreign policy changed. With AKP coming to power Turkey turned from a country fully on the Western team to a country engaged also with the Muslim world. Before, relations with Israel were a viewed as indispensable for Turkey’s close dialogue with the United States. Israel could lobby Turkish interests in Washington against an anti-Turkish Armenian and Greek lobby. But now, when Turkey’s foreign policy is less pleasing to the West and more independent in engagement with its Muslim neighborhood, it is a component of the new pro-Islamic policy that is at odds with Israel. (Rubin, 2012)

Since the Cold War Turkey has been explicitly and implicitly in the Western camp. Europe and the United States needed Turkey for the anti-Soviet initiatives they were undertaking together with Turkey, a country bordering the Soviet empire. The Western military equipment
targeted against Soviet Union was in Turkey’s territory. Turkey in its turn needed allies like the European Union and the United States to ensure itself against the threat of the Red Army at its borders. But the reason for close relations with the European Union and Turkey’s striving to enter it were surely not only the political interests and geostrategic needs but moreover the ideological vision of Turkey’s future rooted in Kemalism. The latter was the legacy of Ataturk that sees the future of Turkey solely with Europe. It was deeply rooted in the minds of the Turkish people for decades since the spread of Kemalism that their way lays with the European Union and they should join the “elite club” at whatever costs.

Yet in 1999 the European Union agreed, with American persuasion and lobbying for Turkey, to accept Turkey’s candidate for full membership at Helsinki Summit. In 2005 negotiations started between Turkey and the European Union but the Cyprus issue, the island being divided between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots due to Turkey’s occupation of the third of the island in 1974, and reluctance of Austria and Germany to agree to Turkey’s full membership were serious obstacles in the process. Till now Turkey hasn’t been admitted to the European Union. The latter points to democracy deficiencies in Turkey, particularly its treatment of minorities, accusing the government of abuse of human rights in the case of the large Kurdish minority. It is possible now that the negotiation process lasts until 2021, and that date is not yet a deadline. When AKP came to power they tried hard to satisfy the famous Copenhagen criteria imposed by the European Union, and obviously positive changes took place: Kurdish cultural and political rights were quite enlarged in comparison to previous years. The government went further and tackled the civil-military issue, worrying Brussels. It lessened significantly the power of the National Security Council and the military circles in general, making them subjective to civilian authority.(Onis, 2003)
Half of Turkey’s trade is with the European Union and a number of businesses, as well as more than three quarters of Turkish population favors joining the European Union, especially when expecting serious economic aid from Europe after joining in the situation of the financial crisis. In general Turkey after the invasion into Iraq became more pro-European country showing strong anti-Americanism. The Iraqi war somehow pushed Turkey from the United States to the European Union and from there started the range of reforms initiated by AKP to improve democracy and please Brussels. (Cagaptay, 2004)

In a recent article of Turkish Daily Radical a famous journalist wrote that by 2003 March 1 decision Turkey gained the prestige in the world showing its new political orientation. According to the article it was the time for Turkey to put her political course towards the European Union instead of the United States. The pro-European orientation was not only due to the Kemalist values but also the AKP’s vision of Turkey in Europe more than of Turkey with the United States. Washington in its turn wouldn’t like a Turkey that looks more to Europe than to its strategic partner for years. Deeper relations with the European Union will lessen Turkey’s dependence on the United States. However an inward looking Turkey, disappointed in the West totally, and turning finally to its Muslim Arab entourage is even less favorable. The United States has lobbied for the Turkish candidacy to the European Union for many years, and any achievements in that domain this far were thanks to American diplomacy. In addition without American support and backing delays in Turkey-the European Union negotiations may happen again. Washington’s role in resolving the Cyprus issue might be critical and for Turkey’s way to the European Union it is the number one problem to deal with. On the other hand, many analysts see American help to Turkey in its acceptance process to the European Union as offering the “Trojan horse” to Europe trying to interfere into European politics with the help of its ally. The
European Union sees problems with Turkey not only in its economic conditions that are lower than average in Europe but also in Turkey’s demography. Entering the European family Turkey will become the second populated country in the Union after Germany and the fact that the population is Muslim doesn’t speak in favor taking into consideration the difficulties a number of European countries have with integrating Muslims.(Onis, Yilmaz, 2004)
Chapter V The Perspective of the Turkish-American Relations

American initiatives in Iraq resulted in transforming the Middle East and in rebalancing the power in the region. It showed that by military power the United States reached its targeted goals of eliminating the authoritative Saddam’s regime and rebuilding of Iraq. It showed shift in international politics. The United States acted not in the terms of “balance of power” like it used to do during the Cold War period because of the “deterrence policy” it was engaged in together with the Soviet Union. Rather it acted as a political major player projecting power and ignoring other EuroAsian powers’ opinion if needed. The United States disregarded European countries’ and its strategic partner, Turkey’s objection, and acted according to its political and military abilities, considering the support within its own country enough to make decisions.(Fouskass, 2003)

One thing is clear now in the United States-Turkey relations: Turkey is no more a political satellite of the United States as it used to be before. It has its own interests in the newly emerged geostrategic situation of the Middle East. And though many American senators turned their backs on Turkey after the Grand National Assembly’s vote, the United States still needs Turkey. Turkey is needed for its geostrategic location, military partnership in NATO, political influence in the region, and again as a secular Muslim model country. And Turkey needs the United States despite the former’s harsh disapproval of American support to Iraqi Kurds. Despite a whole range of issues that contradict Turkey’s vital interests Turkey needs cooperation with Washington. Even if Turkey is no more a strategic partnership of the United States it needs the American-Turkish relations to be held at a certain level of partnership and cooperation. Otherwise Ankara may find itself isolated from the world affairs and out of control of the developments in post-war Iraq rebuilding.(Goksel, 2005)
Turkey, due to its geographic location, military potential and political importance ensures its place in the range of countries, to which the United States always pays specific attention. Turkey remains an important United States partner in Afghanistan. The United States also is important forTurkey in economic sphere: the United States is the third largest export country for Turkey. And of course Turkey cannot disregard the United States when acting at region level, as it is hard to imagine any country in the world that tries to make regional politics without such a global power as the United States. The United States sees Turkey as important in economic, political, military domains. But in this new post-Iraq era the relations will obviously differ from what they were before 2003. Support of an ally will not be taken for granted any more, and more efforts will be needed from both sides to make their diverse vital interests share something in common. Since Iraq was the benchmark of difference in policies and targets and since it’s here that both countries have their own needs and visions of the future of the country, it is from this point that the coordination of policies and initiatives concerning the whole region will start for the sake of desirable outcome. The Post-Iraq United States-Turkey agenda will differ greatly from the strategic partnership of the Cold War period and the1990s.(Parri, 2003)

This new agenda will have to consider the changes and developments in the whole region, especially of those key actors as Iran and Syria. The independent domestic and foreign policy led by AKP, the moods within Turkish population, elite, military and religious circles, and the distribution of power among them should be considered as well. Turkey’s strive to come closer with Arab states, incumbent United States President’s approach to the region as a whole and Turkey in particular will have implications for the bilateral relations. Turkey is also important for the United States for its role in the energy domain, as a key country transporting through its territory the Caspian oil and Iraqi exports. The current and future gas and oil
pipelines important for the United States and Middle East sphere pass through Turkey’s territory. An insecure and instable Turkey, with active terrorism out of the state’s control on its territory will not be profitable for the energy resources transportation. Thus American initiatives in Iraq, and especially those towards Iraqi Kurds, can have negative consequences not only for Turkey but for American energy policy in the region as well. (Gillis, 2004)

On the other hand Turkey, that doesn’t have any problems and issues to push on when needed could become too independent from the United States. So most likely a balance between stability of the country and some degree of vulnerability will be the best option for the United States. Anyhow American policies’ implications for Turkey should be regarded and reactions to them at diplomatic, political and popular level predicted accurately for the success of American policies abroad. So to some extent the United States might back up Turkey to solve Turkish economic and political issues. If the United States continues contributing to the creation of Turkey that has all its economic and national issues settled down, it may be too strong to be dependent on the United States.

Turkey and the United States are important for one another. And though neither one is indispensable and can be replaced both countries will lose much if their relations spoil further. The American-Turkish alliance was too important for each of them for decades and still keeps its importance. If it were lost or destroyed both sides would face serious difficulties. Turkey would have to deal with political solitude in its European Union membership aspiration and the Cyprus conflict. Turkey might also face serious problems with the PKK becoming very active if the United States didn’t lead a pro-Turkish policy towards the Kurds and the PKK. It is possible that the emergence of a Kurdish federal state will become very real and Turkey would be deprived of participation in the post-war Iraq rebuilding, including difficulties with availability of Iraqi
energy resources to Turkey. It would lose its major export partner and financial supporter. Ankara would in general face economic and political difficulties, plus has serious and very real threats to its stability and security via Kurdish activization. Any kind of pressure, including the issue of Armenian genocide, might be used against Turkey. So there is a whole range of problems Turkey might encounter if there is a deterioration of relations with the United States. The United States however is also vulnerable. Without Turkey it will be hard to implement any Middle East policy. Turkey may back up Iran or create problems in Iraq. Iraq might be “visited” regularly by Turkish militants crossing the frontier and Turkey could help Palestine in its conflict with Israel. It also could become closer with Russia in supporting Iranian anti-American and anti-Israeli initiatives and refuse to take part in American operations abroad, e.g. Afghanistan. Having Syria in total chaos, it is hard to imagine implementation of American policies in the Middle East without another major and key actor like Turkey. It will be quite costly for the United States to lose Turkey in a situation when the former has the hostile Iran, anarchic Syria and Iraq, and is at odds with Russia. In addition Turkey turning from the West to the Muslim Arab world, and gathering around her all the anti-American Arab Muslim countries, will be a hard pill to swallow for the United States. Further deterioration of the United States-Turkey relations may finally result into a major blow to the prestige of the United States and its political authority. It might bring Washington to difficulties at military and operational levels where traditionally Turkey has shown a good support for the United States. When Obama came to power in 2008, the United States kept relations with Ankara at a decent level. Turkey was invited to take part at the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) as a co-director although Turkey is an active supporter of Hezbollah and Hamas, organizations considered terroristic for the Western community. (Brackman, 2011)
As regards the European Union, American support to Turkey to promote its membership will most probably continue. Turkey is in hope of entering the “club” by persuading the Franco German alliance, the main EU force, in its decency as future member. Turkey has been at the door to enter the European family for years. Washington doesn’t see any costs of Turkish acceptance to the European Union for herself, whereas for the European Union it will definitely be quite costly in terms of economic aid to a new country with a population of 70 million. The European Union is more inward looking than the United States, and less security oriented than the United States to think about close cooperation with a key player in a troublesome region in order to secure its position and dominance there. By supporting Turkish entrance into the European family the United States supports a fuller Western orientation of Turkey and fuller Western attention to the Middle East region. On the other hand, a final isolation of Turkey from the European Union, in case of the refusal of the latter to accept Turkish membership, might result into Turkish overdependence on the United States, and in keeping contact with the West only through Americans.(Onis, 2003)

It might seem that the United States will gain from Turkish isolation from Europe due to Turkish overdependence on herself. However on the other hand Washington might also prefer Turkey in the European club, foreseeing that a country with Muslim majority of 70 million with low economic standards will weaken the European Union economically and present a threat to its demographic security. And a European Union that is less powerful in the economic domain and less stable in a demographic sphere might be preferable for the United States. Weakened, troublesome and a less monolithic European family will be less assertive and demanding in its relations with the United States. It appears that in future the American-Turkish bilateral relations will remain as strong alliance, though not as strong as they were in 1990s. Both countries need
each other. A possible threat to United States-Turkey relations is a new clash of interests. There are already enough issues to which American and Turkish attitudes and policies differ, and they have already caused enough tension in the bilateral relations. New contradictory policies and needs might lead to further deterioration of the relationship. What the American-Turkish partnership needs now is sharing of common policies and interests to eliminate the tension and harshness that appeared for a while between the two countries.
Conclusion

Since the beginning of the Cold War the American-Turkish strategic partnership prospered. The mutually beneficial political and military cooperation kept the two countries together. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the two countries continued to keep their relations strong. In 2003 the geostrategic interests of the two countries clashed.

The Turkish secular Muslim country model is attractive for the United States. Turkey needs the American support for its acceptance to the European Union and especially in the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Rejecting the United States-led policy in the Middle East Turkey might appear in a situation where it has zero control of the post-war Iraq rebuilding. The possibility to control post-war Iraq rebuilding and to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish independent state implies having relations with the United States that can be categorized if not as a strategic partnership then at least as a cooperation between partners. Turkey is no longer a satellite of United States-led policies, as it used to be in the 1990s, and the strategic partnership between the two countries will hardly be as close and coordinated as it was. The geopolitical situation in the world has changed. Objective reasons, like the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new distribution of power in the region, the vital needs and interests of Turkey and the United States that do not coincide in many spheres require the development of an independent foreign policy. And Turkey cannot afford itself to ignore the interests at the national and state levels. The relations between the two countries, however, will have to be kept at a certain level, as both parties need each other. Turkey needs relations to be held at a high level to be able to participate in post-war Iraq rebuilding and to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state. It also needs the United States support for its acceptance to the European Union and for the successful resolution
of the Cyprus conflict. Turkey needs the United States for help in its economic sphere and for support of its energy programs (gas and oil pipelines). The United States, with the current situation in Syria, Iraq and a hostile relationship with Iran, needs a partner for the implementation of its policies in the region. It will be costly for the United States to have Turkey supporting Palestinians against Israel, becoming closer with Russia and Iran, joining the anti-American Muslim countries, and refusing to take part in NATO military operations (e.g. in Afghanistan). And though the United States puts pressure on Turkey by raising the “Armenian genocide” issue and by supporting to some extent a Kurdish desire for autonomy in Iraq, these are measures that aim to warn Turkey against engagement in activities that work against the United States policy in the region. Washington would hardly spoil the relationship with Ankara for the sake of any other less important political figure. Both countries need each other, both will suffer costs as a result of deterioration of the relationship, both have their own plans to be implemented at both military and political levels. Both countries need the cooperation of the other party, if not a cooperation as tight as it was several years ago, then at least at a level high enough to enable the realization of their foreign policies in the best way possible. It is in the interest of each party to find policies in common and to prevent further clashes of interest in order to avoid cooling of relations.

This Master’s Essay shows support for the **hypothesis** claiming that the American-Turkish relations will continue to cool down if the clashes of interest between the two countries increase. If new interests and needs on both sides appear and contradict one another, the relations will cool down further. During the long history of the American-Turkish relationship any time a problem emerged because of the contradictory interests of the two countries (e.g. war in Iraq, Kurdish activity in northern Iraq) the relations cooled down.
Research question 1 is answered in the following way. It is not only the invasion into Iraq that is responsible for deterioration of relations between the two countries but a whole range of issues among them the new geopolitical situation, Turkey’s domestic policies, a new Islamic party in power, and American diplomatic failures.

Research question 2 is answered: it is unlikely that the new government of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan will join the anti-American alliance taking into consideration how costly it will be for Turkey to fully cut herself from the United States and join other Muslim countries hostile to United States. Prime Minister Erdogan gets high scores in the eyes of the Muslim world with his anti-Israeli and sometimes anti-American rhetoric. This courtship with the Muslim world frightens the United States. Trying to lead an independent policy as a separate political entity in the region with the intention of gaining prestige and authority among the countries of the Middle East may be a thorn to the United States. To gain the status of a leading country in Middle East is quite desirable for Turkey to pursue such a strategy. Having more support in the region will allow Turkey to be more demanding and less conforming in its dialogue with the United States. Nonetheless a complete fracture of the American partnership is highly doubtable if not unreal.

Research question 3 is answered the following way. The Anti-American moods in Turkey were a blow to the American prestige and influence in the Arab world, as Turkey has long been perceived as a model country in close partnership with Washington. A complete loss of influence in Turkey could lead to a loss of influence in other Muslim countries. But the anti-American moods in Turkey were consequence of the Turkish population’s opposition to the United States-led policies in the Middle East and bear temporary character. With the United States refusal to support at any level Kurdish minorities in the region, these moods will decrease.
Thus, the present day anti-Americanism in Turkey is more a reaction to the United States-led policy and can decrease if the Washington led policy in northern Iraq becomes more pro-Turkish.
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