AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA

PEACEKEEPING:
ARMENIA – A NEWCOMER IN THE CLUB

A MASTER’S ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FOR PARTIAL FULFILMENT DEGREE OF
MASTER’S OF ARTS

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SUMMER 2012
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June 2012
Acknowledgements

It was my honor to work with my faculty advisor Dr. Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, who spared no effort to make the best out of my master’s essay in the time constraints we had to collaborate. I would like to thank him for his sincere interest in this issue and his enthusiasm to motivate me for a more comprehensive research. His knowledge and conspicuous attitude towards fostering my critical analysis made my writing as favorable and pleasant as important.

Secondly, I would like to express my gratitude to the American University of Armenia and the faculty staff of the School of Political Sciences and International Affairs. I want to thank these people for justifying my prior expectations of a qualified higher education as much as it was possible in our reality and for always encouraging me to do more than I actually thought I could.

And finally, my gratitude to Mr. Richard Giragosian and Arthur Mkrtchyan for finding time to make my interviews as all-inclusive in its content part as was possible. I would also like to thank them for guiding me through the relevant materials and showing the best of all possible ways to examine the issue.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BATNA – Best alternative to a negotiated agreement
UN – The United Nations
IO – International organization
SC – Security Council
UNPROFOR - United Nations Protection Force
RA – Republic of Armenia
US – The United States
PK – Peacekeeper
PfP – Partnership for Peace
IPP – Individual Partnership Programme
APRP – Planning and Review Process
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INTRODUCTION

The indelible tendency of the world striving towards the globalization implies an imperative to be taken into serious consideration. This imperative implies the management of both intrastate and interstate intractable crises which will cognitively lead to the international long-term peace and security obtained through cooperation. The interstate cooperation on peace and security fosters a mutually agreed-upon frameworks and feasible strategies to achieve the desired aim thus hindering the further contagion of the conflict throughout the neighboring countries. The nature of the idea of security is rather vulnerable since the level of its accomplishment depends on the states’ interests and the great powers’ engagement in a concrete geopolitical region. A manifestation of cooperation for the accomplishment and sustainability of the international peace and security was the formation of peacekeeping forces. Alongside to the signing of the Charter of the United Nations on June 26, 1945, the concept of peacekeeping as such came to being, although no specific legal Chapter of the Charter was dealing with this issue. The operation of the peacekeeping missions was mainly grounded on the moral principles and personal experience of the people having participated in more than sixty peacekeeping missions.¹ However, *Chapters VI, VII and VIII* of the UN Charter are an indirect but still a legislative basis for the peacekeeping operations, which deal with the pacific settlement of the disputes, actions that should be undertaken with respect to the peace, sealing off the breaches of the peace and preventing acts of aggression, also the involvement of regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The sophisticated rather than simply expanded mission and working policy agenda of the operations worldwide emphasizes its watchdog phenomenon over the democratization process, promotion of human rights and the reestablishment of the rule of law in the conflicting regions - the new dimensions of contemporary peacekeeping missions.

Part one of the essay will discuss the analysis of the philosophical essay by Immanuel Kant “The Perpetual Peace” which, apart from shaping the concept of the state of peace on the political level and explaining the probable options to achieve the latter as such, is counter-argued by Plato’s vision of the peace as “the natural harmony”. 2 John Galtung’s expanded notions of “peace” and “violence” conclude the previous philosophical approaches’ ideological development throughout history and explain why Kant’s view is more favorable for the analysis of peace on the state level rather than Plato’s outlook. Part two is aimed at analyzing the contemporary challenges the peacekeeping operations face as a result of the globalization. The historical insights of the peacekeeping development process along with the UN institutionalization and the quite new paramilitary dimensions of peacekeeping missions that have emerged in the light of the conflict contagion tendencies will be considered. The third part of the essay will discuss the case of Armenia as a newcomer in the peacekeepers’ “club”. The Armenian cooperation with the international organizations (namely NATO) will be analyzed, the initiatives this cooperation is based on and try to decompose the implication level of the new paramilitary dimensions of the peacekeeping missions. Part three of the essay will also try to demonstrate the political and military costs and benefits Armenia faces while becoming the part of the international peacekeeping and cradle the political credentials vis-a-vis the military ones. The conclusion will summarize the main findings of the essay and conclude Armenia’s role in

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complementing to the peacekeeping missions with the promotion of democratic principles in the conflicting areas. In the end, the bibliography will be provided.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

Perpetuation of peace has been as vital in the development of the history of humanity as the ways to cease the armed conflicts. The intrastate conflicts carry a potential threat of contagion throughout the region and further thus disturbing and shattering the international efforts to handle the rival situation. Immanuel Kant’s philosophical essay “The Perpetual Peace” is one of the early observations of stabilizing and institutionalizing peace on the interstate level. The concept of Perpetual Peace as such refers to a state of affairs where peace is permanently established over a certain area, but Kant discusses the sustainability of peace on the permanent level and argues the necessity of having standing armies as such. “The Perpetual Peace” is one of the core essays to understand the need for the formalization and institutionalization of the peace establishment “techniques” (i.e. international organizations) thus shifting the arrow of the international relations towards cooperation instead of antagonism.

The report “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines” exposes the achievements of the UN peacekeeping operations in the management of the complex international conflicts over the past six decades. It first of all gives the understanding of the complex rather than simply expanded mission and working policy agenda of the operations worldwide emphasizing the watchdog phenomenon of the peacekeeping missions over the

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democratization process, promotion of human rights and the reestablishment of the rule of law. The report identifies the comparative advantages and limitations of United Nations peacekeeping operations as a conflict management tool, and explains the basic principles that should guide their planning and conduct. One of the advantages of this document is in the review of the previous mistakes in order to avoid further similar ones, but its primary significance is its legislative highest-level framework for United Nations peacekeeping. Any subordinate directives, guidelines and/or training materials issued by United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support should conform to the principles and concepts referred to in here.

Another article, “Building on Brahimi. Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty”, discusses the UN peacekeeping missions’ dubious and shattered future as a consequence of the military overstretch and financial crisis, contrasting the poor reality to the prior achievements in human rights protection and political stability fostering.\(^5\) The authors indicate the relevance of distinguishing the causes to the symptoms of peacekeeping missions’ failure in states they have been deployed since the miscomprehension of the aforementioned two ideas serves one of the grounds for the missions to malfunction. Nevertheless, there lies a contra-argument on the probable dismissal of peacekeeping missions in the future, since a number of UN member states and great powers have reviewed the significance of promoting peacekeeping and are eager to complement to its further development. As a concluding idea, the article states that the peacekeeping missions are of no significant help and importance unless they follow efficiency strategy – aiming at a concrete goal in bringing up the stability of the state deployed. As a result, the following argument could be fostered: the authors see UN as the only role actor in worldwide

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peacekeeping operations although not neglecting the financial and personnel aid from pro-western international organizations or NGOs. Instead of pointing out the “hegemon” superiority of UN as a sole supplier for peacekeeping operations, it would be rational to discuss possible on-the-ground implication of the same pro-western international organizations’ and NGOs’ decision making equality process, notwithstanding the fact that they have their constant financial and personnel allotment.

Kyle Beardsley’s approach to the contagion of armed conflict in the light of either the presence or the absence of the peacekeepers on the ground analyses cause of the austerity of conflict contagion worldwide and assesses the possible leverages that could be used to diminish its recurrence. It also estimates the peacekeeping forces' ability in conflict emergence risk reduction. The problem of the article is the diffusion of the armed conflict across state borders since the conflict resolution emergency has gone far beyond intrastate spectrum. The on-the-ground capability of peacekeeping missions to prevent the contagion as such is seen as one of the cornerstones in establishing peace and stability beyond the country of deployment. The research question estimates the different propensities for armed conflict spread with and without peacekeeping. The problems addresses here are mainly related to transnational movement of and support for insurgencies, thereby the prior prevention of intrastate conflict can diminish the probability of the conflict diffusion across the borders. The main argument of the article lies in the explanation of the importance of lighter and substantially sustainable peacekeeping troops in the conflict regions. The relevance of the article is the statistic data proving that states with neighbors that have experienced armed conflict without peacekeeping are themselves

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significantly more likely to become involved in an armed conflict. In contrast, states with neighbors that have experienced armed conflict with peacekeeping are not significantly more likely to become involved in an armed conflict.

The “Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations” frames a thorough and overall theoretical comprehension on the multidimensional component aspect of peacekeeping operations, since the geopolitical contagion tendency of contemporary conflicts is of an unpredictable pace. The report initiates with the explanation of the need for peacekeeping forces alongside with the emergence of the UN in 1945. It supports the argument that impartial presence of regulatory peacekeeping forces on the conflict area is a cornerstone for the upcoming diplomatic negotiations of the parties in conflict. Depending on their mandate, multidimensional peacekeeping operations today have gone far beyond their once authentic significance of solely military monitoring and already incorporate civilian and humanitarian affairs. In order to shape a comprehensive vision a mere theoretical approach to the multidimensional aspect of the peacekeeping mission is not enough. The on-the-ground implementation strategies or policy implications to facilitate the empirical perspective of the contemporary peacekeeping operations could be of a rational support of the theoretical argument and form a ground for further research on the issue.

The memo “IO Performance in Peacekeeping” by Lipson develops a framework for the research on organizational performance of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It provides a reformulated definition of organizational performance as the utilization of organization’s resources, technology and relations with other organizational environment to

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achieve the given goals. It further dwells on the incorporation of the organizational governance into UN peacekeeping operations with its corresponding four stages: defining objectives, level of analysis, indicators and sources of organizational performance. All the four components of organizational performance contribute to the organizations on how to improve their performance in peacekeeping operations. The influence of the malfunctioning of the poor organizational performance and their sustainability is also discussed which has the tendency to aggravate peacekeeping operations and prolong their deployment for no obviously rational reasons. The primary definition of the organizational performance has a vaguely overgeneralized denotation: it could have differentiated between the types and the permissible amount of resources to be used to give more specific characteristics to this rather general idea of organizational performance.

Autesserre’s examination on “Peacetime Violence Post-Conflict Violence and Peacebuilding Strategies” provides an outlook on academic findings examining the sources of the persistence of the violence in post-war environments and the strategies addressing them. It distinguishes between unaddressed pre-war tensions, war-induced cleavages, and peace-generated conflicts. The relevance of the synthesis is in the adherence of the best field research practices that scrupulously examine the peacebuilding strategy weaknesses. One of the weaknesses is neglecting the micro-level dynamics of violence. Another one deals with the insufficient attention and resource misallocation to state reconstruction. A third reason may serve the peacebuilders’ short-sighted action strategy often focusing on the national realm and neglecting sub-national and supra-national tensions, thus decreasing the effectiveness of their programs. These weaknesses explain why peacebuilding efforts often fail to end violence even when they produce other positive outcomes. This kind of critical review provides ample ground

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for further empirical researches to make conclusions why peacebuilding operations can easily fail in their implementation.

The book by Durch and Berkman “Who Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations” touches upon the hardships facing the enforcement, stability and sustainability of peace both conceptually and operationally as a result of the globalization, the consequences the latter unavoidably carries with it and the clash of belief systems. It also represents the metamorphosis of once solely monitoring prerogative of the peacekeepers to the new assignment of armed “watching” over the political tasks of internal security, peacebuilding, and state-building in some of the world’s weakest, poorest, and most war-ravaged places. The current volume considers the historical review of security support to peace operations—what kind, how much, by whom—and then turns to likely future demand for that support based on current trends in conflict, conflict resolution estimating the state vulnerability to violent internal conflicts. The relevance of the book is in its representation of historical evidences of peacekeeping operations’ difficulties with theoretical assumptions how similar situations could be handled today. Another important aptitude of the analysis is the critical consideration of the strengths, weaknesses and accomplishments of NATO, UN and other alliances’ priority tasks when providing support for the peacekeeping missions worldwide.

An unpublished article by Arthur Mkrtchyan gives the chronological sequence of Armenia’s participation in peacekeeping trainings. The purpose of the article is to provide a ground for a deeper further analysis of Armenia’s achievements in international peacekeeping

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missions’ preparations and to provide a further outlook in which spheres Armenia could be engaged more thus enlarging the scope of its participation in worldwide multidimensional peacekeeping operations.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

The research questions of the paper are:

1. What are the necessary preconditions for peace to be present within a state?

2. What are the modern paramilitary functions of peacekeeping in today’s globalized world?

3. What are the costs and benefits of the RA to participate in peacekeeping operations?

The hypothesis of the paper is: Armenia’s participation in the international peacekeeping operations has more political credentials rather than military ones.
Methodology

For the purpose of the study the content analysis of primary and secondary data is used. The primary data is based on the international documents and interviews with Richard Giragosian – the founding director at Regional Studies Center, and Athur Mkrtchyan – the head of the Armenian peacekeeping forces. The secondary data covers the content analysis of the books and journal articles which explain the legal basis for peacekeeping, examine appropriate ways for the feasible implementation of the peacekeeping missions as a congruous response to the contemporary challenges caused by the globalization.
Part 1

The Concept of Peace in Political Philosophy

“No conclusion of peace shall be considered valid as such if it was made with a secret reservation of the material for a future war. Peace means an end to all hostilities.”

Immanuel Kant, “The Perpetual Peace”

In some philosophical essays that deal with the idea of a sovereign state and the authority the latter can exercise within its geographical boundaries the issue of a “state of peace” as such is viewed as a phenomenon initially lacking in the nature. To put this otherwise – peace is a state which should be conceived and developed by people, a condition to be maintained and sustained by the statesmen for the sake of the survival of the people. Immanuel Kant, in his philosophical essay “The Perpetual Peace”, discusses the state of nature as “the state of war”. The rationale behind the assimilation of these two concepts is explained through the verification that the state of peace among the people living together is not the state of nature: even if it does not entail directly forcible hostilities, it nonetheless displays a constantly present threat to the latters. That is why people living in the state of nature are potentially in the state of war. This, however, needs a careful interpretation, since another philosophical analysis by Plato regarding the peace of a sovereign political unity discusses the recognition and preservation of “natural harmony” as a

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prevailing contributory factor of peace and order in the society.\textsuperscript{13} If, according to Kantian theory, the state of nature was the state of war, Plato’s “natural harmony” stands in an inverse relation with Kant’s “state of nature” thus creating a direct link with the understanding of the state of peace. The natural harmony is as elusive to achieve as the state of peace within a state, since it can be achieved only when the citizen is fully capable of understanding and performing his role in the society according to his “natural endowment” which is based on the personal merits, political knowledge and social responsibilities. In his political philosophy Plato finds the roots of the concept of a sustainable peace in the anthropocentric perspective. As mentioned, the individual within the society, along with his personal normative values, responsibilities and political knowledge, is the center – the \textit{actual creator} of peace, but since we frame our considerations on the international range (the state-to-state relations) the individual level of discussion, although an important determinant for understanding the character of peace as such, cannot serve an ample ground for further analysis. Plato’s “peace” is more of a theoretical, pure-logic orientation, while Kant’s “peace” dwells on the political philosophy with an empirical background. Therefore, Kant’s “The Perpetual Peace” is viewed as an initial step towards understanding the idea of peace within the state and it is here that the imperative of a “formally institutionalized” state of peace is brought forward.\textsuperscript{14} Herein, the essay “The Perpetual Peace” might be one of the earliest implications denoting the need for an institute that would actually formalize the peacekeeping process on the supranational level, where the states, being unconditionally concerned with the stable peace and security of their own subjects, would be obliged to respect the desire of the neighboring state to sustain a long-term peace and stability on its own. As discussing the utopian idea of the perpetuation of the peace, Kant casts doubt on the

\textsuperscript{13} Boakye, L. 2010. \textit{The Quest for Peace}.

\textsuperscript{14} Reiss, H. S. 1991. \textit{Kant: political writings}. 

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perpetuation of the standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) as such. As a matter of fact, he sees the accomplishment of the state of permanent peace whereby abolishing the armies at all, “... for they constantly threaten other states with war by the very fact that they are always prepared for it.”15 “The Perpetual peace”, however, might be perceived as an arbitrary description of the peace in whole, since today the stable progression of the arms sales’ race all over the world theoretically rejects Kant’s perspectives of the abolishment of the standing armies. If wars pursued solely destructive elements, they would have disappeared at a certain point in history but the economically “suitable” aspect of armed conflicts for single actors (be it a state or individuals) affirm that wars or warlike situations are far from being handled unanimously.

In the political philosophy the concept of peace has never been a unanimously agreed-upon notion. In his article “Johan Galtung: Positive and Negative Peace”, Baljit Singh Grewal, a political analyst, states that the two controversial aspects of peace (*negative* and *positive*), that derived from peace theory, set the examination of international peace on a completely new dimension.16 Being the introducer of the terms “negative and positive peace”, Johan Galtung initially had the intention to dilate, amplify the concept of violence which originally would refer only to the direct assault or warfare towards a state. This way of perceiving the concept of violence, in its turn, limited the interpretation of international peace to a narrower frame as “the mere absence of the direct assault or warfare” (later to be referred as “negative peace”).17 When the concepts of *indirect* and *structural violence* were formalized as a result of Galtung’s concept-expansionism theory, the interpretation of the international peace was expanded as a natural consequence. Thus, the *indirect* and *structural violence* (Galtung’s expanded notion of violence),

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was characterized as the lack of integration of people into the common society. Integration assumed not only the proficiency of the people living on the same geopolitical territory to accept the common socio-cultural values or intrastate political propensities, but covered the whole international spectrum with the mandatory presence of such vast and comprehensive concepts as multilateralism on the regional and international levels, arms control due to the mutually agreed upon conventions and treaties, balance of power which directly derives from the arms control mechanisms and the democratic rule of law. Referring to negative and positive peace, Galtung states that the negative peace is the “absence of violence, absence of war”, while the positive one is “the integration of human society”. The interesting part of this analysis is the possibility for these two opposing aspects of international peace to come together at a certain point. What we witness today is the domination of “one nation”18 (as Galtung names the United Nations) fully equipped with coercive power ready to put into practice. Galtung surmises that this very readiness to act might bring to the integration (positive peace) but there is only one way this implication can earn practical grounds: the complete disarmament. This very point makes a rational link between Kantian theory of standing armies’ abdication for the sake of the permanent peace accomplishment and Galtung’s “one nation” outlook. Hence, Kant and Galtung’s perceptions of reaching a perpetual peace within the states pass throughout the same scope of subverting the coercive power in the face of standing armies. It should be noted that this way of appreciating the logics behind the theory does not discuss the practicability of the conclusion but gives a theoretical understanding of the possibilities to achieve international peace.

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From the very first sight the idea of expanding the concepts of peace and violence gives more stable grounds to label this or that act by a government or a leader as either personal or structural violence which, in its turn, gives more legitimate basis to handle them accordingly. However, the wider is the concept of violence, the more insubstantial the achievement of the positive peace (hereinafter, we shall be referring only to positive peace, because the latter does not frame itself into the Copenhagen school of “survival = security” narrow ideology, but covers the modern international relations’ key concepts of multilateralism and democratic rule of law, as mentioned above) becomes for the following rational reason. One of Galtung’s concept-expansionism theory opponents Kenneth Boulding argues that the fragmentation of the concept of peace into positive and negative misleads the peace researchers into the sole theoretical field of study exempt of empirical practicability. This blame is not groundless, since peace needs to be realized first and foremost of all and not described as a theoretical study. Theory, in case not

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potentially feasible and rationally implementable, is a self-aimed study that partially complements to the scientific development. What Boulding did not take into close consideration while elaborating his own concept of “stable peace”\(^\text{20}\) which actually was the coinage of Galtung’s ideas of the absence of war (negative peace) and the absence of the structural violence (positive peace) was his opponent’s preceding point that both the concepts of negative and positive peace can collapse. “Stable peace” as Boulding defined was examining how the social systems such as religion and economic behavior supplemented to the peace in the state.

This dichotomy of ideas about peace study has actually one controversial point: Galtung examines peace through the scope of the expanded theory of violence while Boulding defines peace irrespective of any edge dealing with the concept of violence, be it personal or structural\(^\text{21}\). All the other definitions of peace – positive, negative or stable – should either be detached to be examined on the theoretical level or not to be detached at all for one reason: the absence of the personal violence is the inevitably binding but not sufficient component for the peace to be feasible. The “positive” and “stable” peace concepts, in case combined in a single context, can make the part whole. As a conclusion, peace theory should be split into categories for the theoretical research purposes only, however the political implementation of it both on the intrastate and interstate levels should be the consequence of all the categories integrated in the following prioritization order:

1. political will to provide the stability, security and the continuous absence of on-the-ground conflicts/military operations (absence of the direct [personal] violence);
2. political will to manage the socio-economic and cultural integration (absence of the indirect [structural] violence)


\(^{21}\) Ibid.
3. political will to sustain the obtained peace (realization of positive + negative peace)

Back to Immanuel Kant’s “The Perpetual Peace” – the final and crucial point the essay makes is the rudimentary implication about the necessity of a union among the states, which, without bending the sacrosanct sovereignty of a state, would form a domain where each state would be responsible to a considerable extent for the security, well-being and stable development of the neighboring one. This would not be a self-aimed or limitless supervision over the neighbor, but a rather well developed mutually agreed-upon initiative based on the legitimacy of a mandate which unequivocally meant a pursue of self-interests of a state within a union (a vivid example of Boulding’s “stable peace” fostering international stability and security in case it achieves success on the intrastate level). The self-interest on this matter is predetermined by the regional stability stimulating a natural and unfluctuating economic growth. Economic stability indirectly implies a check and balance system within the union, which brings the parties engaged to a similar economic level. The similar level of economic capability of neighboring states prevents the arms sales’ race of unmanageable extents, which, practically, is the most powerful leverage for the conflicts by the mere fact that it exists as a BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement). Kantian perspective “to demand of the other states that they should enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civic one, with which the rights of each could be secured…” 22 restates his former idea of a need for a formal institution to handle the regional peace and security. This kind of formal institution turned out to be the United Nations along with its constitution – the UN Charter.

Part 2

The Evolution of Peacekeeping and the Feasible Levels of Its Implementation

The international practice of bringing the belligerent parties to a common understanding can be conventionally traced back up to June 26, 1945, when the Charter of the United Nations was adopted in San Francisco. The aim of this document was precise: whatever could be reached through soft and non-coercive diplomatic negotiations should not be attempted to distort the international peace and security through wars, thus, “saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war” otherwise the armed intervention in the face of ad hoc military standings from member states would be obliged to get engaged into the conflict area. This, however, is the internationally accepted view on the deployment of the troops for the sake of the international peace however the first compendious effort to address security concerns by an international organization dates back to the League of Nations in 1920. The Articles 12, 13 and 15 of the League of Nations Covenant ipso facto announced that whatever the dispute between the member states, it should be settled within the legal obligations and in accordance with the League of Nations bodies, namely the Council and the Assembly. Article 16 comprehensively stated that in case any of sovereign nation state “resorted to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15”, it thus “would be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League.” Article 16 also called for the readiness of the member state military structures to willingly contribute to the “protection of the covenants of the League.” If there was such a diplomatic all-inclusive prototype of having a peacekeeping military framework

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24 The Covenant of the League of Nations (Including Amendments adopted to December, 1924). http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art16
25 Ibid. 
in the name of the Covenant Articles then why did it collapse along with the League? Leaving aside the general politico-historical motives for the League to cardinally transform and re-emerge into the United Nations in 1945, we shall particularly dwell on the implication why the collaborative security system of the time failed contributing into the consequent inevitable collapse of the whole League of Nations. The notorious fiasco to deal with the crises of Manchuria (1931-1933) and Abyssinia (1934-1937) must be regarded as a core understanding of the case. On the one hand Russia was pursuing “railway diplomacy” in Manchuria, the southeastern territory of China, which was a matter of an urgent concern since it was designating the control over the Chinese Eastern Railway up to Vladivostok. This clash of interests fortunately did not lead to a military intercourse, however it straightforwardly pointed out how much the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 on not using war as a means of solving foreign problems had cracked. On the other hand Japan’s ascending pretension on the expansion of her land territory was acquiring a feasible form of a threat. It is in this very point that the powerlessness and inefficiency of the League’s collective security came to light along with the Japanese soldiers’ settlement on the Manchurian territory after the latter’s armed Mukden Incident against the weakened and fragmented Chinese armed forces. As an aggressor, Japan should not have avoided economic and military sanctions but the League failed to achieve the “fair trial” because of the political incentives. A similar failure happened in Abyssinia which turned out to be a most dull attempt of the Mussolini regime’s Italian power expansionism strategy particularly in the north-east of Africa. A major factor to trigger the Abyssinia crisis was the circumstantial conviction that whatever illegal (in terms of international law) were committed, it would face the same reality as the Manchurian case – the impunity. Despite the Ethiopian emperor’s efforts

27 Ibid.
appealing to the League for help no tangible military intervention from the international organization was achieved. The unequivocal failure to use the peacekeeping (although still not developed as an international term as such) in both the Manchurian and Ethiopian crises was an initial ground for the League to collapse but what was the reason peacekeeping as an international military tool to cease the armed skirmish faced such a fiasco back then in 1930s?

The argument behind the breakdown of the collaborative military intervention into disputing parties’ affairs in 1930s could and must be analyzed through the scope of the political processes of the time. Any international organization has its sustaining pillars – the superpowers which are the nucleus for the maintenance of the target points the commonly arrived at Convention (or as Kant states - constitution) dictates. In case of the League of Nations these pillars were France and Great Britain with the exclusion of Russia and the United States (despite the fact that the latter was the actual initiator for the idea of formalizing the League). The diplomacy behind the scenes was politically understandable yet morally unacceptable: the [militarily] meaningful participation of the League in Manchurian issue would mean the participation of France and Britain first of all which was economically intolerable since both were living the grip of depression and were immersed in the problems of maintaining their own empires. Meanwhile the case with Ethiopia did not pursue economic and/or power regaining justifications. Instead, the diplomatic relations with the emerging power of Europe – Italy, proved to be crucial and the lack of the League’s actions could be explained with the political and diplomatic unwillingness to spoil the relations in the neighborhood. All the aforementioned implications come to state that peacekeeping in the current understanding being a sole prerogative of the international organizations respectively depends on the political will and the diplomatic gambit of the superpowers engaged and cannot be viewed upon as solely a military
structure with its corresponding military administrative superintendents. In this respect there could be drawn one parallel between the ad hoc forces of the League and a standing army of a sovereign nation state: the army being a military institution with its hierarchic prioritization of the personnel cannot and has no right to accomplish a self-determined and uncoordinated actions on the command of the head of the armed forces unless there is a political decision to do so. So was the peacekeeping operation initiative of the League back in 1930s: the international ad hoc troops’ deployment was found inappropriate to be implemented in Manchuria and Abyssinia because of the political incentives but the Covenant of the League never stated a word on deploying military troops on the belligerent land *out of the self-interest and political dividends of the great powers at the expense of the smaller political entities* which practically happened. The collapse of the League in 1946 was timely, because France and Britain could no longer obviously remain the only power centers for the world.

The transformation (or re-emergence) of the League into another international organization – the United Nations – in 1945 was somewhat of a comprehensive interstate step towards the enlargement of the participation of the newly emerging and/or post-war rehabilitating nation states including the Big Five permanent membership in the Security Council which is responsible for the peace and security in the world and peacekeeping operation launches. Now the deployment of the peacekeepers does not internationally rest upon two superpowers’ political agendas, but has to be elaborated collaboratively with a universal aim and will of ceasing the wars in the future.

As a matter of fact, the chaos left as an aftermath of the Cold War and interpreted as “the old world disorder in new configurations” can never tell where the military action will and will
Although this supranational international organization (IO) – the UN – was aimed at bringing the states from all over the world to the understanding that peace and security are not of local or regional character but encompass the world, more than 100 major conflicts worldwide since the establishment of the UN still alarm the incomplete and limping success of the UN Security Council efficiency. The reason for this are the 279 vetoes in the Security Council, which demonstrate the failure of the mutually arrived at opinions and acquiesce to the self-interest-based priorities of the nation states. After the Cold War the situation dramatically changed since the threat of the new World War made the parties engaged review their national political agendas and regain their “responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter.” Today, as a result, it might be interpreted that there is no more apparently obvious East-West competition after the international organizations’ vigil presence in the world politics however the true picture could state the contrary. If the rivalry does not necessarily include military actions or has curtailed the number of the latters (which, obviously, is the case), there might be an erroneous impression that the contemporary international conflicts do not generally have that tendency to trigger a military intercourse. Undeniably, the international relations are of an interstate character and this first of all assumes a sound intrastate condition for each of the parties engaged. In case there is an intrastate active turbulence, there is no guarantee that the neighboring state will be exempt of the consequences of the adjacent conflict. Kyle C. Beardsley, in his article “Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict”, discusses the role the peacekeeping forces play in the prevention of the conflict contagion. As the empirical findings show, there is about 70% increase in the possibility of an armed conflict

30 Ibid.
contagion across the state borders in case the peacekeepers are not deployed to a recent neighboring conflict and a significant drop of probable confrontations when the peacekeepers are deployed. The necessity to discuss the conflict resolution in a cluster of neighboring states is explained by the severity of the armed confrontations the unmanageable character of which can easily distort the regional stability. It would be incompetent to discuss, e.g., the Israeli-Lebanese war of 2006 without taking into account the primary intrastate agitations of the two countries, or refer to the Russia-Georgia war without considering the long-term devastating contentions of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Chechnya which had already shattered and destabilized the state security correspondingly in Georgia and in Russia.

Although being the conceiving stage for the formal peacekeeping missions, the UN has no specific Chapter of the Charter that immediately deals with the deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping operations however Chapter VI and Chapter VII have often been addressed to invoke the peacekeeping operations. Chapter VI of the UN Charter deals with the “Pacific Settlement of the Disputes” and Chapter VII of the UN Charter addresses the “Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches to the Peace and Acts of Aggression”. Along with the first peacekeeping missions (1950s) some feasible spectra were elaborated to hypothetically divide the UN military intervention into the phases. Boutros Boutros Ghali, the sixth Secretary-General of the UN (1992-1996), in his famous report of 1992 (later to become the inducement for the legally binding and internationally agreed upon peacekeeping operations)

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32 Ibid.
defines the three components of the peace establishment in the world: *preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping.*

1) *Preventive diplomacy* as such is the initial step for the peace to be established. It is aimed at detecting and resolving the disputes at the earliest stage however if this stage is eluded and there is an ample ground for the conflict to be realized, preventive diplomacy has to use the soft power to limit the probability of the escalation of the military actions and prevent them from being spread. Preventive diplomacy requires considerable measures to be undertaken initially, most significant of them being confidence based information gathering and both formal and informal fact-finding. The first stage of accomplishing peace establishment may be performed by the Secretary-General personally or via the General Assembly. Regional organizations can also participate in the process alongside with the UN. Confidence building can be executed in a number of ways: systematic exchange of military missions between the states, the arrangement and execution of the free access to the information which include 1) on-the-ground monitoring; 2) regional arms agreements. Confidence building is one of the essential and initial steps for the preventive diplomacy to be effective, thus the new techniques are constantly being elaborated to enrich the existing arsenal of the measures. Fact finding is another complementary aspect of the preventive diplomacy. Since the prevention of the deterrence of military confrontation needs to be early detected, facts that are eligible should have the full capacity to be rapidly and precisely reached out. As the studies of the conflict emergence show, most of them have economic and social background. Hence, the UN draws its attention on the socio-economic and political developments of the party states with regards to fact finding so as to unfold the conflict probabilities at the earliest stage and report an early warning, thus complementing to the

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preventive diplomacy mission. Preventive diplomacy today has merged so much within the concept of peacekeeping, that Paul Deihl, in his article “Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace”, totally assimilates these two concepts not giving any differentiating characteristic between the two.\textsuperscript{36} This can be explained by the current tendency of overgeneralizing the concept of international peacekeeping which gives ample space to maneuver with the employment of the paramilitary functions of peacekeeping as well. And still, not to run astray from the original path of sorting the components of the worldwide peace establishment we shall regard the concepts of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping separately, namely according to Boutros Ghali’s categorization.

2) \textit{Peacemaking}, as indicated in the UN report of 1992, is the action of “bringing hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{37} As stated, in the extended row of the paramilitary options to cease the skirmish, Chapter VI of the UN Charter particularly and primarily dwells upon the “negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements” (Article 33)\textsuperscript{38} and other means complementing the positive outcome of the interference. In the long run of reaching a state of peace, peacemaking lies between the initial conflict deterrence and peacekeeping and, depending on the situation, has either diplomatic or military character. One of the leverages to fulfill the task the imposition of the sanctions is fully under the capabilities of the Security Council, Article 41 of the Charter. This factually suggests, that when an ongoing violent conflict cannot be handled by the contending


\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}
parties, the military intervention of the peacekeeping personnel deals with the peacemaking process which is aimed at the attempt to end the violence. Douglas Noll, a full time peacemaker and mediator who has dealt with over 1200 cases, has elaborated some practicable principles of an effective peacemaking process. Thus, he initially addresses peacemaking as a durable and long-term element in the conflict resolution and not a “polite agreement” with all its superficial, seemingly agreeable consequences. The integrity process of the people after the violent hostilities and the accomplishment of seeking and telling the truth is another highly important technique of peacemaking. The peacemaker instills this value in the process and insists on a commitment to “truth telling from everyone participating in the process.” The opportunity to discuss and examine the “forbidden subjects” of the conflict is another constructive approach to the implementation of the process. This anthropocentric approach to the basic peacemaking allows new visions and ideas about relationships to be explored and perhaps created. Noll stresses the process of discovering the new ideas and solutions to the existing devastated conditions that seem incredible to handle. The other statements accentuate on the feasibly positive and successful outcomes the peacemaking techniques have, one of the ultimate destinations of which is to be a watchdog over the probable escalation of the temporarily settled but still smouldering conflict and to create a refuge for the suffered, whose primary human rights were disenfranchised as a consequence of the armed confrontations.

Accomplishment of a ceasefire is another adjacent phase of peacemaking which actually does not deal with the military aspect of the peacekeeping, since the ceasefire has been reached as a result of either a successful negotiation or the BATNA (diplomatic peacemaking). But the

suspension of hostility does not necessarily imply a guarantee of peace, thus the actual presence of the missionaries at the earliest stage of the real military actions’ deterrence raises the possibility of a more durable and comparatively long-term peace and stability between the confronting sides. Shane Smith in his article “What is a Ceasefire and Why is it Important?” underlines the most significant achievements this sub-stage can bring into the post-conflict amelioration process.\footnote{Smith, S. M. 2003. “What is a Ceasefire and Why is it Important?” Beyond Intractability. http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/cease-fire (Accessed April 27, 2012).} Being a temporary cessation of violence, it does not and cannot fundamentally settle the larger conflict but is intended as a step in that direction. Very often a mutual or bilateral ceasefire is signed to avoid the polarizing effects of the economy the two parties are very probable to face as a result of the military expenditures: individuals gaining and masses (society) loosing. However, ceasefires are not often as peace aimed as they might seem. As the history of post-conflict situations shows, many of them are manipulated as tools for political or strategic asset. For instance, one party may use a ceasefire to reconstruct its ammunition and/or arrange its forces into more convenient martial strategic dispositions. As Smith goes on with the tenuity and vulnerability of the ceasefires, a hostile party may also undertake other provocative actions that are “not in-line with the spirit of the ceasefire”\footnote{Ibid.} in an effort to destabilize the tactics of its opponent, very often inciting the other side to break the ceasefire, bringing condemnation and pressures from third parties. Thus, the ceasefire, although originally aimed at contributing to the peace establishment process as a whole, may divert the escalation of the conflict into a new dimension, in case any of the two disputing parties has geopolitical motives to bring the conflict to his own end.
3) Peace-keeping, the last phase of peace establishment and the “invention of the UN” (as Ghali states), is the actual cluster of all the aforementioned parts that make the idea of peacekeeping possible. Even though the peacekeeping is a relatively new concept, the basic conditions for its successful implementation remain unchanged. Ghali names the following points that are and should be inviolable: 1) a clear and practicable mandate; 2) the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; 3) the continuing support of the Security Council; 4) the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; 5) effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field and; 6) adequate financial and logistic support.44

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*Figure 1: Structural presentation of peacekeeping phases

**Peacekeeping**

1. Preventive Diplomacy
   - Information gathering
   - Formal/informal fact finding
   - Confidence building

2. Peacemaking
   - Negotiations, mediation, enquiry
   - Conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement

3. Peace-enforcement (arbitrary)
   - Cease-fire enforcement (B. Ghali)
   - Accomplishment of ceasefire
   - Resort to regional agencies
   - Post-conflict peace-building

*Figure 2: Prioritization of the peacekeeping processes

1. Initial conflict detection and deterrence (preventive diplomacy)
2. Peacemaking (the attempt to bringing reconciliation between the two hostile parties) (diplomatic peacemaking/military peacemaking)
3. Accomplishment of ceasefire
4. Post-conflict peace-building — (1) rebuilding the institutions & infrastructures; (2) building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among the belligerent parties
5. **Peace-keeping**
Figure 1 illustrates the basic phases Boutros Ghali stated in his 1992 report with the exclusion of peace-keeping (we restrict the usage of the term ‘peace-keeping’ in order to avoid the confusion between the general concept of ‘peacekeeping’ as the collective security of the international organizations and ‘peace-keeping’ as a final phase, the outcome of the actions of these collective military ad hoc armies) and an arbitrary usage of the term ‘peace-enforcement’ initially absent in Ghali’s report as a compound phase. Since the essence of the two major peacekeeping phases (preventive diplomacy and diplomatic/military peacemaking) is already provided, we shall try to understand the core value of the term ‘peace-enforcement’. It would be incompetent to exclude the term from Ghali’s report completely since we encounter the concept in the report in a slightly metamorphosed way: Ghali calls it the ceasefire-enforcement. Donald M. Snow partially explains the reason why the term does not appear in Ghali’s report. He considers this term as a pure American concept synonymous with ‘military peacemaking’.

Ghali did not refer to any national concepts in his report because the UN is a supranational institution and must avoid implementing tools/concepts that speak for a concrete state. He suggested terms that would be universally acknowledged without including or excluding any specific national comprehension of this or that concept and from this perspective Ghali’s report is absolutely relevant. Thus, it can be logically deduced through Snow’s approach that excluding peace-enforcement from the main phases of peacekeeping does not presuppose the rejection of the term as such. It only gives a vaster and freer room for deliberations. Snow mentions some crucial reasons why the peace-enforcement is fundamental. Peacemakers are not always welcomed in the territories they are deployed for one simple reason: if there is an urgent

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peacekeeping need, it means (at least) one of the hostile parties prefers military conclusion for the problem more than the negotiated affairs. Peacemakers are not always militarily engaged in the peace establishment process, but when they do, their peace making mission is logically altered to *peace enforcement* process, where peace is not reached, but imposed (peace enforcement in this matter can be partially leveled with *military peacemaking* only peace enforcement is a rather comprehensive stage to be explained later rather than military peacemaking, which is a subcategory of the second – peacemaking phase). All this assumes that peace enforcers very often may be urged to use a physical force to separate the combatants which rationally means that they need to be equipped and trained differently in contrast with peacemakers whose engagement in physical military actions is incomparably low. As a result, peace enforcement reviews the paramilitary functions of peacekeeping as well and expands them to include negotiating skills, foreign language competency and special martial trainings.\(^{46}\)

Another reason the UN SC refused to use the concept of peace enforcement as an underlying phase was the costly, expensive character of the latter compared to preventive diplomacy or peacemaking. UN resources are not always adequately responsive to the needs of peace enforcement which, as mentioned above, usually includes completely different type of equipment and intensive trainings, hence the caution of the UN SC to avoid the usage of this term. But there is one very dangerous line which, when trespassed, will definitely cause irretrievable consequences: when peacekeeping forces can be inserted into peace enforcement situations. A vivid example of this kind of miscalculation was the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force – the first United Nations peacekeeping force in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Yugoslav wars) peacekeepers in Sarajevo war zone in 1992, where the


peacekeepers were placed in a peace enforcement situation which could not be handled for obvious justifications: insufficiently trained and inadequately equipped. ⁴⁷

As figure 1 indicates, the last stage of the third arbitrary phase of peace enforcement, after having accomplished the ceasefire, aims at the post-conflict peace building action-plan which is nothing but the paramilitary function of the comprehensive concept of peacekeeping. As mentioned, it strives first of all to rebuild and reconstruct the socio-political institutions that either collapsed as a result of the turbulence or were shattered too much to re-function properly. Another characteristic feature of peace building is the regain and restoration of the infrastructures in the damaged territories of both conflicting parties. Secondly, the post-conflict peace building takes the role of the “immediate interlocutor” in establishing bonds of peaceful and mutual-benefit-oriented intercourse between the belligerent parties. This penultimate level of successful peacekeeping implementation can be seen in Figure 2 as well. Interestingly enough, post-conflict peace building was not mentioned in Boutros Boutros Ghali’s report as a component for peacekeeping. Apart from its costly character, it could also be explained by the contemporary paramilitary function it bears which it used to lack then. As a conclusion, it can be derived that peacekeeping forces today do not restrain themselves solely in the maintenance of the physical survival or well-being of the people of conflicting sides, but engage further ameliorative steps that should be taken as a must for a better and successful fulfillment of the mission. As a proof, William J. Durch and Tobias C. Berkman, in their cohort study “Who Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations”, discuss the urgency of the multidimensional component of today’s peacekeeping, “as populations grow and distances shrink, borders leak, and belief systems clash, the divisibility of peace becomes

increasingly difficult to sustain, either conceptually or operationally…” The peacekeeping troops, compared to other types of intervention that shifted the historical development of the governance of a sovereign unity, are carried out only under the international mandate – an agreed upon doctrine, where the decision making process rests upon many shoulders. This international mandate today has acquired somewhat paramilitary dimension. The term “paramilitary dimension” when regarding peacekeeping can be defined as a schedule of actions predetermined for the peacekeepers to accomplish in the conflicting territory which do not directly involve military actions, instead they are aimed at reconstructing the devastated infrastructure in both affected areas, (re)establishing the rule of law and fostering internationally-recognized principles of democracy and respect for human rights. These are the paramilitary dimensions of today’s globalized world, where the sole peace establishment process has ceased to be effective unless it incorporates the principles for the good governance for the suffered parties. Ghali’s principles are the ground for formalizing the peacekeeping missions but twenty years have passed after the report and the inevitable progress of the government structures and ideological changes the governments have faced has ultimately resulted in the shaping of the multidimensional aspect of today’s peacekeeping.

As a conclusion, the understanding of the politico-historical processes the world underwent after the collapse of the League of Nations is essential to estimate the level of the urgency of finally institutionalizing the Charter-based idea of the collective security. As mentioned, there are no Articles of the UN Charter that directly deal with the fulfillment of the peacekeeping operations, however the imperative of the UN’s intervention in the conflicts that shatter the international stability and security was the cornerstone for Boutros Boutros Ghali to

49 Ibid.
make the famous report of 1992 grounding the three principles of peacekeeping for the achievement of the international peace and security. As the political processes are constantly developing and altering in their ideology of governing, so do the conflicts: they change in the character and the level of violence. This observation logically leads to a conclusion, that sole military intervention, apart from being too restricted and unclear in the final peaceful outcome of the conflict, is a necessary but not insufficient component for the accomplishment of peace. Peacekeeping should be regarded in a cluster of paramilitary functions which include the reestablishment of the infrastructure of the suffered regions, introducing or reconstructing the democratic principles and the respect for the human rights. Unless there is a clear comprehension that a success is achievable only when the peace establishment process is viewed in the complementary setting, peace establishment will be half-realized objective rather than an on-the-ground accomplishment.

Part 3

The Geopolitical Implications of Armenia's Participation in Peacekeeping Missions: the Costs Paid and the Benefits Gained

It stands to reason, that today the political isolation has become impossible in our globalized world. The formation and institutionalization of the international organizations set the ground for multi-vector cooperation and determination to sustain and maintain the international peace and security as the crucial stance for the war-free world. The Republic of Armenia, with its fatal geopolitical location and developing trends to enhance new strategic alliances in and out of the region, has become a part of the concept of having secure world through collective security and cooperation. It all started in 2001, when the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia Vartan Oskanian, on behalf of the RA Government, signed a memorandum to join the system of peacekeeping operations under the mandate of the UN. Although the peacekeeping unit of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia was formulated on March 2001 with Captain Artak A. Tonoyan as the first commander, the first peacekeeping operation Armenia took part was only in 2004. As the former deputy defense minister of the RA Arthur Aghabekyan states, Armenia tries to balance its cooperation on the strategic alliances with the international community which is interested in the secure and stable development of the Caucasus region and this very mutual interest-based relationship actually defines the “foreign military policy and military co-operation programs” of the Ministry of Defense of Armenia.

51 «ՀՀ Հանրապետության պետական զինվածության կողմից երկու կողմի հաճախածության մասին», unpublished article by A. Mkrtchyan
52 Ibid.
*Figure 3: Armenian Peacekeeping Operations*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Deployment</th>
<th>Year/ Rotation Period</th>
<th>Head of the Personnel/ Number of peacekeepers</th>
<th>Auspices</th>
<th>Additional Info</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Feb. 2004/ (6 months)</td>
<td>First Lieutenant Artyom Avdalyan/ 34</td>
<td>Greek Military Units</td>
<td>2006 – RA decision to increase the PKs’ number up to 70. 2008 – As a result of the international military reduction, the number of RA PK reduced up to 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Jan. 2005/ (6 months)</td>
<td>Captain Garush B. Avetisyan/ 45</td>
<td>Polish Military Units</td>
<td>The decision of the Coalition Forces in Iraq to leave a limited number of US military force, as a result, Armenian PKs withdrawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afganistan</td>
<td>Jan. 2010/ (up to June 2012)</td>
<td>Mayor Arkadi M. Tonoyan/ 40</td>
<td>German Military Units</td>
<td>Armenian PKs participating in the International Security Support Forces; the termination of the service expected in June 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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54 Information source: «<< հայ եռան հասարակական կազմակերպություններ>>, unpublished article by A. Mkrtchyan
Armenia’s cooperation on the security strategy most significantly deals with NATO, particularly the framework of the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), which is viewed as a leading element of Armenia’s security when dealing with the international players. This, however, does not reduce Armenia’s willingness to cooperate in the Euro-Atlantic region. This is illustrated with the readiness to participate not only in peacekeeping missions and exercises but also in antiterrorist initiatives and regional programs carried out according to the scope of Armenia’s interior military capacity. As a result, Armenia-PfP fertile cooperation increased the qualitative and quantitative strategic deals between Armenia and NATO in a wider range, including scientific, cultural and educational programs. This, undoubtedly, is both – a military and political merit for the enhancement of the efficient army ready to implement rapid and/or spontaneous military commands on the military perspective, and have a more in-depth integration process on the political aspect. The Armenia-NATO ties do not restrain themselves solely within the spectrum of PfP programme but also engage the Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) which prioritizes peacekeeping, language training, defense policy and strategy, exercises, military education and training and military medical service.55 Another dimension of Armenia-NATO cooperation in the field of security and peace is the Planning and Review Process (APRP) (October, 2003). Planning and Review Process aims at “creating national peacekeeping forces and demining center according to NATO standards for participation in a NATO/PfP exercises and with the purpose of real engagement in peacekeeping operations in the nearest future.” 56

55 Aghabekyan, A. “Evaluation of Bilateral and Multilateral Defence Co-operation and Assistance.”
56 Ibid.
*Figure 4: Armenian Peacekeepers’ Military Exercises/Trainings and Peacekeeping Programs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country of Deployment</th>
<th>Military Training Program</th>
<th>NATO Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>“Cooperative Best Effort”</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace (PfP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002; 2004</td>
<td>Georgia; Lithuania</td>
<td>Medical Rescue Trainings</td>
<td>Individual Partnership Program (IPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>“Cooperative Best Effort”</td>
<td>Planning and Review Process (PARP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>F.Y.R of Macedonia</td>
<td>“Cooperative Partner”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>“Viking 2005”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>“Rapid Trident 2006-2007”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>“Cooperative Longbow”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>“Sea Breeze” “Cooperative Longbow” “Cooperative Spearman”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012**</td>
<td>F.Y.R of Macedonia</td>
<td>“Cooperative Longbow” “Cooperative Lancer”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Trainings</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Doctor 2008” “Urgent 2008”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 Trainings</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Doctor 2009” “Objective 2009”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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57 Information source: «<< այս 95532 օրիորդությունը հասանելու նպատակ>>», unpublished article by A. Mkrtchyan
** [http://www.mil.am/1337349266/page/158](http://www.mil.am/1337349266/page/158)
What are the costs a country has to pay and the benefits it can gain when participating in peacekeeping missions? The answer is of multidimensional character since the costs and benefits comprise both military and political propensities. The founding director at Regional Studies Center Richard Giragosian states in the interview, that there are three broad and comprehensive aspects that explain the rationale behind Armenia’s involvement in peacekeeping missions: *international experience, political integration* and *know-how for operating in multicultural settings*. 

Thus, in order to understand whether the costs and benefits Armenia faces are more of political rather than military amplitude, the unfolding of these three general spectra should be provided. As Giragosian mentions, international experience of Armenian military units in the country of deployment is more of a military advantage for the obvious reason that the personnel gets the discernment and the knowledge of the contemporary military equipment and the techniques to run the latters. This is a rather feasible achievement for the armed of Armenia because it is vital for a non-fighting army to sustain its continuous military readiness in case there is a need to handle the domestic conflict resolution process relating to Nagorno Kharabakh.

Another significant aspect is the nature of peacekeeping operations where Armenia serves under the foreign command and as it is illustrated in figure 4, it is not offensive in nature and deals mainly with the civic society, establishment of peace in the territory and participating in antiterrorist initiatives. This suggests that the military experience is actually rather limited because the peacekeeping mission experience Armenian military units gain is different than the combat experience. The justification to this is the personnel that is sent to the aforementioned peacekeeping programs: e.g., when in 2005 Armenian troops, under the command of captain Garush B. Avetisyan were sent to Iraq for carrying out the peacekeeping operations Armenia had

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58 Interview with Richard Giragosian, the founding director of the Regional Studies Center (Yerevan, June 5, 2012)
agreed and signed to participate previously, the personnel consisted solely of sappers, doctors and drivers.\(^6\) This comes to prove that Armenia’s participation in peacekeeping missions pursues not straightforwardly military gain (the units sent predominantly consist of non-fighting personnel) but rather an integration process into contemporary international political processes, and this is the next broad area Giragosian mentions. NATO peacekeeping initiatives that deal with language training, defense policy and strategy, exercises, military medical service, military education and training are aimed at engaging Armenia into a new environment of cooperation on the supranational level, hence the political gain outweighs the military one. Moreover, Armenia is an “isolated, landlocked and insignificant country in terms of global insecurity”. Therefore Armenia’s peacekeeping operations maximize, build up its strength more than it would ordinarily be.\(^6\) Another broad area Giragosian mentions is the know-how for operating in multicultural settings. This very skill was prioritized in the interview with a combat of the Armenian peacekeeping forces Arthur Mkrtchyan, who stressed this ability to manage to coexist and collaborate in a multicultural environment. He states, that dealing with civic society and experiencing a cultural shock after the deployment is one of the most difficult tasks for an ordinary peacekeeper to handle primarily along with homesick and other personal difficulties a young soldier may experience.\(^6\) This is the reason he highly acknowledges the role of the NATO peacekeeping oriented programs that train the young combatants in multi-vector perspectives, including the basic knowledge about the deployment country, its traditions and customs’ characteristics and intercultural communication. Hence, the know-how for operating in multicultural settings is essential for the efficient outcome of the training programs and can be put into both sets of political and military benefits the peacekeeping covers.

\(^6\) Information source: «<< Ու 95532 ԶՆՐՆՈՒՄՆ ՊՈՍՈՒՄՆՈՒՄՆ ՈՐՈՇ»», unpublished article by A. Mkrtchyan
\(^6\) Interview with Richard Giragosian, the founding director of the Regional Studies Center (Yerevan, June 5, 2012)
\(^6\) Interview with Arthur Mkrtchyan, the combat of the Armenian peacekeeping forces (Yerevan, March 29, 2012)
What are the costs Armenia pays for participating in peacekeeping missions? Two of the basic disbursements should be taken into account: for every peacekeeping operation Armenia joins initiatives of western origin, namely NATO programs. This theoretically damages the strategic relationship with Russia as the Russia-NATO “rivalry” is not new in its politico-historical perspectives. But neglecting Russian factor as the first strategic ally would be politically short-sighted and Armenia’s stand in this matter is clear: Armenia’s not joining NATO is a message to Russia to show Armenia’s political alliance-based loyalty to the latter.\(^\text{63}\)

The second cost that Armenia has to take into consideration is the endangering the lives of Armenian soldiers. Richard Giragosian finds that Armenia dangers the lives of the soldiers with every peacekeeping of deployment. It has domestic political implications: “if Armenians are dying when serving in Afghanistan and not in fighting against Azeris, then is it worth then at all?” states the political analyst.\(^\text{64}\) This is another dimension that Armenia should consider while deploying peacekeeping troops. However the benefits gained do overpower the costs. One of the obvious gains the country wins is the possibility to deepen the ties with NATO, which, as already mentioned, cover not only the military preparedness and elevation of the cultural awareness of the participants due to the continuous peacekeeping trainings but go deep to comprise also the scientific, educational and cultural programs which aims at strengthening Armenia’s role on the international arena, which, in fact, has a direct link to the broadening of the international experience the military personnel of the Armenian Armed Forces undergoes.

And finally, a third point that makes Armenia’s participation in peacekeeping missions politically beneficial: deepening ties with NATO is not unilateral in its political implication.

\(^{63}\) Interview with Richard Giragosian, the founding director of the Regional Studies Center (Yerevan, June 5, 2012)

\(^{64}\) Ibid.
Despite Armenia’s not joining NATO, the more Armenia has pro-western inclination, the more it could theoretically motivate Russia to enhance and deepen its strategic (first of all) military alliance with Armenia for the sake of the preservation of peace and security in the region.

*Figure 5. The Probable Costs and Benefits for Armenia’s Participation in Peacekeeping Missions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Russian factor as a counterpoise to NATO</td>
<td>1. international experience (<em>military</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Endangering the lives of Armenian soldiers</td>
<td>3. political integration (<em>political</em>)</td>
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<td>4. know-how for operating in multicultural settings (<em>political/military</em>)</td>
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<td>5. Deepening comprehensive ties with NATO (<em>political</em>)</td>
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<td>6. Stronger bargaining position with Russia (<em>political</em>)</td>
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CONCLUSION

As a conclusion, the tendencies of today’s efforts to reduce the warlike circumstances in the world seem to be too far from handling, however the institutionalization process of stabilizing the international peace and security on the legal grounds has always been in a process. As it was obvious from Immanuel Kant’s philosophical essay “The Perpetual Peace”, there is no state of peace in nature which notwithstanding the fact that does not exist as such should be sustained and maintained through first of all abolishing the standing armies of the sovereign states under the auspices of the governments of the states. It was also clear, that this theoretical utopian perspective has no feasible grounds for today’s globalized world with escalating arms sales indicators, however the core significance of the essay was the conceiving idea of institutionalizing the collective security under “one nation’s declaration” – the prototype of today’s United Nations with its Charter. The second part touched upon the politico-historical processes that confirmed the need for a more structured and formalized collective security. Further, the reasons the League of Nations security policy collapsed were touched upon and the historical transition of the League’s failed strategy into the United Nations’ comprehensive interstate step towards the enlargement of the participation of the newly emerging and/or post-war rehabilitating nation states including the Big Five permanent membership in the Security Council responsible for the peace and security in the world and peacekeeping operation launches was discussed. Boutros Boutros Ghali’s core components towards conceptualizing the idea of peacekeeping as such were provided which run through the red line in the background of the modern paramilitary functions peacekeeping has developed throughout its history. As the findings showed, these modern paramilitary functions of peacekeeping, though being
comprehensive and vast in their theoretical propensities, have quite empirical implications which
comprise the recovery of the democratic principles in the devastated conflicting territories,
establishing the rule of law, renovating the local infrastructure and promoting human rights.
Finally, part three discussed Armenia’s role as a newcomer in the contemporary peacekeeping
“club” and its dimensions Armenia cooperates with the international organizations, namely the
UN and NATO. It started in 2001, when the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia Vartan
Oskanian signed a memorandum to join the system of peacekeeping operations under the
mandate of the UN. As the study showed, today Armenia is closely cooperating with NATO-
initiated PfP, IPP and PARP programs, which are aimed at raising the awareness of the
participants about contemporary sophisticated military technologies, giving an insight into the
non-military initiatives that Armenia has been engaged which include scientific, cultural and
educational programs. All these initiatives are aimed at enlarging the political integration of the
country. The study also discussed the political and military costs Armenia pays and the benefits
she gains when participating in peacekeeping missions. As the findings showed, the benefits of
participating in the international peacekeeping missions outweigh the costs the country pays
which implies that the path of political integration Armenia has undertaken is and can partially
be predetermined by the country’s participation in peacekeeping training programs aimed at
enlarging the paramilitary scope of NATO undertakings. The analysis of the study also showed
that Armenia’s political credentials outweighed the military ones.

As a matter of fact, the stabilization of worldwide peace and security is a matter of
concern not for single actors but the whole international community and this implies the
commitment of the states’ governments to the adherence of the UN Charter fostering stability
and cooperation. The degree of devastation wars or warlike situations cause to the international
security and stability is unpredictable and in order to avoid the fatal consequences the world has already witnessed twice, the cooperation and integration into the international political processes should be in the core of the international relations as an alternative to confrontations and as a diminishing factor for armed conflicts.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX 1

Questionnaire for the interview

1. What is the most difficult task for a peacekeeper to deal with on the early period of his deployment?

2. How would you evaluate the peacekeepers’ input in the conflict resolution processes?

3. What benefits does Armenia have when participating in peacekeeping missions compared to those countries who are not engaged in peacekeeping initiatives?

4. How would you characterize the costs Armenia pays when participating in peacekeeping missions?

APPENDIX 2

Interviewees

Arthur Mkrtchyan, the combat of the Armenian peacekeeping forces

Richard Giragosian, political analyst, the founding director of the Regional Studies Center