

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA

THE DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC OPINION ON FOREIGN POLICY

IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS:

FACTORS AFFECTING THE PERCEPTION OF RUSSIA

A MASTER'S ESSAY SUBMITTED TO

THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FOR PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

BY

SOFYA SIMONYAN

YEREVAN, ARMENIA

DECEMBER 2008

SIGNATURE PAGE

Faculty Advisor

Date

Dean

Date

American University of Armenia

December 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	7
Literature Review	8
Methodology.....	18
Findings	21
Georgia	21
Azerbaijan.....	23
Armenia	25
Analysis	27
Georgia	27
Azerbaijan:.....	28
Conclusion and Recommendations	30
APPENDIX	32
GEORGIA	32
AZERBAIJAN.....	38
ARMENIA.....	44
REFERENCES	49

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1.....	10
Table 1: First language spoken in the household	32
Table 2: Second language spoken in the household	32
Table 3: Ethnicity	33
Table 4: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the economic sphere.....	33
Table 5: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the political sphere.....	33
Table 6: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the economic sphere.....	34
Table 7: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the political sphere.....	34
Table 8: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the economic sphere.....	34
Table 9: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the political sphere.....	35
Table 10: Attitude towards Georgia cooperating with NATO	35
Table 11: Attitude towards Georgia becoming a NATO member.....	35
Table 12 : Last country of migration	36
Table 13: Duration of the migrant's stay in Russia	36
Table 14: Migrant's right of residence in Russia	36
Table 15: Sources of income of the migrant in Russia.....	37
Table 16: Labor conditions of the migrant in Russia	37
Table 17: Channel of migration to Russia	37

Table 18: First language spoken in the household	38
Table 19: Second language spoken in the household	38
Table 20: Ethnicity	39
Table 21: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the economic sphere	39
Table 22: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the political sphere.....	39
Table 23: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the economic sphere.....	40
Table 24: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the political sphere.....	40
Table 25: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the economic sphere.....	40
Table 26: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the political sphere.....	41
Table 27: Attitude towards Azerbaijan cooperating with NATO.....	41
Table 28: Attitude towards Azerbaijan becoming a NATO member	41
Table 29: Last country of migration	41
Table 30: Duration of the migrant's stay in Russia	42
Table 31: Migrant's right of residence in Russia	42
Table 32: Sources of income of the migrant in Russia.....	42
Table 33: Labor conditions of the migrant in Russia	42
Table 34: Channel of migration to Russia	43
Table 35: First language spoken in the household	44
Table 36: Second language spoken in the household	44
Table 37: Ethnicity	44

Table 38: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the economic sphere.....	45
Table 39: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the political sphere.....	45
Table 40: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the economic sphere.....	45
Table 41: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the political sphere.....	45
Table 42: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the economic sphere.....	46
Table 43: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the political sphere.....	46
Table 44: Attitude towards Armenia cooperating with NATO	46
Table 45: Attitude towards Armenia becoming a NATO member	47
Table 46 : Last country of migration	47
Table 47: Duration of the migrant's stay in Russia	47
Table 48: Migrant's right of residence in Russia	47
Table 49: Sources of income of the migrant in Russia.....	48
Table 50: Labor conditions of the migrant in Russia	48
Table 51: Channel of migration to Russia	48

Introduction

Many scholars and political philosophers have recognized that political systems are products of socially transmitted ideas, habits of mind and traditions and that no analysis of policy making makes sense without a cultural or identity context (Inkeles and Bauer 1959; Almond and Verba 1963; Gray 1999; Jones 2003).

With the end of the Cold War, extensive research has been conducted to identify the determinants of foreign policy orientations in the post-Soviet space, focusing on the competing images of Russia versus West. Studies have shown that the cultural context embedded in the notion of identity is one of the most important factors shaping political attitude and behavior in the post-Soviet space, thus, reaffirming Huntington's paradigm that in the post-Cold War world the most significant distinctions among peoples are neither ideological nor political but cultural.

The notion of identity has become central in most studies that focus on Russia's relations with its "Near Abroad" neighbors. The post-Soviet nations forming part of the Russian Federation, CIS or Europe are often perceived in terms of their cultural affinity with Russia and their political orientation towards or against Russia. In a way, this "pro" or "anti" Russian perception came to replace the classic Cold War division of nations into "socialist" or "capitalist" blocs forming a new, less explicit geopolitical identity.

The purpose of this paper is to study and compare the determinants of public opinion on foreign policy in the South Caucasus focusing on either pro-Russian or pro-Western attitudes to their foreign policies.

The paper begins with a literature review of studies conducted on post-communist foreign policies, sets the hypothesis and the research questions discussed in this study, and then provides a detailed description of the methodology used to test the hypothesis and the research questions. The findings section provides the data on the variables used in the study followed by the data analysis. The paper concludes with a set of policy recommendations.

Literature Review

Studies of post-communist foreign policies have attracted much attention in the last two decades. Many scholars have attempted to identify the major tendencies in the post-communist states in terms of their foreign policy orientations and to analyze the core reasons underlying their foreign relations. Studies have also considered the content of official foreign policy statements and media to determine the general orientation of foreign policy in post-communist states. In some post-communist countries, the phrase “Back to Europe” or “Return to Europe” is substantially evident in popular discourse. At the heart of these slogans are the beliefs that these countries are not conforming but re-adopting practices and values not only that they share but also to which they have historically contributed (Fawn 2003).

According to Fawn, while the Soviet influence is still strong in the post-communist countries, the Soviet or Russian cultural influences appear to be relatively small for those countries seeking Western reorientation. This represents a major concern for Russia, which is interested in maintaining and increasing its influence in the region through conducting what Valdez refers to as a “Russophone” foreign policy of protecting the interests of Russians, as well as “Russified” non-Russians and Russian-speakers living in the “Near Abroad” (Valdez 1995).

Still, for many post-communist countries prevalent are the practices of balancing between big neighbors - obviously, for the simple reason of securing statehood (Fawn 2003). Charles King argues, that, for example, Moldova does not have foreign policy but only foreign relations and that national identity is not consequential to those relations. Rather, the neutral position Moldova adopted with respect to its two key neighbors is based substantially on “a realistic assessment of options of a small country situated on the periphery of Europe” (King 2003). However, the viability of neutrality as a policy option in the post-communist states is often unaffordable. Hence, as Fawn argues, the post-communist lack of choice of neutrality makes geopolitical alignment even more important – either towards Western or Russian institutions.

According to Munro, feelings about foreign affairs issues vary in intensity across society,

and minority preferences are sometimes more influential than those of the majority (Munro 2007). Munro studies the factors that influence the outlook of Ukrainians, determining whether they face West in hopes of re-establishing the ties that bound western Ukraine to Central Europe in Habsburg times, or whether they face toward Moscow, which offers, as an alternative, a Eurasian vision of Ukraine's political future. Between these two options is a third way—attempting to maintain equal openness to both sides. The study reports survey data from the February 2005 survey in Ukraine with a nationally representative sample of 2,000 respondents, focusing on whether they saw their country's future more with Russia or more with Western Europe. The variables under study include regional differences, social and economic structure, political values and the cultural dimension, including communal or national identity.

With respect to the cultural dimension, Shulman identifies two distinct “national identity complexes” in Ukraine, one “ethnic Ukrainian” and the other “Eastern Slavic.” The two complexes comprise diametrically opposed attitudes toward Ukrainian and Russian culture, language, and history, and include cultural and foreign policy preferences (Shulman 2004).

Kubicek found that ethnicity sometimes affects foreign policy preferences in Ukraine, after controlling for other demographic, contextual, and economic influences (Kubicek 2000).

According to McAllister and Light, Ukrainian-speakers tend to be more pro-Western than Russian-speakers, controlling for other influences. On the basis of these and other prior studies, it appears that communal identity, including ethnicity and language, strongly affects foreign policy preferences in the post-Soviet states. In other words, cultural background influences the orientation between Russia and the West (White, McAllister, and Light 2002).

In 2000, Petrenko et al (2000) attempted to reconstruct an implicit model of geopolitical space perceived by the Russians, analyzing specific ethnic stereotypes and mental geopolitical perceptions of the Russians with regard to other nations. The sample of the respondents comprises mostly students or graduates of a number of Russian universities, and, as such, cannot be considered truly representative.

The bias in the level of education of the respondents is explained by the nature of the study, which requires certain knowledge of geography and geopolitics. The respondents were asked to grade a number of countries, including post-Soviet states, characterizing the level of coordination of the countries with Russia in terms of their “friendliness and spiritual closeness to Russia.” The scales ranked from 3 to -3, with 3 standing for the maximum value given by the respondent and -3 standing for the opposite, antonymic value. The findings were then juxtaposed to a geographic map indicating the level of friendliness and spiritual closeness to Russia in different countries (see figure 1).

Figure 1.



To identify the closest and most reliable partners of Russia among post-Soviet space, Samuylov (2001) conceived different geographic, ethnic-cultural and historical characteristics measured by the level of religious, cultural and ethnic closeness towards the Russians, the attitude of the titular ethnos of the state to Russia and the Russians within that state and the modern geopolitical and security orientations of the post-Soviet state. Each measure was estimated through the quantitative expression of the affinity with Russia, where the attitude to Russia ranked 0-6, from the most negative corresponding to value 0 to the most positive attitude corresponding to value 6, respectively. The analysis considered history and geography of the countries under study, their culture, their modern security and geopolitical factors, public polls, and other empirical data available at the moment of study. According to Samuylov's classification, among the post-Soviet states, Belarus had the highest cumulative grade on all eight measures totaling 38, while Armenia ranked second totaling 31. Belarus and Armenia are followed by Moldova, whose cumulative grade was 23, and then by Kazakhstan and Ukraine rating 21. As for the other two South Caucasus states, Samuylov argues that despite the cultural and religious affinity, Georgia can be ranked only 15, which is explained by the pro-Western foreign policy conducted by the ruling elite and the wide-spread anti-Russian moods in the Georgian political circles. Similarly, Azerbaijan is estimated 10, and this low grade is accounted for by the "pro-Turkish and pro-Western foreign policy mostly under the rule of the former member of the Soviet Communist Politburo, President Geydar Aliev... who achieved withdrawal of all Russian troops" (Samuylov 2001:41). However, Samuylov believes that such a geopolitical orientation is natural for a state, which, with respect to religion, culture, ethnic kin and geography is objectively closer towards Turkey than Russia. According to Samuylov, the same is true with regard to the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which are rated 18, 13, 9 and 5, respectively.

The studies conducted by Petrenko et al (2000) and Samuylov (2001) both view the cultural factor dominant in the modern post-Soviet foreign policy - an assertion that can be traced back to Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" (1996), arguing that, with the end of the Cold War, culture became both a divisive and a unifying force in international relations since different civilizations have different systems of basic human values.

If culture has come to be viewed as a dominant factor in shaping modern international relations, geography and economy have traditionally affected most foreign policy priorities all over the world. In the South Caucasus, the factors that traditionally determined foreign policies of the three states were location, history, and the developments of the regional conflicts. In this regard, the close coordination of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan with Russia was natural in the years following the independence, given the historical perception of Russia as the main guarantor of stability and security. Similarly, Russia's interest in the South Caucasus was long-standing with roots of the military involvement dating back to Peter the Great (1683-1725) whose abortive Persian expedition of 1722 aimed at extending the Russian presence toward the Indian Ocean (Kazemzadeh 1974; Swietochowski 1995). The expansion of the Russian influence in the region gave rise to a new cultural phenomenon that emerged from the contact of the two civilizations – traditional Eastern and comparatively modern Western as represented by Russia. In the first decades of the nineteenth century liberal Russia, despite its autocratic tradition, was for the Caucasus nations a channel to the West, reinforcing their sense of Europeanness. As a result, a new social force emerged in the context of the Caucasus history termed "intelligentsia", which, however, carries a somewhat different meaning from that in European languages (Jones 2003; Swietochowski 1995). In Russia, the classic definition of "intelligentsia" was that of "a group formed of individuals from various social classes and held together by ideas, not by a shared common profession or economic status" (Swietochowski 1995:25).

In the languages of the Caucasus nations in Russia, the term “intelligentsia” referred to those who had acquired the ways of the Europeans viewed as infidels in the Muslim societies, and as such, were no longer a part of the traditional community. Thus, for instance, Swietochowski argues that within the Azeri society, the intelligentsia represented “a conduit for European ideas” and “the main agent of change,” due to the set of common attitudes, values and beliefs that this group shared starting from the first decades of the nineteenth century. In the Caucasus societies, intelligentsia implied certain achievement in European-style education, acquired through familiarity with the Russian environment, mostly through military or civil service, respectively. They usually had attended Russian military schools or the “Russo-Tsar” schools in existence since the 1830s, and soon intelligentsia came to be dominated by graduates of Russian universities and of the teacher’s seminaries in Gori and Tiflis. Conversely, people with a background of traditional Islamic schooling were not counted among intelligentsia (Swietochowski 1995).

The era of Sovietization brought new cultural policies that aimed to cut the links to the past and ensure integration and fusion of all nationalities into the Soviet system through intensified secularism and Russification in the Caucasus. Since study of the native language in Russian schools of the non-Russian republics was not obligatory, the parents were left with the choice of sending their children to schools with either Russian or the native language of instruction. Since many parents believed that Russian education gave more opportunities for their children’s future careers, they preferred to send their children to Russian schools. As a result, the schools with non-Russian languages of instruction were degraded to a second-class status. In general, bilingualism covered a large part of the better educated, urban population, who would use their native language mainly as the spoken idiom (Henze 1984). This phenomenon was particularly strong in Azerbaijan, where, according to Swietochowski (1995), the majority felt more comfortable writing and reading in Russian than in Azeri.

“Let’s say it frankly,” wrote poet Bakhtiar Vahabzade (1988), “The Azerbaijanis attending the Russian schools are often unable to express their thoughts in the native language.... In Azerbaijani school, the teaching of Russian begins in the first grade, that is, before the children have thorough knowledge of the native language, without the feeling for its nature and beauty” (Vahabzade 1988).

The years of perestroika and independence of the three South Caucasus republics saw a growing wave of nationalism leading to eruption of ethnic conflicts. With intensification of nationalistic sentiments across the region, voices were raised against the dangers of linguistic and cultural Russification and against Russian imperialism in particular. However, by 1993, it became obvious that Russia was not going to lose its influence in the South Caucasus. “An Empire does not die easily, especially if it sits astride the geopolitical center of the world’s land mass and the relationship of forces evokes the image of a shark among sardines,” writes Swietochowski (1995:234). Today, Russia continues to play a key role in the South Caucasus, yet, some analysts point out that the influence that Russia continues to wield among the Caucasus states is a product of not as much victory of Russian diplomacy, but rather of a number of factors largely outside of Russia’s control, such as post-Soviet inertia, geography, and political convenience (Flanagan and Schear 2007). Also, in the recent years, the foreign policies of the three South Caucasus states have started to take a different direction with respect to a greater involvement with the EU and NATO. The enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and the decision to incorporate Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan into the European Neighborhood Policy opened wide perspectives for closer political, economic and cultural integrations with the EU. The involvement of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the European Neighborhood Policy is an indication of a stronger wish to become a member of the European family, as the EU borders are moving Eastward, even though ENP does not envision ultimate membership for the country (Poghosyan 2005).

In a commentary in "The Moscow Times," Thomas de Waal, the Caucasus editor at the London-based Institute for War and Peace Reporting, argues that Moscow's influence in the South Caucasus region has been steadily waning in recent years (RFE/RL 2007). According to de Waal, although Russia has become stronger politically and economically than 10 years ago, its "shortsighted" policies have resulted in a weaker influence on Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan on all fronts. Thus, as a result of Russia's blockade of Georgian wine and agricultural products, Georgia has opened its market to other countries. Similarly, Gazprom's policies pushed Azerbaijan into a more pro-Western position, and, according to Stepan Grigorian, the director of the Center for Globalization and Regional Cooperation in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, this shift is even happening in Armenia, partly due to Russia's closure of the Verkhny Lars crossing point between Armenia and Georgia, which automatically closed off Armenia's ground communications. As a result, Armenian businessmen began orienting themselves more toward Western markets (RFE/RL 2007).

In many ways, foreign policy formulations in the South Caucasus have been characterized by a game of balancing geopolitical interests and allegiances. In this regard, the official foreign policies pursued by the three South Caucasus states differ in terms of their either pro-Russian or pro-Western orientations. Starting from the first years of independence, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been bound into a common front forming a GUAM force (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) to counterbalance Russia, which was viewed by these states as a potential enemy, due to the support Russia has been showing for the secessionist claims of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and its military and political alliance with Armenia (Cornell 2000). Conversely, the course that Armenia has followed views Russia as an important ally and a key guarantor of its security. Thus, unlike its two South Caucasus neighbors that have clearly made their choice between these two pro-Russian or pro-Western alternatives in favor of the West, Armenia is still more in favor of Russia (Begoyan 2006).

The war in South Ossetia of August 2008, which Western scholars have named “The Five-Day War,” brought the relations between Russia and Georgia to their lowest point. US journalists were quick to compare the conflict to Leonid Brezhnev's crushing of the Prague Spring or Hitler's invasion of the Sudetenland (King 2008). Others view it as a test of strength, in which Russian strength has prevailed, taking the chance to stand up to “U.S. influence in Moscow's backyard” (Sestanovich 2008). The damage brought by the war to the tools of Western policy has never been so severe since the dark days of the Cold War because even those NATO members that had endorsed eventual membership for Georgia or Ukraine are now divided on the issue. According to Sestanovich (2008), the war brought some reassessment of foreign policy priorities across the former Soviet states. If some had viewed closer cooperation with NATO as a critical lifeline to the outside world, in the aftermath of the war, they wonder whether this is still a good idea (Sestanovich 2008).

Whatever the differences in the official policies of Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan towards Moscow, Russian culture still forms a part of all the three nations' identities – to a greater or lesser degree. Also, Russia is home to millions of Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians, and many families back in these states depend on the remittances they send home. Hence, the final decision of the three South Caucasus states in terms of choosing to orient itself toward Russia or the West depends on which option can fully satisfy not only their geopolitical and national interests of the states but also the national identity of their populations at large.

This study analyzes the determinants of public opinion on foreign policy in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan focusing on either pro-Russian or pro-Western attitudes to their foreign policies. The research hypothesizes that people holding stronger Russian identities are more likely to have a pro-Russian attitude to foreign policy, which includes a positive attitude to closer coordination more with Russia than the West (including NATO) both in the economic and political sphere.

For the purposes of this study, “identity” is conceptualized as cultural and socio-economic background. Cultural background includes measures such as ethnicity and the language(s) spoken in the households. The research then analyzes whether people of a stronger Russia-oriented cultural background are more likely to have a pro-Russian attitude to foreign policy (Research Question 1).

Socio-economic background is measured for the households that have migrants in either Russia or EU/US and are conceptualized by the level of integration of the migrant in the host country, assuming that the higher the level of the migrant's integration in the host country, the stronger is his/her household member's sympathy and affiliation with that country (Research Question 2). The term integration may be interpreted in different ways, but for the purpose of this paper, the term is used as the degree to which immigrants become part of the host society. Tubergen, Maas, et al. (2004) found that education, work experience, age at time of migration and length of stay in the host country are important factors affecting socio-economic integration. Migrants who move at a young age or are born in the country, who have been living in the host country for many years, those with higher education, more work experience and better language skills usually have a better economic position in the host society (Siegel 2007).

Variables used to test the level of integration include the duration of the migrant's stay, the migrant's right of residence in the host country, whether he/she has a paid occupation, whether his/her work is based on the written contract, as well as the channel of migration, i.e. whether migration has been facilitated by a private person or organization.

Methodology

The data used in this study is based upon the CRRC Data Initiative Survey carried out by CRRC Data Initiative Development Team, Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC). The Data Initiative is a cross-border effort initiated by CRRC to collect data on a wide variety of social, political and economic indicators in the South Caucasus region. The CRRC teams in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia began to collect reliable data on the region in the fall of 2003. CRRC carried out the first survey in 2004, only in the capital cities of the South Caucasus with a representative data at the level of Yerevan, Baku and Tbilisi. Multistage cluster sampling was employed through stratification. It consisted of three main phases: first level sampling, actualization, and second level sampling. The Primary Sampling Units in Baku and Tbilisi were census districts, while in Yerevan they were electricity supply branches, as the information on census districts was not accessible. The Secondary Sampling Units were households, and the Final Sampling Units – respondents. Sampling within each household was implemented using the Kish Table. Only household members aged 18 and over were eligible to be interviewed.

In Yerevan, the households were randomly selected based on electricity users' lists. Electricity supply branches were used as the general frame for the sampling design, and 1,500 respondents (one in each household) were interviewed in the selected households.

In Baku and Tbilisi, the households were randomly selected based on the census general frame. 1,489 respondents (one in each household) were interviewed in the selected households in Baku and 1,472 respondents were interviewed in the selected households in Tbilisi.

In 2005, CRRC expanded its efforts to include one region in each country: Kotayk region in Armenia (based on the voter list), Shida Kartli region in Georgia (based on census district lists), and Aran region – Mugan zone in Azerbaijan (Based on census district lists).

In 2006, the CRRC increased the representativeness of the collected data by implementing surveys in all regions of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan controlled by the central government (with the exception of Nakhichevan and Salyan in Azerbaijan). More than

2,000 households were surveyed in each country, representing both urban and rural areas. Stratified cluster sampling using proportional stratification techniques was employed during the Data Initiative 2006 survey for the regions. Three levels of stratification were applied. At the first level capital cities, urban (excluding capitals) and rural areas were considered as strata. Thus, the samples are representative for each of the aforementioned strata and the proportional stratification is ensured. At the second level of stratification, the regions in the three countries were considered as strata and proportional stratification at regional level and urban-rural areas in each region was applied. At the third level, the respondents from regions were selected (one from each household) based on a Kish Table. Thus, the data generated by Data Initiative 2006 is representative at the national level, the level of the capital city and the level of urban-rural areas in each country.

In Armenia, the 715 respondents interviewed in Yerevan were selected from the list of respondents surveyed during 2004-2005, and 1,350 households were randomly selected in all ten Armenian regions (marzes) based on the lists of electricity users, with one respondent interviewed in each household. In total, the sample for Armenia comprises 2065 respondents.

In Azerbaijan, the 622 respondents interviewed in Baku were selected from the list of respondents surveyed during 2004-2005, and 1,778 households were randomly selected in all nine regions from the census district lists, with one respondent interviewed in each household. In total, the sample for Azerbaijan comprises 2400 respondents.

In Georgia, the 600 respondents in Tbilisi were selected from the list of respondents surveyed during 2004-2005, and 1,800 households were randomly selected in all ten regions from the census district lists, with one respondent interviewed in each household. In total, the sample for Georgia comprises 2400 respondents.

The questionnaire consisted of more than 120 questions structured into the following blocks:

- 1 General description of households.
- 2 Demographic data
- 3 Educational data
- 4 Migration data
- 5 Health data
- 6 Political attitudes/behavior data
- 7 Social institutions data
- 8 Crime data
- 9 Economic status of households and respondents.

For the purposes of this study, the following measures have been selected for correlation analysis:

1. *Demographic data* such as language(s) and ethnicity
2. *Political attitudes* including respondents' attitude towards cooperation with Russia vs. West (including US and EU) and becoming a NATO member.
3. *Migration data* including the number of migrants in a household, their destination countries, residence status, duration of migration, channels of migration facilitation, occupation and the labor conditions of the migrant abroad.

All data was collected through face-to-face in-home interviews lasting between 30 and 40 minutes on average. The response rate was approximately 80 percent for all regions in all years. After the interviews were completed, the answers including those to the open-ended questions, were entered and coded in coordination with all three CRRC offices. Finally, a combined 2004-2006 regional database was produced in SPSS format.

The survey datasets in SPSS format, as well as the corresponding code books, data analysis guides, the questionnaire and a detailed description of survey methodology is available online at www.crrccenters.org for use by social science researchers and the public at large locally and globally.

Findings

Georgia

Demographics Variables

With respect to the language(s) spoken in the household, 83.4% of the respondents (n=2002) named Georgian as their first language spoken, and only 2.0% percent of the respondents (n=47) named Russian as the first language spoken in their households, which was the fifth popular answer after Georgian, Azerbaijani, Armenian and Mingrelian, respectively (see Table 1).

Of all the 2400 respondents, only 20.6% (n=494) said they spoke a second language in their households. As presented in Table 2, Russian was named by 36.8% of the bilingual respondents (n=182). The second popular answer was Mingrelian mentioned by 31.4% (n=155), followed by Georgian mentioned by 22.7% of the respondents (n=112).

According to the data on ethnicity, 84.8% of the respondents (n=2035) said they were ethnic Georgians, 6.1% (n=146) were ethnic Armenians, 5.3% (n=128) ethnic Azerbaijanis, and 1.5% (n=36) ethnic Russians (see Table 3).

Foreign Policy Attitude Variables:

82.5% of the respondents (n=1980) agreed that, in the economic sphere, Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia, including the 10.3% (n=247) who were rather supportive and 72.2% (n=1733) who were fully supportive of the idea. Conversely, only 5.9% of the respondents (n=124) disagreed, including the 3.5% (n=84) who fully opposed and the 1.7% (n=40) who somewhat opposed the statement (see Table 4).

As for political sphere, on the whole, respondents were less supportive of cooperating with Russia, as opposed to economic cooperation. Thus, 79.7% of Georgians (n=1912) agreed that, in the political sphere, Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia, and 7.9% (n=163) opposed the idea, while 13.5% (n=325) did not give any answer at all (see Table 5).

With respect to US, 73.4% of the respondents (n=1755) agreed that, in the economic sphere, Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with US, and 8.2% of the respondents (n=197) opposed the idea (see Table 6). As presented in Table 7, cooperation with US in the political sphere was supported by 72.5% of the respondents (n=1739) and opposed by 8.5% of the respondents (n=203). Compared to cooperation with Russia, however, questions related to cooperation with US – both in economic and political sphere, yielded more “don’t know/can’t say” answers – 18.7% (n= 448) and 19.1% (n=458) as opposed to 12.3% (n=296) and 13.5% (n=325), respectively. The number of “don’t know/can’t say” answers also increased in questions related to economic and political cooperation with EU - 21.7% (n=520) and 21.8% (n=523), respectively (see Table 8 and Table 9).

Finally, 7.1% of Georgians (n=133) opposed cooperating with NATO and 7.8% (n=145) opposed membership to NATO. The rate of “don’t know/can’t say” answers is similar to that of EU-related questions – 21.8% (n=522) and 22.6% (n=542), respectively (see Table 10 and Table 11).

Migration Variables:

To identify the most popular destinations of Georgian migrants, respondents were asked to name the last country of migration of any of the household member(s) including themselves. In total, there were 205 migrants in all 2400 households interviewed. As presented in Table 12, Russian Federation was the most popular answer to host the greatest number of migrants from the households interviewed (n=116). Hence, for the purposes of this study, only data on migrants in Russia has been presented to analyze the variables on migration.

With respect to the duration of the migrant(s)' stay in Russia, the data showed that 69.8% of the migrants (n=81) had spent 1-3 years in Russia, which was the most popular answer (see Table 13). Also, 60.3% of the migrants (n=70) had a temporary registration, 72.3% (n=84) had a paid occupation, and only 29.3% (n=34) had a paid occupation (including probably) based on a written contract (see Table 14, Table 15 and Table 16). As for the question related to the channel of migration, the most popular answer for 55.2% of the migrants (n=64) was "nobody" (see Table 17).

Azerbaijan

Demographic Variables:

With respect to the language(s) spoken in the household, 90.5% of the respondents (n=2171) named Azerbaijani as their first language spoken. 3.0% of the respondents (n=71) said the first language spoken in their households was Russian, which was the second popular answer (see Table 18).

Of all the 2400 respondents, only 9.4% (n=226) said they spoke a second language at home. As presented in Table 19, Azerbaijani was named by 48.7% of the bilingual respondents (n=110). The second popular answer was Russian mentioned by 32.7% (n=74).

According to the data on ethnicity, 87.2% of the respondents (n=2093) said they were ethnic Azerbaijanis, 3.0% (n=73) were ethnic Talysh, 2.9% (n=70) ethnic Lezgins, and 2.5% (n=61) ethnic Russians (see Table 20).

Foreign Policy Attitude Variables:

54.9% of the respondents (n=1360) agreed that, in the economic sphere, Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia, as opposed to the 7.3% of the respondents (n=177) who disagreed with the statement (see Table 21). At the same time, the question produced a greater number of "don't know/can't say" answers than a similar question asked in Georgia - 37.8% (n=907) in Azerbaijan as opposed to 12.3% (n=296) in Georgia (refer to Table 4).

As for political sphere, respondents in Azerbaijan were also less supportive of cooperating with Russia, as opposed to economic cooperation. Thus, only 48.6% of the respondents (n=1168) agreed that, in the political sphere, Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia, and 9.3% (n=221) opposed the idea, while 42.1% (n=1011) did not know or refused to answer at all (see Table 22).

With respect to US, 48.5% of the respondents (n=1165) agreed that, in the economic sphere, Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with US, and 8.3% of the respondents (n=200) opposed the idea, while 43.1% of the respondents (n=1035) did not know or refused to answer at all (see Table 23). As presented in Table 24, cooperation with US in the political sphere was supported by 50.6% of the respondents (n=1208) and opposed by 6% of the respondents (n=143), while 56.3% (n=1351) did not know or refused to answer at all.

As for EU, 45.9% of the respondents (n=1102) agreed that, in the economic sphere, Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with EU, 7.5% of the respondents (n=180) opposed the idea, while 46.6% (n=1118) did not give any answer at all (see Table 25). Also, 44.5% of the respondents (n=1069) supported Azerbaijan's cooperation with EU in the political sphere, while 9.8% (n=235) opposed the idea and 45.7% (n=1096) did not give any answer at all (see Table 26).

Finally, 10.5% of the respondents (n=250) opposed Azerbaijan's cooperation with NATO, and 12.4% (n=298) opposed Azerbaijan's membership to NATO (see Table 27 and Table 28).

Migration Variables:

To identify the most popular destinations of Azerbaijani migrants, respondents were asked to name the last country of migration of any of the household member(s) including themselves. In total, there were 99 migrants in all 2400 households interviewed.

As presented in table 29, Russian Federation was the most popular answer to host the greatest number of migrants from the households interviewed (n=92). Hence, for the purposes of this study, only data on migrants in Russia has been presented to analyze the variables on migration.

As presented in Table 30, 55.4% of the migrants (n=51) had spent 1-3 years in Russia, which was the most popular answer. 66.3% of the migrants (n=61) had a temporary registration, 57.6% (n=53) had a paid occupation, and only 29.3% (n=34) had a paid occupation (including probably) based on a written contract (see Table 31, Table 32 and Table 33). As for the question related to the channel of migration, the most popular answer for 51.1% of the migrants (n=47) was “private person” (see Table 34).

Armenia

Demographic Variables:

With respect to the language(s) spoken in the household, 97.2% of the respondents (n=2007) named Armenian as their first language spoken. 2.1% percent of the respondents (n=44) said the first language spoken in their households was Russian, which was the second popular answer (see Table 35).

Of all the 2065 respondents, only 12.5% (n=259) said they spoke a second language in their households. As presented in Table 36, Russian was named by 9.7% (n=200). The second popular answer was Armenian mentioned by 2.6% of the respondents (n=53).

According to the data collected on ethnicity, 98.5% of the respondents (n=2034) said they were ethnic Armenians, and only .3% of the respondents (n=7) said they were ethnic Russians (see Table 37).

Foreign Policy Attitude Variables:

Only 0.5% of the Armenian respondents (n=11) opposed the statement that, in the economic sphere, Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia (see Table 38).

In much the same way, only 0.6% of the respondents (n=13) opposed Armenia's cooperation with Russia in the political sphere (see Table 39).

With respect to US, 5.2% of the respondents (n=33) opposed the idea that, in the economic sphere, Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with US, while 68% (n=1405) refused to give any answer (see Table 40). As for the political cooperation with US, 1.7% of the respondents (n=35) opposed the idea, while 67.9% of the respondents (n=1403) refused to give any answer to the question (see Table 41).

The number of "don't know/can't say" answers was also large in the questions related to economic and political cooperation with EU - 34% (n=1322) and 63.2% (n=1305), respectively (see Tables 42 and 43).

Finally, 24.5% of Armenians (n=506) said they oppose cooperating with NATO and 28.3% (n=583) opposed membership to NATO (see Table 44 and Table 45).

Migration Variables:

To identify the most popular destinations of the Armenian migrants, respondents were asked to name the last country of migration of any of the household member(s) including themselves. In total, there were 252 migrants in all 2065 households interviewed. As presented in Table 46, Russian Federation was the most popular answer to host the greatest number of migrants from the households interviewed (n=216). Hence, for the purposes of this study, only data on migrants in Russia has been presented to analyze the variables on migration.

As presented in Table 47, 42.1% of the migrants (n=103) had spent 1-3 years in Russia, which was the most popular answer. 69.4% of the migrants (n=175) had a temporary registration, 73.8% (n=186) had a paid occupation, and only 31.3% (n=79) had a paid occupation (including probably) based on a written contract (see Table 48, Table 49 and Table 50). As for the question related to the channel of migration, the most popular answer for 42.9% of the migrants (n=108) was "nobody" (see Table 51).

Analysis

The findings of the survey have been analyzed through SPSS and presented for Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, separately. The analysis for each South Caucasus country was conducted through T-test comparing means for demographic and foreign policy attitude variables to test Research Question 1, as well as migration and foreign policy attitude variables to test Research Question 2, respectively.

Georgia

T-test was run on demographic and foreign policy attitude variables to test Research Question 1, revealing a statistically significant difference with respect to the first and the second language spoken in the households and ethnicity, on the one hand, and the attitude to foreign policy, on the other hand. In particular, T-test showed a statistically significant difference with respect to the first language spoken and some of the foreign policy attitude variables, namely, opinion that Georgia should cooperate with Russia both in the economic and political spheres, as well as the attitude towards cooperating with NATO and becoming a NATO member. As for the second language spoken in the households, there was a statistically significant difference only with respect to the attitude towards cooperating with NATO and becoming a NATO member, which implies stronger resistance of Russian-speakers to integration with NATO. Thus, it can be inferred that Russian speakers are more likely to oppose integration with NATO and to support cooperation with Russia, while Georgian speakers tend to prefer the opposite.

As far as ethnicity is concerned, T-test revealed a statistically significant difference with respect to the opinion that Georgia should cooperate with Russia both in the economic and political spheres, as well as the attitude towards cooperating with NATO and becoming a NATO member, implying that ethnic Georgians are more likely to support integration with NATO and to oppose cooperation with Russia.

Concerning Research Question 2, T-test revealed a statistically significant difference with respect to the following variables measuring migrant's integration in Russia and foreign policy attitude variables:

- a) Right of residence and the attitude towards cooperating with Russia both in the economic and political spheres implying that households whose migrants reside in Russia legally, are more Russia-oriented;
- b) Paid occupation and the attitude towards cooperating with Russia both in the economic and political spheres, implying that households whose migrants in Russia are better off are more Russia-oriented;
- c) Labor conditions (work based on a written contract) and the attitude towards cooperating with Russia both in the economic and political spheres, implying that households whose migrants in Russia enjoy a better socio-economic status are more Russia-oriented;
- d) Migration facilitation (through private person or organization) and the attitude towards cooperating with Russia both in the economic and political spheres, implying that households where migrants moved to Russia with help of a private person or organization are more Russia-oriented;
- a) Duration of migration and the attitude towards cooperating with Russia both in the economic and political spheres; implying that households whose migrants have resided in Russia for a longer time are more Russia-oriented.

Thus, it can be inferred, that households having more integrated migrants in Russia are more Russia-oriented.

Azerbaijan:

T-test was run on demographic and foreign policy attitude variables to test Research Question 1, revealing a statistically significant difference with respect to the first language spoken in the households and ethnicity, on the one hand, and the attitude to foreign policy, on the other hand.

In particular, T-test showed a statistically significant difference with respect to the first language spoken and foreign policy attitude variables, namely, the attitude towards cooperating with Russia, attitude towards cooperating with US and EU and the attitude towards cooperating with NATO and becoming a NATO member. Thus, it can be inferred that Russian speakers are more likely to oppose cooperation with the West, including integration with NATO, and to support closer cooperation with Russia, while Azerbaijani speakers tend to prefer the opposite.

As far as ethnicity is concerned, T-test revealed a statistically significant difference with respect to the attitude towards cooperating with Russia, attitude towards cooperating with US and EU, as well as the attitude towards cooperating with NATO and becoming a NATO member, implying that ethnic Azerbaijanis are more likely to support integration with NATO and to oppose cooperation with Russia.

Concerning Research Question 2, T-test revealed a statistically significant difference with respect to the following variables measuring migrant's integration in Russia and foreign policy attitude variables:

- b) Right of residence and the attitude towards cooperating with Russia both in the economic and political spheres, implying that households whose migrants reside in Russia legally, are more Russia-oriented;
- c) Duration of migration and the attitude towards cooperating with Russia both in the economic and political spheres, implying that households whose migrants have resided in Russia for a longer time are more Russia-oriented.

The findings, thus, suggest that households having more integrated migrants in Russia are more Russia-oriented.

Armenia

T-test was run to test Research Questions 1 and 2, which, however, revealed no statistically significant difference with respect to the variables used in this study.

Conclusion and Recommendations

As the findings and analysis suggest, the Hypothesis has been supported for Georgia, partly supported for Azerbaijan and completely rejected for Armenia. This conclusion allows for a further generalization, theorizing that identity affects foreign policy preferences only when public perceives some tangible alternative to the existing order of international relations.

Although all three South Caucasus states have strong European aspirations and identity, not all of them view Europe as a reliable guarantor of security. Clearly, for Armenians, no or little alternative to Russia is perceived, as Russia continues to be viewed as the main protector of Armenia's safety and stability. In this regard, certain policy recommendations could be in order to align public opinion in Armenia with the official foreign policy of Complementarity through the following steps:

- Raising public awareness about Armenia's relations with partners other than Russia, including but not limited to European Union and ENP initiatives, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, OSCE, NATO, etc.
- Increasing cross-border interactions and people-to-people contacts that could integrate Armenia in EU independently from the state of relations with Russia. Practice of other countries shows that opportunities for peers to exchange experiences provide an important driving force for regional partnership and successful cross-border cooperation. This involves local actors, often with an important civil society dimension. Examples of such contacts include the Youth program, which promotes people-to-people contacts and co-operation between civil society actors in the youth field, including international youth exchanges, voluntary service, training, seminars and a number of other activities. The Youth in Action program, launched in 2007, includes increased opportunities for cooperation with neighborhood countries within the Youth in the World action. Organizations from the EU and the ENP countries cooperate through exchanges and training and network projects. Another example of cross-border interactions and people-

to-people contacts include Tempus - a program dedicated to promoting cooperation and partnerships between Universities in the EU and in neighboring countries, as well as Erasmus Mundus, which provides scholarships for post-graduate studies, Jean Monnet Action that supports teaching and research and other programs promoting student mobility inside and outside Europe (Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007. Progress Report Armenia 2007).

- Diversifying mass media to make it more international. Since most perceptions about the world largely depend on the information received from mass media, one way of forming and/or changing public opinion is exposing the public to more channels of information by providing broader opportunities for mass media choice.

APPENDIX

GEORGIA

Table 1: First language spoken in the household				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Armenian	111	4.6	4.6	4.6
Assyrian	3	.1	.1	4.8
Azerbaijani	126	5.3	5.3	10.0
Georgian	2002	83.4	83.4	93.4
Greek	7	.3	.3	93.7
Persian	1	.0	.0	93.8
Kurdish	44	1.8	1.8	95.6
Ossetian	1	.0	.0	95.6
Russian	47	2.0	2.0	97.6
Talysh	1	.0	.0	97.6
Yezidi	6	.3	.3	97.9
Mingrelian	50	2.1	2.1	100.0
Moldovan	1	.0	.0	100.0
Total	2400	100.0	100.0	

Table 2: Second language spoken in the household				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Abkhaz	3	.1	.6	.6
Armenian	17	.7	3.4	4.0
Assyrian	1	.0	.2	4.3
Georgian	112	4.7	22.7	26.9
Greek	2	.1	.4	27.3
Kurdish	8	.3	1.6	28.9
Ossetian	6	.3	1.2	30.2
Russian	182	7.6	36.8	67.0
Yezidi	2	.1	.4	67.4
English	2	.1	.4	67.8
Svan	4	.2	.8	68.6
Mingrelian	155	6.5	31.4	100.0
Total	494	20.6	100.0	
Missing System	1906	79.4		
Total	2400	100.0		

Table 3: Ethnicity				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Abkhaz	3	.1	.1	.1
Armenian	146	6.1	6.1	6.2
Assyrian	2	.1	.1	6.3
Azerbaijani	128	5.3	5.3	11.6
Georgian	2035	84.8	84.8	96.4
Greek	4	.2	.2	96.6
Iranian	2	.1	.1	96.7
Jewish	1	.0	.0	96.7
Kurdish	3	.1	.1	96.8
Ossetian	28	1.2	1.2	98.0
Russian	36	1.5	1.5	99.5
Yezidi	9	.4	.4	99.9
Ukranian	3	.1	.1	100.0
Total	2400	100.0	100.0	

Table 4: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the economic sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	84	3.5	4.0	4.0
Somewhat oppose	40	1.7	1.9	5.9
Somewhat supportive	247	10.3	11.7	17.6
Fully supportive	1733	72.2	82.4	100.0
Total	2104	87.7	100.0	Total
Don't know/Can't say	296	12.3		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.72 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 5: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the political sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	103	4.3	5.0	5.0
Somewhat oppose	60	2.5	2.9	7.9
Somewhat supportive	292	12.2	14.1	21.9
Fully supportive	1620	67.5	78.1	100.0
Total	2075	86.5	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	325	13.5		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.65 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 6: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the economic sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	99	4.1	5.1	5.1
Somewhat oppose	98	4.1	5.0	10.1
Somewhat supportive	482	20.1	24.7	34.8
Fully supportive	1273	53.0	65.2	100.0
Total	1952	81.3	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	448	18.7		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.50 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 7: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the political sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	108	4.5	5.6	5.6
Somewhat oppose	95	4.0	4.9	10.5
Somewhat supportive	496	20.7	25.5	36.0
Fully supportive	1243	51.8	64.0	100.0
Total	1942	80.9	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	458	19.1		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.48 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 8: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the economic sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	95	4.0	5.1	5.1
Somewhat oppose	84	3.5	4.5	9.5
Somewhat supportive	490	20.4	26.1	35.6
Fully supportive	1211	50.5	64.4	100.0
Total	1880	78.3	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	520	21.7		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.50 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 9: Opinion that Georgia should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the political sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	103	4.3	5.5	5.5
Somewhat oppose	78	3.3	4.2	9.6
Somewhat supportive	493	20.5	26.3	35.9
Fully supportive	1203	50.1	64.1	100.0
Total	1877	78.2	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	523	21.8		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.49 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 10: Attitude towards Georgia cooperating with NATO				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	60	2.5	3.2	3.2
Somewhat oppose	73	3.0	3.9	7.1
Somewhat supportive	713	29.7	38.0	45.0
Fully supportive	1032	43.0	55.0	100.0
Total	1878	78.3	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	522	21.8		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.45 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 11: Attitude towards Georgia becoming a NATO member				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	62	2.6	3.3	3.3
Somewhat oppose	83	3.5	4.5	7.8
Somewhat supportive	694	28.9	37.4	45.2
Fully supportive	1019	42.5	54.8	100.0
Total	1858	77.4	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	542	22.6		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.44 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 12 : Last country of migration				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Armenia	5	2.7	2.7	2.7
Austria	1	0.5	0.5	3.3
Belgium	1	0.5	0.5	3.8
Columbia	1	0.5	0.5	4.4
Egypt	1	0.5	0.5	4.9
France	3	1.6	1.6	6.6
Germany	12	6.6	6.6	13.1
Greece	22	12.0	12.0	25.1
Israel	2	1.1	1.1	26.2
Italy	3	1.6	1.6	27.9
Netherlands	1	0.5	0.5	28.4
Portugal	1	0.5	0.5	29.0
Russian Federation	116	51.4	51.4	80.3
Spain	5	2.7	2.7	83.1
Sweden	1	0.5	0.5	83.6
Turkey	7	3.8	3.8	87.4
UK	3	1.6	1.6	89.1
Ukraine	12	6.6	6.6	95.6
Uzbekistan	2	1.1	1.1	96.7
USA	6	3.3	3.3	100.0
Total	205	7.6	100.0	

Table 13: Duration of the migrant's stay in Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
3-6 months	22	19.0	19.0	19.0
6-12 months	13	11.2	11.2	30.2
1-3 years	81	69.8	69.8	100.0
Total	116	100.0		

Table 14: Migrant's right of residence in Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Already a citizen	26	22.4	22.4	22.4
Have the right of residence	11	9.5	9.5	31.9
Temporary registration	70	60.3	60.3	92.2
Does not have a status	4	3.4	3.4	95.7
Don't know/can't say	5	4.3	4.3	100.0
Total	116	100.0		

Table 15: Sources of income of the migrant in Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
S/he had/has a paid occupation	84	72.3	72.3	61.2
S/he had/has a paid occupation and other source(s) of income	8	6.9	6.9	68.1
S/he had/has other sources of income	6	5.2	5.2	73.3
No. s/he did/does not have any income	12	10.5	21.6	94.8
Don't know/Can't say	6	5.2	5.2	100.0
Total	116	100.0		

Table 16: Labor conditions of the migrant in Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
The migrant's work is (probably) based on a written contract	34	29.3	29.3	29.3
The migrant's work is (probably) not based on a written contract	53	45.7	45.7	75.0
Don't know/Can't say	29	25.0	25.0	100.0
Total	116	100.0	100.0	

Table 17: Channel of migration to Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Private Person	35	30.2	30.2	30.2
Organization within home country	5	4.3	4.3	34.5
Organization outside home country	7	6.0	6.0	40.5
Nobody	64	55.2	55.2	95.7
Don't know/Can't say	5	4.3	4.3	100.0
Total	116	100.0		

AZERBAIJAN

Table 18: First language spoken in the household				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Azerbaijani	2171	90.5	90.5	90.5
Persian	1	.0	.0	90.5
Lezg	58	2.4	2.4	92.9
Russian	71	3.0	3.0	95.9
Talysh	42	1.8	1.8	97.6
Turkish	5	.2	.2	97.8
Tat	16	.7	.7	98.5
Avar	35	1.5	1.5	100.0
Turkmen	1	.0	.0	100.0
Total	2400	100.0	100.0	

Table 19: Second language spoken in the household				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Abkhaz	1	.0	.4	.4
Azerbaijani	110	4.6	48.7	49.1
Persian	1	.0	.4	49.6
Lezgi	8	.3	3.5	53.1
Russian	74	3.1	32.7	85.8
Talysh	30	1.3	13.3	99.1
Turkish	1	.0	.4	99.6
Ingiloy	1	.0	.4	100.0
Total	226	9.4	100.0	
Missing System	2174	90.6		
Total	2400	100.0		

Table 20: Ethnicity

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Abkhaz	5	.2	.2	.2
Azerbaijani	2093	87.2	87.2	87.4
Iranian	4	.2	.2	87.6
Jewish	1	.0	.0	87.6
Kurdish	1	.0	.0	87.7
Lezgin	70	2.9	2.9	90.6
Russian	61	2.5	2.5	93.1
Talysh	73	3.0	3.0	96.2
Turkish	12	.5	.5	96.7
Tat	36	1.5	1.5	98.2
Ukrainian	2	.1	.1	98.3
Ingiloy	1	.0	.0	98.3
Avar	36	1.5	1.5	99.8
Zakhar	3	.1	.1	99.9
Sakhur	1	.0	.0	100.0
Turkman	1	.0	.0	100.0
Total	2400	100.0	100.0	

Table 21: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the economic sphere

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	92	3.8	6.2	6.2
Somewhat oppose	85	3.5	5.7	11.9
Somewhat supportive	412	17.2	27.6	39.5
Fully supportive	904	37.7	60.5	100.0
Total	1493	62.2	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	907	37.8		
Total	2400	100.0		

Mean = 3.43 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)

Table 22: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the political sphere

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	114	4.8	8.2	8.2
Somewhat oppose	107	4.5	7.7	15.9
Somewhat supportive	344	14.3	24.8	40.7
Fully supportive	824	34.3	59.3	100.0
Total	1389	57.9	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	1011	42.1		
Total	2400	100.0		

Mean = 3.35 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)

Table 23: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the economic sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	82	3.4	6.0	6.0
Somewhat oppose	118	4.9	8.6	14.7
Somewhat supportive	430	17.9	31.5	46.2
Fully supportive	735	30.6	53.8	100.0
Total	1365	56.9	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	1035	43.1		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.33 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 24: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the political sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	57	2.4	4.2	4.2
Somewhat oppose	86	3.6	6.4	10.6
Somewhat supportive	399	16.6	29.5	40.1
Fully supportive	809	33.7	59.9	100.0
Total	1351	56.3	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	1049	43.7		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.45 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 25: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the economic sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	85	3.5	6.6	6.6
Somewhat oppose	95	4.0	7.4	14.0
Somewhat supportive	501	20.9	39.1	53.1
Fully supportive	601	25.0	46.9	100.0
Total	1282	53.4	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	1118	46.6		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.26 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 26: Opinion that Azerbaijan should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the political sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	77	3.2	5.9	5.9
Somewhat oppose	158	6.6	12.1	18.0
Somewhat supportive	469	19.5	36.0	54.0
Fully supportive	600	25.0	46.0	100.0
Total	1304	54.3	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	1096	45.7		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.22 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 27: Attitude towards Azerbaijan cooperating with NATO				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	138	5.8	9.2	9.2
Somewhat oppose	112	4.7	7.5	16.7
Somewhat supportive	530	22.1	35.5	52.2
Fully supportive	715	29.8	47.8	100.0
Total	1495	62.3	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	905	37.7		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.22 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 28: Attitude towards Azerbaijan becoming a NATO member				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	163	6.8	11.1	11.1
Somewhat oppose	135	5.6	9.2	20.3
Somewhat supportive	460	19.2	31.3	51.6
Fully supportive	711	29.6	48.4	100.0
Total	1469	61.2	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	931	38.8		
Total	2400	100.0		
Mean = 3.17 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 29: Last country of migration				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Russian Federation	92	92.9	92.9	92.9
Syria	1	1.0	1.0	93.9
Ukraine	4	4.0	4.0	98.0
Uzbekistan	1	1.0	1.0	99.0
USA	1	1.0	1.0	100.0
Total	99	100.0	100.0	

Table 30: Duration of the migrant's stay in Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
3-6 months	25	27.2	27.2	27.2
6-12 months	16	17.4	17.4	44.6
1-3 years	51	55.4	55.4	100.0
Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Table 31: Migrant's right of residence in Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Already a citizen	13	14.1	14.1	14.1
Have the right of residence	7	7.6	7.6	21.7
Temporary registration	61	66.3	66.3	88.0
Does not have a status	7	7.6	7.6	95.7
Don't know/can't say	4	4.3	4.3	100.0
Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Table 32: Sources of income of the migrant in Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
S/he had/has a paid occupation	37	40.2	40.2	40.2
S/he had/has a paid occupation and other source(s) of income	16	17.4	17.4	57.6
S/he had/has other sources of income	9	9.8	9.8	67.4
No, s/he did/does not have any income	17	18.5	18.5	85.9
Don't know/Can't say	13	14.1	14.1	100.0
Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Table 33: Labor conditions of the migrant in Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
The migrant's work is (probably) based on a written contract	22	23.9	23.9	23.9
The migrant's work is (probably) not based on a written contract	53	57.6	57.6	81.5
Don't know/Can't say	17	18.5	18.5	100.0
Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Table 34: Channel of migration to Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Private Person	47	51.1	51.1	51.1
Organization within home country	4	4.3	4.3	55.4
Organization outside home country	7	7.6	7.6	63.0
Nobody	23	25.0	25.0	88.0
Don't know/Can't say	11	12.0	12.0	100.0
Total	92	100.0	100.0	

ARMENIA

Table 35: First language spoken in the household

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Armenian	2007	97.2	97.2	97.2
Assyrian	5	.2	.2	97.4
Kurdish	8	.4	.4	97.8
Russian	44	2.1	2.1	100.0
Yezidi	1	.0	.0	100.0
Total	2065	100.0	100.0	

Table 36: Second language spoken in the household

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Armenian	53	2.6	20.5	20.5
Greek	2	.1	.8	21.2
Kurdish	1	.0	.4	21.6
Russian	200	9.7	77.2	98.8
English	2	.1	.8	99.6
Polish	1	.0	.4	100.0
Total	259	12.5	100.0	
Missing System	1806	87.5		
Total	2065	100.0		

Table 37: Ethnicity

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Armenian	2034	98.5	98.5	98.5
Assyrian	7	.3	.3	98.8
Russian	7	.3	.3	99.2
Yezidi	10	.5	.5	99.7
Tatar	1	.0	.0	99.7
Ukranian	5	.2	.2	100.0
Lithuanian	1	.0	.0	100.0
Total	2065	100.0	100.0	

Table 38: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the economic sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	1	.0	.1	.1
Somewhat oppose	10	.5	.6	.6
Somewhat supportive	104	5.0	6.0	6.7
Fully supportive	1613	78.1	93.3	100.0
Total	1728	83.7	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	337	16.3		
Total	2065	100.0		
Mean = 3.93 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 39: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with Russia in the political sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	5	.2	.3	.3
Somewhat oppose	8	.4	.5	.8
Somewhat supportive	120	5.8	7.0	7.8
Fully supportive	1572	76.1	92.2	100.0
Total	1705	82.6	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	360	17.4		
Total	2065	100.0		
Mean = 3.91 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 40: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the economic sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	9	.4	1.4	1.4
Somewhat oppose	24	1.2	3.6	5.0
Somewhat supportive	267	12.9	40.5	45.5
Fully supportive	360	17.4	54.5	100.0
Total	660	32.0	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	1405	68.0		
Total	2065	100.0		
Mean = 3.48 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 41: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with US in the political sphere				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	14	.7	2.1	2.1
Somewhat oppose	21	1.0	3.2	5.3
Somewhat supportive	244	11.8	36.9	42.1
Fully supportive	383	18.5	57.9	100.0

Total	662	32.1	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	1403	67.9		
Total	2065	100.0		
Mean = 3.50 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 42: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the economic sphere

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	1	.0	.1	.1
Somewhat oppose	10	.5	1.3	1.5
Somewhat supportive	269	13.0	36.2	37.7
Fully supportive	463	22.4	62.3	100.0
Total	743	36.0	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	1322	64.0		
Total	2065	100.0		
Mean = 3.61 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 43: Opinion that Armenia should primarily strive to cooperate with EU in the political sphere

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	3	.1	.4	.4
Somewhat oppose	13	.6	1.7	2.1
Somewhat supportive	253	12.3	33.3	35.4
Fully supportive	491	23.8	64.6	100.0
Total	760	36.8	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	1305	63.2		
Total	2065	100.0		
Mean = 3.62 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 44: Attitude towards Armenia cooperating with NATO

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	351	17.0	27.7	27.7
Somewhat oppose	155	7.5	12.2	39.9
Somewhat supportive	516	25.0	40.7	80.7
Fully supportive	245	11.9	19.3	100.0
Total	1267	61.4	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	798	38.6		
Total	2065	100.0		
Mean = 2.52 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 45: Attitude towards Armenia becoming a NATO member

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Fully oppose	437	21.2	35.3	35.3
Somewhat oppose	146	7.1	11.8	47.1
Somewhat supportive	447	21.6	36.1	83.1
Fully supportive	209	10.1	16.9	100.0
Total	1239	60.0	100.0	
Don't know/Can't say	826	40.0		
Total	2065	100.0		
Mean = 2.35 (4=fully supportive and 1=fully oppose; don't know/can't say excluded)				

Table 46 : Last country of migration

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Russian Federation	216	85.7	85.7	85.7
China	3	1.2	1.2	86.9
Egypt	2	0.8	0.8	87.7
Germany	1	0.4	0.4	88.1
Greece	1	0.4	0.4	88.5
India	1	0.4	0.4	88.9
Poland	3	1.2	1.2	90.1
Spain	4	1.6	1.6	91.7
Turkey	1	0.4	0.4	92.1
Ukraine	3	1.2	1.2	93.3
USA	14	5.6	5.6	98.8
Don't know/Can't say	3	1.2	1.2	100.0
Total	252	100.0	100.0	

Table 47: Duration of the migrant's stay in Russia

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
3-6 months	89	35.3	35.3	35.3
6-12 months	57	22.6	22.6	57.9
1-3 years	106	42.1	42.1	100.0
Total	252	100.0	100.0	

Table 48: Migrant's right of residence in Russia

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Already a citizen	24	9.5	9.5	9.5
Have the right of residence	33	13.1	13.1	22.6
Temporary registration	175	69.4	69.4	92.1
Does not have a status	8	3.2	3.2	95.2
Don't know/can't say	12	4.8	4.8	100.0
Total	252	100.0	100.0	

Table 49: Sources of income of the migrant in Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
S/he had/has a paid occupation	137	54.4	54.4	54.4
S/he had/has a paid occupation and other source(s) of income	49	19.4	19.4	73.8
S/he had/has other sources of income	26	10.3	10.3	84.1
No. s/he did/does not have any income	22	8.7	8.7	92.9
Don't know/Can't say	18	7.1	7.1	100.0
Total	252	100.0	100.0	

Table 50: Labor conditions of the migrant in Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
The migrant's work is (probably) based on a written contract	79	31.3	31.3	31.3
The migrant's work is (probably) not based on a written contract	116	46.0	46.0	77.4
Don't know/Can't say	57	22.6	22.6	100.0
Total	252	100.0	100.0	

Table 51: Channel of migration to Russia				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Private Person	97	38.5	38.5	38.5
Organization within home country	19	7.5	7.5	46.0
Organization outside home country	12	4.8	4.8	50.8
Nobody	108	42.9	42.9	93.7
Don't know/Can't say	16	6.3	6.3	100.0
Total	252	100.0	100.0	

REFERENCES

- Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney (1963). "The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations." Little Borwn, Boston.
- Begoyan, Anush (2006). "National Concepts of Security and the Problem of Integration in Transcaucasia." Iran & The Caucasus. 10: 287-301.
- Colin S. Gray (1999). "Strategic Culture as Context: the First Generation on Theory Strikes Back." Review of International Studies. 25: 49-69.
- Conrell E., Svante (2002). "The South Caucasus. A Regional Overview and Conflict Assessment." Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) Report by Cornell Caspian Consulting.
- CRRC Data Initiative Survey, 2004-2006: Caucasus Research Resource Centers, Tbilisi, Georgia (Webpage: <http://www.crrccenters.org>).
- Fawn, Rick (2003). "Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies." Journal of Communist Studies & Transition Politics. 3:1-41.
- Flanagan, Stephen J.; Schear, James A. (2007). "Strategic Challenges. America's Global Security Agenda." National Defense University Press, Potomac Books, Inc. Washington, DC.
- Henze, Paul B. (1984). "The Significance of Increasing Bilingualism Among Soviet Muslims." in The USSR and The Muslim World. ed. Yaacov Ro'i, 117-28. George Allen & Unwin, London.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon & Schuster, New York
- Jones, Stephen (2003) "The Role of Cultural Paradigm in Georgian Foreign Policy." The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 3:83-110.
- Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007. Progress Report Armenia (Webpage: http://www.aeplac.eu/pdf/AP_CR/PR_2007/armenia_en.pdf)
- Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007. Progress Report Armenia (Webpage: http://www.aeplac.eu/pdf/AP_CR/PR_2007/armenia_en.pdf)
- Inkeles, Alex and Bauer, Raymond (1959). "The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society." Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Kazemzadeh, Firuz (1974). "Russian Penetration in the Caucasus" in "Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution." T. Hunczak, ed. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick.
- King, Charles (2003). "Marking Time in the Middle Ground: Contested Identities and Moldovan Foreign Policy." Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics. 19.3:60-82.
- King, Charles (2008). "The Five-Day War. Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis." Foreign Affairs. Vol 87, No. 6
- Kubicek, Paul (2000). "Regional Polarisation in Ukraine: Public Opinion, Voting and Legislative Behaviour." Europe-Asia Studies 2:273-294.
- Munro, Neil (2007). "Which Way Does Ukraine Face? Popular Orientations Toward Russia and Western Europe." Problems of Post-Communism. 6:43-58.

- Petrenko, V.F., Mitina, O.V., Berdnikov, K.V., Kravtsova, A.P., Osipova, V.S. (2000). "Psikhosematnicheskiy analiz etnicheskikh stereotipov: liki tolerantnosti i neterpomosti." Smysl, Moskva.
- Poghosyan, Tevan (2005). "Armenia's Foreign Policy: Towards Real Complementarity." Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. 6: 10-13.
- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty RFE/RL (2007). "South Caucasus: Is Russia Losing Influence?"(Webpage:<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/04/mil070419-rferl03.htm>).
- Samuylov, Sergei (2001). "The Ethnic-Cultural-Geopolitical Approach to Formation of the New Limited Russia's Security System within a Post-Soviet Space." Final report of the Research Project.
- Sestanovich, Stephen (2008). "What Has Moscow Done? Rebuilding US-Russian Relations." Foreign Affairs. Vol 87, No. 6
- Shulman, Stephen (2004). "The Contours of Civic and Ethnic National Identification in Ukraine." Europe-Asia Studies. 1:35-56.
- Siegel, Melissa (2007). "Immigrant Integration and Remittance Channel Choice." Maastricht Graduate School of Governance Working Paper No. 2007/WP009.
- Swietochowski, Tadeusz (1995). "Russia and Azerbaijan. A Borderland in Transition." Columbia University Press, New York.
- Tubergen, F. V., Maas, I., & Flap, H. (2004). "The Economic Incorporation of Immigrants in 18 Western Societies: Origin, Destination, and Community Effects." American Sociological Review. 69:704-727.
- Vahabzade, Bakhtiar (1988). "Dva Kryla." Bakinskii Rabochii. 10/11.
- White, Stephen Leonard; McAllister, Ian; Light, Margot (2002). "Enlargement and the New Outsiders." Journal of Common Market Studies. 40:135-153.