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THE CAUSES AND OUTCOMES
OF PALESTINIAN INTIFADAS

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ABSTRACT

The Master's Essay examines the causes of Palestinian intifadas (First Intifada and Al-Aqsa or Second Intifada), the role of international organizations, the influence of Israeli lobby on the conflict, the U.S. policy, the Oslo Accords, the Roadmap to Peace. It is argued that the Second Intifada broke out when the Oslo Accords failed: the peace process yielded in nothing, no agreements have been implemented completely. There have been violations of international law, which has not been addressed properly and influence of international organizations, especially UN, was not significant enough to force the sides to comply with the agreements.

The other part of the Essay deals with the reasons behind the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the development of extremist groups. The competing interests and struggle for regional power created extremist groups and forced Islamic Fundamentalism to gain momentum and get support of the masses. Other argument supporting this idea is that when the people fail to build a state and suffer territorial losses and are suppressed all the time to exercise their rights as a nation, they turn to religion to achieve these goals.

INTRODUCTION

Territorial changes, territorial integrity and international conflict are the most debated and controversial issues in today's world politics. The initiation of these issues lies on the foundation of economic, political, historical and ethnic reasons. As Goertz and Diehl (1992, 83) contemplate "it [territorial expansion] forms an important component of most interstate conflict." Further contemplating on the issue of territorial expansion Goertz and Diehl (1992, 57) conclude that "...state formation represents the most basic form of territorial changes: and indigenous population achieves self-determination." In many cases these issues are complicated and confounded by the emergence of extremist, religious and nationalistic aspects. Middle East is the vivid example of the aforesaid.

The essence of this master's essay is to study the Palestinian issue. The main focus will be on the Intifadas, mediators and third parties (especially U.S.A., the case of U.S. is interesting taking into consideration the role the Israeli Lobby plays). The interesting point in this case is that the negotiations yielded in designing a road map to peace. Nevertheless, the end result was failure. The study of this case would be very useful in Armenian reality as negotiations on Karabakh issue are going on assisted by third parties and mediators.

As it has been mentioned above the aim of this master's essay is the study of Palestine issue, the main questions that will be studied in depth are: (1) the role of mediators – U.S.A., USSR, the Russian Federation, and the European Union, as well as the Arab states and Iran; (2) the role of international organizations (UN, Arab League, EU); (3) negotiations, causes of failure including Oslo Peace Process and Roadmap plans; (4) the reasons behind the emergence of Hamas; (5) emergence and development of Palestinian Authority and its Structures; (6) Islamic fundamentalism and secularism in terms of the conflict and the influence of the Israeli lobby. It would be very helpful to give a brief historical background of

the conflict before proceeding to the main part of the essay. The roots of the conflict go back to 1918-1920 when the Palestinians with the help of the British overthrew the Ottoman Rule.

Palestine has been under the control of different powers. It has been under the rule of Ottoman Empire until 1917-1918. The Turkization policies pursued by the ruling party made the Arab leaders to seek independence (downloaded from the website of the UNO). The Arab leaders including the leaders of Palestine helped the British to overthrow the Ottoman rule. Instead the British promised to help the Arab leaders to create an independent Arab Kingdom on the Arab territories of the defeated Ottoman Empire. That agreement was not to be fulfilled as it was decided to give the mandate of Palestine to Britain (see appendix A) during San Remo Conference on April 24, 1920 (between the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Belgium). Before San Remo Conference, in 1917 the British expressed their support for establishing a homeland for Jews in Palestine. Large-scale immigration of Jews to Palestine starts under the aegis of Balfour Declaration which states:

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country (Balfour Declaration).

This was the evidence of the support promised to European Zionists by the British government. The goal of Zionist movement (founded in 19th century) is to establish a homeland for the Jews; Palestine is associated with the place where once (1200 BC) the Jewish nationhood evolved. It may seem that this movement has religious character, but it is practically a political movement initially having only some religious connotations, i.e. associating Palestine with the biblical Jewish homeland. The immigration of Jews into Palestine started in 1920s though it bore non-extensive character. But the growing anti-Semitic sentiments which later developed into atrocities against Jews in Europe (Holocaust)

accelerated this process. This large influx of Jewish immigrants or settlers caused dissatisfaction among the Arab population. The tension between the Arab population and the growing Jewish population were increasing year after year. From time to time these tensions erupted in unrests, clashes. The first riots against Jews took place in 1920s, the serious one being the clash at Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. The clashes between Arabs and Jews continue to occur over time. Another major collision between Arabs and Jews occurred in 1936 which lasted until the outbreak of World War II. After the end of World War II the British decided to withdraw from Palestine giving their mandate to the United Nations. According to Rowley and Taylor (2006) the decision was made considering the actions of three Jewish terrorist organizations: *Haganah*, *Irgun*, and *Likud*, the British could not cope with the situation, they even could not improve it. On November 27, 1947 the UN brought forward the *1947 UN Partition Plan* (see appendix B) dividing the area between the two people trying to solve the dispute Jerusalem (see appendix C) having the status of an internationalized city. The Partition Plan enjoyed the support of the major superpowers of the time: the Soviet Union and the United States. This kind of collaboration on such an issue between the rival powers has been unbelievable. This can be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union tried to find a counterbalance to the British. The Plan gave out about 50 per cent of Palestine to the Jews (Rowley and Taylor 2006). The Jewish side accepted the plan while Palestinians as well as their Arab allies rejected the decision completely. This disagreement over the issue escalated into war between Arabs – Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria – and Israel. In 1948 the Jewish people declared their independence establishing the state of Israel. This created a huge problem of refugees: Arabs, who were driven out from their homes now in the territory of Israel, and also the problem of Jewish exodus from Arab lands. The UN General Assembly Resolution 194 provided that “that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so.” But this resolution remained on

paper and the refugee population began growing. UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, was established by United Nations General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees. According to the official website of UNRWA, it is today the main provider of basic services – education, health, relief and social services – to over 4.3 million registered Palestine refugees in the Middle East.

The history of the conflict is marked by several wars that broke out in the region between Israel and Arab countries. By the end of Arab-Israeli war (1948-1949) Israel controlled almost 80% of Palestine (see Appendix D for the map of Israeli borders in 1949-1967) except for Gaza Strip, Galilean and Judean portions and the western portion of Jerusalem (Rowley and Taylor 2006); the areas of West Bank and Gaza strip were under the control of Jordan and Egypt until 1967. The Arab states were never united behind Palestine. These states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan) themselves fought against Israel. In 1967, June 5 a war broke out in the Middle East involving Israel and the Arab states – Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq into it. This war is largely known as the Six Day War. As a result of the Israel got control of Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions during the first days of the war that called for immediate ceasefire failed meeting the ignorance of Israel. The military operations ended only after the resolution of June 10, 1967 when the Soviet Union and other countries broke off diplomatic relations with Israel and the Security Council warned to impose sanctions. In November 22, 1967 (S/RES/242) the final resolution has been adopted which provided for:

“Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;”

“Affirms further the necessityFor achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;” (S/RES/242)

In the result of the war, a new flow of Arab refugees from the occupied territories started. Many refugee camps fell under the control of Israeli military (Rowley and Taylor 2006). The Resolution provided for peace establishment emphasizing the rights of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State. As Chomsky (in Carey 2001, 10) ponders that this resolutions stipulates “a settlement among existing *states*: Palestinians were unmentioned, part from oblique reference to ‘a just settlement of the refugee problem.’” This means that Palestine was not recognized or acknowledged as a state by the parties to the conflict and the mediators. This resolution did not established peace in the region. There have been tensions which escalated into war in 1973 largely known as Yom Kippur War¹.

In 1971 Egyptian president Anwar Sadat made assertions of concluding peace if Israel would withdraw from all occupied territories. From 1971-1972 and much of the 1973 he kept on making threats of war. Sadat tried also to gain approval and support of the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union was prone to keep détente with the U.S.A. (Bard² 2006). In October 6, 1973 Egypt and Syria launched a surprise military attack on Israel on the Suez Canal in the south and the Golan Heights in the north which became known as Yom Kippur War. Egypt and Syria enjoyed the support (fiancial, human resources, military (providing with weaponry) of several Arab countries as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and of several North African countires – Sudan, Morocco, Tunis (Bard 2006). The Israeli forces have been really caught surprised but after some time the Israelis adjusted to the situation. By October 14, 1973 the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) made the Syrian side to retreat to the armistice lines and then advanced towards the Egyptian line (See appendix E). Though firstly Egypt and Syria were

¹ The Jewish day of Atonement: Holy day for Jewish people, takes place on October 6

² Mitchell Bard is the Executive Director of the nonprofit American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (AICE) and a foreign policy analyst

refused of support but later they enjoyed also the support of the USSR, the Israelis – the support of the U.S.A. From 1953 the USSR pursued pro-Arab policy. Three weeks after the war started the UN Security Council called the warring parties to a ceasefire (UN Security Council Resolution 338). The UN Security Council Resolution called for the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Within the framework of Camp David Negotiations (1978) the Sinai Peninsula has been returned to Egypt.

The struggle against Israel created different political and military groups amongst which were the Palestine Liberation Organization³ (PLO) and Hamas. PLO was formed in 1964 by the Arab League which was aimed at destructing the State of Israel by military means and terrorist groups. PLO membership is made of the following factions: Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian People's Party (PPP), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF, Abu Abbas faction), the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), As-Sa'iqa, the Palestine Democratic Union (Fida), the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF, Samir Ghawsha faction), the Palestinian Arab Front (PAF). The PLO has no central decision-making body: the factions are to follow the PLO charter and Executive Committee decisions. The organization dealt with the refugee issues and issues concerning every aspect of life of Palestinians. PLO receiving recognition from UN in 1974 was representing Palestine in international arena. From 1969 to 2004 Al Fatah leader Yasser Arafat became chairman of the PLO. Mahmoud Abbas is the present chairman of PLO. According to Encarta Encyclopedia “The PLO was established to provide a more legitimate and organized channel for Palestinian nationalism than was offered by scattered Palestinian guerrilla (fedayeen) groups.” Fatah was the first such group to join later followed by Popular Front for the

³ In Arabic *Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyyah*, www.wikipedia.org

Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Saiqa, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).

In 1988 PLO recognized the sovereignty of Israel renouncing also the use of terrorism. Israel recognized PLO as the official representative of Palestinian people. In September 1993 Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin concluded an agreement on the creation of interim Palestinian National Authority that allowed to administer the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. These negotiations more specifically the readiness of the Palestinian side to negotiate with Israel brought forward accusations and grievances among the Palestinian society. The Palestinian Islamic groups Hamas (acronym for *Harakat al-Muqawima al-Islamiyya*⁴) and Islamic Jihad levelled grave accusations to the PLO of betraying the PLO principles and goals and playing the game suggested by the Israeli side. It is believed that Hamas has been created and funded by Israel for dividing the Palestinian society. Hamas was the direct alternative to the PLO (Andromidas 2002). As Andromidas (2002) discussed in his article Hamas has traditionally stood in opposition to the secular nationalism of Arafat, the PLO, and its supporting governments. Kissinger (2006) in his article published in Washington Post 2006, February 27 issue states that

“The emergence of Hamas as the dominant faction in Palestine should not be treated as a radical departure. Hamas represents the mind-set that prevented the full recognition of Israel's legitimacy by the PLO for all these decades, kept Yasser Arafat from accepting partition of Palestine at Camp David in 2000, produced two intifadas and consistently supported terrorism.”

This represents Hamas as a not very radical organization, not in a way as it is represented above. These organizations, their structures, and popularity will be fully covered in the main body of the essay.

There have always been tensions between Israel and Palestine: killings, sudden attacks, and other violent events. These tensions were escalating and finally erupted into

⁴ Or Islamic Resistance Movement, www.wikipedia.org

Intifadas – violent uprisings. The First Intifada took place in 1987 and lasted to 1993. The causes of this Intifada always give rise to disputes. In general, the human rights violations, home demolitions, killings of civilian population including children by Israeli soldiers, deportations, etc. were the last straw. Ben Efrat (2002) states that “people of no importance:” workers, women and youth rose up in revolt. About 1,162 Palestinians (241 of them children) and 160 Israelis (5 of them children) have died.

The Second Intifada or Al-Aqsa Intifada broke out in 2000 and still continues. The Intifada took its name from the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem when followed by Ariel Sharon’s visit to that place demonstration broke out in Old Jerusalem, a day later in West Bank and Gaza. The causes underlying the Second Intifada are quite different. Ben Efrat (2002) considers these issues focusing on the specific features such as contradictory goals: different those of the people, lack of revolutionary leadership, armed struggle including suicide actions against civilians. The Al-Aqsa Intifada was marked by unseen brutality and was criticized severely by both sides. According to Daoud Kuttub (2001) one of the key differences between the First and Second Intifadas was the violent means (firearms) have been applied against Israeli settlements near Palestine, as well as in its turn this Second Intifada was not a surprise for Israel as was the First one. Israel used tanks, missiles, and attack helicopters to suppress the uprising. According to Daoud Kuttub (2001) the Second Intifada will not end and would continue in one form or other until there is solution to the refugee issue and an independent state in West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza.

LITERATURE REVIEW

There is extensive literature on the Israel-Palestine issue. No other conflict in Middle East was in the center of attention as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many scholars have done extensive research trying to clarify and analyze the factors underlying the conflict religion, nationalism and ethnicity being the most intricate ones. The region itself is so complicated and contradictory; here the interests of different countries and superpowers are crossed.

Bill and Springborg (2000) made their analysis basing on three dimensions. These dimensions are: (1) competition between two peoples: Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. The Jews or Zionists claim to have a right of a homeland in historical Palestine asserting that the Jewish people once lived there some two thousand years ago. Palestinians argue for having the ownership and occupation of the land for centuries. Besides, they claim that by the existence of Jewish state in their land their national civil would be or are denied. (2) The second dimension is Arab states as participants. These countries possess almost two-thirds of world's oil reserves. These countries sought to gain advantage for themselves instead of uniting behind Palestine. (3) Involvement of extraregional in this conflict. Could Zionists create their own state had it not been the British or the American support? The Soviet Union at first supported the Jewish side counting on that Israel would become a counterbalance for British influence. The Arab-Israeli conflict has also been in the center of attention of international organizations: the UN, European Community, and International Socialist Organization (Bill and Springborg 2000, 223-225). Any simplified interpretation of the conflict will be false.

Chomsky (1983) in his book "The Fateful Triangle. The United States, Israel & the Palestinians" discusses the special relationship between the U.S.A. and Israel and the historical backgrounds of Israel and Palestine taking into consideration the later

developments in terms of religion, Zionism, and extreme ways of struggle. The book also has an analysis of the risk of the confrontation of the superpowers of the time.

In terms of the special relationship between the U.S.A. and Israel, the role of Israeli Lobby should not be ignored. Mearsheimer and Walt⁵ (2006) analyse the role of Israeli Lobby in U.S. foreign policy and the extent to which the Lobby diverted or skewed. They argue that U.S. foreign policy shapes events everywhere sometimes not reaching the anticipated results bringing the example of Bush Administration efforts in the Middle East region. They say that these efforts in Iraq “helped to produce a resilient insurgency in Iraq, a sharp rise in world oil prices, and terrorist bombings in Madrid, London, and Amman” (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, 1). Another argument is that the influence of Israeli Lobby is so colossal that the decisions made in terms of foreign policy and the U.S. domestic, national interest may not always match⁶.

Carey (2001) in the foreword of the book “The New Intifada. Resisting Israel’s Apartheid,” which is a collection of different articles, tries to give a somewhat balanced view of the origins and basic facts of *The New Intifada*. The goal of the book was to analyze the “structural flaws in the Oslo agreements giving voice to Palestinian side and those Israelis and Americans who abhor repression carried out in their name” (Carey 2001, 2). The book covers also the issue of Palestinian refugees and the miserable conditions they are in. the book covers these issues in the following order: (1) Repression and Resistance; (2) The Media War; (3) Refugees, Remembrance, Return; (4) Activism Awakened.

Prof. Mohamed S. Dajani Daoudi⁷ in his paper “*Big Dream / Small Hope. A Peace Vision*” presented at the American University of Armenia laid down his views about the

⁵ John J. Mearsheimer – faculty member in the Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Stephan M. Walt – faculty member in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

⁶ The views of the authors are their personal views, they do not represent the intuitions’ positions

⁷ Professor Mohammed S. Dajani Daoudi is the Director of the American Studies Institute at Al-Quds University, slide presentation of this paper is available at: www.bigdreamsamllhope.com.

Arab-Israeli conflict and discusses the peace issue asking the following question “Why is it that peace seems so elusive?” The point made by Prof. Dajani is that putting the peace issue in either Palestinian or Israeli context would inevitably lead to conflict. His study has three parts: (1) where we are today, i.e. living the big dream – conflict; (2) where we ought to be, i.e. living the small hope – conciliation; (3) how to get there – peace (Dajani 2006, 2).

Continuing the idea of peace another author, Ifat Maoz, deliberates on process of peace building in terms of Oslo Peace Accords in his article “*Peace building in Violent Conflict: Israeli Palestinian Post-Oslo People-to-People Activities.*” He defines the main goal of peace building activities as prevention of further violence, which was not the case, as Oslo Agreement could not prevent further violence. Peace making is always accompanied by peace building, the author of this article draws particular attention to “specific type of peace-building activity: dialogues and joint people-to-people projects at the grassroots level.” Ifat Maoz builds his arguments on the fact that agreements alone on higher level are not enough to start and carry out peace building, the relationships should be made better, friendlier at the grassroots level.

Baskin and Al-Qaq (2004) in their article “YES PM: Years of Experience in Strategies for Peace Making” also discuss the question of people-to-people (P2P) strategies. Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations, Civil Society institutions, Palestinian and Israeli scholars are involved in P2P projects. It is believed that P2P projects would greatly support and improve the peace-building processes started at political level as those involved in the project are closer to the people. Baskin and Al-Qaq (2004, 544) define the meaning of P2P as “P2P denotes civil society cooperation; building constituencies for peace from the ground up, conflict resolution, learning the political narrative of “the Other,” bringing people into creative interaction, and learning from one another and about each other’s culture.” These points are very interesting in considering the case of the Second

Intifada: could it be prevented had these projects served their goals? The following activities are carried out by P2P: Track II activities, professional meetings and trainings, formal educational activities, capacity and institution building activities, political struggle, solidarity groups, advocacy groups and so on. In order not to have another terrible experience of Intifada, the importance of such activities and projects grows as it tries to bring together common people.

Besides these, there are other factors that make this case even harder and they are the religious and aspect of the conflict. Is the struggle a religious one (Zionism), does it claim to have some nationalistic character? Was the struggle of Palestinians secular, which grew into a religious one (emergence of Hamas)? When speaking about nationalism the following aspects of it are of interest for this study: it can refer to the process of forming or maintaining nation-states; it can refer to the psychological feeling or identification with a particular national community; sometimes, to the aspiration to be self-determining, which can take a secessionist form (Moore 2004). The nationalist movements can be significant sources for political instability (e.g. the Spanish Basque country, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir in India, the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Turkey).

Yosseph Shilav (2001) analyzes the factor of religion in his article “Religious Factors in Territorial Disputes: An Intra-Jewish View.” Shilav (2001) reflects on that sanctification of a land could bring about longing to come and resettle it. Here the degree of commitment of individuals and community is very essential. The danger here is the gap between political and religious viewpoints. Since the difference in territorial and idealistic ambitions (e.g. the land corresponding to Eretz-Yisrael) could lead to conflict within the state which will undermine the processes going between the countries. The article also discusses territory and sovereignty taking into consideration the above-mentioned factors.

Mahdi Abdul Hadi (2006) contemplates that secular nationalist domination in Palestine is giving way to religious one (PLO and Hamas). One can track these changes in the Palestinian society. According to Abdul Hadi (2006) the following factors are having impact on these trends: practices and policies of Israeli military occupation, culture of Israeli society (secular thought and Jewish religious revivalism), the combination of externally-financed economic modernization and security-motivated restrictions on movement. All these factors contribute to the process of losing to Islamist trends. Another argument for the rise of radical Islamic activities is brought by Budeiri (1997). He argues, “this is perceived as the outward expression of the denial of a reality that is held to be corrupt and in need of transformation” (Budeiri 1997, 1). Do the failure of international mediation, non-implementation of signed agreements, violations of international law brought to this situation? This question is very vital when we look through the history of the conflict. Can it be said that the struggle of Palestinians through course of time turned from a secular to a religious one and is just the contrary for the Israeli side? These are issues that should be studies in depth as radicalism often resorts to violent means to gain psychological compensation for the politically disaffected, the socio-economically disadvantaged, and the spiritually frustrated (Budeiri 1997).

THE FIRST INTIFADA, 1987-1993

The origins of the conflict go back to 1921 when the first Israeli settlements in Palestine began. The struggle between Palestinians and Israelis goes on and on taking different forms – from clashes and uprisings to wars. These wars often involved regional and non-regional actors, both Arab and non-Arab states. The region has rich natural resources; it has great geopolitical importance. The words of president Lyndon Johnson has also expressed the idea in his May 23, 1967 statement that Middle East is “[t]he birthplace of civilization and of three of the world's great religions, it is the home of some 60 million people and it is the crossroads between the East and the West.” Bush in his statement to Congress on March 6, 1991 also states “The Persian Gulf and Middle East form a region rich in natural resources with a wealth of untapped human potential.” These clashes also created different military and extremist organizations as the Israeli Hagana, Irgun, and Likud, Palestinian HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA). As it has been mentioned before the tensions existing between Palestinians and Israelis from time to time erupted in clashes or uprisings. The First Intifada⁸ or the “war of the stone” took place on the 9th of December 1987 in refugee camp in Jabalya in Gaza. There are many causes underlying the first uprising. But the “last straw” that made the insurrection to burst out was a car accident. An Israeli truck driver hit a Palestinian car that was taking workers back home; four of the Palestinians were killed in the accident. Following it a tide of riots began in Gaza gradually involving the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Other causes of the intifada are considered the frustration of Palestinians, violation of basic rights, home demolitions, imprisonments without trial, torture of prisoners, mass detentions, deportations, etc. National Public Radio (NPR) reporter Mike Shuster described the situation the Palestinian were in that brought to Intifada. He reported “[Palestinians] were stateless, living

⁸ In Arabic is uprising, shaking off. The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 2001-05

under the humiliation of identity checks, body searches and verbal abuse that were the rule of the Israeli army, watching helplessly as Israel expanded Jewish settlements on what had been their land."

What were the prior events that brought to such kind of mass uprising? In 1978 at Camp David two agreements were concluded: one provided for peace between Egypt and Israel which then became the basis of the peace treaty signed in 1979; the second one provided for granting autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Beinin and Hajjar). As the UN Security Council Resolution 242 that ended the Six Day War provided only "a just settlement of the refugee problem" (S/RES/242) without indicating how it would be solved. Here the question of the right of return of refugees comes forth. But this issue will be discussed in detail in one of next chapters of the essay. The one important point here to mention is the destitute conditions of refugees and their being denied the basic rights; they are often subjected to harassment and humiliation. In Camp David Accords, an interim administration of five-year term was envisioned to be established after which the future of the occupied territories would be negotiated (Beinin and Hajjar). As Kaplan⁹ (2000) in one of his lectures (Lecture #7) delivered at Jewish University in Cyberspace (JUICE) contemplates the agreement for establishing autonomy was rejected by the PLO, Israel has focused its attention to the war in Lebanon. Only the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt has been implemented. According to the primer of Beinin and Hajjar analysing the case from another viewpoint argue that the plan was rejected because it does not "guarantee full Israeli withdrawal from areas captured in 1967 or the establishment of an independent Palestinian state." Other cases that served as triggers of the uprising were the ambush of seven men from Gaza by Israeli military in October of 1986. It is said that these persons were from Palestinian Islamic Jihad militant organization. Later an Israeli kills a Palestinian schoolgirl. In

⁹ Jonathan Kaplan is a professor at the Jewish University in Cyberspace

December of the same year an Israeli salesman is being killed in Gaza. The car crash was the last straw adding to the growing despair, repression, and frustration of the Palestinian people.

The First Intifada was a mass movement or “grassroots protests” as described in Aljazeera website; it involved women, teenagers, children, students, workers, teachers, and intellectuals and many others, i.e. people from all layers of the society stood up to change the situation. A PLO activist in an interview given to Fromoccupiedpalestine.org on 4 November, 2004 described the First Intifada as “mass participation - it was like a civil rebellion.” This First Intifada was not expected to erupt by both sides though later PLO (which at the time of first intifada was set in Tunis) claimed that it had organized it. What makes this uprising distinct from the others is scale – it covered all of the Occupied Territories – duration (about four days), and manifestations: mass rallies, general strikes and unarmed confrontations, combined with self-administration of daily life and attempts at civil disobedience (European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation). The uprising also made the international community to be aware or more precisely become aware of the situation in the region. Soon four PLO factions – Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP and the PPP – incorporated into the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) began organizing the activities of the unrest. The organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad challenged PLO leadership of the Intifada. In any case no faction or organization assumed full leadership: the Uprising was directed by councils of ordinary people not affiliated with any faction or organization. The most important thing to mention is that it was non-violent. The Palestinians were not equipped with any kind of ammunition; initially it included stone throwing, erecting barricades and burning tires. Later they also used Molotov cocktails and hand grenades while the IDF was equipped with the latest ammunition and weaponry. Besides, IDF was and is also very well trained regular army. But then Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin asserted that the Israeli side would meet the insurrection with “Iron Fist” or “breaking of bones” (UN:

Palestine History) policy. This policy assumed and involved such violent means as severe beatings, use of live ammunition and rubber bullets, etc. (UN: Palestine History). Then the question arises Why meet the insurgents with such violent policy? (see appendix F for Intifada I casualties for both sides). Firstly, it can be assumed that Israelis were not expecting such challenge that brought the Palestinian question into agenda of world community. The public was shocked hearing about the methods of repressing the uprising, the conditions of refugees and people in the Occupied Territories. The UN Security Council Resolution 605 (Adopted on 22 December, 1987) condemned Israel in human rights violations. The Resolution also requested the Secretary General to submit a report that would provide recommendations for ensuring safety and protection of Palestinian civilians (UN: History of Palestine). Secondly, it can be argued that Israel tried to suppress the Intifada and at the same time making the Palestinians understand that any attempt to bring down Israeli occupation would be severely punished to avoid its repetition.

The international community sought ways to stop the killings. And PLO was recognized to represent the Palestinian people. But Israel does not recognize PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and considered it a terrorist organization. In November 1988 the Palestinian National Council¹⁰ (PNC) in Algeria convened a session, in which it declared the independence of the Arab State of Palestine in West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The PNC also recognized the state of Israel and renounced terrorism. Israel did not recognize PLO¹¹ as an eligible side to take part in negotiations; and the loyal ally of Israel – U.S.A. – as Beinun and Hajjar (9) called “did little to encourage Israel to abandon its

¹⁰ The Palestinian National Council (PNC) is the parliament in exile of the Palestinian people. The PNC elects an Executive Committee which assumes leadership of the organization between its sessions. The Council normally meets every two years. Resolutions are passed by a simple majority with a quorum of two-thirds. The first session was held in Jerusalem in 1964. Subsequent sessions were held in Cairo (1965), Gaza (1966), Cairo (1968–1977), Damascus (1979–1981), Algiers (1983), Amman (1984), and Gaza (1996 and 1998). (www.wikipedia.org)

¹¹ The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established by PNC as the political expression of the Palestinian people. Ahmad Al-Shuqeiry was the first chairman of the PLO Executive Committee elected by PNC.

intransigent stand.” U.S. did not approve an entry visa for Yasser Arafat when the General Assembly moved its session in Geneva to consider the question of Palestine in December. In 1988 in Geneva Yasser Arafat recognizes the state of Israel and renounces terrorism. Arafat is refused an entry visa to the U.S.A. a second time in 1990 when the Security Council convenes a session to discuss the situation of May 20 events in Herzelyia town in Israel: about eight Palestinian workers have been killed that day from the fire opened by an Israeli.

MADRID PEACE CONFERENCE AND OSLO ACCORDS

After the end of the Gulf War the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. undertake serious attempts to address the situation in the Middle East, namely the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. President Bush in his statement to U.S. Congress dated March 6, 1991 asserted that “We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab states – and between Israelis and Palestinians. The tactics of terror lead nowhere. There can be no substitute for diplomacy.” Another interesting point in his statement is that he emphasized the recognition of Israel and spoke about “legitimate Palestinian political rights” without saying a word about the recognition of Palestine¹². He also stated “a comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace.” In mid-October the U.S. issues Letters of Assurances to the Palestinians and Israel on 18 October, 1991. The Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians stresses the importance of Palestine participation, as it is very crucial in reaching just and comprehensive peace. Besides it also asserted that the American side “do[es] not recognize Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem or the extension of its municipal boundaries, and we encourage all sides to avoid unilateral acts that would exacerbate local tensions or make negotiations more difficult or preempt their final outcome.” In the Letter to the Palestinian side the U.S. states “we do not support the creation of an independent Palestinian State. Neither do we support the continuation of the Israeli rule or annexation of the Occupied Territories.” These Letters of Assurances also stress that “Palestinian residents of Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza who agree to the two tracks concept and to negotiation by phases” can participate in the negotiations. This term made sure that the participation of PLO would not be possible in the negotiations which at that time was set in Tunis. But it does not impede the PLO

¹² “This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel’s security and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin tests of fairness and security.” Bush statement to U.S. Congress on March 6, 1991

leadership to advise or consult the delegation members. After issuing the Letters of Assurances invitation has been sent to participate in Madrid Peace Conference. The invitations has been issued by the United States and the Soviet Union that claimed their readiness to help to achieve “a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.” The government of Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan are invited. Egypt is invited as a participant, as will be the European Community, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was invited at Secretary General level as an observer; GCC members will be invited to participate in organizing negotiations on multilateral issues. The United Nations Organization is invited to send an observer who will represent the Secretary General. At last the Palestinians are invited as part of a joint Jordanian – Palestinian delegation. The negotiations between Palestinians and Israel will include at the initial stage talks on interim self-government which will last five years, beginning the third year of the period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will take place on permanent status on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338.

The Madrid Peace Conference (the opening conference) began on October 30, 1991. The First Intifada ended with the convening of the conference. The framework of Madrid conference was four bilateral talks between Israel and its Arab neighbours (Israel-Jordan, Israel-Palestinians, Israel-Syria, Israel-Lebanon). The bilateral negotiations were held in Washington following immediately the opening conference from November of 1991 to January of 1994. The multilateral negotiations were convened in Moscow in 1992 and touched topics that touched the future of the Middle East such as water, environment, arms control and regional security, refugees and economic development. The most impressive result of Madrid Peace Conference was the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan signed in

1994. As it concerned to Israeli-Palestinian talks, there were no remarkable results. Norway hosted many times Israeli and Palestinian negotiators whose main host was U.S. And here in Oslo began the secret negotiations between Israel and the PLO. Actually the initial negotiations were also conducted between Israel and PLO though indirectly as the Palestinian negotiators were consulted and advised by PLO leaders. In 1993 these negotiations resulted in signing the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP). The initial talks were held in London, but finalized in Oslo. The DOP was signed in Washington, DC on September 13. The official signing ceremony was hosted by the U.S. President Bill Clinton, during which PLO leader Yasser Arafat and the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and was witnessed by Warren Christopher for the United States and Andrei Kozyrev for Russian Federation; the ceremony was ended with a handshake of Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat. The Declaration of Principles would enter into force one month after its signing. The Accords also provided the long expected mutual recognition of Israel and PLO. Israel – Palestine Liberation Organization letters of recognition were official letters between the Government of Israel at the level of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the PLO leader Yasser Arafat. In his letter dated September 9, 1993 to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin Yasser Arafat recognizes the state of Israel, renounces terrorism and declares “those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid.” Yitzhak Rabin in his letter (same day) to Yasser Arafat announces “Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.” Main architects behind the plan were Johan Jorgen Holst (the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs), Terje Rod-Larsen and Mona Jull. The negotiations were reportedly conducted in total secrecy (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia).

What is the essence of Oslo Accords? The Accords provided Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (Jericho area) and the creation of Palestinian Authority (Cairo Agreement or Gaza and Jericho Agreement) (PA) as an interim body for self-government in five-year term in the above mentioned areas “leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)(DOP), as well as an elected Legislative Council in order the Palestinians govern themselves according to the rules of democratic principles, free elections would be held for the Council (Bill and Springborg 2000). Article V of the DOP provided that permanent status negotiations are to be considered in the future but not later than the beginning of the third year of interim period. The issues like status of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-operation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest will also be considered later. These latter issues have been causes of the First Intifada and their deference to future created sense of distrust within the Palestinian public, i.e. the signing of accords was not accepted identically. The authority concerning education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation¹³, and tourism will be transferred to Palestinians. The Council would establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats. Besides an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols (From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). The argument underlying this “step by step” approach of negotiations was that “as confidence was built through interactions between the two parties, the more difficult issues would be easier to deal with” (Bill and Springborg 2000, 279).

¹³ During the First Intifada Palestinians as a manifestation of complaint boycotted taxes, to which the Israeli Government responded by raising taxes

The Oslo peace process was not concluded by signing the DOP; in the period of 1993 through 1999 a number of Israeli-PLO agreements have been reached, which was envisioned by the Accords. These Agreements are:

- The Gaza-Jericho Agreement (also called the Cairo Accords), signed 4 May 1994
- The Transfer of Powers, signed 29 August 1994
- The Interim Agreement and Elections (also called the Taba Accords or Oslo II Accords), signed 28 September 1995
- The Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, signed 15 January 1997
- The Wye River Agreement¹⁴, signed 23 October 1998
- The Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum, signed 9 September 1999.

First of all what did these agreements provide for? The Cairo Accords (see appendix H for the map) established the Palestinian Authority and provided for Israeli withdrawal. As outlined in the agreement the Israeli forces withdraw from most of the area in 1994. According to the Oslo II Accords or Taba Accords (see appendix I for the map) signed 28 September 1995 the some parts of West Bank and Gaza (for the maps see Appendix G) would be divided into three zones or areas:

- Area A - full control of the Palestinian Authority, Gaza and Jericho, and seven major Palestinian towns in the West Bank – Nablus, Kalkilya, Tulkarem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin and Hebron
- Area B - Palestinian civil control, Israeli military control, includes 450 Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank
- Area C - full Israeli control, unpopulated areas of the West Bank, including areas of strategic importance to Israel and the settlements

¹⁴ The memorandum bears the name where it was negotiated – Wye Plantation Center in Maryland, U.S.A.

Bill and Springborg (2000) analyzing Oslo I and Oslo II agreements mention that both dealt with interim arrangements and the key, contentious issues, such as Palestinian statehood, Jewish settlements, the status of Jerusalem, refugees (right to return), have not been addressed. The Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, signed 15 January 1997 provided for the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron in accordance with Taba or Oslo II Accords. The Agreement was signed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. According to the Protocol IDF should withdraw 80% of its forces from the town of Hebron within ten days from the signing of the Protocol. The withdrawal was to be carried out in three stages. The first stage includes withdrawal from rural areas in the West Bank, the second stage will be carried out eight months after the first stage, and the third one will be completed by mid-1998. The U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in his letter to Netanyahu expresses this idea that the signing of the protocol is a crucial step in the peace process. The Wye River agreement dealt with further redeployments (See Appendix J for the map) (1% to Area (A) 12% to Area (B)) in the West Bank, security issues (prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities, cooperation in security issues: bilateral, forensic, trilateral¹⁵) and other concerns. Many parts of this memorandum were never implemented. The memorandum also mentioned “nullification of the Palestinian National Charter provisions” (The Wye River Memorandum, 1998) which was envisioned to be carried out in Oslo Accords. There is also provision about final status negotiations that will be resumed: “on an accelerated basis and will make a determined effort to achieve the mutual goal of reaching an agreement by May 4, 1999. The negotiations will be continuous and without interruption. The United States has expressed its willingness to facilitate these negotiations” (The Wye River Memorandum, 1998). The Sharm el-Sheikh

¹⁵ In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a high-ranking U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet as required and not less than biweekly to assess current threats, deal with any impediments to effective security cooperation and coordination and address the steps being taken to combat terror and terrorist organizations. The Wye River Memorandum, 1998

Memorandum was signed on September 9, 1999 by Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat at Sharm el Sheikh in Egypt, overseen by the United States represented by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The memorandum was witnessed and co-signed by President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia). This memorandum was an attempt to resume the negotiations between Palestine and Israel, and to make both parties to meet the commitments they took by the agreement in the framework of Oslo Peace Process. It once again emphasized the resumption of final status negotiations, implementation of redeployments, release of Palestinian prisoners, security issues, etc.

Initially the Oslo Accords has raised hopes in the peoples of both countries – Palestine and Israel – that at last there will be end to violence, and the conflict would be resolved through peaceful means. But the signing of Oslo Accords has not been accepted identically in both countries. According to Kaplan (2000) the opposition in Israel is portrayed as follows: Tehiya and Gush Emunim called for open annexation of all of the territories, the Labor Party policy was that some form of territorial compromise is required in order to have democratic state and not just a Jewish state, i.e. the policy assumed to give Palestinians a form of self-government. The stand of the Likud party towards the Palestinian issue according to Hoffman (2006, 5) is “no negotiating with the Palestinians until they fully acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and there is a full cessation of terror and incitement; any future negotiations will be on a reciprocal basis only...A united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.” The grievances among the extremist groups in Israel about the withdrawal of Israeli forces and transferring territories to the Palestinian Authority were rising significantly: these groups were ready to resist any attempt of territory transfer by violent means. It is believed that one of the member of such groups assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 4, 1995: he was even made accused of betraying Israel (Kaplan 2000). Shimon Peres became the new Prime

Minister. The existence of such kind of sentiments in Israeli society contributed to the victory of Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 elections. Likud position on Oslo process was negative. The party opposed it from the very first day of talks. By Netanyahu's coming to power the process had come to halt, but the subsequent talks with Arafat resulted in Hebron agreement, later in 1998 in Wye River Memorandum. Here intervention by U.S.A. played great role.

In Palestine Islamic organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and PLO faction Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) expressed their dissatisfaction and grievance with the negotiations. Hamas and Islamic Jihad accused the PLO in betraying its principles and goals and playing the game suggested by the Israeli side. Though PLO renounced terrorism and committed itself to work for security and prevents acts of violence Hamas has carried out several suicide bombings. This was followed by a violent act by Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish settler, opened fire on worshippers in the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, that ended with 30 dead Palestinians.

There have been accusations from both sides in not meeting the commitments made during Oslo Peace Process. A communication by Israel Government Press dated March 3, 1998 makes accusations of non-compliance of the Palestinian side with their obligations under the Accords. The communication listed the commitments that the Israeli side has already met and stated that "Palestinian commitments contained in the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement were recycled in the September 1995 Oslo 2 Accord and reaffirmed in the January 1997 Hebron Accord, yet remain unfulfilled."

But non-compliance from the Israeli side was also present, even more there exist breaches of international law. The Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories were rising and which is a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel is a signatory to the Convention. This means that once the countries sign and ratify the treaty it becomes

binding¹⁶. The Fourth Geneva Convention assures that civilian population of occupied territories is protected and also the Convention prevents the occupying power to change permanently the status of the territories (Pacheco 2001). As Pacheco (2001, 182) further contemplates “the Conventions has become the internationally accepted guideline for armies to follow in their treatment of civilians for all occupations and is considered reflective of customary principles of international law.” The Conventions also aims for protecting civilian population from confiscations of property or settlements of the people of the occupying country. Human rights of civilians under the control of the occupier are also protected by this Convention. Its provisions provide protection against illegal detention, deportation, torture, house demolition, humiliation and degradation of the civilian population. Therefore, respect for the Convention in the occupied territories is of vital importance for the Palestinian side as “it strengthens and legitimizes Palestinian demands for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories, undermines Israeli claims to sovereignty over annexed Jerusalem or other territories...” (Pacheco 2001, 183). As the analysis of the violations of the Convention presented in the official website of European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and Euro-Arab Cooperation (MEDEA) shows that the violations mainly concerned the ban on settlements in territories under military control (or just occupied territories), closing down of educational institutions, house demolitions, holding prisoners from occupied territories in Israeli prisons. Pacheco (2001) asserts that Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza has doubled (reaching to almost 200,000), in East Jerusalem it grew to 170,000, and the expansion of Jewish settlements have been done on the account of the confiscated Palestinian lands. Besides Israel claimed that the Geneva Convention does not apply in this case, as the territories are not occupied but annexed. BBC reports (Geneva Convention, August 2004) Israel’s argument for non-applicability of the Geneva Convention is “that the international

¹⁶ Israel signed the conventions on 8 December 1949 and ratified them on 6 July 1951

conventions relating to occupied land do not apply to the Palestinian territories because they were not under the legitimate sovereignty of any state in the first place.” In February 1999 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution¹⁷ that called for a conference about the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Territories. The international community position in this respect is that the Convention fully applies to this case. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and the Israeli human rights group B’tselem consider the Convention to be binding and applicable to Israeli – Palestinian conflict. The conference was held on 15 July 1999 at the Geneva UN HQ but it had no significant results. The Swiss Government called for a conference of the 189 High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 on 5 December 2001. On November 8, 2001 during daily press briefing the U.S.A. stated its position on the conference, it read “The U.S. has made clear its opposition to the meeting of parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention and will not attend. We believe such a meeting would be counterproductive and has no legal basis under the Convention, which we strongly support.” The Convention (Article 6) applies and is in effect until the occupation is over completely despite the signed agreements¹⁸. This means that the agreements signed since 1993 do not assume that the Geneva Conventions ceases to be in effect. The same is true in respect to the protection of civilian population (Article 8)¹⁹. The Amnesty International also stated that Israel has committed grave breaches of Geneva Conventions.

¹⁷ The resolution was adopted by 115 pro votes (15 of which were the EU countries), two (Israel and the U.S.A.) votes were against, five abstentions (MEDEA)

¹⁸ The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or occupation mentioned in Article 2. In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention shall cease on the general close of military operations.

In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory, by the provisions of the following Articles of the present Convention: I to 12, 27, 29 to 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 to 77, and 143 (Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 6).

¹⁹ Protected persons may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be (Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 8).

According to Amnesty International calculations since the Intifada more than 700 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli security forces of which at least 150 were children. Palestinian detainees frequently suffer torture or other ill treatment under interrogation. At least 34 people are held under administrative detention orders without charge or trial. The violations also include collective punishments against Palestinians: closures of towns and villages, demolition of more than 550 Palestinian homes and prolonged curfews (News Service Nr. 214, Amnesty International). The Geneva Conventions should be also respected by the Palestinian side: the Palestinian armed groups such as Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine deliberately killed more than 230 Israelis through shootings, suicide bombings, and other violent acts.

The Oslo Accords has failed. Why? What were the factors that undermined the peace process? There are different views concerning the issue. Terje Rod-Larsen (one of the designers of the Oslo I) described the process as a “win-win” or “loose-loose” situation: if either of parties fails, the other also fails. Professor Joxe²⁰ called the Oslo process a sham and accused of it Israel (Marlowe 2000). Israel is to be blamed for the failure of the Accords: the Israeli leaders slowed and revised the implementation of each agreement, enjoying “Washington’s total support.” What was the weakness of the Oslo negotiators? According to the analysis of Pacheco (2001) one of the weaknesses of Oslo negotiators was the ignorance of the Fourth Geneva Convention as a guideline. The Madrid negotiators considered it as a guideline; they were fully aware of the political implication the Geneva Convention would have, had Israel admitted its applicability to this conflict taking into account human rights violations, status of the occupied territories, etc. One thing that was also very important during Madrid talks is that the negotiators were Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories being very well aware of the situation inside the country. The PLO negotiators

²⁰ Prof. Alain Joxe is the director of the Interdisciplinary Centre for Research on Peace and Strategic Studies (CIRPES) at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales.

lived in exile, acted outside the country, so they had general ideas about the inner conditions. During Madrid talks Declaration of Principles has been designed by the United States which was refused by the Madrid negotiators: the draft have not touched the questions of Geneva Convention Applicability, ceasing of settlement expansion and land confiscations, the status of Jerusalem (Pacheco 2000).²¹ The PLO conceded, it conceded to the “step by step approach,” it conceded to negotiating the status of Jerusalem later, conceded to negotiate the right of return. PLO made many miscalculations during Oslo Accords. These miscalculations cost the Palestinians so dear. The delay of negotiations on the final status of East Jerusalem contributed to the rise of Jewish population there (from 22,000 grew to 170,000). Besides, during final status talks in 2000 negotiations were about what parts of East Jerusalem should be under Palestinian control. In the result, one square mile of “Old City” was divided into tiny sovereignties (Pacheco 2001). The negotiations on Area C (created by Oslo II agreement) resulted in not Israeli withdrawal but legitimization of Israeli claims to sovereignty considering Israeli presence and investment in this area satisfactory reason. The construction of bypass roads for IDF redeployment was catastrophic: torn agricultural lands, uprooted large vineyards, and a grave damage to Palestinian economy. The Palestinian authority made attempts to stop the actions but in vain. The roads also had strategic significance for Israel. Israeli control over water resources is another tool to control the population: in February 2001 Israeli is reported to close of water supply to the cities of Bethlehem and Hebron (Pacheco 2001).

Another factor according to Bill and Springborg (2000) was Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu’s coming to power in 1996 after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. Shimon Peres, successor of Rabin, lost the elections to Netanyahu, as Peres never enjoy public support. Netanyahu was an opponent of Oslo Process; his election campaign was

²¹ The analysis done by Allegra Pacheco are based on the arguments and analysis of Madrid negotiators, anmely Faisal Husseini – head of the Madrid negotiating team

based on refusal of Israeli withdrawal, of refugee return, opposition to the Palestinian claims on East Jerusalem. Over years the enthusiasm of Palestinians for Oslo Accords was coming down, Islamist and radical groups were gaining more and more support from the Palestinian public. This is also an important factor while discussing the failure of Oslo Accords.

Rothstein²² (2006) emphasizes other factors that may bring to failure during peace process and are important not less than the other factors already discussed. These factors are trust of the other side, possibility of real peace, establishment of permanent truce other than temporary, attitudes and beliefs that sustained and deepened the conflict, willingness to significant concessions as well as their interpretation and evaluation. According to Rothstein (2006) there are three factors that “ensured” Oslo failure: (1) deficiencies in Oslo’s terms, (2) escalating and reciprocal failures of implementation, and (3) public support for sustaining and deepening the concluded agreements.

During peace building in violent conflicts people-to-people activities are important in terms of creating trust or at least create tolerance at grassroots level. Such kind of activities have been carried out by a number of NGOs after 1993 when the Oslo Accords have been concluded. Maoz (2004, 563) defines the goal of peace-building activities as “prevention of further violence” which was not the case in Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During such activities great emphasis should be placed on dialogues and joint people-to-people (P2P) projects at grassroots level aiming at transforming the relations between the sides through constructive, open, and mutually respectful communication (Maoz 2004). The conducted workshops – IPCRI (Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information) Israeli-Palestinian youth reconciliation-aimed dialogue workshops – have revealed that after these workshops the

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stereotyped perceptions of each other had been changed. Both sides viewed each other as more *considerate of each other, tolerant and good hearted* (Maoz 2004). In these activities equality, symmetry and joint actions are of vital importance; they are the basis of success and trust. Equality has broader interpretation concerning the place, language, projects and organizations, e.g. workshops can be conducted either in English or both in Hebrew and in Arabic, or they can be conducted both in explicitly Jewish and Arabic sites. Baskin and Al-Qaq²³ (2004) emphasize the role of Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations, civil society institutions in P2P projects. It is believed that P2P projects would greatly support and improve the peace-building processes started at political level, as those involved in the project are closer to the people. Baskin and Al-Qaq (2004, 544) define the meaning of P2P as “P2P denotes civil society cooperation; building constituencies for peace from the ground up, conflict resolution, learning the political narrative of “the Other,” bringing people into creative interaction, and learning from one another and about each other’s culture.” Considering the case of the Second Intifada it should be mentioned that P2P activities should be given greater attention and the extent of involvement also should be larger in order to avoid violent uprisings and actions in future.

Coming back to Rothstein analysis of the failure of Oslo Accords, the decision-making style of the leaders is to be considered central to the three factors undermining it. He argues that weak leaders try to decide as little as possible in order to satisfy those who could do him harm (Rothstein 2006). Accordingly, Arafat’s role in Oslo failure as weak leader from the perspective of Israel and the United States is of key importance: “Oslo failed largely because Arafat was incapable of or unwilling to make peace, perhaps because he could not deal with the prospect of having his rhetoric of ultimate triumph thrown back into his face” (Rothstein 2006, 8). The reasoning behind this idea is that Arafat has been in power through

²³ Gershon Baskin and Zakaria Al-Qaq are co-directors of Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information

that period of negotiations as opposed to the Israeli side; the Israeli leaders often fought to stay on power and Likud leaders in order to do so promised their constituencies that if they are elected they would not be bound by Oslo principles²⁴ (Rothstein 2006). Rothstein (2006, 8) argues that “[Arafat’s] decision to support the use of violence, his refusal to oppose Palestinian terrorist groups in a serious manner, and his illegal importation of arms directly threatened the process and destroyed the peace movement in Israel.” Arafat is accused of all of this when Palestine after the Gulf War received little aid from the Arab states; without bringing the fact that Israel was receiving large amounts provided by the United States. According to Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) total U.S. aid to Israel amounts well over 140 billion in 2003 dollars; Israel got nearly 3 billion USD to develop weapon systems. Besides all that Israel is given access to intelligence “that it denies its NATO allies and has turned a blind eye towards Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons” (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, 3). Israel enjoyed full support of the United States in all aspects.²⁵

Taking into account all of the above-mentioned it can be concluded that Oslo failure is in defective implementation and violations of international law. This failure brought to a new INTIFADA in 2005. Mistrust among the Palestinian public towards agreements and towards conflict resolution through secular means made them turn to religion. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism is the ample proof of it. The main factors that should be paid greater attention during further negotiations learned during Oslo Peace Process are: there should be no delays in the implementation of the concluded agreements, illegal Jewish settlements should not be turned a blind eye, there should be active involvement of all regional actors in the implementation of the concluded agreements.

²⁴ E.g. Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu’s election campaign in 1996. He won 1996 elections

²⁵ Since 1982, the United States as vetoed 32 UN Security Council resolutions critical of Israel, blocked Arab states’ efforts to put Israel’s nuclear arsenal on the Agenda of International Atomic Energy Agency (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006)

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT OR CAMP DAVID II

The UN made a call to convene a conference in Geneva to consider the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the grave breaches of it. The conference was held on 15 July 1999 at the Geneva UN HQ but it had no significant results. The situation is believed to change when Labor Party leader Ehud Barak came to power. His election raised hopes that the peace process can be relaunched. Barak was more prone to be engaged in active negotiations towards peace. His first step was to begin negotiations with Syria over the Golan Heights but the Syrian side refused the agreement. The next step was the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli side began withdrawals that were to be implemented under Wye River Agreement. And the final status talks resumed, and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum set the timeline for the completions of the negotiations. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was a memorandum signed on September 4, 1999 by Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt, overseen by the United States represented by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright which discussed the issues of redeployment and final status negotiations (Wikipedia, free encyclopedia). And the negotiations within the framework of Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum led to Camp David Summit in 2000. U.S. President Clinton invited PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to a summit in Camp David, Maryland, U.S.A. The summit is to be convened on July 11, 2000. The summit was convened on July 11, 2000 and ended on July 25, 2000. The final status issues – Jerusalem, security, borders and refugees – were to be discussed during the summit in order later in September to conclude an agreement. The timeline set by the 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum called for final status negotiations to be completed by September 13, 2000. According to Palestinefacts.org analysis the opportunity to exchange ideas non-publicly is significant in terms of political constraints, which in case of public exchange is difficult to handle. Ehud Barak, according to American

side, had made substantial concessions that were even unexpected for the Israeli public. The concessions made by the Israeli side were refused by Yasser Arafat. The Camp David negotiations ended in failure: it is said that “the Palestinians demanded sovereignty over all of East Jerusalem including the Haram-As-Sharif (Temple Mount) (Mideastweb). The details of the proposals and talks are not made public fully yet, there is no clear understanding what has been proposed by Israeli and Palestinian sides to solve the status of East Jerusalem, refugee issues (right of return under UN resolution 194), security issues, redeployment of Israeli forces from the West Bank, and complete, 100% withdrawal from Gaza strip. Palestinefacts.org basing on media reports briefly introduces the concession proposal made by Ehud Barak. The offer is the following:

- Israeli redeployment from 95% of the West Bank and 100% of the Gaza Strip (see appendix K for the map)
- The creation of a Palestinian state in the areas of Israeli withdrawal
- The removal of isolated settlements and transfer of the land to Palestinian control
- Other Israeli land exchanged for West Bank settlements remaining under Israeli control
- Palestinian control over East Jerusalem, including most of the Old City: Palestine would obtain sovereignty over suburbs in the north and the south of Jerusalem that would be annexed to the West Bank, including Abu Dees, Alezariye and eastern Sawahre. Within East Jerusalem, in (Beit Hanina-Shuafat), there would be a civilian administration affiliated with the Palestinian Authority with the possibility of linking it to West Jerusalem through a municipality covering both sectors. (Essentials of the Camp David II Proposals by Israel)
- “Religious Sovereignty” over the Temple Mount, replacing Israeli sovereignty in effect since 1967 (www.palestinefacts.org)

There is no disclosure of information of the proposal of the Palestinian side. Lack of counterproposal and firm stand of Arafat on the right of return of refugees made the Camp David Summit yield in failure. The Summit ended with issuing a Trilateral Statement defining the agreed principles to guide future negotiations.

Malley²⁶ and Agha²⁷ (2001) analyze the Camp David negotiations taking into account the formed idea of generous Israeli offers and Arafat's guilt in refusing them and for failure in talks. Perceptions of blaming one side and praising the other have ripple effects. Analysis of the causes of Camp David summit should consider such facts as "history, the dynamics of the negotiations, and the relationships among the three parties" (Malley and Agha 2001). Malley and Agha (2001) stress several factors that are vital in the analysis of Camp David negotiations. The first one is different perspectives of participants of Camp David which in its turn lead to divergent approaches to talks. Malley and Agha (2001) claim that Ehud Barak was guided by three principles during the negotiations: antipathy towards the step by step approach, the Palestinian leadership will make a compromise having explored and found other possibilities unappealing, conviction of Barak team that the Israeli public would ratify an agreement with Palestinians. Second factor is Barak's victory in elections in respect to Netanyahu's failure in implementing Israel's signed obligations. His first moves after election reassured the Palestinians that he is willing to negotiate and implement but then his positions on most of the issues proved the contrary. There was a big mistrust against the Israeli and US side by Yasser Arafat: the Israeli side did not accomplish the prior negotiations and there was no progress in negotiations. Malley and Agha (2001) also mention that Arafat had put several conditions before agree to participate in the summit.

²⁶ **Robert Malley** is Middle East Program Director at the International Crisis Group. Between 1998 and 2001, he was President Clinton's Special Assistant for Arab-Israeli Affairs. He was a member of the US peace team and participated in the Camp David summit

²⁷ **Hussein Agha** is Senior Associate Member of St. Antony's College, Oxford University. He has been involved in Israeli-Palestinian affairs for more than 30 years

First, he sought additional preparatory talks to ensure that Camp David would not fail. Second, he requested that the third Israeli territorial withdrawal be implemented before Camp David – a demand that, when rebuffed by the US, turned into a request that the U.S. “guarantee” the withdrawal even if Camp David did not yield an agreement (what he called a “safety net”). A third Palestinian request – volunteered by Clinton, rather than being demanded by Arafat – was that the U.S. remain neutral in the event the summit failed and not blame the Palestinians.

This once again proves that Arafat did not trust the summit and the Israeli side. And the U.S. side promised that there would not be “finger-pointing” (Malley and Agha 2001). Israel was not conceding lands of its own but it was giving back the lands of mandatory Palestine. Malley and Agha 2001 argue that Palestinians’ failure was that “[they] never managed to rid themselves of their intransigent image. Indeed, the Palestinians' principal failing is that from the beginning of the Camp David summit onward they were unable either to say yes to the American ideas or to present a cogent and specific counterproposal of their own.”

Benny Morris conducted an interview with Ehud Barak concerning the Camp David summit which was published in May 23, 2002 issue of the Guardian.²⁸ In this interview Barak blames Arafat for the failure of the summit and assures that Arafat wants the destruction of Israel by insisting on the right of return of refugees. Moreover, he accuses the Palestinians of telling lies “they are products of a culture in which to tell a lie... creates no dissonance. They don’t suffer from the problem of telling lies that exists in Judaeo-Christian culture,” basing on this argument he believes that to reach their goals they (Palestinians) are ready for everything (Morris 2002). Kristof in his article published in *The New York Times*, on May 17, 2002 responds to Camp David summit and also claims that Arafat was not to blame for saying “no” to the Israeli proposal as the viability of a state established after the proposal would be questionable. The proposal “would have left the Palestinian state shorn of

²⁸ This is an edited version of an article which appears in the current edition of the New York Review of Books. Barak's interview with Morris was a reply to an article by former US negotiator Robert Malley and Hussein Agha in the New York Review of Books. Malley and Agha also respond to Barak in the current issue.

at least 9 percent of the West Bank, crippled by the loss of water and good land, and (even in the best version) nearly divided by an Israeli annexation running east from Jerusalem” (Kristof 2002). A conclusion can be drawn from all of these that there is great mistrust between the countries and the growing extremist groups are gaining more and more support at the grassroots level because all attempts to find a final solution turned out to move in a circle.

THE SECOND INTIFADA

The Second Intifada broke out on September 28, 2000 after Likud leader Ariel Sharon's visit to Jerusalem's Haram al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary, or Temple Mount). The Second Intifada or Al-Aqsa Intifada took its name from the Muslim holy place – the temple Al-Aqsa or as it otherwise is called Haram al-Sharif, the Noble Sanctuary, or Temple Mount. Ariel Sharon visited Haram al-Sharif guarded by Israeli police and soldiers. The aim of Sharon's visit was to check whether everyone can access Temple Mount, the freedom of worship is guaranteed everybody, but before, during and after his visit the area has been sealed off (Said²⁹ 2001). This Intifada was militarized from the very beginning as opposed to the First Intifada. The Al-Aqsa Intifada has never ended officially. Unlike the First Intifada the Al-Aqsa Intifada was not a surprise for the Israelis, they were ready to respond to any changes in situation after the 1996 tunnel events.³⁰



Muhammad al-Durra and his father

During the first phases of the uprising mass demonstration and clashes with Israeli forces, exchanges of gunfire were often occurring and from time to time gaining new heights by an event or action undertaken by Israeli forces. There have been no attempts to stop the clashes spreading throughout the territories. Israel launched a series of retaliatory air strikes against the Palestinian Authority. In the first six days of the Intifada, 61 Palestinians were killed and 2,657 were injured by the Israeli Military and Police (Al-Aqsa Intifada, Aljazeera). One such trigger was 12-year-old Muhammad al-Durra and his father on September 30. Reciprocal attacks continue: Israel warplane attack in Gaza in 2001, suicide bomb attack on a disco in

²⁹ Edward W. Said is University Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University. He is the author of many books, including *The Question of Palestine*, *Orientalism*, *The politics of Dispossession*, etc.

³⁰ Netanyahu government in 1996 decided to open a tunnel that went alongside the Al-Aqsa mosque to the Via Dolorosa. This caused several (about five days) days of rioting and numerous casualties – 70 Palestinians and 15 Israelis were left dead

Tel Aviv by Islamic Jihad, another suicide attack leaving 15 people dead this time by Hamas, PFLP leader Abu Ali Mustafa is killed in a missile strike, following it Israel's tourism minister Rehavam Zeevi is assassinated – PFLP takes revenge (BBC News 2004). The bloodiest year since the Intifada broke out was 2002 – the reciprocal attacks kill about 45 Palestinians and 28 Israelis are killed during the period of 8 to 27 March. There have been several attempts to end the violence and try to come back at negotiating table. The U.S. offered a number of Bridging proposals before sitting around the negotiating table in Taba in 2001, January 21-27. According to EU non-official summary of Taba negotiations there have been progress on some issues that have not been resolved in Camp David. These talks also gained nothing and the violence continued.

The reasons behind the Second Intifada are different and disputable and always give rise to hot debates. The seven years of Oslo Peace Process, the continuing military occupation of Israel of Palestinian territories (West Bank and Gaza), the unresolved issue of the right of return of refugees, expanding Jewish settlements, degradation of agricultural land to construct bypass roads, the trigger for the Intifada to burst out was Ariel Sharon's visit to Al-Aqsa mosque in East Jerusalem. The views of both sides of the causes of Al-Aqsa Intifada differ: the Palestinian stand on this issue is that Palestinians were frustrated with the failure of Oslo Accords and Camp David Summit in 2000, continuing Israeli settlement expansion, and no hope for the resolution of the conflict; the Israeli side argues that Intifada was organized, it was Palestinian policy in order to achieve what they failed during negotiations, and achieve these goals through terror and violence. Ya'Ari (2000) argues that this Intifada was imposed by Arafat because "[h]is goal in engineering the current violence is to avoid a deal which would force him to surrender those claims" (denial of Palestinian rights and renouncing any claims of Palestinian cause). In Camp David Summit he was offered such a deal, the acceptance of which will mean the end of the Palestinian claims. Said (2001) described the

Intifada as a turning point in Israeli-Palestinian relations. This intifada was different from the other in many ways and those in power should be aware that the outcome the movement is not easy to predict. Said (2001, 30-31) in his article “Palestinians under Siege” also warns about this:

“What must be clear to every ruler, including Clinton and Barak, is that the period of stability guaranteed by the tripartite dominance of Israel, the United States and local Arab regimes is now threatened by popular forces of uncertain magnitude, unknown direction, unclear vision. Whatever shape they eventually take, theirs will be an unofficial culture of the dispossessed, the silenced and the scorned.”

The tension became more acute when Likud leader Ariel Sharon came to power in 2001 February elections. Ben Efrat (2002) makes an argument that Palestinians protested not only against Israel but also against Palestinian Authority. The leadership of the Second Intifada were comprised of Tanzim (new faction formed of Fatah representatives, leader was Marwan Barghuti), Hamas and Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Brigades (Kuttab 2001). Besides, a broad political coalition was formed – the National and Islamic Forces (NIF) – to lead and direct the uprising. But the role of Fatah was the most crucial one in the Intifada. Rabbani³¹ (2001, 79) argues that Fatah was “the most important factor in transforming the initial clashes into a sustained rebellion.” At that time among the groups in the leadership of the Intifada Fatah was an organized force. Fatah and PA are “closely intertwined” (Rabbani 2001, 79) but Fatah is not a part of the government. Its position on Oslo Accords has been sceptical and it always maintained relations at grassroots level.

A number of scholars connect the eruption of the Second Intifada with Oslo failure followed by Camp David summit failure in 2000. The reasons why Oslo failed has already been discussed but there are other assumptions underlying the failure of Oslo; namely, the

³¹ Mouin Rabbani is director of the Palestinian American Research Center in the West Bank town of Ramallah.

inequality of powers at negotiating table. Robinson's³² argument that Oslo, Camp David failures are not the real causes in the eruption of the intifada rather it bears structural character – hegemonic peace. Hegemonic peace is “peace between significantly unequal powers that nevertheless retain the autonomy to accept or reject the terms of settlement” (Robinson 2001, 112). One important characteristic of hegemonic peace is that it is destabilizing to the hegemon and to the weaker party. The Israel-Palestine case was not that of the hegemon and the state under the complete domination of the hegemon. In this case this destabilization case is not that significant as it would be in case of hegemon and a party that is weaker and not under the complete domination of the other. The history has seen such precedents: the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. The peace treaty reflected the power of the allies but Germany was not under their complete domination. The result was another war. Another one is the Israel-Lebanon peace treaty in early 1980s. Consequently, the peace process that was initiated in Oslo fits this characterization of hegemonic peace. Yitzhak Rabin's assassination in 1995 is an example of instability of hegemonic peace (Robinson 2001). There has always been great imbalance of powers even if not considering the broad support of the United States both financially and diplomatically. The argument brought forward by Robinson about “just peace” is also true for Israeli-Palestinian case. This is so because “peace treaties invariably reflect power, not justice” (Robinson 2001, 112). Oslo Accords prove this notion of power: Palestine has made significant concessions during the seven years of negotiations; Camp David Accords put the viability of the to-be-formed Palestinian state under question had Arafat accepted Ehud Barak's proposal. “Just peace” should be achieved when the most crucial issues for the Palestinians are solved – the refugee issues, end of human rights violations, bringing to a halt the expansion of Israeli settlements

³² Glenn E. Robinson, the author of *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution*, is an associate professor in the School of International Graduate Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and a research fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

in the Occupied Territories. Israel could decide what to implement: could refugees return without Israel's consent – no, could the settlements be dismantled without Israel's consent even if the dismantling process should be implemented under the agreements – no. Palestinians has no leverage against Israel. How the Second Intifada was commented in media is also very important. The international community could have distorted views about the causes of Intifada and its development, which in its turn influences the opinion and actions of the world public towards the Palestine case.

There are also other views and analysis of Al-Aqsa Intifada. Eisenstadt (2001) discusses the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the prospects for Arab Israeli war. The Second Intifada is believed to have connotations of religious struggle which puts it at the center of attention of the Arab world. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the activeness of extremist organizations make the international community to be aware of the possible eruption of religious war. The U.S. policy after September 11 marks the beginning of the war against terrorism which is not necessarily connected with Islamic movement throughout the world. This issue would be discussed much more detailed in one of the next chapters of this essay. The reasoning behind the perspectives of Arab-Israeli war is based on the situation Al-Aqsa Intifada had created. According to Eisenstadt³³ (2001) the Al-Aqsa Intifada presented the Arab-Israeli struggle in terms of religious conflict, brought back the "Palestinian question" on the agenda of Arab politics, made extremist groups to call for the liberation of Palestine (pointing to Hezbollah) pointing out three scenarios it can develop into:

- 1) Hizballah provokes an escalation along the Israel–Lebanon border, leading to a clash between Israel and Syria;
- 2) Iraqi pressure on Jordan leads to the entry of Iraqi forces into that country, and an Israeli military response, or;
- 3) Palestinian terrorists launch a chemical or biological (CB) attack against Israelis, using materials provided by Syria, Iraq, or Iran, prompting Israeli retaliation against the suspected state sponsor.

³³ Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

The reason for anticipating CB attack is the CIA assessment of Hamas interest in acquiring chemical and biological weapons (Eisenstadt 2001). The only scenario that came true to some extent is the recent developments in Israel – Lebanon relations.

Michael Herzog³⁴ (2004) suggests two versions of Intifada causes: Palestinian and Israeli. Palestinian stand on the causes of Intifada is that continual Israeli provocations – from settlement building to Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount – triggered the uprising; the Israeli stand is that Intifada was a means to achieve the issues that “could not have been achieved through negotiations.” To what extent is this true? It is not real that Arafat would trigger an uprising because there are also views that this Intifada undermined Arafat’s authority at home as well as in the Arab world and in international community, but it can also be that he would do nothing or little to suppress it trying to achieve the goals he could not through negotiations.

³⁴ Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog (Israel Defense Forces), former top military aide to Israel's minister of defense, is currently a visiting military fellow at The Washington Institute.

MEDIA COVERAGE OF AL-AQSA INTIFADA

Robinson (2001) states that the causes of Oslo failure can be seen at different levels: failure to end Israel's military occupation of West Bank and Gaza, Camp David summit of 2000, Sharon's visit to Al-Aqsa mosque. These reasons are understandable only to those who are somehow related to Palestinian question – scholars, politicians, international organizations, and so on. But the reasons are not quite clear for international community as the media presents it under different light. The media often represented the Second Intifada under the light of Arafat's war (Robinson 2001). The First Intifada has not been presented in media so widely. It has been covered mainly by Arab media and the coverage was not large scale one. Said (2001) have studied the American media and evaluated whether the Palestinian realities and viewpoints were given fair hearing. The studies focus on the major U.S. newspapers – New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, and Boston Globe. Mass media plays an important role in public opinion formation which in its turn is very important for elections. Taking into account the role of mass media in public opinion formation in American reality, the distorted views about the Palestinian question could influence U.S. policy. Could War in Iraq be avoided if Americans would have the image of the complete reality? The general picture created in American mass media is that Israel is surrounded by hostile Arabs, Palestinians are threatening the existence of Israelis, Islamic fundamentalism is gaining a momentum and is a real threat to everyone (the events of September 11 proved that it was true. But this issue would be discussed in more detail later on), etc. but there is nothing said about house demolitions, detentions, arrests, degradation of Palestinian agricultural lands to build bypass roads, the breaches of international law, mainly the Geneva Conventions by the Israeli side.

Here the role of Israeli Lobby is significant. It organizes boycotts, letter writing campaigns, demonstrations against news outlets which are believed to be anti-Israeli or

criticizing Israeli actions (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). Abunimah and Ibish (2001) conducted another study of U.S. media this also proved that the opinion dominating in the U.S. public is distorted as the events are not represented fairly. The media created opinion that Arafat is to blame for igniting the uprising; that during Camp David summit Palestinians rejected a generous proposal by the Israeli side, etc.

THE TWO INTIFADAS COMPARED

Are the two Intifada different from each other? If so, what makes this Intifada distinct from the other? The first question can be answered “yes” they bore different characteristic features. These features are:

- Growing frustration among Palestinians (Non-implementation of Oslo Accords and subsequent agreements, unimproved conditions (continued incarceration (before 1993),
- armed struggle including suicide actions against civilians (casualties 3,651 Palestinians and 1007 Israelis)
- unseen brutality (lynching)
- Active participation of the National and Islamic Forces (Fatah was losing its popularity)
- Mass movement, a kind of civil disobedience (First Intifada)
- What is this national liberation or religious struggle?

The most important distinguishing feature of First Intifada from the Second one is the mass movement – non violent uprising – it can also be said that it was civil disobedience. The means for the participants to express their frustration with Israeli occupation were through boycotting Israeli products, refusal to go to work (large Palestinian workforce (it was a cheap labour force) was employed in Israel), opening of underground schools. Though the Intifada erupted in all parts of the Occupied Territories almost simultaneously it was not organized. The forces that later began to centralize the uprising and direct it were from outside (PLO from Tunis); in the initial phases the activities were by local activists (Andoni³⁵ 2001). In contrast the Second Intifada soon after its eruption escalated into “military clashes” and has high rates of casualties from both sides – according to MEDEA as of May 2004 the death toll was 4,046 of which 3,057 are Palestinians, and 918 Israelis. The situation during the Second

³⁵ Ghassan Andonni is president of the Palestinian Center for Rapprochement between People in Beit Sahour, West Bank

Intifada was much more different from the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Islamic forces enjoyed the support of the population which gave rise to another complicated question “is it national liberation movement or religious struggle?” Hamas and Islamic Jihad have built the principles of their struggle on religious basis, and were among the influential forces of Intifada 2000 leadership.

THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 2003 TO PRESENT

In 2003 Yasser Arafat appoints Mahmoud Abbas Prime Minister. Abbas' government often came into conflict with Arafat and later with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. As a result of a number of suicide bombings the West Bank cities were reoccupied and a new wave of violence began. The Quartet – United-States, Russia, European Union and the United Nations – on the 30th of April 2003 proposed the “Road Map for Peace” with clear phases, timeliness, target dates, and benchmarks aimed at creating a provisional Palestinian state and allow for negotiations of a final status agreement. Performance based means that the transition from one phase to another requires meeting the goals and obligations of the corresponding phase. There should be also international monitoring and supervision. Arafat and Sharon both committed themselves to implement the peace plan. The final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict was envisioned to obtain by 2005. The road map envisioned a two state solution urging the Palestinians to stop terror attacks and build democracy based on tolerance and liberty. The road map was to be implemented in three stages each having clearly set timelines: Phase I: Ending Terror and Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions, should be completed in May 2003; Phase II: Transition, timeline is June 2003 – December 2003; Phase III: Permanent Status Agreement and end of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, timeline – 2004-2005. During the first phase of the road map the issues of Security, Palestinian Institution-building, humanitarian response, civil society and settlements. The road map envisioned that Israel withdraws from the areas occupied since September 2000; the Palestinian security forces should take the place of IDF. The second phase was to deal with establishment of independent Palestinian state with provisional borders, adoption of a new constitution. The third and final phase was to reach final settlement; the negotiations would be based on UN Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 1397. As Collin Powell at a Quartet press conference dated September 2006 stated that “the

Quartet process has also allowed the different perspectives and different approaches that each of us takes in the region to come into harmony so that we all are united in providing a common front – in the form of the Road Map – to the parties, as opposed to each member of the Quartet and many other individuals, countries and organizations represented by the Quartet going off with different plans and suggestions every day of the week.” Although both sides committed themselves to the implementation of the road map the violence occurred over and over. In June 10, 2003 about 16 people are killed in Jerusalem as result of a suicide attack. Following it Israel tries to kill Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi. At the end of June cease-fire or “hudna” is reached between PA and Islamic Jihad and Hamas and DFLP. At that time Israel withdraws from Northern Gaza. In 2003 after winning the elections Ariel Sharon begins the building of Security Barrier (also called Apartheid Wall) along the Green Lines.³⁶ The UN General Assembly called for an Emergency session (on December 8, 2003) and adopted a resolution (ES-10/14) asking International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague an advisory opinion on the legality of the barrier (Isseroff 2006). Israel boycotted the ICJ hearing and submitted a brief saying that the “court should not rule on the matter.” United States and several EU countries behaved the same way arguing that it is a political matter. ICJ advisory opinion provided that it is a violation of human rights and should be demolished. Israel refused to abide by the decision, but made slight modifications in the route of the barrier (Isseroff 2006). These events were impediments for successfully carrying out the road map. By the end of 2003 the road map was in a halt – neither party has complied with the dates and requirements. The November 2004 Yasser Arafat dies; and Mahmoud Abbas becomes his successor. In 2005 February Sharm el-Sheikh summit the leaders of

³⁶ The term **Green Line** is used to refer to the 1949 Armistice lines established between Israel and its opponents, besides it separates the territories occupied after Six-Day War (West Bank and Gaza including). The Israeli side of the Green Line encompasses 78% of what was Palestine in 1947. The line does not denote an official border. it is largely used to differentiate between those areas within the Israeli side of the Line, which are administered as part of the State of Israel, and the areas outside it, which are either administered by the Israeli military or in agreements with the Palestinian National Authority (Wikipedia, free encyclopedia).

Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority declared their continuing support for the road map. By September 2005 Israel withdraws its all settlements from Gaza and from some parts of West Bank. The implementation of road map enters into halt when Sharon suffers a sudden stroke and slips in coma. Soon Sharon is declared incapacitated by the Knesset and Finance Minister Ehud Olmert becomes the interim Prime Minister. In the end of June Hamas and Fatah declare about the adoption of the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict according to the 1967 borders. In January parliamentary elections Hamas wins 76 seats of 132. The U.S. and Israel refused to recognize Hamas. And the Israel-Lebanon war further complicated the peace negotiations and undermined stability in the Middle East region and brings the road map into a deadlock. As Kissinger (2006) points out “the advent of Hamas brings us to a point where the peace process must be brought into some conformity with conditions on the ground.” Negotiations would be possible only when Hamas renounces violence and the Israeli side and the mediators should admit the fact that Hamas is popularly elected government. The Crises Group (2006, 35) estimations have revealed that “the severity of Israel’s occupation practices inevitably will continue to determine the success of the ceasefire.” The above mentioned facts imply that both sides should be ready to concessions, renouncing stands that were previously impediments for the negotiations and ceasefire.

ZIONISM AND NATIONALISM: SECULAR OR RELIGIOUS STRUGGLE?

While considering the question of Palestine many factors come forth make this issue even harder and they are the religious and aspect of the conflict. Is the struggle a religious one (Zionism), does it claim to have some nationalistic character? Was the struggle of Palestinians secular, which grew into a religious one (emergence of Hamas)? When speaking about nationalism the following aspects of it are of interest for this study: it can refer to the process of forming or maintaining nation-states; it can refer to the psychological feeling or identification with a particular national community; sometimes, to the aspiration to be self-determining, which can take a secessionist form (Moore 2004). The nationalist movements can be significant sources for political instability (e.g. the Spanish Basque country, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir in India, the Kurdish regions of Iraq and Turkey).

Moore (2004) defines nationalism as a political ideology “centered on the idea that there is moral significance attached to membership in a nation, and in the continued... existence of the nation.” In order a nation to exist and express its identity its people should have political rights. Moore (2004) further argues that nationalism can have three different connotations: nation-building or psychological feeling or identification with a particular national community or the aspiration to be self-determining, which can take a secessionist form. What does this mean when put into the framework of Israeli-Palestinian relations? It can be inferred from this that Israeli case fits the first connotation – nation building. When there are religious roots in the process of nation building this becomes much more complicated. Nation building and religious factor can bring to secession or sanctification of a land. Shilav (2001) argues that sanctification of a land could bring about longing to come and resettle it. This is what happened with Jews. A portion of Palestine is considered to be the biblical land of Eretz-Yisrael; its sanctification led to Jewish settlements in Palestine. There is danger in this kind of nation building. The danger is in the gap between political and religious

viewpoints since the difference in territorial and idealistic ambitions (e.g. the land corresponding to Eretz-Yisrael) could lead to conflict within the state which will undermine the processes going between the countries. What happened in the following years of Jewish settlements in Palestine is the typical example of the above said. The Jewish struggle initially has religious grounds (Zionism) and then turned into a secular one. Zionism is the term for the sanctification of a land: connecting Jewish people to the land of Israel. The movement then was secular and started as a response to the growing anti-Semitic sentiments in Europe and Russia. In Israeli-Palestinian case the situation is much more difficult and complicated with the rise of extremist Islamic movements: secular nationalist domination in Palestine is giving way to religious one (PLO and Hamas). One can track these changes in the Palestinian society. These movements are very active in the recent developments in the region.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM: EMERGENCE OF HAMAS

What causes made Islamic fundamentalism to arise? Do the failure of international mediation, non-implementation of signed agreements, violations of international law brought to this situation? This question is very vital when we look through the history of the conflict. Can it be said that the struggle of Palestinians through course of time turned from a secular to a religious one and is just the contrary for the Israeli side? Budeiri (1997, 1) argues that radical Islamic activities are “perceived as the outward expression of the denial of a reality that is held to be corrupt and in need of transformation.” Ziad Abu Amr brings five factors that contributed to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Palestine: loss of Palestine in 1948, defeat of Arab States in 1967 Six-Day War, Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran (restoration of Islam as a viable alternative to secularism), decline of PLO, and finally the *Intifada*. These factors influenced the rise of Islamic fundamentalist movement in the following way. All these taken together created fear among the people that Arabs could lose their national identity. The argument brought forward by Budeiri (1997) confirms this. Budeiri (1997) reflects on the issue that by turning to Islam people believe that it could provide them psychological and physical security. The events taken place in the Middle East region, especially with regard to Palestine from 1948 to present created Islamic fundamentalist groups: Hamas³⁷, the Islamic Jihad³⁸. These groups are often regarded as terrorist groups considering the suicide attacks and the concept of *jihad*, the interpretation of which brings about hot debates. Kimball³⁹ maintains that Jihad means “striving or struggling in the way of God” and it has two dimensions greater and lesser. Greater Jihad means struggle within

³⁷ Hamas is an acronym for *Harakat al-Muqawima al-Islamiyya* – Islamic Resistance Movement. It was created as the armed wing of the religious revivalist Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) in Gaza

³⁸ Islamic Jihad is an acronym for *Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini*, founded in 1980s

³⁹ Professor Charles A. Kimball, chair of the Department of Religion at Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem, NC is the author of three books, including “Striving Together: A Way Forward in Christian-Muslim Relations and Religion,” “Politics and Oil: The Volatile Mix in the Middle East,” and “Angle of Vision: Christians and the Middle East.”

oneself to do right things, lesser one is defend Islam outside. Khan⁴⁰ (2003) brings the definition of Jihad, which is the same as the above mentioned:

“Jihad is essentially a struggle to purify the self and to establish social justice. The highest form of Jihad, *Jihad-e-Akbar* (The superior Jihad) is struggle against the self to improve and excel in moral and spiritual realm. The lowest form of Jihad is the military Jihad that is essentially defensive and constrained by strict ethics of engagement.”

Taking into consideration the above-mentioned definitions of the concept of *jihad* it can be inferred that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is influenced by the actions and policies of non-Muslim states. Palestinians were not allowed to create a state where they could follow the *greater Jihad*; rather there have been created fear that they will lose their identity in terms of religious, political, and territorial aspects. Hence, the role of *lesser Jihad* – outward defence of Islam – becomes crucial. The interpretation of lesser Jihad can be different: violence in service of religious purpose, defence of Islamic identity, etc.

Besides the already discussed factors and causes of Islamic fundamentalism and emergence of Hamas, the role Israel was also influential in encouraging the emergence of religious groups which was seen as a means diverting Palestinians from the “nationalistic cause” (Andromidas 2002). This means that Israel supported or encouraged the emergence of groups that are “antagonistic” to the PLO. Hamas (Hamas has also military wings (such as the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade) that carry out the suicide attacks, etc.) is itself a political movement, but the difference with other political movements or organizations is that Hamas considers that one of the methods to achieve the goals PLO failed to do is through Islam, i.e. through religion. The popular support for Hamas in recent years shows that the Palestinian people believe that Palestinian state could be established only through turning to religion (sense of weakness of secular struggle) being frustrated with failure of PLO to achieve independence, the Israeli oppression, failure in economic and political front.

⁴⁰ **Dr. Muqtedar Khan**, the director of international studies at Adrian College. He is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and a fellow of the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. He is the author of *American Muslims: Bridging Faith and Freedom* and *Jihad for Jerusalem: Identity and Strategy in International Politics*. Muqtedar Khan is also the President of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists and member of the Shura Council of the Islamic Society of North America.

FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN THE REGION AND THE ISRAELI LOBBY

The role and competing interests of superpowers in the region also contributed to the revival of Islamism and make peace elusive. The most influential superpowers in the region were the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the United States is the sole superpower and most influential actor in the region. Besides, the United States is considered to be the most loyal ally of Israel. The Israeli Lobby in U.S.A. plays a key role in this special relationship. Chomsky (1983) claims that this special relationship is especially expressed in military and economic as well as diplomatic support U.S. provides to Israel. Diplomatic assistance that U.S. shows to Israel is expressed in its foreign policy and votes in the United Nations – U.S. often vetoed Security Council resolutions condemning Israel, Israeli backing during negotiations. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) state that Israel is the largest U.S. aid recipient since the World War II. The strategic interests of superpowers in the region are in its oil resources – control over these resources. In this special relationship the role of Israeli Lobby should not be ignored. The influence of the U.S. in world politics is huge. The example is Middle East. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) claim that U.S. efforts or attempts to bring peace in the region not always give the anticipated results bringing the example of Bush Administration efforts in the Middle East region. These efforts in Iraq “helped to produce a resilient insurgency in Iraq, a sharp rise in world oil prices, and terrorist bombings in Madrid, London, and Amman” (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, 1). How it is attached to Israeli lobby? The influence of Israeli Lobby is so colossal that the decisions made in terms of foreign policy and the U.S. domestic, national interest do not always match – the Israeli Lobby (AIPAC, CPMJO) has enough power to skew the U.S. foreign policy in the directions that favour their interests, stands and policies. The Israeli Lobby also puts great efforts to picture Israel positively, in regard to Palestinian cause it tries to present Palestinians under a negative light. Any time the media reports unfavourably on Israel or criticizes it, the

Lobby organizes “letter writing campaigns, demonstrations boycotts” (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, 21). One of the strong sides of the Lobby is funding which enables it to influence Congress (providing funds during elections), the same is true also for presidential elections (large number of Jewish voters and about 60% contribution to the funds) (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). Another is the Lobby tries to advocate and push forward Jews in different positions such as congressional staffers, advisors to the president.

The U.S.S.R. was kind of counterbalance to U.S. hegemony in the Middle East before it disintegrated. Now Russia acts instead of it, but it does not have the influence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was providing strategic, financial, ideological and diplomatic support to the Arab regimes such as arming with state-of-the-art weaponry and army trainings. Russia’s stand in the Palestinian – Israeli conflict does not resemble that of the Soviet Union. As Avieri (2001) claims Russia has not enough leverage in Israel-Arab peace process, but anyhow Russia’s influence is considerable. The Russian policy is more supportive of U.S. peace efforts in Israel-Palestine cause.

CONCLUSION

The Israeli-Palestine conflict has been on scene since its inception from time to time escalating into wars. There have been riots and uprisings; the most important and significant of them was the First Intifada. It has begun as a non-violent mass uprising. Even more it can be termed also as civil disobedience. The main causes underlying the uprising were the frustration of Palestinian people, the continuing humiliation, home demolitions, unlawful arrests, and unbearable humanitarian conditions. The First Intifada riveted the attention of the international community to the situation in the region – to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The uprising was suppressed by violent means by the Israeli side, by so-called Iron Fist policy. It also brought the Palestinian Liberation Organization back to Palestine from an exile in Egypt and brought to the stage Islamic extremist movements such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Negotiation process was leading nowhere before the entrance of PLO into them as PLO leaders agreed to many terms that was not accepted by the early negotiators in Madrid. Thus in 1993 the Oslo Accords were signed followed by a number of agreements. The Oslo Accords raised many hopes for solving the conflict peacefully. But, alas, they failed. There are arguments for the failure of Oslo Accords: defective implementation, violations of international law, continuing violence. The end of the Oslo Peace Process was marked by the outburst of the Second Intifada. This uprising was different than the First One. It was more violent, was lead by extremist groups (the Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood Brigades and others). The reasons behind are various: growing Israeli settlements, giving up many territories to achieve peace, issues that have not been addressed during the peace process, the more and more deteriorating human conditions. The Al-Aqsa Intifada never ended officially like it was the case with the First Intifada. The second uprising has in some sense also connotations of religious struggle. People turn to religion when they cannot achieve peace, build state and national identity, which can turn to be very dangerous in these days. It gives

rise to thoughts whether the competing interests of the foreign powers and the struggle for regional power were not the causes for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, extremist groups.

To summarize it can be said that the competing interests of the superpowers in the region, the oppression the Palestinians are facing and trend among the Palestinians to turn to religion to achieve their goals make peace in the region elusive. Unless the issues of refugees, the status of Jerusalem are addressed and there is tolerance at grassroots level of both sides, the end result of negotiations and agreements will mostly fail.

There are some implications for Armenia in respect to Nagorno Karabagh conflict when the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is closely analyzed. One implication is about the agreements: even if they are minutely worked out and signed in the presence and under the guarantees of international mediators, they are not necessarily implemented resulting in further and bitter conflict. The second is that as a rule the weaker party turns to be a loser. This means that any treaty with Azerbaijan about the fate of Nagorno Karabagh, if it stipulates the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the liberated territories, is prone to a similar collapse.

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
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
APPENDICES

Appendix A. THE BRITISH MANDATE (1920-1948)



Source: <http://www.israelipalestinianprocon.org/PalestinianNationhood/britishmandatemap.html>

Appendix B. U.N. PARTITION & THE FIRST ARAB / ISRAELI WAR 1947 - 1948




MAP KEY

- = Jewish Land
- = Arab Land
- = International Jerusalem

Source: <http://www.israelipalestinianprocon.org/NewMaps4/1947large.html>


Appendix C. A MAP OF THE UN PLAN FOR JERUSALEM AND JERUSALEM AS DIVIDED UNDER THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS.



Note - The "Green Line border" (dotted blue line) in the map shows the division of Jerusalem according to the 1949 armistice.

Source: <http://www.mideastweb.org/jerusun.htm>

Appendix D. THE WIDTH OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (IN MILES) WITHIN THE BORDERS HELD BETWEEN 1949 AND 1967



Source: <http://www.israelipalestinianprocon.org/mapintro.html>

Appendix E. Yom Kippur War, 1973



Source: <http://lexicorient.com/e.o/uyomkipwr.htm>

Appendix F. FATALITIES IN THE FIRST INTIFADA

Palestinians killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem)

Year	Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces	Of them: Minors under age 17	Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians	Of them: Minors under age 18
Dec 9-31 1987	22	5	0	-
1988	289	48	15	2
1989	285	78	17	5
1990	125	23	9	2
1991	91	24	6	3
1992	134	23	2	0
1993-13.9.93	124	36	5	1
14.9.93-31.12.93	30	4	8	0
1994	106	16	38	8
1995	42	4	2	1
1996	69	10	3	1
1997	18	5	2	0
1998	21	3	6	0
1999	8	0	0	0
2000 until 28.9	14	2	0	0
Total	1,378	281	113	23

Israelis killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem)

Year	Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians	Of them: Minors under age 17	Israeli security forces personnel killed by Palestinians
Dec 9-31 1987	0	0	0
1988	6	3	4
1989	3	0	6
1990	4	0	3
1991	7	0	1
1992	11	0	14
1993-13.9.93	16	0	15
14.9.93-31.12.93	11	0	3
1994.	11	0	12
1995	7	0	9
1996	3	1	19
1997	4	0	0
1998	8	0	3
1999	1	0	2
2000 until 28.9	2	0	1
Total	94	4	92

Palestinians within the Green Line

Year	Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces	Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians
Dec 9-31 1987	0	0
1988	1	5
1989	1	2
1990	1	10
1991	5	2
1992	2	0
1993-13.9.93	7	2
14.9.93-31.12.93	4	0
1994.	7	1
1995	0	1
1996	0	2
1997	0	1
1998	0	1
1999	1	-
2000 until 28.9	4	-
Total	33	27

Israelis killed within the Green Line

Year	Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians	Of them: Minors under age 17	Israeli security forces personnel killed by Palestinians
Dec 9-31 1987	0	0	0
1988	2	0	0
1989	17	1	5
1990	13	0	2
1991	7	0	4
1992	8	1	1
1993-13.9.93	6	0	5
14.9.93-31.12.93	3	0	2
1994.	47	2	4
1995	9	0	21
1996	38	7	15
1997	25	3	0
1998	1	0	0
1999	1	0	0
2000 until 28.9	0	0	0
Total	177	14	59


Notes:

1. The first Intifadah began on 9 December, 1987.
2. On 13 September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, which began the Oslo Process.
3. The "Al-Aqsa" Intifadah began on 29 September, 2000.

BTSELEM - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories

Source: http://www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/First_Intifada_Tables.asp

Appendix G. GAZA STRIP AND WEST BANK ACCORDING TO OSLO ACCORDS



Appendix H. CAIRO AGREEMENT, 1994 – 1995



MAP KEY







- = Israel & the Disputed Territories (Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights)
- = Transferred to Palestinian Control
- = Israel
- = Jerusalem
- = Area of Israeli Control (see [175 mile radius](http://www.israelipalestinianprocon.org/NewMaps4/1947large.html))

Source: <http://www.israelipalestinianprocon.org/NewMaps4/1947large.html>

Appendix I. OSLO II, 1995 – 1999




MAP KEY

-  = Israel & the Disputed Territories (Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights)
-  = Exclusive Palestinian Control
-  = Palestinian Civilian/Administrative Control
-  = Israel
-  = Jerusalem
-  = Area of Israeli Control (see [175 mile radius](http://www.israelipalestinianprocon.org/Maps2/1995.html))

Source: <http://www.israelipalestinianprocon.org/Maps2/1995.html>

Appendix J. THE ACTUAL AND PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENTS (NOV. 1999)


Current and Projected Israeli Redeployment According to the Wye Memorandum 1998



Source: <http://www.mideastweb.org/mredeploy1.htm>

Appendix K. WOULD-BE PALESTINE AFTER CAMP DAVID, 2000

Projection of the West Bank Final Status Map presented
by Israel, Camp David, July 2000



**Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
(PASSIA)**