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CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATIVE ATTITUDE IN CIVIL
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List of Abbreviations

CCs	Candidate Countries
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSC	Civil Service Council
EAS	European Administrative Space
EU	European Union
HRM	Human Resource Management
PAA	Pre-Accession Advisor
PAR HQ	Public Administration Reform Headquarters
PSRC	Public Sector Reform Commission
RA	Republic of Armenia
SSAS	State-socialist Administrative Space
USSR	United State Socialist Republics

Abstract

Transition countries found themselves in an inquiring situation of having too much and too little bureaucracy at the same time. On the one hand they have inherited the legacy of the enormous bureaucratic apparatus of their communist past. On the other hand there was an acute shortage of bureaucracy in its original positive meaning: a modern civil service, which is professional, independent of political parties, transparent, impartial, responsible and accountable for design and implementation of state policy. Whereas governments may change frequently, career civil servants remain, accumulate experience and skills, and guarantee continuity of the state. To establish such effective and responsible civil service is one of the main tasks of public administration reform.

The purpose of this study is to show to what extent Armenia succeeded in implementing those reforms or, in other words, whether Armenian bureaucrats resemble the state-socialist type or European type. In addition, the findings are compared with those concerning Czech Republic to contribute to better understanding of the place of Armenian bureaucrats from the international perspective.

This research is a replication of the study conducted by John A. Scherpereel in four ministries of Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2002. The questionnaire is constructed around six ideal characteristics of the state-socialist administrative space (SSAS) and European administrative space (EAS).

The findings of this study show that in general Armenian ministerial personnel is in the interstitial, ambiguous space between state-socialist and European ideals as the Czech ministerial personnel. However, there are differences, the possible explanation to which may be the fact that comparing with the Czech Republic Armenia is a small country. Further, there is a difference in values that should guide the behavior of public employee, and the unemployment rate in Armenia is higher than in Czech Republic. Also, it can be assumed that

Armenian bureaucrats perceive job in public administration as prestigious because they have high expectations in terms of promotion outside. And finally, the fact that the survey was conducted among bureaucrats that have high positions creates certain bias.

However, in spite of all possible explanations concerning the differences between the “location” of the ministerial personnel of the Czech Republic and Armenia between SSAS and EAS, the findings yet cast doubt on the appropriateness of methodology. Perhaps, further research is needed to address the issue of administrative space in more detail.

Introduction

One of the oldest and most frequent activities of almost all governments of the world has been administrative reform. However, the problem with the meaning of the term, the complexity of the issue and constraints bring about the limitation with reorganization and administrative reform. There is the paramount “dilemma of three-dimensional organizations in public sector: the leadership/management dimension with clear expectations from employees, the employees/workers dimension with their own expectations often in conflict with the first dimension, and the citizens or clients of the organizations to be served, which is often in conflict with the first two dimensions” (Farazmand 1999, 805). The attempts to reform the administrative systems of modern governments must be directed toward “reconciling these seemingly irreconcilable dimensions” of public organizations. Besides, the attempts at administrative reform should include social, political, and economic pressure of the society, and the relationship between local and central governments. Nevertheless, as time passes and new reality develop, there always will be a need for reconsideration of reform measures (Farazmand 1999).

Therefore, one of the challenging tasks and perhaps the most important for all countries and especially for transition ones is the creation of modern public administration system, the principles of which are transparency, accountability, publicity, effectiveness, and efficiency of public sector management. Modern democracies understand public administration first and foremost as service to citizens and to the public. This kind of understanding of the basic role of public administration is the foundation from which its principles, forms, methods of activity, and requirements for professional and independent performance are derived. The basic characteristics of public administration consist of the knowledge of various and often contradictory aims that it is obliged to defend. Especially today, in the period of major social changes, new demands, and the limitation of financial and

human resources, public policy is under more pressure for making responsible selection of priority aims and redefining tasks and functions of public administration in accordance with the aims (National Training Fund).

One of the important tasks of public administration is to identify and recognize public interests in order to create good basis for differentiating the functions of public administration. Public administration and the whole public sector are going through a radical change of their position in relation to economy. Direct interventions in the economic sphere from the totalitarian era were eliminated because of their ineffectiveness and bureaucratically burdensome methods. But that does not mean that the economic regulatory functions of the State and the related tasks of public administration were eliminated completely. Thus, a modern, rationally and effectively functioning public administration is substantial and indispensable prerequisite for economic growth. Besides, another important function of public administration is to secure and strengthen democratic institutions and mechanisms.

As has been already mentioned modern democracies understand public administration first and foremost as service to citizens and to the public. To achieve this long-term goal a new system of professional training for public administration and the establishment of civil service that will meet present day's needs are of crucial importance for transition countries. With this regard it is important to specify what civil service reform in transition is.

Civil Service Reforms in Transition

According to Beblavý (2002), the process of setting of the specific sets of public policy measures which aim is a significant change of public policy in a certain area with the purpose to get a qualitatively new state can be defined as reform process. And civil service is “a subset of public sector,” which excludes certain groups of employees. Then Beblavý states that the public administration of transition countries was problematic in the following aspects: there was a lack of skills and information creating obstacles to participating in policy-making in a new world of market democracy and a lack of public service culture; the employees were vulnerable as individuals and were responsive to political pressure; and there was little political accountability toward the people from bureaucracy.

To change this picture the essential components of all civil service reforms have become: first, to replace some of the old public administration staff with new employees with a different set of skills and preferences; second, to create incentives for the new staff to modify their conduct in a desirable manner; third, to equip the public administration staff with skills that will make possible them to respond to incentives in a desirable manner.

In this regard, the management of civil service reform means preparation, interpretation, monitoring of implementation and amendments of a new civil service law; management of transition of the existing public administration staff into the new system; organization of training for existing and new civil servants; and establishing institutional solutions for recruitment, dismissal, evaluation and remuneration system of civil servants. However, because of the legalistic culture and other factors of Eastern European countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union a new civil service law became a central point of civil service reform and its management.

The present study examines whether there are changes in civil service in Armenia since independence. To be precise, to what extent Armenia succeeded in implementing civil service reform and, what is the development of the Armenian ministerial personnel.

Besides, the findings of this study are compared with those of Scherpereel's concerning Czech Republic to contribute to better understanding of the place of Armenian bureaucrats between SSAS and EAS from the international perspective. In this regard there is a necessity to consider civil service in both Armenian and Czech Republic and to specify the similarities between Eastern European and the former Soviet Union countries which will make this comparison and the study itself meaningful.

Administrative Space

To define administrative space Scherpereel resorted to “Weber's classic conception of the state as a human community that successfully claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory,” and states that “involves control of territory, administrative personnel, and the military.” Scherpereel's administrative space relates to the second component of the definition involving not only “the universal enforcement of rules but also (a) the subjective processing of rules by bureaucrats and (b) the ways bureaucrats use rules to guide action.” Based on this conception the following components are considered as administrative space: “explicit laws (i.e., civil service laws and/or labor code); explicitly codified and implicitly recognized ethical principles; legal relationships (i.e., among political leaders, political parties, and administrative apparatuses), subjective perceptions of those relationships, and action according to those perceptions; objective (i.e., pay) and subjective (i.e., status, prestige) distinctions between bureaucrats and other actors (i.e., broader domestic publics); bureaucrats’ understanding of the work they do and the goals that their work helps to accomplish; bureaucrats’ perceptions of the relative importance of signals they receive (i.e., from political leaders, from counterparts in other ministries, from international organizations, from citizen-consumers).” Two ideal administrative spaces are state-socialist administrative space (SSAS) and European administrative space (EAS).

The decision to study the executive branches of Czech and Slovak countries came because of the great contradiction between the EU criticisms and the studies of the Europeanization of national administrations in member states and recent studies of candidate countries (CCs). According to EU criticism, with certain exception, the Czech and Slovak executive branches remain unreformed. While the studies of the Europeanization of national administrations in member states and recent studies of candidate countries (CCs) claim that these criticisms may be exaggerating the extent of bureaucratic stagnation and “ignoring CC's

motion toward the EAS.” Scherpereel argues that some characteristics resemble state-socialist patterns, while others show the movement toward the EAS and that Czech and Slovak administrations are “in an ambiguous interstitial space between state-socialist and European ideals.”

The aim of his study was to determine whether bureaucrats of these two countries more resemble the state-socialist administrative space (SSAS) or European administrative space (EAS) rather than to explain. And, since the study was around the distinction of two administrative spaces it was necessary to define administrative space very thoroughly.

In the state-socialist model the distinctive attributes of the SSAS originate from the interaction of territorial and personnel administration. On the territorial level the model consists of three tiers: municipalities, districts, and regions. National committee governs each tier. “Executive councils of the committees oversee the administration of sectoral policies by the committees under their charge and are checked by a system of dual subordination.” Theoretically, they are accountable to their respective local committees, and to the executive office of the next highest tier of administration. Each committee is also monitored by a corresponding branch of the centralized single party.

As it was already mentioned the basic organizational principle of all communist parties is democratic centralism. This concept originally appeared in 1840s and later developed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the early twentieth century. According to this concept decision-making should be centralized but “subject to some control by the membership of the party and should be binding on all members.” The rules of the CPSU adopted by the Twenty-Seventh Congress in March 1986 typically elaborate the concept of democratic centralisms: a) electivity of all leading party organs, from the lowest to the highest; b) periodic reports of party organs to the party organizations and to higher organs; c) strict party discipline, and subordination of the minority to the majority; d) the binding nature

of the decisions of higher organs on lower organs; e) collectivity in the work of all organizations and leading party organs, and the personal responsibility of every communist for the fulfillment of their duties and party assignment (Holmes 1997).

Having been applied only to the party, democratic centralism became the organizational principle for most political institutions in communist countries. The structure of parties is organized on pyramidal way. Communist parties exercise their hegemonic role through the so-called nomenklatura system. This means that the communist party was involved in the appointment of people in the state administration, the police, the military, the judiciary, education, the economy, trade unions, etc. Thus, the nomenklatura system assured communist parties of total control over appointments, which enabled the party to penetrate and influence all the most important sections of society and the socialization process of young people undermining civil service independence (Holmes 1997).

The rubber-stamp legislature abolished specific civil service laws and replace them with universal labor codes. Such laws were defended by parties which claimed that no status distinction should divide state and nonstate employees and that any worker is just a worker. Hence, they destroy the concept and reality of independent civil service.

With regard to the EAS there is no unanimous definition. For the purpose of the study, however, Scherpereel considers the definition of the EAS less important than the characteristics that comprise it. He cites the agreement of the observers that European Court of Justice's decisions have been most influential in spreading and synthesizing the different administrative traditions of EU member state. Each member state continues to organize its administrations in its own unique way. The European Court of Justice still draws from national case laws to make binding decisions that affect the organization and operation of national administrations and all EU members. The gaps that once divided national administrative norms, perceptions, and actions have been closed by the following variables:

“common activity in implementing the acquis, intensification of cross-national contacts among bureaucrats, international discussion of best practices, and the existence of peer pressure among national administrations.”

For the purpose of the study Scherpereel defines two ideal types of state-socialist administrative space (SSAS) and European administrative space (EAS) by six criteria. They are the followings: first, social prestige of employment in public administration; second, foremost direction of administrative communication/coordination; third, identification with civil service as distinctive social group; fourth, employment system; fifth, frequency of contact with international organizations and other states' bureaucrats; and finally, nature of relationship to politics.

Ideal Type: SSAS

The first operationalizable component of the ideal-typical SSAS, according to Scherpereel is the low social prestige of employment in state administration. The legal attitude toward civil servants similar to any other workers and the shift in policymaking importance from state to party bureaucracies made state administration a low-prestige sector. Ministerial personnel may profitably use their positions to get an access to resources or influence with powerful groups. The distinction between state positions and party positions may be unclear at the higher levels of state bureaucracy creating difficulty to citizens for recognizing the powers. There are no specific, legally defined perquisites and specific constitutional obligations for state administrators. Besides, there are no coordinated cross-sectoral civil service training system, unified recruitment and promotion system.

The second component of the ideal-typical SSAS is vertical direction of administrative communication/coordination. The pyramidal structure of the party suggests itself that ministries are more expected to supervise the administrative activity of their counterparts at lower level of the state than to advise and coordinate activities in the center.

Besides, mutual familiarity and coordination is limited by the absence of a system of HRM that enhances transfers and communication among ministries making them “solitary islands.”

Third component of the ideal-typical SSAS is low identification with civil service as distinctive social group. Because of the absence of the structures for unified civil-service identity such as labor unions for defending the interests of civil servants, universities and training centers bureaucrats are less apt to differentiate themselves as a distinctive social group. Besides, “state administration is promoted as a single sell within the broader organism of the national economy, bureaucrats are less incline to distinguish themselves as a cohesive cultural and interest group.”

Fourth component of the ideal-typical SSAS is position based employment system. The rate of staff-turnover is high, and most bureaucrats spend portions of their professional life outside of state administration. Mainly this can be explained by the needs of revolutionary periods when parties replaced counterrevolutionary staffs with politically acceptable neophytes. Moreover, the regime itself introduces legal and informal incentives for keeping of the system’s position basis. Bureaucrats are paid marginal rewards in spite of the years working within particular organization and they can get similar benefits in nonstate positions. The institutionalized, compulsory training requirements are rare. And, the absence of the uniform professional development scheme brings about high turnover because it creates perceptions of professional burnout. As a result, bureaucrats may be tempted to change their job even though a new job may offer marginal difference in salaries if at all.

The fifth component of the ideal-typical SSAS is low frequency of contact with international organizations and other states' bureaucrats. The administrative work requires monitoring of the implementation of sectoral decisions at each state level. That is why it is necessary to have written and personal consultations with counterparts in other sovereign states and institutions on best practices and administrative goals particularly at lower levels of

administrative hierarchy. However, for the given system of employment relations, the kinds of professional development that contacts with international organizations and other states' bureaucrats may promote are not necessary.

The sixth component of the ideal-typical SSAS is that the SSAS is politicized. High positions are included in nomenklatura lists. Bureaucracy reacts to party's signals and answer to counterpart bureaucracies rather than experts. "Overt, critical political statements and evidence of collaboration with the regime's critics are still de facto grounds for suspicion, demotion, and/or dismissal." It is worth mentioning again that all these six characteristics are for the ideal typical SSAS.

Ideal Type: EAS

According to Scherpereel the six characteristics that can identify the EAS are the followings. The first component of the ideal-typical EAS is that EAS bureaucrats operate in a high social prestige area. The implementation of the EU laws and directives and the management of the European integration is a difficult task that requires highly professional and competent personnel. Hence, bureaucrats are recruited from the best, promising university graduates that are paid on scales similar to private-sector scales. Society accepts state employment as a prestigious profession. "Tenure of a civil service position is esteemed, in itself, and independent of its incumbent's identification with particular social economic, or political group."

The second component of the ideal-typical EAS is that the EAS is characterized by special emphasis of horizontal, interministerial coordination. Definitely, vertical coordination among different state levels is of great concern of all states. However, ministers act as planners and regulators not as managers, "governments are network of mutual dependence. Bureaucrats acknowledge their mistakes and actively seek for advice and criticism from their counterparts in other ministries. Ministerial interdependence is supported because of modern

techniques of HRM through transfers, secondments, and coordinated information system. “Ministries are nodes in an interconnected governance network.”

Third component of the ideal-typical EAS is that the EAS bureaucrats recognize their interdependence and identity with the civil service as a distinctive group. The fact that bureaucrats in the EAS work for state, enjoy specific constitutional rights and responsibilities and that their work differs from that of private sectors identifies them from any other group of society. Besides, the existence of the social institutions like civil-service universities, strong unions is a condition of the identity with the civil service. “Scholars of the EAS stressed the utility of all-civil-service ethical codes and principles – including reliability, predictability, accountability, transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness – for building cohesive administration.”

Fourth component of the ideal-typical EAS is a career system of employment. The career development path in the EAS is uniform and transparent which ensures the building of a prestigious civil service and attracts highly qualified recruits. In addition, bureaucrats may be offered perquisites and training incentives in order to be encouraged to devote themselves to the civil service. The goal is the provision of stable professional development and avoidance of professional monotony.

The fifth component of the ideal-typical EAS is that bureaucrats in EAS are in frequent contact with their counterparts in other states and with international organizations. National bureaucrats should be in close contact not only with their counterparts in other states but also with the relevant sectoral authorities in Brussels. “They must adapt to a vision of policy-making in which the center of decision-making has to a large extent been shifted to Brussels and accordingly reorient their impressions of whose voices count most.” Dense associational networks a) between the Commission and states and b) among national state

administrations themselves are as characteristic of the EAS as dense networks within national states.

The sixth component of the ideal-typical EAS is that EAS administrations are relatively depoliticized. Despite the fact that the highest nonminister positions are often occupied by representatives of political parties and they generally lead ministries, politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens clearly recognize the line that separate political from nonpolitical personnel. Bureaucrats' participation in political parties is regulated by the states in different ways to various degrees. A clarity test is applied here which is that acceptable and forbidden modes of participation must be strictly separated by strict borders, and that all participants must be aware of these borders the violation of which must be quickly punished.

Scherpereel then contrasts these six ideal-typical characteristics of SSAS and EAS in Table 1 (p. 562). He considers that it is necessary to stress that the EAS concept has not been tested yet with empirical evidence from EU member states. Member states are different according to the rules that govern their administrations and the ways that national bureaucrats internalize and use these rules. Scherpereel also suggests that based on the recent studies according to which (a) "member states administrations are dynamic systems that can change in relatively short periods and (b) certain conceptual dichotomies – including the opposition between career- and position-based systems are increasingly obsolete given contemporary developments in public-sector HRM, it would be worthwhile to put the EAS concept to the test with survey and other empirical data from member state administrations. That would help to establish an empirical EU baseline enabling, thus, candidate countries to be compared. Scherpereel draws his hypotheses based on the following considerations. First of all, there is no explicit empirical evidence of Czechoslovakia's proximity to the SSAS ideal type before 1989's regime transition.

Table 1
Characteristics of State-Socialist Administrative Space (SSAS)
and European Administrative Space (EAS)

Characteristics	SSAS	EAS
Social prestige of employment in state administration	Low	High
Foremost direction of administrative communication/coordination	Vertical	Horizontal
Identification with civil service as a distinctive social group	Low	High
Employment system	Position based	Career based
Frequency of contact with international organizations	Low	High
Nature of relationship to politics	Politicized	Depoliticized

However, by 1989, the Czechoslovak administrative space was stagnant. Scherpereel states then that theoretical contributions are different from the empirical developments. Theoreticians claim that it is very difficult to reform post transitional bureaucracies, and therefore to reconfigure administrative spaces. They argue that the legitimacy of new regime requires professionalism and expertise that only inherited bureaucrats possess. For this reason politicians have to, even if reluctantly, accept bureaucrats for maintaining the state apparatus. Hence, theoreticians doubt in the ability to shift in the total administrative environment when it is so difficult to replace personnel.

In addition, the slow progress in passing civil service legislation, which might help create European space, indicates a closer resemblance to the SSAS than the EAS. Only after six odd years of European institutions' pressure to pass civil service legislation did Czech Republic and Slovakia change their laws. According to Scherpereel, this delay can be explained by the politicians' satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the "opportunities the system affords for ensuring party influence in administrative branch" and with the problems of previous system respectively.

On the other hand, with respect to the resemblance to the EAS, the empirical evidence shows that the creation of special EU departments or subdepartments in most

ministries and increasing familiarity of domestic bureaucrats with EU laws and procedures point to the movement toward the EAS. In addition, due to the negative evaluations of previous public administration reform projects the Commission reappraised pre-accession funding priorities and conceded more ground to twinning over technical assistance.

From theoretical perspectives, according to Scherpereel, the ever-expanding literature on Europeanization of public administration in EU member states suggests similar to the empirical evidence hypotheses. Many of these studies indicate the pivotal role of the contacts between bureaucrats from different states in promoting convergence. The existence of the EU departments in ministries and the twinning mechanism, as well as the ongoing negotiations in Brussels supports the movement toward the EAS argument.

To support his hypotheses Scherpereel then conducted a survey of 210 Czech and 86 Slovak managers in four analogous ministries. The survey findings finally supported his hypotheses that administrations of Czech Republic and Slovakia are “in an ambiguous, interstitial space between state-socialist and European ideals” (p. 554).

Research Design

Like in the study conducted by John Scherpereel in the present study a research survey was organized among managers in four Armenian ministries: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Ministry of Healthcare, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and Ministry of Transportation and Communication. Ministries of the Republic of Armenia operate in accordance with their by-laws. The by-laws and organizational structure of ministries are approved by the Government. To ensure the fully-fledged and efficient performance of the functions vested in a ministry and its engagement in civil law affairs, ministry staff is created with the status of a public administration institution. The staff consists of structural units (departments, divisions, and secretariats) and detached units (agencies and inspectorates). The functions of ministries are prescribed by laws, decrees and orders of the RA President, decrees of the RA Government, and the international treaties of the Republic of Armenia.

To see whether Armenian bureaucrats resemble their predecessors or European type a face-to-face interview was conducted among all managers in corresponding ministries. The research instrument in this study was Armenian translation of the survey questionnaire used by John A. Scherpereel. The survey questions requested attitudinal items, and 16 questions employed either multiple response items or standard Likert scale. Questions are designed around six characteristics of administrative space.

Similarities between the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The late 1980s can be characterized by major political changes, such as dissolution of international socialist system and the USSR. The transition of many countries to market economy arose the new stage of development in the history of these countries - transition period. This period is a phase of the realization of reforms for establishing economic system with developed infrastructures and creating market economy to ensure social stability of society. The key principle of transition period strategy is that the state should be able to plan, organize and control not only the destruction of former system but also the creation of the new one (Tumanyan 2000).

After dissolution of international socialist system countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former USSR rejected partocracy and took their course to democracy. The achievements are greater and the prospects brighter in some countries than in others. However, in spite of a great variety of forms of post-socialist countries, there are some general common features that should be stressed. First of all, all these countries share the same legacy from the communist party regime the basic organizational principle of which was democratic centralism (Holmes 1997). Second, there is the internal conflict within the power structure in socialist system. The third similarity is the crucial role of bureaucracy and the system of cadre organization (Gabrielian 1999). Besides, some peculiarities of post-communism countries, which allow differentiating them from others, are distinguished in “a fourteen-point model of post-communism” (Holmes 1997, 15).

Legacy from the communist party regime

To understand the legacy from the communist party regime it is necessary to examine the structure of power. According to Kornai (1992), “The characteristics of the power structure are precisely the source from which the chief regularities of the system can be deduced.” The Communist party was the fundamental institution in the power structure. That was a one-

party system where the organizational principle was "democratic centralism." The democratic side of the principle consists of the electoral procedure, according to which all leading bodies and all party secretaries at every level are elected by the party membership through delegates or acts of election by party leaders who themselves have been elected already. The other side of the organizational principle is characterized by the fact that the decision of a higher party body is binding on a lower party body, and on every member of the party. Formally the organization was built up from below but in reality it worked to a far greater extent from above.

The central leadership has a large staff of appointed party officials that had no power and represented a bureaucratic hierarchy of department heads, deputy department heads, and employees. Although the right to decide belonged to the elected bodies, in fact, bureaucracy exercised great influence on the management of affairs. Under a system where instructions passed down from above must be fulfilled by the subordinates - the system of superiority and subordination - the difference between elected officers and appointed officials is blurred. Such relations are called "vertical linkages" in which the order from the superior is required to be obeyed by the subordinate.

The state of the classical socialist system under its constitution, laws, and legal regulations is like any other modern state consisting of three separate branches: a legislature, a state administration, and a judiciary. However, the elected party leaders and the appointed party officials were known as the party apparatus that played the key role in selecting the members of the legislature, the state administration, and the judiciary. Despite the distinction between the party that should perform political functions and the state that should perform administrative ones, in reality these two tasks were not clearly distinguished. Therefore, it was common to talk of "members of the apparatus," "functionaries," and "cadres" without distinguishing where functions are performed. For these reasons the term "party-state" is used

to characterize the system. This party-state system, i. e., the mixture of the political and administrative functions is one of the major characteristics of the system.

Internal conflict within the power structure and the crucial role of bureaucracy

Based on a given structure of system where there is no great difference between the party and bureaucracy it is worth discussing the other two similarities between transition countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which are the internal conflict within the power structure and the crucial role of bureaucracy, together. In his theory of “centralized pluralism” Alec Nove does not treat the party and bureaucracy as distinctive parts but rather as parts of a whole, and concentrates on ministerial bureaucracy. He states that ministerial bureaucracies are more informed about the current situation and future possibilities than planning agencies. They directly affect the plans and instructions they receive, and there is a constant “tug-of-war” between the ministries and planning agencies. The centralized pluralism is, according to Nove, “ministerial empires, and upward pressures originating with them” that are realities of economic and political life. Thus, the most powerful and important interest groups in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former USSR were the ministerial bureaucracies (Gabrielian 1999, 50).

Bureaucracy did not lose its importance during transformation; on the contrary, it became even more important. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union bureaucracies have been “the main avenues of interest articulation and aggregation.” They may also be the “most cohesive and powerful interest group.” In many transition countries political parties are fragmented and there is a struggle between the “usually fragmented legislatures” and the executive branch. This situation creates favorable condition for bureaucracies (Gabrielian 1999).

Despite the differences that each country of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has possessed due to inherent events, preconditions, and decisions made during the

communist era, bureaucracy in all countries had a considerable power. Therefore, one of the difficult tasks that Eastern European countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union have to perform is “the task of reforming and restructuring these communist-era bureaucracies” (Gabrielian 1999, 40).

Peculiarities of post-communism

Although, the fourteen-point loose model articulated by Holmes (1997), gives separate characteristics of post-communist states, in practice they mostly interact and are mutually dependent.

First point is the assertion of independence and the rise of nationalism. The reasons of stating the uniqueness of this feature are the rejection of external domination and the recent sense of liberation. Second point, which is near absence of a culture of compromise, refers to the weakly developed democratic culture without little knowledge of “consensuality and compromise” (Holmes 1997, 16). Third point, which is high expectations of leaders, refers to the extreme believe in the ability of individual leader. Consequently, if it becomes obvious that the president is not able to make changes rapidly and significantly, many citizens become disappointed with and even antagonistic toward the president. Fourth point is cynicism towards and/or mistrust of political institutions, which is a propensity to believe that “politics are both personalized and conspiratorial”, and there is “a communist legacy of corruption” (Holmes 1997, 17). Among the numerous reasons of corruption is the fact that many politicians have been influenced by decades of communist values and rule. Besides, many goods are so expensive for many officials that they turn to corruption to obtain them. Hence, it will take many years to develop faith of citizens in institutions.

Fifth point is rejection of teleologism and grand theories because it contradicts conspiracy. Sixth point, which is an ideological vacuum, is that there is no widely accepted ideology. It replaces by nationalism which is not true ideology. Nationalism, along with such

problems as possibility of it becoming aggressive and exclusionary, can be dangerous because it can have negative influence on the development of a democratic political culture. “Both nationalism and religion contain clear homogenizing imperatives, which are hostile to the bargaining and compromise demanded by democracy.” Hence, the seventh point is moral confusion which is “moral vacuum” (Holmes 1997, 19). As a result, there is an increase in crime rates which is another feature of many post-socialist countries. Definitely, the increase in crime rate is also because of declining living standards, increase of unemployment and the uncertainty of the new state institutions; however, the main reason is the moral vacuum.

Eighth point is comprehensive revolution. The post-communist states differ from other transitional ones in that they try to change their politics, economy, and society simultaneously. Ninth point is temporality. Most people in these countries want to become politically, economically, and socially like the West. As soon as they perceive that they have arrived they will no longer be post-communist. Tenth point is dynamism because they are moving. Besides, there are already reasonably distinct stages, which is another point about the dynamics of post-communism. The eleventh and twelfth points are instability and a widespread sense of insecurity respectively. Frequent elections and changes of government, frequent votes on confidence in the government, constant re-forming of political parties and coalitions are all points out the fact that most post-socialist countries are relatively unstable. However, the most important fact of uncertainty is unspecified frontiers in many parts of the post-communist world. In addition, high unemployment rate and uncertainties about property ownership have led to the increase in feeling of insecurity. Thirteenth point is unfortunate timing in terms of getting economic aid and investment. And the final point is legitimization problems which is citizen’s perception of the incompetence of elite.

It is obvious that these fourteen points are not exhaustive. Although they are not applicable to all countries and they are focused mainly on similarities, nevertheless, they help to conceptualize post-communism.

Problems with civil service

The task of simultaneously building markets, political institutions, and civil service structure is a formidable task indeed. However, the main challenge of transition was the establishment of a public sphere independent of the state and the introduction of democratic control over the state. There was little attention paid to the problem of reforming the state itself. There has been no extensive program of decommunization. There was a tendency of ruling parties to control appointments to the upper level of the civil service. The administrations in these countries also lack a public service culture. In all post-socialist countries to various degrees people have been moving from public administration to private enterprises. The technocrats occurred in the most favorable conditions having successfully transformed public assets into private property with the help of those in administration. Due to the unplanned privatization former managers of state enterprises became the new private owners. Lustration laws when used were directed to harm the reputation of political opponents rather than to reform the administration (Kaldor and Vojvoda 2002).

“This state of affairs contributes to problems with the civil service in general and the law enforcement agencies in particular. Undoubtedly corruption is a social, economic, and cultural phenomenon present under all political regimes around the globe” (Kaldor and Vojvoda 2002). But what is peculiar to the post-socialist countries is the lack of resources in state budget to finance sufficiently their civil service and law enforcement agencies. As a result weak law enforcement leads to the inadequacy of tax collection, the growth of a shadow economy and the emergence of different mafia-type networks, often with links to the administration (Kaldor and Vojvoda 2002). Thus public institution in these countries are still

experienced by people as clientalistic, mostly dependent on ruling party loyalty and not as neutral institutions working in the interest of the public. And it was not until the late 1990s when the necessity of undertaking civil service reforms became the priority in the agendas of many post-socialist countries.

As it was mentioned above, the transition of many countries to market economy arose the new stage of development in the history of these countries - transition period. And, due to geographical, cultural and historical differences the development of civil service in both countries Armenia and Czech Republic during that period has its peculiarities and proceeds differently. Hence, the consideration of the process of the development of civil service in both countries at length can be important to comprehend the current position of ministerial personnel in both states concerning European standards.

Civil Service in Czech Republic

Under socialist regime the administrative staff of the Czech Republic was affected by the 40 years of non-democratic conditions. There was a preference to the political loyalty rather than to such important criteria as professionalism and efficiency, the mistreatment of the public administration for the goals of the governing Party and the distortion of ethical values and administration culture. After the change of regime in 1989, again, insufficient concern was devoted to personnel policy, personnel management and development of human resources in public administration. In addition, there was a high turnover of many capable employees into the private sector after 1989. This kind of development was due to the low level of salaries and unclear perspectives in the public sector (National Training Fund).

As a result, young qualified professionals had little interest in working for civil service, there was an insufficient generation change and the operation of the system rested with the generation of retirement age in many places. However, the most important reason for young generations' unwillingness to work in civil service was because of the "generally

disorganized conditions in civil service.” The condition, that guaranteed neither professional growth for the employees nor career promotions and career prospects.

By and large, the picture of public administration in Czech Republic had the following main problems. With regard to staffing the authorities there was the shortage of professionals, insufficient proficiency in foreign languages, a lack of permanent and close working with the EU and with other foreign entities. Concerning recruitment for civil service there was a lack of high quality applicants and the absence of the higher education institution for training. There were shortcomings in organization and control, weak motivation and the increase of staff numbers. Finally the absence of a law led to politicizing of the civil service and to a lack of accountability in civil service which is irreplaceable from the viewpoint of guarantees of the compliance with job duties.

The attempts to change civil service were undertaken by reforming Labor Code in the early 1990s. The Code contained some provisions that were aimed specifically at regulation of public sector employee behavior. Ministry of Labor has played a key role in the Czech Republic by preparing a legal framework and remaining responsible both for general legislation and specifically civil service regulations. To oversee the implementation of civil service reforms and functioning of the civil service a separate agency, bureau, which is a part of the Government Office was envisaged, the director of which was a political appointee. However, all these changes did not alter significantly public administration of the Czech Republic which was lagging behind other reforms. Only after strong criticism from the EU which stressed that public administration of the Czech Republic was not prepared enough for the accession did officials take more efforts toward civil service reforms. “Without the EU pressure, it is unclear whether any relevant reform would be passed in the Czech Republic” (Beblavý 2002). With this regard, Phare project, which started in 1990 and paid little attention to public administration, at the end of 1997 shifted its strategy toward helping to

revive the stagnating public administration and for proposing reform strategy for coming period.

Since then twinning has been the dominant form of assistance in public administration reform in Phare project financed by the European Commission. The aim of twinning projects is to help the Candidate Countries (CCs) to strengthen their institutional and administrative capacity in preparation for EU membership. Twinning is a mechanism for the direct transfer of knowledge and experience in applying EU legislation and practice from Member States to the CCs. Its key element is the Pre-Accession Advisor (PAA), a civil servant from an existing EU Member State, who comes to live and work in the Candidate Country for at least 12 months continuously. This gives the Candidate Country the opportunity to acquire the expertise and knowledge to improve the structures necessary to implement the EU “acquis,” and to learn directly from the experience of colleagues (UK-Czech Republic Action Plan 2003). It should be clarified that the *acquis communautaire* or the *aquis* is the EU law, and it is of great importance that candidate countries will be able to implement it. To ensure this European Union institutions have increased pressure and spent funds for enhancing administrative capacity in central and eastern European candidate countries. The way the governments of candidate countries operate will inevitably change because of the need for national administration to obey the same laws. Thus, this mechanism of twinning helps candidate countries in their development of modern administrations with the structures, human resources, and management skills that are needed so much for acquiring abilities to implement the *acquis communautaire* to the same standards as the most developed countries of the European Union. This mechanism not only creates framework for transferring knowledge and experience, but also gives current and future member states an opportunity to build up long-term inter-institutional partnerships.

The United Kingdom considers bilateral cooperation as an important complement to the EU's pre-accession activities in Czech Republic, delivered through various programs, including the Phare program. The United Kingdom has been involved in many twinning projects in the Czech Republic. Under the EU twinning program, British experts have been working to support financial regulations and the promotion of principles of good governance (UK-Czech Republic Action Plan 2003).

However, it should be stressed that in spite of the six-year pressure from European institutions to pass civil service legislation Czech Republic passed such legislation only in the spring of 2002. The main reason for the delay in passing such legislation is explained by the "reticence" of domestic politicians who, despite the problems with the previous system, welcomed the opportunities the system affords for ensuring party influence in administrative branch. The legislation was passed after the survey conducted by Scherpereel for the study, that was being used as a replication to reveal the changes in administrative attitude in civil service of Armenia.

Civil service in Armenia: historical background

Armenia did not have much experience in civil service. During the First Republic (1918-1920), an elementary civil service system was created, but with the establishment of the Soviet system in Armenia in 1920, a Soviet model of cadre policy took over. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Armenia delayed starts in public administration reform. The absence of an institutionalized civil service system led to a number of negative consequences: instability in state organizations and their frequent restructuring; arbitrariness in recruitment, promotion, grading, and displacement, and an inflated state apparatus; a constant personnel turnover; lack of professionalism and qualification of civil servants; and finally, widespread corruption. In the absence of a clear civil service framework, the solution of these problems depends on the will and interest of individual state bodies.

The situation started to change in 1999 when The Public Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) was established by the prime minister of the republic of Armenia according to the decree N544 on “Primary Activities of Public Administration System Reforms of RA.” The Public Sector Reform Commission is integrated with the Office of Government of RA and acts under the commands of the Minister-Head of the Office of Government RA with the latter being responsible to the Prime Minister. The Commission is made up of senior public officials from the RA Presidency, different ministries, the Civil Service Council, the Academy of Public Administration and non-governmental organizations. PSRC is responsible for implementing public administration reforms in Armenia in three directions: public administration system structural and functional reforms, establishment of civil service, and financial management reforms.

In 1999-2001 the Commission drafted in the preparation and the National Assembly adopted the following laws on: state non-commercial organizations, civil service, the remuneration of civil servants, customs services, military service, the service in the police,

and tax services. In the effort of ensuring effective application of these laws, the President of RA first ratified the February 4, 2002 Order PO-1045 specifying the priority issues generated due to RA Law on Civil Service, and the August 5, 2002 Order PO-1158 specifying the priority issues generated due to RA Law on “Military Service,” “Police Service,” “Tax Service,” “Customs Service,” “Remuneration of Civil Servants.”

In the effort to increase the work efficiency of Government of RA, functional and structural optimization of the ministries of RA for restructuring of ministries, government agencies, regional administrations and other public bodies there has been drafted and approved by the President of RA in 2002 the following legal acts: Presidential decree on the “Government of RA Structure”; Presidential decree on the “Establishing the system of functions of Government of RA”; Presidential decrees on the “Amendments to the decrees on public administration in the regions of RA” and on “Public administration in Yerevan city” (Public Sector Reform Commission).

The first Civil Service Law, after several attempts, was enacted as late as January 2002. This law set up the Civil Service Council (CSC) as an independent body responsible for most aspects of the new civil service. To introduce a new system of civil service in public administration, the public sector reforms have included: the creation of a new structure for civil service management; merit-based recruitment of civil servants and their promotion; the introduction of a system for civil servants' training; the description of the posts available in civil service and the determination of the terms of reference for each position; the introduction of a system for civil servants remuneration and social insurance, as well as for personal incomes and assets statement (Public Sector Reform Commission).

The Armenian School of Public Administration was established in 1994 with EU help and strengthened by another EU project in 2001-02, as the institution to deliver the preliminary round of training to new civil servants. The Public Administration

School/Academy operates under the aegis of the Civil Service Council and has an extensive mandate for civil service training and the organization of this training through a variety of educational entities (Danielian and Selimyan 2004).

Having become the member of the Council of Europe and signed various agreements with Europe such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Armenian government took an obligation to make necessary changes to bring its laws and, moreover, its Constitution to the close proximity to the European laws and Constitution for achieving acceptable European standards. The present study examines the extent to which Armenia succeeded in implementing those reforms or, in other words, whether Armenian bureaucrats resemble the state-socialist type or European type.

This research is a replication of the study conducted by John A. Scherpereel to reveal whether east-central European bureaucrats more resemble their socialist-era predecessors or their member state counterparts.

Survey Results: The Six Characteristics

The first characteristic is social prestige of employment in public administration.

The majority of the sample of Czech (55.1%) bureaucrats answered that prestige had “little or no” influence on their decisions to pursue work in public administration. Whereas in Armenia 62.5% of respondents consider that prestige had medium influence on their decision (Table 1, Q1). On the other hand, only 12.5% Armenian bureaucrats noted that prestige played a large role in their choice, but in Czech this figure constitute 7.9%. These figures show that prestige played a role on the respondents’ decision to work in public administration.

Table 2
Characteristic 1: Prestige of Employment in Public Administration

Question	Response	Czech Republic	Armenia
1. Influence of prestige of state employment on respondent's decision to pursue job in public administration.	No influence	.236	.075
	Small	.315	.175
	Medium	.369	.625
	Large	.079	.125
2. How would you evaluate the prestige of employment in public administration?	Not prestigious at all	.073	-
	Rather unprestigious	.223	.050
	Neutral	.519	.250
	Quite prestigious	.146	.675
	Extremely prestigious	.039	.025

The responses to the second questions support this assertion (Table 2, Q2). Asked how they evaluate the prestige of employment in public administration 67.5% of Armenian bureaucrats answered “quite prestigious” as opposed to 14.6% of Czech bureaucrats. Thus, according to the figures on the first characteristic the results in Armenia point out the direction to the EAS and in Czech Republic – in the direction to the SSAS. It can be assumed that the reason for such startling difference is because of the high expectations that Armenian bureaucrats have in terms of promotion, like, getting highly paid job outside of civil service. Besides, high unemployment rate also may cause to consider public job very attractive.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the survey was conducted among bureaucrats that take high position. The picture may be completely different in the lower levels of hierarchy.

However, even though the figures point out to the direction toward EAS, the responses to further questions regarding the rigidity of the organizational culture cast doubt on the possibility of perceiving employment in public administration as prestigious. Hence, it is difficult to identify the Armenian administrative space with either the SSAS or the EAS.

The second characteristic is foremost direction of administrative communication/coordination.

The questions are about the sources of bureaucrats' information about the activity of Civil Service Council (CSC), Public Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) and other state official bodies involved in the reform activities. Responses to these questions give understanding in the prevailing modes of communication among ministries. The sum of interministerial information sources on the activities of bodies involved in reforms is 41.7% which is more than percentages of the media (22.3%) and intraministerial sources (26.8%) (Table 3, Q3). Therefore, the main means of information exchange is interministerial communications.

In addition, if in Armenia only 10% of bureaucrats are not well familiar with the activities of Public Sector Reform Commission and Civil Service Council, in Czech Republic this figure was constitute more than 50% of respondents who were not familiar with public administration reform headquarters (HQ). This unit was responsible for proposing broad changes in the organization of the state, for drafting concepts toward these goals and soliciting professional and public reactions to the concepts. However, the short-term consequences proposed by the headquarters for changing the foundation of the state were not as great for central state employees as in the case of the reform in the civil service law. Not surprising were responses of the survey indicating "utter ignorance" (19.1%) or "glancing"

familiarity (34.4%) with the activities of PAR HQ (Table 3, Q3). As a result, 32% of Czech respondents received information on the HQ from the media coverage.

Table 3
Characteristic 2: Foremost Direction of Administrative Communication/Coordination

Question	Response	Czech Republic	Armenia
3. From which of the following sources do you receive information about the activity of Civil Service Council, Public Sector Reform Commission and other state official bodies involved in the reform activities? (Multiple answers possible). From which of the following sources do you receive information on the draft civil service law? (In Czech Republic).	Not informed	.025	-
	Mass media	.411	.223
	Labor union	.092	-
	Colleagues in my ministry	.362	.268
	Personal contact with personnel of Public Sector Reform Commission and/or Civil Service Council	.337	.283
	Legislative process or interministerial amendment	.166	.134
	Other	.129	.092
4. How familiar are you with the activities of Public Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) and Civil Service Council?	Entirely unfamiliar	.191	-
	Somewhat familiar	.344	.100
	Moderately familiar	.292	.325
	Quite familiar	.120	.575
	Extremely familiar	.053	-
5. From which of the following sources do you receive information about activities of Public Sector Reform Commission and Civil Service Council? (Multiple answers possible)	Never received any information	.132	.022
	Mass media	.320	.283
	Literature distributed by PSRC	.136	-
	Colleagues in my ministry who are in contact with PSRC	.432	.283
	Personal contact with PSRC	.257	.347
	Other	.150	.065

The fact that 43.2% of Czech respondents received information from within their ministries about draft of civil service law shows the importance of intraministerial communication. In this regard it should be mentioned that in the case of Czech Republic there was a question which measured the source of information on the draft of civil service law. In

this case bureaucrats had their personal stake in legislation. Therefore, the quality of information flow may be conditional on the nature of the particular policy under consideration. That is to say, where there are personal stakes in legislation intraministerial connections dominate and in the opposite case interministerial communications take over.

In contrast to Czech bureaucrats, 57.5% of Armenian managers are quite familiar with the activities of Public Sector Reform Commission and Civil Service Council (Table 3, Q4). Asked about the sources of information about activities of CSC and PSRC, 28.3% of Armenian bureaucrats answered “mass media” and 34.7% - personal contact with PSRC (Table 3, Q5). Hence, interministerial communication dominates in Armenia. This amazing difference perhaps can be explained by the fact that Armenia is a small country. Its bureaucratic apparatus is not large and many employees know each other and everybody is concentrated in Yerevan. Further, these findings are not enough to place Armenian bureaucrats categorically to the close proximity to the EAS based only on these two cases. Nevertheless, they show the direction toward EAS.

The third characteristic is identification with civil service as distinctive social group.

The questions designed in the way that enables to understand bureaucrats’ individual career paths and perceptions of what separates state employment from other occupations. Interestingly, the answers to the question whether they ever worked full time in any other ministry, organ of central state administration, or other organ of municipal, district, or regional administration, showed that 42.5% (in Czech republic – 47.1%) of respondents have worked in state bodies other than their own (Table 4, Q6). Taking into consideration the employment system and “the conventional wisdom about paucity of internal labor markets in socialist and postsocialist states” (p. 572), these figures are amazing.

Large numbers of bureaucrats in both countries agree about the values that should guide their professional behavior. Most of them named reliability, loyalty to the state and

effectiveness as the most important values. Though, instead of expertise the majority of respondents, more than 40%, in Armenia mentioned noncorruption (Table 4, Q7). Answers to the questions of how specifically state work differs from nonstate work show that 50% of Armenian managers believe that public employment is more stable. Besides, 22.5% pointed out to the rigidity of the organizational structure, and 12.5% - public service and lower salaries (Table 4, Q8). In Czech Republic answers varied widely. Although, most bureaucrats perceive the existence of a difference between state and nonstate work and agree upon certain common values, there is no agreement on actual content of the state work as distinct from the private work.

Table 4
Characteristic 3: Identification with Civil Service
as a Distinctive Social Group

Question	Response	Czech Republic	Armenia
6. Have you ever worked full time in any other ministry, organ of central state administration, or other organ of municipal, district, or regional administration?	Yes	.471	.425
	No	.529	.575
7. What are the two or three most important values that should guide the behavior of employees of public administration?(First four responses pooled)	Reliability	.576	.675
	Loyalty to the state	.400	.575
	Effectiveness	.395	.500
	Expertise	.371	.150
	Transparency	.219	.050
	Noncorruption	.138	.425
	Work in the public interest	.090	.075
8. How specifically does public employment differ from private employment?	Public service	.129	.125
	Public employment is more stable	.105	.500
	Lower salary	.090	.125
	More social contacts	.062	.025
	Rigidity of organizational structures	.052	.225
	Other	.443	-
	No specific reasons given	.119	-

However, in Armenia in contrast to Czech Republic the picture is different because 5% of respondents consider transparency as an important value versus 21.9% of Czech bureaucrats, and the fact that 22.5% of Armenian managers specify public administration as rigid versus 5% of Czech managers directs Armenian bureaucrats toward SSAS. Hence, with regard to the third characteristic Armenian administrative space is closer to the SSAS, whereas in Czech it is germinal EAS.

The fourth characteristic is employment system.

The answers to the question about holding a full-time job outside of public administration show that 30.0% of Armenian bureaucrats have held full-time jobs outside of public administration as opposed to 72.7% of Czech respondents (Table 5, Q9). These figures illustrate more closeness of Armenian bureaucrats to the ideals of career state employment than Czech bureaucrats. Question about the importance of passing civil service legislation in Czech Republic were changed into the importance of changing the law on remuneration of civil service in Armenia. For the purpose of accurate replication of the survey, the questions 10 and 11 were not changed drastically, but as the judgment above shows the comparison between these two questions (Q10, Q11) cannot be fully accurate. However, the fact that 72.5% (Table5, Q12) of respondents consider stability as influential in their decision to pursue job in state administration illustrate that bureaucrats are still seeking the ways to make their job more stable which means that state's employment system does not resemble the career-based ideal.

Nor can it be said that the employment system in Armenia and in Czech is position based. It is not enough to state strongly about it just relying on the response to the question which can be interpreted another way. That is to say, bureaucrats by stressing the stability as an important reason for changes in the law may point out the stability of public employment generally rather than securing their own position. They may consider their position quite

secure and simultaneously perceive other positions as fragile. They may want to stabilize their own position and the stability of the whole system. This assumption may be supported by the analysis of the following two questions.

Table 5
Characteristic 4: Employment System

Question	Response	Czech Republic	Armenia
9. Since completing your highest educational degree, have you ever held a full-time job outside of public administration?	Yes	.727	.300
	No	.273	.700
10. How important are the changes in the law on remuneration of civil service that will be enacted on the first of January in 2006?	Not important at all	.025	-
	Rather unimportant	.049	-
	Moderately important	.123	.225
	Quite important	.286	.725
	Extremely important	.517	.050
11. Why is it important to make changes in the law on remuneration of civil service that will be enacted on the first of January in 2006? (First response)	Increases stability	.330	.300
	Increases certainty	.088	-
	Increases social prestige	.082	.100
	Increases independence from parties	.082	-
	Increases professionalism	.071	.375
	Increases effectiveness-	.060	.200
	Increases salary	.060	.025
	Other	.227	-
12. Influence of stability of state employment on your decision to pursue job in state administration	No influence	.207	-
	Small	.167	.075
	Medium	.389	.725
	Large	.236	.200
13. From what year have you worked full-time in public administration (including municipal, district, regional, and central administration)?	1958 to 1969	.073	-
	1970 to 1979	.268	.250
	1980 to 1989	.220	.150
	1990 to 2005	.439	.600
14. If you had the opportunity to move to a private-sector position that paid the same as your current position, would you accept the private-sector position?	Yes	.074	.075
	No	.926	.925

The 60.0% of Armenian managers have entered and have worked full-time in public administration since 1990s, 15% - since 1980s and 25% - since 1970s (Table 5, Q13). Further comment needs to be done in terms of the question 14 which is “If you had the opportunity to move to a private-sector position that paid the same as your current position, would you accept the private-sector position”? Responses to this question are 92.6% of Czech bureaucrats versus 92.5% of Armenian bureaucrats that would not accept the private-sector position. Since the question is asking to move to an equal position, no change is implied, so this question is not the best one for measuring intricacies of the employment system.

Therefore, it can be concluded with respect to the fourth characteristic of administrative space, which is state employment that on the one hand the managers want to increase stability of state employment and move closely to a career-based system. On the other hand, managers have worked more than a decade in public administration and look at the stability as one of the privileges of state employment. Hence, it is difficult to identify the Armenian and Czech administrative spaces either with SSAS or the EAS.

The fifth characteristic is frequency of contact with international organizations and other states' bureaucrats.

International contacts are rather frequent in Armenia. Almost 90% respondents have taken part in professional international trainings; whereas in Czech Republic this figure is almost 50% (Table 6, Q15).

The answers to the direct questions about the frequency of personal contact with international organizations show that 35% of managers have had rather frequent contact, 40% - occasional. In Czech Republic 27% bureaucrats had no or very few (35.3%) contacts with representatives of EU institutions. In Armenia 2.5% of managers had no or few (17.5%) contacts with international organizations or institutions. Hence, with regard to the frequency of contacts with international organizations and other states' bureaucrats Armenia is in better

Table 6
Characteristic 5: Frequency of Contact with International Organizations and Other States' Bureaucrats

Question	Response	Czech Republic	Armenia
15. Have you ever participated in a professional stagier program or other professionally relevant training or exchange program abroad?	Yes	.462	.900
	No	.538	.100
16. How frequently do you have direct personal contacts with the representatives of the international organizations or institutions?	never	.271	.025
	very seldom	.353	.175
	occasionally	.232	.400
	rather frequently	.068	.350
	very frequently	.077	.050

condition than was Czech in 2002. In this case, however, it is again worth mentioning that figures might be different if the respondents were not of high position.

The sixth characteristic is nature of relationship to politics.

There were not explicitly political questions in the survey in order to get large response rates and more reliable results. The survey questions therefore may suggest only indirect evidence on the sixth characteristic. In Czech Republic the delay in passing civil service legislation indicated the strength of party interest in influencing the executive branch and the turnover of ministerial personnel was still high. In terms of Armenia the same reasons can be stated.

Perhaps the most important data that Scherpereel's survey already presented was the perceived importance of changes in law. The responses, by pointing out the importance of the changes for increasing stability and professionalism, offer that many bureaucrats are interested in decreasing direct party influence in ministries.

In fact, significant room remains here for research on the extent and development of party politicization of the executive branch.

Conclusion

Table 7 summarizes the findings. The results show that in the case of the two characteristics which are foremost direction of administrative communication/coordination and frequency of contact with international organizations and other states' bureaucrats there is a movement toward EAS in Armenia. However, in the case of the employment system, social prestige of employment in public administration, identification with civil service as distinctive social group and nature of relationship to politics there is no unambiguous approximation with the EAS. On the other hand, it would be difficult to state the extent to which the state administration approximates the EAS ideal, especially taking into consideration the fact that there are no empirical studies of the EAS. With respect to the Czech state administration no characteristic unambiguously approximates the EAS ideal. By and large, the findings are full of ambiguities, and most characteristics in both countries occupy the interstices between SSAS and EAS.

Table 7
Summary of Findings: Approximation of the SSAS and EAS

Characteristics	Czech Republic	Armenia
Social prestige of employment in state administration	SSAS	Ambiguous
Foremost direction of administrative communication and coordination	Ambiguous – depends on policy under consideration	Movement toward EAS
Identification with civil service as distinctive social group	Germinal EAS	SSAS
Employment system	Ambiguous	Ambiguous
Frequency of contact with international organizations and other states' bureaucrats	Ambiguous	Movement toward EAS
Nature of relation to politics	Undetermined	Undetermined

To remind, John A. Scherpereel decided to conduct this study to clear the great contradiction between the pessimistic criticism of the European Commission and optimistic criticism of the studies of the Europeanization of national administrations in member states and recent studies of candidate countries. His findings supported neither of them. The

optimistic criticism can be explained by the fact that the study of the Europeanization of national administrations in member states was conducted among employees that were working in the newly created EU departments in each office or ministry. The findings showed that despite direct EU pressures, appearance of EU departments in ministries, the process of harmonization of domestic legislation with *acquis* and increasing contacts with international administrators, Czech bureaucrats have not joined the EAS yet.

On the other hand, the Scherpereel's findings proved the exaggeration of Weberian predictions about impossibility of administrative reform in transition countries. The facts that state employment differed from nonstate employment, that there were certain values that prevailed state work and that there was the necessity of intense cooperation with member-state counterparts testified that Czech bureaucrats were far away from the state-socialist ideal.

The most appropriate questions that Scherpereel was concerned with was the extent to which those findings represented a stable equilibrium, whether that interstitial administrative space was an "evanescent" stop on the road to Europe or distinctive ideal type which would survive long in the future. Although it was too early to answer to these questions, nevertheless, Scherpereel expected that there was a real hope for the Europeanization of employment system and bureaucrat-party-politician relationships provided that the laws were implemented and that the process of enlargement successfully concluded.

In Armenia the findings revealed a little difference with the Czech Republic. The movement on two characteristics (communication and frequency of contact with international organizations) is less sluggish than in Czech Republic. The contact with international organizations, according to figures, is better than in Czech Republic. However, it is again worth mentioning the senior level of respondents which creates certain bias to the really existing conditions. The approximation of the criterion of the foremost direction of

administrative communication/coordination to the EAS can be explained by the fact that Armenia is a small country and its bureaucratic apparatus is not large and many employees know each other. Perhaps, that is why interministerial communication dominates in Armenia.

It can be assumed that Armenian bureaucrats perceive job in public administration as prestigious because they have high expectations in terms of promotion often outside of public service, also because there is significant unemployment (Armenian National Statistical Service gives estimates of 10 to 30%). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the survey was conducted among bureaucrats that take high position. The picture may be completely different in the lower levels of hierarchy.

With regard to the identification with civil service as a distinctive social group in Armenia in contrast to Czech Republic the picture is even worse. Armenian managers specify public administration as rigid and did not point out to the expertise as one of the important values that should guide the behavior of public employee. Hence, with regard to this characteristic, the Armenian administrative space is in close proximity to the SSAS.

It is difficult to identify the Armenian and Czech administrative spaces either with SSAS or the EAS with regard to the state employment. On the one hand the managers want to increase stability of state employment and move closely to a career-based system. On the other hand, managers have worked more than a decade in public administration and look at the stability as one of the privileges of state employment.

The last characteristic, the nature of relationship to politics, is undetermined in both republics. In Czech Republic it was because of: first, the strength of party interest in influencing the executive branch; second, the high turnover of ministerial personnel; third, the perceived importance of stabilizing state employment and promoting professionalism. In Armenia the reasons are the same.

Finally, it can be concluded that there are some civil service reform and change. Nevertheless still very many things are ambiguous. On the whole, the study revealed ambiguity as Scherpereel found them. Furthermore, if there were a need to support or reject hypothesis (pessimism over optimism), the same research would be done. But to use it as a further construct, for other research as well, further studies are needed.

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