

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA

THE ROLE OF CULTURE AND PERCEPTION IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY—
ARMENIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIPS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN—Association of South East Asian Nations

IGNO—International Non-Government Organization

IGO—International Government Organization

IR—International Relations

NATO—North-Atlantic Alliance

UN—United Nations

UNESCO—United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

USA—United States of America

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this Master's Essay is to explore the role of culture and perception in international relations. In addition, the theoretical framework is applied to a specific area of study: Armenian-Russian relationships. Thus, this Master's Essay is aimed at discussing the theoretical background on the role of culture in international relations, a particular insight into the way the issue can be diagnosed, and a case study devoted to Armenian-Russian relationships. This case study intends to explain how Armenian people traditionally perceived Russia and Armenian-Russian relationships, how they are perceived now in some Russian-language newspapers issued in Armenia, and what is the nature of these relationships in retrospect and now.

Therefore, this Master's Essay has the intention to examine the main hypothesis of this study: in the future the Armenian-Russian relations are feasible to be in a good shape, partly because of cultural and perceptual perspectives since culture and its component—perception—do play a big role in shaping international relations.

INTRODUCTION

Effective foreign policy rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state's "place in the world," its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them.

Hill and Wallace, 1996

Although it is generally recognized that there are “striking contrasts in international behavior, which reflect religious, ideological, value, and institutional differences between nations and cultures,” and that there is an established “link between culture and the way people perceive and think about the world,” this point is still not given a needed emphasis in international relations (Fisher 1988, 1). The relationships between nations may be as difficult and complicated as the relationships between the people. The image of one people in the consciousness of another one may be as contradictory and lamellar as the image of one person in the consciousness of another person.

Nevertheless, the culture and its complement—the perception—are less often acknowledged as the means of explaining good or bad relationships with one or another country and/or nation. But mindsets (including political culture, identity, beliefs and assumptions) must be taken into account as solutions are sought since mismatched mindsets explain a lot of problems existing in international relations. Moreover, as Lockhart (1999, 10) notes, “culture’s centrality to social explanation depends on how it is conceived.” While studying, for instance, the bilateral relations, one should take into account the perception factors, deriving from cultural differences, about the counterpart. Thus, as Hovannissian (1994, 271) claims, “the history [together with the memory it implies] is at work at many levels of popular and official behavior [while studying the Armenian foreign policy].” So, first of all, this study is aimed at explaining how culture and perception shape international

relations, what is their role, and, how this theory is related to a specific case: Armenian-Russian relationships.

Therefore, the purpose of this Master's Essay is to explore the role of culture and perception in international relations. In addition, the theoretical framework is applied to a specific area of study: Armenian-Russian relationships.

As far as the structure of this study is concerned, it consists of four parts. First of all, the theoretical background of the issue is discussed with the conceptualization of the main notions.

In the 2nd part of the Master's Essay the methodology together with the research questions are presented. Here the so-called research design is given.

In the 3rd part, the detailed analysis of the research questions is provided. To be more specific, it should be said that the following issues are discussed: the role of culture in international relations, a particular insight into the way the issue can be diagnosed is provided (a detailed discussion of this means is available), and a case study devoted to Armenian-Russian relationships. To put it in the right way, this case study intends to explain how Armenian people traditionally perceived Russia and Armenian-Russian relationships, and how they are perceived now in some Russian-language newspapers issued in Armenia.

In the 4th part these relationships in retrospect and their current situation are studied.

Finally, after identifying the problem, conclusions together with the recommendations on how to improve these relationships based on the culture and perceptual perspectives are provided in this Essay.

PART ONE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

In this part the discussion of the contending views on the theory of culture and perception, the conceptualization of these notions, and the literature review are laid out.

Cultural pluralism

Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993) defines culture as the "total pattern of human behavior and its products embodied in speech, action, and artifacts and dependent upon man's capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations." Even if language, religion, political and legal systems, and social customs might be seen as living artifacts, currently cultural differences also appear. According to Young (1976, 23), "cultural pluralism is a quintessentially modern phenomenon." The major categories of the cultural differentiation may be grouped as ethnic, race, religion, caste, and region.

Ethnicity: As Young (1976, 48) points out, "the defining attributes of ethnic commonality may include language, territory, political unit, or common cultural values or symbols." In majority of cases, a shared language is usually present. Thus, a speech community is a candidate for common identification on the territory of Armenia.

Race: As Young (1976, 49) explains, "race enters the list of cultural differentiators as a stepchild of prejudice, above all a legacy of stereotypes." The first usage of the term "race" is "quite recent in human history" (Young 1976, 49). And now race, being a scientific basis for social differentiation and collective consciousness, remains a potent factor (Young 1976, 51). To put it in another way, race is "perhaps the least "primordial" of all the bases of cultural differentiation; ...however, it creates a particularly intractable and bitter form of cultural pluralism" (Young 1976, 51).

Regionalism: This is, in part, "a residual category," as Young (1976, 64) claims.

Religion: Religion “offers not only a comprehensive world view, but also an all-embracing social identity” (Young 1976, 51). However, as Young (1976, 52) points out, religion as an element in cultural pluralism is limited to the great world religions such as Islam and Christianity.

Then, it should be mentioned that cultural pluralism is at root a subjective phenomenon.

Indeed, as Ferguson (2001, 1) points out, “culture” is difficult to define but an easily understood and important concept in international affairs.” At the very beginning, it implies “the human made part of the environment,” which can be communicated and which provides the patterns, meanings and knowledge of human activity socially and in relation to the world” (Hudson 1997, 4, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 1). Moreover, Ferguson (2001, 1) outlines “three areas where culture is often found useful in discussing international affairs”; these areas are “*political, strategic, and organizational cultures.*” In the next paragraphs these areas are discussed one-by-one.

The “*political culture*” implies “all of the discourses, values, and implicit rules that express and shape political action and intentions, determine the claims groups may and may not make upon one another, and ultimately provide a logic of political action” (Hudson 1977, 10, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 1). Thus, as Ferguson (2001, 1) presents, many “individuals or groups have staked a place on the world stage through linking cultural aspirations with political action.” For instance, the current desire of India to be considered “as an advanced technological power and France’s claim to be both a cultural and military power were all based in part on cultural claims.”

The “*strategic culture,*” having many overlapping features with the political culture, mainly “concerns the methods nations and other groups choose to achieve their goals, and the cultural factors which affect the way they seek cooperation or competition in the international scene” (Ferguson 2001, 1). For example, as it has been argued by Ferguson (2001, 2), “China

tends to have a very strong strategic tradition which influences political activity, foreign affairs and defense activities.” This type of culture is intensified especially “in times of warfare or intense conflict,” when certain cultural trends are inclined to become more important (Ferguson 2001, 2).

The “*organizational culture*” “refers to typical ways societies structure power relations in institutions, organize groups to achieve goals, and promote economic activities” (Ferguson 2001, 2). The following examples: “patterns of leadership, manager-worker relations, styles of cooperation and conflict, patterns of openness and secrecy,” may be affected by broader cultural conceptions (Ferguson 2001, 2). Illustrations of where this type is present are Carthaginian, Roman, Islamic, Chinese, Malay and Japanese cultures (Ferguson 2001, 2).

However, these three areas may overlap each other; and “culture” often has a very broad, background [effect] on behaviors and institutions” (Ferguson 2001, 2).

Thus, from this point one can come to the counterpart and component of culture, perception that may be characterized through symbols and stereotypes. As a result, its role also needs to be discussed.

Perception

As Young (1976, 142) discusses, “cultural identities...contain a set of symbolic representation of reality.” Indeed, as Edelman (1971, 101) claims, “divisions based upon race, nationality, religion, and clearly demarked class or caste evoke the most sensitive and cherished anxieties regarding self-definition and survival” (as quoted in Young 1976, 142). Human beings have the ability to symbolize. They do it by relating “past, present, and future through a set of reconstructed images which generalize individual experiences,” by formulating them in collective terms and investing them with social meaning (Young 1976, 142).

As Mannheim (1936, 3, as quoted in Young 1976, 142) argues, theoretically, human beings speak the language of their group; they think in the manner in which their group thinks. Therefore, as Burke (1966, 5, as quoted in Young 1976, 143) clarifies, man is typically the symbol-using animal, experiencing the whole overall “picture”—a construct of the symbolic systems.

Indeed, the symbols play an important role in mapping cultural pluralism. According to Edelman (1971, 7), “it is through their power to merge diverse perceptions and beliefs into a new and unified perspective that symbols affect what men want, what they do, and the identity they create for themselves.”

As Young (1976, 147) points out, symbols rely heavily on stereotyping to perform their labor of ordering the social universe; thus, a given communal group is attributed “a set of imputed traits, physical and behavioral.”

Throughout the 20th century, stereotypes have been studied, especially together with the study of “national character” perceptions. And, as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1981, 281) claim, in their analysis of international conflict psychologists frequently relate the phenomena of “displacement” and “projection” to the concept of “national images.”

Image theory

The “images reflect a process of selective perception caused by the traditional historic view of other nations as transmitted through the educational system, folklore, the news media, and other channels of socialization” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1981, 281). While conceptualizing the term “image,” one may use the definition given by Kelman (1965, 24, as quoted in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1981, 281): “the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive system [or] the individual’s conception of what the object is like.” Moreover, according to Boulding (1959, 121, as quoted in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1981,

281), the behavior of complex political organizations is determined by decisions, which involve “the selection of a preferred position in a contemplated field of choice,” and which is, in turn, the function of the decision-maker’s image. The image is a product of messages received in the past—not a simple accumulation of messages but “a highly structured piece of information-capital.” In the interpretation of Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1981, 281), “every nation is a complex of the images of the persons who think about it; hence the image is not one but many.”

Each nation perceives the other one in a particular way; each nation holds certain institutionalized images of another one. Therefore, the importance of symbols and values cannot be underestimated; their role is big enough in forming the dynamic basis on which peace and conflict rest. Worsley (1988, 69), for instance, points out the substantial contribution of images institutionalized as stereotypic beliefs to foreign policy decisions.

Culture of foreign countries and perception about them should be paid close attention if Armenia is determined to get allies in the larger world. As Fisher (1988, 4) points out, “it is...important to anticipate the way those involved are programmed to perceive the issue at hand.” And this foreseeing is feasible since, according to Esman (1994), even ethnic pluralism is not collective psychos, but rather a pervasive reality that politicians can manage.

Moreover, to ensure international security affairs, we should, for sure, have accurate information about the social and cultural life of those with whom we must interact in a changing world. As Worsley (1988, 69) claims, one of the prerequisites for building confidence with the outside world is to have much more knowledge about the culture of another nation, about cultural differences and much more exchange of such knowledge.

Therefore, values and symbols give social life its dynamism. According to an example given by Brassett (1998, 89), William Beeman (1986, 333), a consultant to the US State Department during the Iranian hostage crisis, was urging anthropologists to write about their

understandings of other cultures in the well-known journals read by members of the foreign policy community.

However, as Brasset (1988, 81) indicates, we also need to be conscious of our own values and manipulation of symbols. Besides being aware about the images of the other, we also need to be knowledgeable about the images of ourselves. Thus, Uzunova (2000, 3) mentions that universal requirements acquire various values in different cultures, and “each biologically conditioned feature receives cultural value.” Those values are transmitted from generation to generation. Each nation possesses the ability of learning and interaction through the system of learnt symbols. This transmission, called by Uzunova (2000, 3) “the transmission of the learnt behavior” from generation to generation, is seen as the basis of the very possibility of culture.

In general, the world is multi-colored and vivid. But without the national peculiarities of the culture, the world culture would not be so diversified. The more the culture of a given nation has national characteristics, the more it belongs to the whole world. Each nation has specific culture and traditions, which explain the diversification of the world culture and create the conditions for the existence of the nation. The cultural traditions and the cultural heritage of each nation are the main source for the creative strength of its culture. The culture of each nation is its soul and its essence. To build constructive relations with any nation, peoples need to take into account the role of its culture.

Thus, it is important to study how culture and perception shape the relationships of Armenia with the outside world. The purpose of this Essay is to study the relationships of Armenia with its close neighbor—Russia. This country is chosen purposefully since our relationships with Russia have become a determining factor of Armenian nationhood and self-identity.

It is important to study these relationships especially now since the years of independence have changed the situation in the sphere of culture in Armenia, as Egiazarian (2002, 1) claims. According to him (2002, 1), currently in Armenia the “culture that has nothing in common with the old traditions arrived together with the economic relations borrowed from the West.”

PART TWO: RESEARCH DESIGN (METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH QUESTIONS)

In this part of the Essay the methodology of this study together with the research questions and hypotheses are presented.

Methodology

The Armenian-Russian relationships are studied from cultural and perceptual perspectives. The case study is held by answering the questions of a checklist suggested by Fisher in his work Mindsets (1988): this checklist is intended to guide the researcher in applying psycho-cultural concepts to the analysis of real international events and cross-cultural interactions and to find out the effects that mindsets may be having on them. So, the aim of this case study is diagnosing mindsets cross-culturally. This checklist includes at least in part the factors that influence mindsets: situation and context; knowledge and information base; the image factor; cultural and social determinants (the cultural lens); individual personality and group dynamics. This checklist has immediate applicability. Thus, possible problems can be identified and corrected while something can be done about them.

According to Fisher (1988, 72), first of all, we need to identify just whose mindsets are being diagnosed. For the purpose of this study, the unit of analysis is the Armenian public.

Second, we need to be precise in defining the central subject (issue or event) that elicits differing patterns of perception and reasoning. For the purpose of this study, the image factor is taken into account. The image factor and the sources of image are important to analyze; these images mean images of the counterparts, self-images, and international images.

Third, in order to understand the nature of gap between points of view, we need to apply a two-way comparative approach. The Armenian side of the issue is highlighted by content analysis of some Russian-language newspapers issued in Armenia. The content analysis of a mass medium is considered to be important since our perception about a country comes more

often from mass media; therefore, as Serfaty (1990, 6) claims, although “the media don’t usually determine the foreign policy agenda, they clearly wield a large amount of influence.” The counter side’s perspectives are not discussed since it is impossible to conduct interviews in Russia or make content analysis of newspapers issued in Russia. It is one of the limitations of this study.

Therefore, a mixture of several methods is applied while conducting this study.

The above-mentioned methods are used to answer the following research questions:

1. What is the role of culture in international relations?
2. What issues should be taken into account, while studying cross-cultural relationships?
3. How did Armenians perceive Russians and relationships with them traditionally?
4. How Russia is perceived in some Russian-language newspapers issued in Armenia?
5. What kind of relationships was between the Armenian and Russian people in retrospect?
6. What kind of relationships is between the Armenian and Russian people now?

The main hypothesis of this study is that *the Armenian-Russian relations will be in a good shape in the future, partly because of cultural and perceptual perspectives since culture and its component—perception—do play a big role in shaping international relations.*

Although this Master’s Essay is focused on the relationships between these two countries, it deals also with the special kind of experience shared by people from all over the world who carry out their professional responsibilities in or relating to a foreign national or cultural environment.

PART THREE

The Role of Culture in International Relations

Why do many countries have difficulties in understanding each other? Why, while dealing with such issues as human rights, democracy or economic policy, do not they come to any consensus? More frequently, such collisions are attributed to economic and political aspects.

Therefore, the significance of culture in international system has always been ignored. Thus, one of the cornerstones of international relations—realism—considers culture to be not very important and gives priority to power and state. Moreover, previously, political scientists preferred to omit or just mention this issue (for example, Fisher presents two such cases, when R. Jervis in Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976) prefers not to discuss cross-cultural aspects of the international politics, or when R. Axelrod in Structure of Decision (1976) just mentions cultural factors).

However, as Latipov claims (2002, 1), “for the last decade or so, there is a new alternative view emerging that assumes that cultural resemblance/differences are to be taken into account in the analysis of international relations.” The end of the Cold War especially has boosted this approach, according to which, “cultural differences would increasingly shape the international order and politics” (Latipov 2002, 1).

For instance, recently this view was discussed in the article of Samuel Huntington (1993) The Clash of Civilizations. This article highlights the role of civilizations and culture in world politics. Thus, as Huntington (1993, 18) argues, “the ideological struggle” of the Cold War has been replaced by the conflict of cultures, and after the Cold War, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational. One can easily agree with applying cultural approach to international politics. Thus, for instance, Latipov (2002, 2) agrees that the “cultural differences” now form the dynamics of international/global politics.”

So, Huntington (1993) was the first who raised the agenda of cultural dimension to international politics in the era of globalization (Latipov 2002, 4).

But, what about the claim of Huntington that “cultural differences” inevitably lead to conflicts? According to the approach of Huntington (1993), when the countries enter into economic contacts, in an age of increasing globalization, different civilizations clash and merge at the same time. And the clash seems to be predominant. However, it can be claimed that such situations are not unavoidable. The last version of Huntington’s (1996, 20-21) thesis is summarized by Ferguson (2001, 12-13):

Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies.

Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence: Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.

Part III: A civilization-based world order is emerging: societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful; and countries group themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization.

Part IV: The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China; at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate “kin-country rallying,” the threat of broader escalation, and hence efforts by core states to halt these wars.

Part V: The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique, not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.

The possibility of conflicts between states and societies that try to interact still remains since, as Latipov (2002, 2) argues, “different values and attitudes, inherited from long historical experiences, preclude the mutual understanding and potentially contain the danger of conflicts between countries and cultures.”

Therefore, one can state that “the gap in values and attitudes (in other words, cultural misunderstanding/misperception) is the most fundamental linchpin of international politics” (Latipov 2002, 2).

The culture and its component: cultural perception do play a big role in international politics and need to be studied in order to prevent many conflicts, clashes, misunderstandings that still exist in the current world.

As Fisher (1988, 43) explains, “people look on international issues and events through a cultural lens.” Being a part of international politics implies dealing with completely new patterns of “mindsets,” with different “patterns of thinking” (Fisher 1988, 41). Representatives from different nations may look at the same event and give different explanations. Therefore, underestimating the role of cultural perceptions is not an effective position.

But what does the concept of “culture” imply, or, as Fisher (1988, 44) puts it, “how people start out being alike within their own culture?”

The term “culture” has many definitions; as a result, scholars essentially have been unable to agree on its conceptual parameters. However, as Latipov (2002, 3) specifies, some consensus has emerged around the notion that “culture is a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behavior.” Moreover, Geertz (1975, 15) defines the “culture” as “the answer a society gives to the problem of the incompleteness of human existence; thus, all cultures are different, but they are all answers to the same problem” (as quoted in Latipov 2002, 18). In addition to this definition, Mazrui (2002, 3) gives “seven functions of culture”: it helps to provide lenses of perception and cognition; it provides motives for human behavior; it provides criteria of evaluation; it provides a basis of identity; it is a mode of communication;

it serves as a basis of social stratification; and it defines the system of production and consumption (as quoted in Latipov 2002, 2).

Sometimes, as Fisher (1988, 44) mentions, culture is used as equivalent to civilization (the well-known example is the case of Huntington (1993, 1996)). Moreover, an interesting comparison is discussed by Fisher in Mindsets: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations: the newborn child mind is “like a blank tape, waiting to be filled, and culture plays a large part in the recording process” (1988, 45). So, according to Fisher (1988, 46), “culture is learned behavior,” but, at the same time, “it is shared behavior, which is important because it systematizes the way people do things, thus avoiding confusion and allowing cooperation.”

In order to avoid confusion and to allow cooperation, in order to understand efficiently the differences in international behavior, people should “look for significant differences in mindsets imposed by the culture” (Fisher 1988, 47). “Invisible walls” (Latipov 2002, 5) need to be studied. Cultural norms and identities are a key for understanding the practices of international relations. Not only the economic interests, race, and nationality, but also cultural differences are important elements in international studies. In the post-Cold War system they are becoming the number one, as Latipov (2002, 4) claims.

A case presented by Latipov (2002, 4) helps to understand the importance of cultural differences: while working in the United Nations, serving “as a prominent forum for multicultural negotiations among delegates from countries with different cultural traditions, Mingst and Warkentin come to the conclusion that culture does really play a role in multilateral negotiations. Bozeman contents that culture constitutes an insurmountable barrier to effective communication and policy.”

Or, as Fisher (1988) thinks, culture plays a fundamental role in cross-national negotiations and diplomacy since, according to him, if there is an evident cultural gap

between the negotiating parties, there will be a great potential for misunderstanding, and the negotiators will lose more time talking in vain. The result of such negotiations may be, in the best case, the break between the negotiating sides; in the worst case, the “clash” meaning war, conflict, mutual accusations (Latipov 2002, 4).

Another case can be presented from the business world, where overcoming only the language barriers is not enough. To succeed in new markets, businessmen should be able to penetrate into the very core of the world’s most dynamic business culture, to understand who is who, how they connect, how they negotiate and how they make decisions (Latipov 2002, 5):

During the recent Middle East and North Africa economic summit, a few Israeli and Qatari businessmen met privately outside the confines of the luxurious conference center in Doha. It was the first time they had met. One of the Israelis, experienced in conducting business with Arab countries, started the conversation with his Qatari hosts. He spoke slowly, talking about everything except of trade. After some time he noticed his Israeli colleagues were becoming impatient. When the meeting ended he was asked why he had spent so much time talking about nothing. He tried to explain to them the significance of time in building relationships. “Some Israeli businessmen have not the slightest idea about the cultural differences between us and the Arabs. They think they can walk in, talk shop, and sign a deal and that’s that. It’s time we learned how to drink tea slowly and make small talk” (excerpt from The Financial Times¹, as quoted in Latipov 2002, 6).

But this example is an episode of “clash of civilizations” because of perception gap on a micro-level. But similar situations occur frequently on a global level, when the cultural or perceptual differences lead to mutual clashes.

People do the same thing at the different continents, but “what is done and how and why it is done will be different to the degree that they are affected by the cultural lens through which the activities are viewed and the mindsets which come into play” (Fisher 1988, 55). The ways are different since people are built in different “environmental patterns” (Latipov 2002, 6).

¹ The Financial Times is available on-line at: <http://news.ft.com/home/rw.html>.

As Inglis (2001, 2) discusses, the “rediscovery” of ethnicity and cultural identities created an awareness of the need to cope with the management of ethnic and cultural diversity through policies, which promote ethnic and cultural minority groups’ participation in and access to the resources of society.” “Multiculturalism is a democratic policy response for coping with cultural and social diversity in society.”

Such needs appear recently when globe has suddenly become too small, distance has diminished, and nations have met each other. These realities have clashed different values, beliefs, stereotypes, and identities. For instance, as Latipov (2002, 6) presents, politicians from different countries (for example, Bill Clinton of USA and Chiang Zemin of China at summit in Washington, D.C., in 1998) see the same issues (of human rights, Tibet, abortion, etc., for instance) in different ways because of their differing cultural backgrounds. Their electorates or nations do, too.

But what happens when people, politicians, businessmen, children from different historical and cultural backgrounds that have shaped them and influenced their views, habits and behavior meet each other or change environment? As Latipov (2002, 6) explains, they “feel cultural shock, and they have to adjust to it.”

Therefore, as Fisher (1988, 55) adds, “simply understanding that the culture is the source for much of the content and design of perception and reasoning is not very helpful in actual field situations, where the number and variety of culturally molded mindsets is so large and complex.” We should also be able “to recognize culturally channeled outlooks; we may succeed by just “noting how praise or censure is given, how children are taught,” we may find the outlooks in cartoons, humor, in literature, in poetry” (Fisher 2002, 56). We may recognize by notifying the roles that others have. The social roles individuals may assume in a given situation include cultural self-definitions, and the nature of the “relevant others” in the social arena shapes identity (Young 1976, 41). For instance, as Sarbin (1970, 547, as

quoted in Young 1976, 41) states, “in order to survive as a member of a society, a person must be able to locate himself accurately in the role structure...by seeking and finding answers to the question “Who am I?”...and locate the positions of the other by asking, “Who are You?””

Moreover, the so-called cultural lens is present “across a wide range of behavior,” and culturally patterned mindsets vary in the level of their importance (Fisher 1988, 59). Fisher (1988, 59) specifies that especially two areas are important for international practitioners: social structure and institutions. The first one deals with the way a given culture defines social prestige, authority, privilege, and occupation, for example. Thus, it explains the above-mentioned “roles that people play in institutional life and...the public mindsets out of which governments derive their logic and try to meet the expectations of their people” (Fisher 1988, 61).

The second area is important since much of the daily work on international level includes institutions such as governmental, political, social, or economic institutions, and “the way institutions are interrelated within a cultural system affects the way that people are programmed to think about any specific institution, be it marriage or the civil service” (Fisher 1988, 61).

The cultural lens, in turn, includes mainly values, which “form the basis and establish the “givens” for mindsets” (Fisher 1988, 63). Taken together, these values comprise the cultural system. Then, differences between value orientations may cause difficulties in modern international work.

Indeed, culture acts as an international barrier, being the fundamental source of conflict, which is based on economic, territorial or political reasons (Latipov 2002, 6). However, culture as a deeper layer causes and shapes these reasons. But, as, for instance, Fukuyama (1992, 45, as quoted in Latipov 2002, 4), the author of The End of History, points out,

contemporary theories do not address “consciousness and culture seriously as the matrix within which economic behavior is formed.” However, Huntington (1993) states, “consciousness and culture” “as the matrix” are multicolored (“the rainbow of cultures”), whereas Fukuyama (1992) considers the universality of only one color” (as quoted in Latipov 2002, 6). And, as Latipov (2002, 7) adds, “in those matrixes, states, countries, cultures and political/economical ideas are all subjected to the same symptoms of culturally colored “shocks” and “adjustments.”

Yet “culture does not impose a cognitive map upon persons but provides them with a set of principles for map-making and navigation” (Vertzberger 1990, 270, as quoted in Aggestam 1999, 13). Thus, “the actors in foreign policy are not simply confined to acting according to the roles prescribed in a script (rule-based behavior)” (Aggestam 1999, 13).

But different cultures have to accept rules of the world game that explain the systems of values, ideas and institutions. This refers not only to developing countries, but also to the developed “core.” Now, in the age of the “borderless world”, negative reaction is taking form of “the clash of civilizations” (Latipov 2002, 7). To settle these misunderstandings, misperceptions, IR practitioners should pay a greater attention to the role that culture and perception play in international relations.

Issues Important for the Study of Cross-Cultural Relationships and Armenian-Russian Case

The above-discussed theoretical framework may be applied to specific cases that stand for illustrations. This application is called by Fisher (1988, 71) “the fine art of diagnosing mindsets.” As this Essay aims at discovering the relationships between Armenia and Russia, it may be useful to apply the Checklist discussed by Fisher (1988, 72) to the cross-cultural interactions between these countries. This Checklist consists of several questions, which, while being answered, may help to understand these relations. These questions that are categorized into some groups, are applied to the relations between Armenia and Russia and presented in the Table 1 (adapted from The Checklist presented by Fisher (1988, 72)): as one can see, besides the questions that should be answered, while dealing with relationships between different countries, this Table presents also examples or explanations of such questions. At the same time, as it is intended to discuss the relationships between Russia and Armenia, some applications of these questions are presented. So, this Checklist is applied to a specific case: the relationships between Armenia and Russia.

The first group of questions—the situation and context—is dealing “with the least culturally mysterious factors” (Fisher 1988, 72). The three main ideas here are *historical, geographical or economic facts of life; context; and unanticipated higher priority concerns or hidden agendas*. They are applied to the Armenian-Russian case and discussed one-by-one.

First of all, Armenia, for example, is a country that has been largely dependent on a limited number of resources, while Russia has had a multi-faceted economy.

Table 1. Checklist with its applications

	QUESTIONS	EXAMPLE	APPLICATION
Situation and context	1. How do obvious differences in historical, geographical or economic facts of life translate into a special pattern of priorities and concerns?	a country background study—history, geography, climate, economy and resources, international connections—translated into psychological effects	limited number of resources versus multi-faceted economy
	2. How does the context in which issues are presented affect the way they are perceived or their dramatic or emotional impact?	a military exercise may be seen as both a routine maneuver and a threatening gesture, depending on what else is going at the same time	70 years of shared history leading to similar perceptions
	3. Do any unanticipated higher priority concerns or hidden agendas influence perception of the issue at hand?	the diplomat who is supposed to have asked darkly when a member of an opposing negotiating team suddenly died of a heart attack, “Now what was behind that?”	during the negotiations whether political instability is present or not
Knowledge and information base	4. What knowledge or information base do people bring to the issue or event?	information from news reports, briefings, the media	image of Russia in newspapers
	5. What is the effect of new information, such as that coming from the media or other channels?	what new information has reached the perceiver and what is the end effect of that new information	interpretation of the new information in mass media
	6. What myths (including historical ones) are included in the information base on each side?	the reciprocal Soviet and American “knowledge” of each other	Russians acting as protectors for the Armenian people
The image factor	7. What images of the other side require consideration?	from the imported television programs, missionaries, newspaper coverage	image of Russians as protectors
	8. What national self-images help explain reactions to issues or events?	national identity and pride, a sense of place in history, popular beliefs about the role of nation in the modern world	Armenians as victims; high national identity
	9. Are images of the international system and of its operations at significant variance?	the superpowers and the countries caught in between have different image of the international security system	negative perception of the new global order by Armenians
Cultural and social determinants: the cultural lens	10. Are there mismatches in deep cultural beliefs, values, or assumptions?	how does one relate to authority, to society’s moral codes, to law?	very strong idea of family in Armenia
	11. Does anything about the issue or event elicit strong emotional reactions because of the cultural lens through which it is viewed?	deeply imbedded and strongly supported by intense emotions to be easily changed	not very strong mismatches between Armenians and Russians
	12. Does experience with differing social structures and the related role behaviors that go with them affect perception of the issue?	effects of social status, privilege, wealth on politics, industrial relations, professional images	women occupying different roles in these countries
	13. What effect does experience with differing institutional forms, functions and operations have?	differences in supervising office employees, campaigning for public, teaching university classes	similar way of campaigning for public office
Individual personality and group dynamics	14. To what extent are differing styles of logic and reasoning apparent? Are they reflected in language?	whether cultures, augmented by languages, tend to think and reason in distinctive ways	deductive versus inductive reasoning, style of logic
	15. To what extent does the uniqueness of individual personality and experience need to be taken into account?	first of all, dealing with overall group patterns of perception and reasoning	strong notion of tsar in Russia
	16. Are any special styles of group dynamics, information processing, or decision making present?	group think operates differently in the US and Japan	different solutions based on different “group thinks”

Secondly, while dealing with the context, one should take into account the following points: “(1) who it is that raises an issue, (2) the context within which it is reported, (3) what other issues it becomes associated with, and (4) what people are generally concerned about at the time” (Fisher 1988, 76). Thus, while applying to the Armenian-Russian case, one can see that in the context of shared history from the 1920s to 1990s, these two countries see many issues in a similar way.

Third, while discussing the relationships between these countries, one should focus on their priority concerns and hidden agendas as well since “anticipating mindset complications is to identify these interconnected concerns or hidden agendas.” For example, during the negotiations between these countries such issues as whether the other side has internal problems (e.g., political instability) or not should be explored. It is the so-called “exercising empathy and doing one’s homework in understanding the larger context for decision making pay off” (Fisher 1988, 77). However, this search for such hidden elements should not be paid over attention; otherwise, we will have very suspicious diplomats.

Then, the second group of questions is the so-called “knowledge and information base,” which may be presented in different ways, thus, leading to differing perceptions (Fisher 1988, 72). Here again, one face three main ideas: *knowledge or information*; *new information*; and *myths*. First of all, it is necessary to ask what information base the person is working from. For example, one should consider what information about Russia is given in the newspapers issued in Armenia. At that time, more often background knowledge may not be so well matched. In case of the countries in question, because of the shared history for about 70 years, there are no very many mismatches, although the situation may be changed soon.

Second, the life is not static, and there are a lot of changes in the world. These changes are reflected in the information provided by different mass media. Even if one has sufficient amount of information about the last decades of another country, still this information is not

final. Then, taking into consideration the information presented in mass media is not sufficient. Moreover, forming opinions based only on the mass media of one country is a biased approach; information from mass media of both countries should be considered.

Thirdly, as a lot of information comes from the myths each side has about its counterpart, they also should be paid close attention. For example, one of the myths about Russians is that Russians were always acting as protectors for the Armenian people.

Next, the 3rd group of the aggregated questions is called “the image factor” (Fisher 1988, 81). This factor is especially given the most emphasis in this Master’s Essay since the component of the culture—the perception goes together with the image factor. Here, three types of images are important: *images of the other side*; *national images*; and *images of the international system*. That is, how a given nation perceives itself, the other side, and the international system. The sources of these images may be very various. Some images come from the above-mentioned myths. Thus, while illustrating the 1st question, the example of the Russians as protectors may be presented.

Secondly, it should be said that the “images of self are just as important as images of others” (Fisher 1988, 82). For example, what Armenians think they are? There is a traditional approach known in psychology as well: a nation may perceive itself as a victim because of the long experience of being tortured. Or another example: many politicians consider the Armenian nation to be a nation with a high and long-term sense of self-identity.

Third, it is important to know how Armenians perceive the international system. This question becomes especially significant in the era of globalization, which implies the issue of a new international order, of a new global order. Armenians, for instance, seem not to be ready to be engaged in that global order.

At the same time, it should be pointed out that considering both “the source and content of images” is very vital since “myth and misperception can be as powerful in forming outlooks as facts and figures” (Fisher 1988, 83).

The next set of questions is called “the cultural lens” consisting of cultural and social determinants; here the following determinants are important: *deep cultural beliefs, values, or assumptions; strong emotional reactions because of the cultural lens; social structures and the related role behaviors; institutional forms, functions and operations; and styles of logic and reasoning.* The 1st determinant is based on whether there are mismatches in deep cultural beliefs, values, or assumptions between the discussed countries or not. For example, how the notion of family is perceived in the Armenian and Russian societies. Armenian society prefers closer relationships, implying a larger idea of family. Especially in the villages, while saying family, people more often understand extended families. Families imply close relationships; a lot of sentiments are involved in this notion. In Russia, the idea of family is not implying extended and close relationships. Another example is the way Armenians perceive authority and law. More often, they do not respect the laws. In addition, there are several beliefs, assumptions, values that may be shared by several nations, especially if they have certain periods of shared history. Thus, for instance, during the Soviet times, the collective economic approach was widespread in Armenia and Russia; it explains why it was not easy to introduce private entrepreneurship in Armenia.

Second, the values, sentiments, legend and identity may be socialized (Fisher 1988, 85). As a result, there are strong mindsets: “beliefs that are too deeply imbedded and too strongly supported by intense emotions to be easily changed” (Fisher 1988, 86). For instance, for each Armenian, the issue of genocide is of such importance. Fortunately, there are no such strong mismatches between Armenians and Russians.

The third question used to discover differing social structures and the role behaviors is aimed at finding out how culture provides “a pattern of thinking which determines who can assume certain roles (lawyer, politician, school teacher) and how the roles are played” (Fisher 1988, 87). The status of a given corporation executive may be perceived differently in different countries. In result, these cultural lenses affect expectations regarding the role behavior. As Armenia is a more patriarchic country than Russia, here certain roles are not given to women as frequently as in Russia, for example.

The fourth question is connected with the previous one. This one deals with cultural lens coloring expectations of an institution’s actual operations. As Fisher (1988, 87) points out, “it is a matter of role behavior for institutions.” The way the institutions behave and act may differ from country to country; these differences lead to uneasy international dialogue. This issue is, indeed, very important since “much of international business is conducted at an institutional level, [and] exploring how the larger culture and institutional system predisposes thinking about the performance of any given institution becomes a key consideration” (Fisher 1988, 88). Once more time, similar Soviet heritage of Armenia and Russia has lead to similar campaigning for public office.

The fifth question is explained by differing styles of logic and reasoning that are reflected in language. Thus, for example, there are societies where people refer to preferences for deductive reasoning implying that the “statements of principles, titles attached to items on conference agendas, or the “we hold these truths to be self-evident” style of reasoning would take priority in molding discussion and debate” (Fisher 1988, 88). At the same time, there are societies with more inductive style implying more and primary “attention to facts, data and details which, when accepted, allow discussion to move on to more general principles” (Fisher 1988, 88).

The last set of questions is dealing with individual personality and group dynamics. Although sometimes individuals such as a Winston Churchill or a Gandhi are paid more emphasis in international relations, group patterns also should be paid special attention since they explain differing outlooks (Fisher 1988, 89). The idea of giving more emphasis on individuals is especially strong in Russia where the notion of tsar has been always of top priority.

The second question requires that cross-cultural differences in decision-making processes be put a special emphasis since the so-called “group think” differs from one country to another; for the same issue different solutions may be found out (Fisher 1988, 90).

In sum, all these sets of questions should be given great emphasis and studied, while dealing with bilateral or multilateral relationships in the world.

Traditional Perception of Russians and Relationships with Them by Armenians

After applying the Checklist presented by Fisher (1988, 72) to a particular case, it is time to understand one of the most important issues from this Checklist: the so-called image factor since mainly it deals with the notion of perception. But before coming to the current image of Russians in the consciousness of Armenians, the traditional image of Russians and relationships with them that Armenians had is discussed. Lurie (1998, 13) has analyzed that issue basing her line of reasoning on the novel written by prominent Armenian writer Khachatour Abovian.

Thus, according to Lurie (1998, 13), “during the last 2 centuries Russians occupied a special place in the ethnic image of the world of Armenians, they personified the “image of protector.” Further, Lurie (1998, 13) presents the following implications of that image:

First of all, the image of Russians could not be thrown away painlessly from the perception of Armenians; it would be possible only if the whole image of the world were principally transformed, and the “image of protector” were transferred to another subject, according to completely new value dominants.

Secondly, the image of Russians in the perception of Armenians is divided in two. “The protector” is assigned ideal characteristics that are sometimes far from the reality. “The image of protector” in the Armenian consciousness has the traits of “deity in a car” from the antic tragedies—deity that descends to the Earth at the critical moment to solve all the problems. Those Russians that exist in reality seem to exist in a parallel way. They have a lot of traits that irritate the Armenians. In the world there are ordinary Russians whom Armenians like somehow; at the same time, there are some “ideal Russians”—rescuers, liberators, protectors from all kind of troubles, they do not have drawbacks, they are more intelligent, stronger, better than anybody in the world. The first or the second of these images may dominate, although both are always present in a more or less expressed way. Third, the tension in the Armenian-Russian relationships leads to the fact that any conflict of Armenians with no matter whom always takes the trace of the conflict with the Russians.

Russians, according to Abovian: If one wants to grasp the perception of Russians by Armenians in the 19th century, he or she needs to study the novel of Abovian: Wounds of Armenia, where this image is formulated very legibly. This novel presents the so-called “ideal image of the Russians” (Lurie 1998, 13).

Before discussing this image, it should be said that this book was written in 1841, when Armenia was already annexed to Russia, when all the hopes for an Armenian autonomy in the composition of the Russian Empire were died, and when the Armenian territories were already distributed among several regions (gubernies). It means that in the Wounds of Armenia there is no momentary delight, no political benefit. The words written by Abovian were written by heart and deep-rooted in the perception of many generations of Armenians (Lurie 1998, 14). For example, one can read from the same novel: “The brave spirit of Russians has saved us” (Abovian 1977, 191). Or, “Yerevan seems to feel having wings, when the Russian army enters it” (Abovian 1977, 261).

Indeed, Abovian (1977) considered the arrival of Russians into Armenia as a blessing. Thus, the romantic legend about Russia was created. But it is interesting to know whether this image remained or not later, in the 20th century, when Armenia already was a Soviet Republic, a part of the Soviet Union.

Russians in the perception of Armenians during the Soviet times: During all the Soviet years Russians were very close to Armenians, they were always together. Armenians were no more afraid that Russians might go out of the life of Armenians (Lurie 1998, 16). Moreover, even in the quiet times for Armenia the Russians were perceived as a friendly and protective force. During the Soviet times, as many may remember, the Russian education was prestigious; children preferred to study in Russian schools; they were taught the Russian language from the very childhood. Therefore, as Lurie (1998, 17) puts it, after the genocide of 1915-1922 the only country that was not seen as adversarial was Russia, the Soviet Russia. Overall, during the growth of Yerevan the belief in the friendship of Russia was especially important because it did not allow despairing completely, becoming undeceived in everybody and unable to act positively. After all, “this belief gave the hope (or the illusion) to be understood some time” (Lurie 1998, 17).

How Russia Is Perceived in Some Russian-Language Newspapers Issued in Armenia

As stated earlier, among the sets of questions the image factor especially is dealing with the idea of perception. Therefore, after understanding what was the traditional image of Russians and relationships with them, it is time to see how Armenians perceive them currently.

For the purpose of this study, an analysis of some Russian-language newspapers was conducted. It was conducted to understand how Armenians perceive Russia and Russians. This study is based on the content analysis conducted by Lurie and presented in her article Russia, I Believe in Your Strength: The Image of Russia and Russians in the Mass Armenian Consciousness (1998).

But, before starting the analysis, it makes sense to say about some limitations because of which the content analysis cannot be called complete. First of all, in order to understand the bilateral relations, the perceptions of both sides about each other should be present. However, as it is not possible to analyze the newspapers issued in Russia, only the perception of Armenians about Russia and Russians may be investigated. Then, because of time limitations only a period of half year of 1998 was considered.

The period was chosen purposefully since the time from March to August of 1998 is considered to some extent a turning point for both countries. Why not the last three years? The reason is that during these years some kind of stability has been present in relationships between these countries. Then, the year of 1998 was a year, when ten years from the period when every kind of movements started in the Soviet Union were already passed away. And it was interesting to know how these ten years shaped and changed the perception of Armenians about Russia and Russians. Moreover, a further analysis of these newspapers is intended to be continued.

In addition, during the year of 1998 the relationships between Armenia and Russia were discussed several times: during that year the discussed topics were *antagonism toward the US and NATO, ascertaining of the necessity for Russia to have an ally in the Transcaucasia such as Armenia and of the fact that Russia was the support for Armenia, and pretensions of Armenia to Russia about its ambiguous politics.*

The newspapers selected were the following Russian-language newspapers: “Respublica Armenia” (“Республика Армения”) (official newspaper that has its Armenian version as well), “Golos Armenii” (“Голос Армении”), “Urartu” (“Урарту”), and “Novoye vremya” (“Новое время”). These newspapers are issued by Armenians for Armenians and Russians (their number is not large in Armenia). It is like a tribute to tradition (Lurie 1998, 43). By content, Russian-language and Armenian-language newspapers do not differ significantly. Some Russian-language newspapers such as “Golos Armenii” are very popular. Russian-language newspapers are chosen for this study since as usual they tend to be more inclined to write about Russia and Russians.

This analysis is of qualitative nature since the studied period was not very long.

Some of the above-mentioned topics are studied and presented one-by-one. One of the ideas presented in the newspapers is the following:

“My homeland, my Armenia needs strong Russia”

Russia is perceived as an unwise baby that sees its benefits not always in a right way (Lurie 1998, 46). For example, “there is an impression that Russia looks for friends not where they are. That is the reason why it loses all geopolitical clashes.”² It loses its clashes especially in Transcaucasia. Thus, “if Russia wants to keep just part of its influence in Transcaucasia, it should undertake adequate measures. But the issue is that it is hardly

² Mesropyan, Narek. “Dear Heidar Alievich.” from “Golos Armenii” (49) (May 9, 1998).

capable to do so.”³ At the same time, it is said that if “Russia had no forces to voice out the US, it was meaningful to help others do it.”⁴ To put it in a concrete way, to help Armenia to fight for its and Russian interests. Russia is called the only, but, “let’s be frank, not very trustworthy ally.”⁵ For example, as one can read in an article called “Alone”: “The official Russia has mentioned several times that, in case of conflict with Azerbaijan, it will not provide us the military aid.”⁶ This is considered as “treason of the traditional ally.”⁷ Then, it is claimed that “my homeland, my Armenia needs strong unified Russia; otherwise Turkey will make of the last pie of the Armenian land one of its northern provinces during a short period of time.”⁸

However, not everything is so one-sided since there are such claims as that “we don’t have other allies more consistent than Russia. If we understood that during the strength of the northern neighbor, we cannot disregard it in the hard times of its trials.”⁹

Therefore, the idea of alliance with Russia is considered to be important. At the same time, the question whether Russia is a good ally or not is put under suspect. That is, the level of closeness and reliability in Armenian-Russian relationships still does not allow complete alliance (Lurie 1998, 48).

While speaking about the issues of military cooperation in which Armenia is interested, it should be mentioned that “even if something will be changed in the region, it will be the

³ Mesropyan, Narek. “Without Armenia.” from “Golos Armenii” (45) (April 30, 1998).

⁴ Mesropyan, Narek. “Around “golden eggs.” from “Golos Armenii” (50) (May 12, 1998).

⁵ Mesropyan, Narek. “We are cut from our ally.” from “Golos Armenii” (56) (May 26, 1998).

⁶ Mesropyan, Narek. “Alone.” from “Golos Armenii” (53) (May 19, 1998).

⁷ Political division. “We should keep mutual security.” from “Golos Armenii” (110) (October 2, 1997).

⁸ Mesropyan, Narek. “There’s life in the old dog yet!” from “Golos Armenii” (23) (March 7, 1998).

⁹ Mesropyan, Narek. “Bridges and horizons.” from “Golos Armenii” (97) (August 29, 1998).

change of the center of the Russian military presence from Georgia to Yerevan.”¹⁰ Similarly, one can see in the official newspaper: “Armenia does a lot of things to keep the military presence of Russia in its territory, which is, according to the President Kocharyan, a guarantor of the stability in the region.”¹¹ It is natural, if it is accepted that “even if not the main, but, in any case, the essential, hopes to regulate the Karabagh problem and to improve the economy of Armenia are related to Russia, its military, economic and political presence in the Republic.”¹²

It seems that the image of the “ideal Russian” was like a revival. This situation becomes more interesting, if we do not ignore the offences of Armenians by Russians such as “people of Caucasian nationality” (Lurie 1998, 44). As one could already get, the traditional image of Russians is very positive. Thus, as Silva Kaputikyan puts it: “we, the Armenian people, have a suffered and reliable experience of friendship with Russia, we have mutual interests.”¹³

However, each phenomenon has also negative sides; thus, at the same time, there is an idea that “the collapse of the Soviet Union was a negative experience” (Lurie 1998, 54).

This fact once more time shows that Armenia perceives Russia in a positive manner. At the same time, “the image of Russia still is divided in two” (Lurie 1998, 60). On one hand, one can find the publications about the “ideal Russians” (Lurie 1998, 62). On the other hand, one can see that there is a sense of threat from the forces that “play in the Caucasus” against Russia, for instance, from Turkey.

¹⁰ Political division. “Let not the sky ruin.” from “Golos Armenii” (79) (July 18, 1998).

¹¹ Political division. “What is the trump-card of Russia?” from “Respublica Armenia” (103) (July 4, 1998).

¹² Vaneskigyan, Arman. “What is the aim of the masters of political manoeuvre?” from “Respublica Armenia” (120) (July 30, 1998).

¹³ Kaputikyan, Silva. “There is the word of the crowd and the word of the people.” from “Golos Armenii” (27) (March 7, 1998).

Russia is accepted to be an ally, in principle. And the issue of alliance is very important for Armenians. But, at the same time, it is perceived that the real Russia cannot yet be called an ally, but a partner.

This point is clarified by Lurie (1998, 44): “Armenia, by its external political mentality, needs the friendship, but not the pragmatic friendship; not the partnership only for benefit, but rather close, almost “interpersonal” relations” since alliance without the friendship, without individual positive attitude is impossible for Armenians. Armenians may speak about the partnership, but, in practice, they cannot enter into relationships, which are called in international politics partner relationships.

In addition, in the articles from the mid-June to the mid-July 1998 the idea that Armenia preferred the so-called “alter ego” of Russia—Belarus was widespread. But even before that period of time there were a lot of articles where the reliability of the modern Russia as an ally was put under suspect.

However, after the mid-July, the articles in the newspapers were becoming sometimes very pro-Russian, but, at the same time, there was some kind of fear for its destiny, if Russia left Transcaucasia, and pity towards Russia, which itself has a lot of troubles.

The findings of this content analysis are the following:

- 1) If Russia has an ally, it is, of course, Armenia.
- 2) If Russia wants to succeed, it should be in alliance with Armenia.
- 3) Sometimes Russia is unpredictable.
- 4) In case of Russia not being in close relationships with Armenia, it can be replaced by the “alter ego” of Russia—Belarus.

Therefore, Armenians perceive Russians and relationships with them in a positive manner: in overall, the perception of Russia and Russians is very positive.

PART FOUR: ARMENIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIPS IN RETROSPECT AND NOW

As one can already see, the perception of one country by another explains the relationships between them. So, after understanding how Armenians perceived and perceive Russians and relationships with them, one can start discussing these relations in retrospect and currently.

Armenia is among the oldest nations in the world, with a rich cultural heritage and a distinct language and style of architecture. However, the unfortunate history of the country did not allow the formation of an easily defined national entity. But Armenia has its own unique customs and institutions. And a lot of what Armenia is facing currently, how Armenians currently perceives the world comes from the history. The impact of historical memory in form of culture is becoming more evident since as Hovannisian (1994, 238) explains, “historical memory intensely colors the outlook of the peoples.” Moreover, “in the Caucasus, memories are especially long, and wounds close very slowly” (Hovannisian 1994, 238).

So, in order to understand the current Armenian-Russian relationships, it is useful to see how they were some time ago. It becomes more important if one remembers that among the issues necessary for explaining the cross-cultural relationships are the obvious differences in historical, geographical or economic facts of life that are later translated into a special pattern of priorities and concerns. In order to understand the concerns of present-day foreign policy of a nation emerging from the Soviet Union, it is necessary to understand the legacies of history.

Therefore, history matters, while discussing cultural patterns.

Armenian-Russian Relationships in Retrospect

As Hovannisian (1994, 262) mentions, “historically, the Armenians have prospered under Russian rule.” In the 17th century “the trade route from Iran to Astrakhan and up to the Volga River was referred to as the Armenian road” (Hovannisian 1994, 262).

Therefore, it is not surprising that many Armenian “political adventurers and idealists” in the 17th and 18th centuries considered Russia to be able to liberate the Armenian people (Hovannisian 1994, 263). In the beginning of the 19th century the Armenians were helping Russia get control over Transcaucasia (Lurie 1998, 66). Armenians “served in large numbers in the Russian armies” (Hovannisian 1994, 263). Even many of Armenians “rose up through the imperial military establishment to the rank of general, one of them, M. T. Loris-Melikov, becoming the chief advisor of Tsar Alexander II” (Hovannisian 1994, 263). Among the Russian generals, leading the Transcaucasian campaign, there were several generals of Armenian origin such as Valerian (Rostom) Madatov (Madatyan) and Vasilii (Berges) Beboutov. Armenian villages provided their detachments to help the Russian army. Naturally, as a result, Armenians expected to get acknowledgement in form of status of autonomy given to Armenia. But they did not get that status owing to circumstances beyond their control. As Lurie (1998, 66) explains, “in the end of 20s of the 19th century a rebellion takes place in Poland, and Nicholas I comes to a conclusion that any people in the Empire should be no more given autonomy.” Although Armenia became divided between several regions (guberniis), Armenians perceived the existing situation with complete tranquility since at that moment the image of the “ideal Russian” dominated (Lurie 1998, 66).

Of course, there were tensions between Armenians and Russians; of course, their real interests clashed several times: sometimes Russia was unjust; sometimes Armenians themselves provoked the negative attitude; sometimes there were tensions because of misunderstandings. During the following decades the image of Russia for the first time was

divided in two since the Russian government that demonstrated some protection until 80s of the 19th century changed the sign “plus” to “minus,” when, for example, after the Balkan war, as it is known, the Armenian province Kars was annexed to Russia (Lurie 1998, 67). Naturally, the reaction of Armenians was as usual emotional. The Russians were faced with the issue of emancipation of western Armenia from the Turks. But, unfortunately, this emancipation just remained as a hope...That is, during the World War I “the Armenians were duped into believing that Russia would emancipate western (Turkish) Armenia and that a national revival was at hand” (Hovannisian 1994, 263).

There was even a moment, when Armenians and Russians approached the point of mutual murders (beginning of the 20th century, period of governing the Caucasus by the administration of the Prince Grigorii Golitsyn) (Lurie 1998, 65). Thus, for example, “Armenian schools were closed for a time, and in 1903 under the governor general, Prince Golitsyn, the Armenian Apostolic Church’s properties were confiscated in an attempt to undermine Armenian national sentiment and bring the Armenian Church under state supervision and sponsorship” (Hovannisian 1994, 263). Therefore, as Lurie (1998, 68) explains, in the beginning of the 20th century the Armenian-Russian conflicts for different reasons were in a big quantity: attempt to close Armenian schools, attempt to get the property of the Armenian Church, attempt of notorious process against the party of Dashnaktutyun, permissiveness of massacres of Armenians by Caucasian Tatars (Azerbaijani) by one side (Russians); and a number of terrorist acts against the representatives of the Prince Golitsyn by the other side (Armenians).

Therefore, starting from the 19th century, when the Caucasus was annexed to Russia, “the Armenians, like all other indigenous populations, were subjected to sporadic Russification policies”—the so-called principle of divide and rule (Hovannisian 1994, 263).

Of course, the above-mentioned conflicts together with conflicts that appeared because of mutual misunderstanding and incompatibility of some elements of culture complicated significantly the relationships between these peoples.

However, the arrival of the new governor general, the earl Vorontsov-Dashkov in the Caucasus made the relationships of the Russians with the Armenians living in the Russian territory very normal; and once more, a period of protection of Armenians started (Lurie 1998, 68). Moreover, “the liberal policies of the Russian Provisional Government, which assumed power after the revolution and the involuntary abdication of Tsar Nicholas on March 1917, inspired renewed hope and optimism among the Armenians, prompting thousands of refugees to return to their homes in western Armenia” (Hovannisian 1994, 264). However, unfortunately, as Hovannisian presents (1994, 264), “such spirits were cut short by the Bolshevik Revolution in November and the resulting Russian Civil War, which completely isolated Armenia and allowed the Turkish armies to recover all of western Armenia and invade eastern (Russian) Armenia.” The quarrel with the western Armenians was solved only on the eve of the World War I. And at that time the politics of Armenia was completely pro-Russian (Lurie 1998, 69). But, in Turkey—the genocide, in Russia—the revolution took place. As the Russian armies were taken away from the Transcaucasia, Armenians were left to their own devices.

An illustration of such difficult relations is the treaty of the Bolshevik government with Mustafa Kemal, according to which Russia abdicated the regions of Kars and Surmalu. Again disappointment... “Mustafa Kemal sealed the fate of that state” (Hovannisian 1994, 264).

Indeed, “once again, however, Armenian interests were sacrificed to broader Soviet policy considerations, and in the Treaty of Moscow in March 1921, Soviet Russia recognized Turkey’s expansion up to the Arpachai/Akhurian and Araxes rivers, the loss of Kars,

Ardahan, and Surmalu (with Mount Ararat), and the award of Sharur-Nakhichevan to Soviet Azerbaijan” (Hovannisian 1994, 264).

As Hovannisian (1994, 264) puts it in the right meaning, “such historical memories make the Armenians believe that the current limited Russian support may be both conditional and temporary, always subject to sudden change in keeping with Russia’s foreign and domestic policy considerations.”

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Therefore, the Armenian-Russian relationships were not idyllic during several decades. And this awareness about their relationships in retrospect allows to understand the current psychological conflict of Armenians with the Russians, and at the same time to understand why it does not shake the image of Russia as protector in the consciousness of Armenians (Lurie 1998, 70). Indeed, “every time, after certain psychological upheavals the Armenians again were giving Russia its status of the protector of Armenians” (Lurie 1998, 65).

Moreover, while “understanding that they were offered up as sacrificial lambs in Soviet-Turkish relations, the Armenians nonetheless made the best of the situation and took advantage of whatever opportunities the Soviet system offered” (Hovannisian 1994, 264). The following examples may be presented: growth of the administrative, economic, and intellectual circles of the Soviet Armenia, the Armenian standard of living being higher than the norms for the Soviet Union as a whole in the 1970s, and “the increased confidence of the Armenians that found expression in their intellectual and cultural creativity and in the reevaluation of the entire history” (Hovannisian 1994, 264). Therefore, as Hovannisian claims (1994, 264), “a period of collective rediscovery was [already] in progress.”

Indeed, “for Armenia, the Russian connection constitutes an enigma” (Hovannisian 1994, 261). In the last decades, once more time Armenians were to be duped: indeed, “the most

pro-Russian of the Caucasian peoples, the Armenians felt let down and even betrayed by Mikhail Gorbachev, their anger for a time extending from his person and position to the Russians at large” (Hovannisian 1994, 261).

However, “after a period of intense anti-Russian sentiment, both the government and the people of Armenia are again turning northward toward the only protection that seems feasible” (Hovannisian 1994, 262). As one can see, “by and large, however, the Armenians are shifting back to a Russian orientation” (Hovannisian 1994, 262).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The world of today differs a lot from that of yesterday. Thus, the end of the Cold War has urged the international community to focus on local ethnic clashes around the world. At the same time, many authors in the field of international relations (IR) are currently suggesting that these ethnic clashes may be solved if mindsets (including political culture, identity, beliefs and assumptions) are taken into account as solutions are sought (Fisher 1988).

- I. Therefore, one of the conclusions of this Master's Essay is that *the culture and its component—perception—really play a big role in IR.*

Indeed, “culture is likely to be important in influencing values, world-views, and the structure of human relationships” (Ferguson 2001, 2). As Hudson (1997, 8, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 2) explains, “culture tells us what to want, to prefer, to desire, and thus to value.” Thus, for example, the culture can influence “varying patterns of individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, power distance and cultural complexity” (Hudson 1997, 8, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 2). And this influence is very pervasive. Therefore, in sum, it can be said that “cultural variables can be shown to affect a wide range of social, political and business behaviors” (Ferguson 2001, 2).

Moreover, “culture is certainly an important element which affects foreign policy” (Ferguson 2001, 2). At the same time, “international relations in its broadest sense are itself the product of the interaction of different cultures” (Ferguson 2001, 2). In this sense, “international affairs are also an intellectual and cultural phenomenon” (Ferguson 2001, 2), of which changing ideas of war and peace are important aspects” (Iriye 1997, 16, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 2). In addition, as Iriye (1997, 16, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 2) argues, “the internationalist imagination has exerted a significant influence in modern world history,” e.g., the vision necessary to create the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN) as well as hundreds of diverse international organizations (IGOs: International Government

Organizations and IGNOs: International Non-Government Organizations, which perform diverse international roles) (Ferguson 2001, 3). Other examples may be found in the Appendix A.

As an illustration Latipov (2002, 8) presents the following idea from the journal The Economist¹⁴:

Goering growled that every time he heard the word culture he reached for his revolver. His hand would ache nowadays. Since the end of Cold War, "culture" has been everywhere—not the opera-house or gallery kind, but the sort that claims to be the basic driving force behind human behavior. All over the world, scholars and politicians seek to explain economics, politics, and diplomacy in terms of "culture-areas" rather than, say, policies or ideas, economic interests, personalities or plain cock-ups. "Culture" as "Globalization" has become a widespread buzzword.

As Latipov (2002, 8) discusses, "we are on the threshold of passing of the "normal science" towards a "revolutionary science." Therefore, the IR should also reflect these changes. Currently, the theory of Huntington (1993)—the theory of "clashed civilizations" with the "emphasis on cultural dimension of world politics is probably one of landmarks of that emerging global process: transition from industrial world to information global society" (Latipov 2002, 8).

As Huntington (1996, 43, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 11) argues, "civilization differences can also lead to conflict." As it was already discussed, according to Huntington (1993, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 11), "conflicts in the future would be between civilizations, and along geographical fracture lines between civilizations" in contrast to wars of the 19th century that were mainly "wars between nations," or to wars of the beginning of the 20th century that were "wars between ideologies." As Huntington (1993, 24) claims, "a civilization is a cultural identity, and the highest, most general level of identity that includes elements of language, history, religion, customs, institutions, as well as self-identification."

¹⁴ The Economist is available on-line at: <http://www.economist.com>.

Moreover, he (1993, 25) specifies which civilizations existing today are the major ones: “Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African.” Therefore, any practitioner of international relations should keep in mind the following reasons presented by Huntington (1993, 25-27, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 11) and explaining why conflicts between civilizations will tend to grow, and why they are often the most intense:

- 1) Civilization differences, e.g. in history, language, culture, religion, are basic and real.
- 2) The world is “becoming smaller,” with more interaction among different cultural groups.
- 3) Modernization has led to a loss of tradition and identity, which is often filled by fundamentalist religious and national feeling.
- 4) The dominant role of the West has led to a response by other civilizations to strengthen themselves, e.g. the rise of Islamic radicalism.
- 5) Cultural “characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved.”
- 6) Economic regionalism is increasing, thereby increasing areas of competition.

Therefore, the serious implications for the future should be studied in detail:

For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with others. (Huntington 1993, 49)

This is especially important in the current world, which “has become borderless and networked” (Latipov 2002, 9). Even if there are a lot of criticisms concerning the hypothesis suggested by Huntington (1993; 1996), the IR practitioners should recognize that “Civilizations Agenda” is a driving force both for international studies and practical politics in every corner of the world” (Latipov 2002, 9). Although this issue of international relations is still debated currently and will be discussed in the future, we should accept that “the clash” theory after the “ideology” of the Cold War period and “cultural differences” are fundamental dimensions of world politics. But, at the same time, it should be said that the consequences of “the clash of civilizations” are not a new form of conflicts, war or violence that are an inevitable outcome of multipolarity (Latipov 2002, 9).

II. The second conclusion of this Master's Essay is that, *while studying cross-cultural relationships, one should take into account a lot of various factors, e.g., the factors presented in the Checklist by Fisher and discussed in this Essay.*

Different cultures influence the way actors (leaders or institutions) reach decisions in foreign affairs especially during times of crisis (Hudson 1997, 4-7, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 4). Thus, as Ferguson (2001, 4) claims, besides "individual characteristics and psychology, governmental politics and structure," individuals "must be affected to some degree by the differences in their societies, their historical experiences, value systems and language structures." Therefore, for the societies' successful interactions the "micro-cultures might be important" (Hudson 1997, 16, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 4), in addition to the needs of states, economies and civilizations.

Thus, any IR practitioner, while studying cross-cultural relationships, should take into account several factors interconnected with the culture. For instance, it may be recommended to concentrate on the following leading questions (Ferguson 2001, 5):

- 1) How do cultural differences lead nations to predictable patterns of interaction?
- 2) "Under what conditions would we expect culture to play a more important role in international interactions?" (Hudson 1997, 18)
- 3) Do "cultural syndromes" lead to predictable "propensities of thought, reaction, and action"? (Hudson 1997, 18)
- 4) Is the protection of national culture and identity itself a core "national interest"?
- 5) What are the dynamics of cultural change and how can this be measured, along with its impact on foreign policy? (Hudson 1997, 18)

Interestingly, even since the 1920s, "governments have often tried to use culture in foreign affairs, promoting their own languages, music, media and views overseas (this in the past was usually a promotion of "high culture")" (Ferguson 2001, 5). As Ferguson (2001, 5) presents, "it was thus recognized that there were cultural borderlands where different cultures interact, and of the usefulness of cultural diplomacy." For instance, Britain tried to promote

its own language and culture as “part of nation-to-nation diplomacy” to Malaysia by the operation of the British Council (Ferguson 2001, 5).

Moreover, the Cold War itself saw an extremely active phase of the use of culture in international relations since, as Iriye (1997, 151, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 5) explains, the “international power relations, defined, to that extent, international cultural relations.” Examples of similar use of culture in propaganda and ideological battles are present in the works of Morgenthau: Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1985), and of Popper: The Open Society and Its Enemies (1971), which “supported specific political and cultural views of how societies and the international system should operate” (Ferguson 2001, 5).

Similar situation takes place with international organizations that “have also tried to benefit from cultural diplomacy and by developing cultural internationalism.” Thus, ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) “itself provides a nuanced example of how trade, cultural patterns, and dialogue can mix to create a successful international organization” (Ferguson 2001, 6).

While dealing with the cross-cultural relations, one should, for example, consider the fact that “different societies took very different views on how models of this world should be constructed” (Ferguson 2001, 3). As one may remember from the Checklist (1988, 72), images of the international system and of its operations may differ; therefore, the images of different societies should be paid close attention. Thus, for instance, “China, in the imperial past, developed a system of Asian international relations based on the *tribute* system, with a core civilized area, surrounded by frontier states linked by tribute” (Ferguson 2001, 3). Or, another example: as it is known, “in Islam there was a recognition of a zone of peace, the *Dar al Islam* surrounded by a potentially hostile *Dar al-Harb*, the zone of war” Ferguson (2001, 3).

Therefore, while dealing with, for instance, the relationships between an Arabic state and China, these perceptions of the “world-system” or world society should be studied since the influence of world-view is pervasive.

III. The next concluding point of this Master’s Essay is that the *perception of Russians and relationships with them by Armenians, no matter, traditional perception or current one, is mainly positive.*

First of all, it should be said that the perception of the other world shapes international relations with that world. Therefore, while studying the relationships between, for instance, Armenia and Russia, the perception of each side about another one should be known. Therefore, besides studying the culture of the opposite side, any IR practitioner should be aware of how the opposite sides perceive each other. The image factor is, indeed, a very strong factor influencing the bilateral or multilateral relations.

Since the perception of the Russians and relationships with them by Armenians was and still remains positive, building friendly and beneficial relationships with Russia now and in the future is considered to be potentially possible. Moreover, this positive perception facilitates the Armenian-Russian relationships. Why? The history has shown that it is not easy to shake the image of the “ideal Russian”: this image of the “protector” is still in the consciousness of Armenians (Lurie 1998, 70). If it were easy to shake that image, this image would be fallen into pieces many decades ago.

As Hovannisian (1994, 271) summarizes, “the obvious conclusion may be drawn that history is at work at many levels of popular and official behavior.” When the Armenian government attempted “to turn a new page and to seek the normalization of relations with traditionally adversarial neighbors,” these attempts “have been generally frustrated as much by the reactions of those neighbors as by the modus operandi of the Armenians themselves” (Hovannisian 1994, 271).

Therefore, as Hovannisian (1994, 271) explains, “the historical record may demonstrate that there is no more viable alternative than a permanent, close association with Russia, even in the absence of a common boundary.”

Traditionally and currently, Armenians have perceived Russians and relations with them very positively, and this perception explains why these relations are feasible also in the future.

IV. The last concluding point of this Master’s Essay comes from the previous one: as the Armenian-Russian relationships in retrospect and currently were and are viable, *they, probably, will be based on friendship and alliance also in the future.*

Although there were tensions between these two people throughout the history, even in the last decades, still friendship and alliance are possible in their relations. For instance, as Lurie (1998, 70) presents, “there were always ebbs and flows in Armenian-Russian relationships: Armenians had to fight for the alliance with Russia; they had to forgive Russia again and again. Thus, Karabagh remembered the Kazak whips of 1905; Yerevan remembers the batons of 1988.” Therefore, these events occurred in the last decade were not for the first time.

Yerevan will, probably, create a new myth since Armenians are usually guided not by reality, but by ideal; and that is the secret of their long life. The secret of the Armenian-Russian relationships is that Armenians wanted to see “ideal Russians,” and they succeeded to do so even when Russians shot them.

As Hovannisian (1994, 266) mentions, in the mid-1990s “the disappointing results of Ter-Petrosian’s initiative relating to Turkey have again turned many Armenian leaders toward Moscow. The relationship is still evolving, but history has shown that Russia, with all its vacillation, remains a vital factor in Armenia’s security and future.”

“Armenians, as a nation, while being occupied by different enemies, wanted holly to see Armenia”; and they saw it; they created it out of nothing; they have a belief in heroism, and in response to genocide, they created a beautiful city-monument—Yerevan, which will win since it does not believe in reality (Lurie 1998, 71).

Currently, according to Tchilingirian (1997, 2), “Armenian foreign policy rests on three linked principles”: *security* (“since Armenia sees its immediate environment as hostile, and its foreign policy agenda is dominated by military and security concerns”); *balance* (“for historical reasons, Armenia prefers to take the initiative in building a set of balanced relations with all relevant powers, rather than relying on a single alignment led by another state,” thus, with both the US and Russia); and *pragmatism* (“Armenia is aware of its relative military and economic weakness and takes account of this in pursuing its foreign relations”; thus having as the main foreign policy lever its geo-strategic position). From this perspective, for example, “the August 29 treaty with Russia on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, in which Moscow committed itself to the defense of Armenia should it be attacked by a third party” is considered an important achievement (Tchilingirian 1997, 4). Therefore, “Russia is the key regional security player, and has proved a valuable historical ally for Armenia,” although Armenia, while welcoming the Russian security guarantee, “does not want to rely exclusively on Moscow” (Tchilingirian 1997, 4).

And in order to understand which foreign policies will be a success in Armenia, one needs to study the cultural and perceptual perspectives of the countries with whom Armenia wants to establish relationships. Why, not offer, for example, a course on the role of culture and perception in international relations in colleges and universities of Armenia aiming at preparing the future practitioners of IR, such as the American University of Armenia? Although culture is “no magic cure to conflict,” it is “a real force in international relations” (Ferguson 2001, 15).

To sum up, it should be said that “while a greater comprehension of the role the mindset factor plays will not be a panacea for resolving all conflict, it will help decrease the damage caused by misperception and misattribution of motives which, left running amok, compounds the difficulty in all international problem solving and conflict resolution” (Fisher 1988, 178). Indeed, although “mastering the gap between national mindsets will not necessarily bring peace and resolve all problems and issues,” it will “at least cut down the damage caused by misperception” (Fisher 1988, 5). It will help in international relations that belong to “the realm of uncertainty,” according to Hoffmann (1965, 134, as quoted in Rummel 1979, 11):

Let us imagine a large gambling place. Around a large roulette table stand players of all sizes and all ages. Behind them are their families. Depending on the stakes, and on the fancies of the roulette ball, the families’ fortunes increase or collapse. Sometimes one player dominates, sometimes the struggle focuses on two main rivals, and sometimes a great number of players share the bulk of the gains. Occasionally, the accidents of the game do not simply ruin a family but kill it. But the game never stops. Such are international relations. They are features, *par excellence*, of the realm of uncertainty.

It will help, for sure, in international relations since the “international relations revolve around an interplay of images” (Fisher 1988, 4). And, as the images of Russia and Russians have been mainly positive in the consciousness of Armenians, Russians should try very hard to ruin these images. Moreover, if the image was and is positive, it implies the feasible good shape of Armenian-Russian relationships in the future as well.

APPENDIX A

Examples of International Cooperation Trends during 1851-1945 (compiled from Iriye 1997 and Nolan 1995, as quoted in Ferguson 2001, 3-4):

- Creation of *Red Cross* in 1859 (and later on Red Crescent)
- 1885 International Institute of Statistics (standardizing national statistical data)
- 1888 International Council of Women
- 1889 International Workingman's Association (The Second International)
- The Hague Conference in 1899, met to strengthen international law
- Creation of 400 international institutions before World War I
- Universal Postal Union, created 1874 (standard weights and measure to aid international mail)
- Creation of Parliament of Religions (Chicago, 1893)
- Holding of 42 international Exhibitions and Expositions 1851-1914 (similar to World fairs, Iriye 1997, 30)
- Proposal to develop *Esperanto* as an international language (first textbook in 1887)
- 1910, Brussels, creation of *Union des Associations Internationales*, serving as headquarters for 132 "cross-national organizations" (Iriye 1997, 32)
- 1928 Pact of Paris, legal agreement trying to renounce use of force to end international disputes
- 1928 creation of World Association of Cooks' Societies (now has 1.5 million members in 52 countries, Iriye 1997, 173)
- The creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO constitution completed in 1945)

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