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Abstract

The Council of Europe quest for achieving peace by civilian means is backed by the democratic peace theory. This study aims at providing a conceptualization of the concept of democratic security in relation to democratic peace theories, and pointing to its practical implications for the Council of Europe policy. In major lines the Organization's policies are responding to the current risks to European security and consistent with democratic peace theory. The Organization perceives democratic security as a by-product of stability across the continent, and the latter as an effect of cohesion. 'Transatlantic security' is viewed as inseparable from the goal of achieving Europe-wide security. In this relation cooperation with other international organizations is deemed essential.

At present the concept of democratic security is diffused in all the spheres of the Council's activity. However, it is constantly evolving as a response to changing realities.

In order to carry out its mission more effectively, the Council of Europe needs re-adaptation of its working methods. Most importantly, sufficient financial resources must back its programs and projects.

Introduction

The concept of democratic security is of relatively recent vintage. The last decade has seen a gradual broadening of the debate on security, which along with its military foundations, is increasingly understood as including economic, political, and cultural ones.

The term of democratic security was launched by the Council of Europe at the 1993 Vienna Summit: the Council of Europe declared its commitment to the quest for the consolidation of peace and stability on the continent, and building "a vast area of democratic security" (Vienna Declaration).

The very inception of European structures after the World War Second was owing to the understanding that in Europe there would be the constant threat of tensions created by dividing lines of ethnic, social and economic nature, unless the European countries were involved in a multilateral cooperation. There was a need for a complex interlocation of European countries in different dimensions: military, economic, social, and political. A sort of 'division of labor' naturally evolved, giving each of the structure relatively well-defined field of action.

By its mandate and Statute the Council of Europe is the guarantor of human rights, pluralist democracy, and the rule of law.

As a result of the upheavals that began in 1989, and the lifting up of the Iron Curtain, risks to overall European security became more salient. The European institutions were provoked by the task of promoting peace in this volatile area.

The only European institution that could take up this concern without redefining its main ideals, was the Council of Europe. Its commitment to the goal of implementation and reinforcement of the rule of law, pluralistic democracy, and human rights was as if a 'ready-

made' answer to the tormented and unstable countries of East-Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

A consensus has developed among politicians and academics that stability in the region requires the consolidation of democracy across the continent. Built on the research and theory of democratic peace, there is a perception that promotion of democracy will enhance security.

By the Vienna Declaration in 1993, the Council of Europe officially confirmed its commitment to the end of democratic security in Europe, and closely linked to it, its policy of enlargement to include the East-Central European countries. To this end, it has converted from a 'club' of established democracies to 'a school of democracy.' Since then, Democratic security has been the doctrinal foundation of the organization's policy of enlargement and all its activities. In spite of this, a comprehensive definition of the notion is still missing.

This research has sought to explore the concept as it is conceptualized by the organization, taking as a basis the practical efforts and policies to the end of the goal of democratic security as perceived by the organization in its evolution since 1990.

Findings in the democratic peace research serve as a basis to assess the possible efforts toward diminishing risks to European security. This analysis is put side by side with the actual efforts taken by the Council of Europe, and their conformity is further examined.

In conclusion, the paper makes an attempt to bring the findings and implications of the analyses to the service of the Council of Europe efforts to the end of security. Several policy recommendations will be suggested.

I. Research Design

The **purpose** of this research is explorative. It aims at examining the place of the concept of democratic security in the policy of the Council of Europe since 1993 Vienna Declaration.

The following **research questions** are to be answered:

1. How is the goal of democratic security defined and conceptualized in the Council of Europe documents?

2. Has the Council of Europe been consistent with and practically committed to the ideal of democratic security since the Vienna declaration?

3. To what extent is the Council of Europe policy responding to the theories of achieving peace by civilian means?

4. In what ways has the Council of Europe changed to the end of democratic security?

5. What are the major deficiencies in the Council of Europe structures that need revision and adaptation for more efficient pursuance the doctrine of democratic security?

Methodology. The study was done by the method of comparing and analyzing Council of Europe documents, as well as historical and archival research of major legal and institutional changes since 1993. The emphasis was put on the study of the Council of Europe policy relating to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

The variable of political consistency and commitment to democratic security was measured by the correspondence of the Council of Europe policy direction to the democratic peace theory built on academic research results. The study of legal and institutional changes is bases on the same conceptualization.

The comparative analysis of Council of Europe documents includes but is not limited to the study of the Parliamentary Assembly recommendations, resolutions; Committee of Ministers

decisions, resolutions, final communiqués of sessions; CLRAE documents, secretary General's official speeches and declarations; as well as the Vienna Declaration and the Final Declaration.

II. Literature Review

The concept and the practical efforts toward democratic security are built on the democratic peace theories. Of approximately a hundred empirical democratic peace articles published and presented over the last ten years, all identify inverse correlation between democratic dyads and militarized conflict. Therefore, many international relations researchers have come to the conclusion that "widespread democratization will lead to a more peaceful world" (Thompson and Tucker 1997, 428).

In contrast, democratic peace theory has not sufficiently covered the much greater problem of intrastate tensions and conflicts (Evans 1994). Evans notes that in today's realities there is much need for a rethinking of the doctrinal foundations of security responses. He argues that 'Cooperative security' or 'comprehensive security' has to be given priority. The terms connote consultation, rather than confrontation, reassurance, rather than deterrence, prevention, rather than correction, and interdependence, rather than unilateralist" (Evans 1994).

Daniel Tarschys (1997, 9) notes, "Without pluralist democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in all parts of Europe, there will always be a risk of new confrontations."

It is now commonly accepted that "building security in post-Cold War Europe rests on more than simply configuring the military requirements of national defense" (Wolt 1999,142). According to Stuart Wolt (1999), a more comprehensive notion of security has developed, which

along with arms control and defense equally identifies economic cooperation, conflict prevention, and democratic governance as its essential components. Promoting the last of these has since 1989 been the express task of the Council of Europe. Stuart notes, "By promoting its core concerns__ pluralist democracy, human rights and the rule of law__ and by encouraging tolerance among different ethnic and religious groups, the Council of Europe could make a unique contribution to stability in the region, engineering a 'democratic security' that would complement the potential military and economic benefits of partnership with other international organizations."

D. Tarschys (1997, 9) is of the same view, considering that the Council of Europe should use 'its comparative advantage' in order to provide security in the region by "civilian means." The unification of Europe presents the Council of Europe with a great opportunity, which "the Council of Europe is in an excellent position to seize" (Tarschys 1997, 9).

Along with D. Tarschys, Diana Pinto (1993, 42) argues that enlargement of the Council of Europe should be perceived "as a way of positively 'locking' a country into an intergovernmental democratic network, with its binding international conventions and treaties, so as to protect it more effectively from its own antidemocratic enemies within." This view is consistent with John Oneal's and Bruce Russett's (1997) research findings confirming that membership to an international organization largely reduces chances of conflict both on intrastate and interstate levels.

Academic research on the Council of Europe efforts to the end of democratic security is scarce. One of them is done by Heinrich Klebes (2001). Klebes concludes, "the effort to reinforce security through the proliferation and strengthening of democratic institutions, the growth of democratic civil societies, and development of cooperation between states defines the

quest for democratic security." He further holds that the Council of Europe offers "the most comprehensive program of technical assistance and cooperation for the emerging democracies". However, he does not provide a conceptualization of 'democratic security' in relation to democratic peace theories, and does not elaborate on its practical implications for the Council of Europe policy.

III. Risks to European Security and the Democratic Peace Theory

The Council of Europe quest for achieving peace by civilian means is backed by the democratic peace theory. In order to later assess the Council of Europe official conceptualization of 'democratic peace' and the consequent policy line adopted to the end of democratic security, it is necessary to review the main findings of the democratic peace research, having in mind the recognized risks to European security.

The collapse of the Soviet Empire and the disintegration of command economies have been followed by the transition processes: social, political, and economic changes have been wrenching all of the former communist states. The parallel transition from state repression to relative political liberalization has facilitated the emergence of long-suppressed ethnic, religious, and political tensions. These tensions have become a major risk to peace and security throughout Europe.

The Council of Europe specifies the following risks to European security:

1. Serious and massive violations of human rights, including minority rights;

2. Major deficiencies in the structure s for the rule of law;

3. Aggressive nationalism, racism, intolerance, interethnic tensions and conflicts;

4. Terrorism and organized crime;

5. Social disintegration, disparities and tensions at local level (Tarschys 1997).

History apparently shows that these risks do not appear separately. They are closely related, and either accompany or follow one another. More specifically, interethnic tensions and conflicts can be viewed as the main direct major risk to European security, and one which is either caused or reinforced by each of the above specified risks. The situation in Yugoslavia provides a case to the point.

Ethnic tensions in their turn bear the risk of escalation and extension, thereby involving nations into interstate conflicts. The recent developments in Macedonia are illustrative in this respect.

As John Oneal and Bruce Russett (1997) rightly notes, it is necessary to look at the 'epidemiology' of conflicts in order to understand their causes both at interstate and intrastate levels.

The idea that democracy is an important cause of peace is an old one.[1] However, the proposition that democratic states do not fight wars against each other has become one of the most influential ideas in international politics only in recent years. The development of sophisticated analytical techniques have enabled to work out impressive empirical evidence in favor of the democratic peace proposition, which is reinforced by substantial theoretical elaboration (Ray 1998).

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[1] The most often cited and perhaps the oldest classical source of the idea is Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay "Perpetual Peace."

Notably, John Oneal and Bruce Russett (1997) has looked at 200,000 cases of peace, conflict and dispute[1] between pair of countries. Analysis of this information has revealed the following. Firstly, a very democratic and a very autocratic country were more than two-and-a-half times more likely to get into a militarized conflict than were two very democratic countries. And since the end of the World War II there were no wars between full democracies. Most of the civil wars and all the cases of genocide also occurred in autocratic or totalitarian states (Oneal and Russett 1997).

Secondly, if two countries were economically interdependent, they were again about two-and-a-half times less prone to engage in a military dispute than if they traded little or at all (Oneal and Russett 1997).

Finally and most significantly in our context, international organizations were found to reduce conflict in many ways. Some of them can actually coerce law-breakers; "all can mediate conflicts of interest, convey information and assist problem-solving, and socialize governments and peoples to common norms and mutual identities." Countries member to international organizations (most of them regional ones) were less likely to fight each other or threaten to do so (Oneal and Russett 1997).

When three of these influences__ shared democracy, economic interdependence and dense international organization networks__were strong, a pair of countries was 80 percent less likely to have military dispute than was the average pair of countries in the world (Oneal and Russett 1997).

Thus, proceeding from these findings, the Council of Europe as a regional international organization has the potential of positively engaging in the protection of peace in the continent at

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[1] He holds it is necessary to look at low-level disputes as well as wars, because most wars begin as escalated disputes.

least in two ways: first, interlocking its members into a legally and politically binding network of obligations; and secondly, consolidating democratic systems, thereby reducing chances of interstate wars.

Of approximately a hundred empirical democratic peace articles published and presented over the last ten years none finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between democratic dyads and militarized conflict (Thomson and Tucker 1997). As Gleditsch (1995) argues, the correlation between democracy and the absence of war is one of the strongest empirical results in more than twenty-five years quantitative research. He contented that a democratic dyad is a "near-perfect condition for peace." In this light the creation and consolidation of democratic institutions and the rule of law in each of the East-Central European countries and in the continent as whole would largely guarantee reduced chances for the emergence of any interstate conflict in Europe.

The democratization of the formerly communist states of the East-Central Europe was the major mission that the Council of Europe took up after 1989 and is still seized by. However, some critiques argue that the process of democratizing states largely increases their propensity to engage in war (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). However, Thomson and Tucker (1997) hold that neither their argument nor the evidence holds up well to close scrutiny. Their further research has found that democratic transitions "do not produce a window of heightened vulnerability to war participation." This finding strongly legitimizes the Council of Europe's engagement in the quest for democratizing East-Central European countries.

The international community can do much to prevent and resolve interstate conflicts. But the increasingly pressing problem of intrastate conflict has received much less attention either conceptually or practically.

While the risk of interstate war is steadily declining in the world, the reverse is true of intrastate war. One of the so-called zones of conflict" in the world today is certainly the East-Central Europe. And as Garett Evans (1994) holds, there is little evidence that violent intrastate conflict will decrease of its own accord in the near future.

In the last decade popular nationalism in the East-Central Europe, long suppressed by communism, is proving the dominant force in the new democracies of the region. Not only has it played a major role in the destruction of the communist empire, but it has destroyed the two multinational states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

Western Europe, either is not immune to the threat of radical nationalism. The continuos radical movements in Spain, France, and the United Kingdom provide examples.

In order to respond to this threat more constructively, it is necessary to "rethink the doctrinal foundations for international security responses; giving much greater emphasis than hitherto to prevention, as distinct from corrective strategies" (Evans 1994, 1).

Over the last decade, a more preventive rather than deterrent approach to security has gained momentum. This was owing to the development of the concept of *common security,* which shortly put means "achieving security with others, not against them" (Evans 1994, 3).   More recently the idea of *comprehensive security* has emerged. It encompasses the notion that security is multidimensional in character, demanding attention not only to diplomacy and political issues, but also to such factors as economic underdevelopment, trade disputes, social disintegration and human rights abuses " (Evans 1994).

The division of labor between the European organizations has naturally evolved in a way so that each organization has taken up more or less specified mission of handling with one of the dimensions of security. Thus, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Western European

union Provide military bases for security; The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has proved to be more specialized in conflict mediation, as well as economic cooperation. The Council of Europe is equipped by its mandate and experience to be the guarantor of human rights, pluralist democracy, and the rule of law__ the three pillars of Western political systems (Pinto 1993).

This comparative advantage of the Council of Europe is just the necessary input in the preventive strategies, increasingly argued to be the most effective and cost-efficient response to the threat to security in the intrastate level (Evans 1994).

The question is how an organization like the Council of Europe can practically deal with this threat? What dose the democratic peace theory provide as underpinning for its efforts?

Building and consolidation of democracy by a statist approach is not enough. Western parliamentary democracy may not necessarily be the proper answer in each case and may in some cases even lead to an escalation of the conflicts (Jonsson 1996).

In each of the new democracies in the East-Central Europe there are large national minorities. Even Poland, normally thought of as a homogeneous state, contains around 250,000 Germans. In every state bordering Hungary except for Austria, there is a large Hungarian minority. Bulgaria contains about one million Turkish-speaking Muslims (10%). The Baltic states contain large Russian minorities, while Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia contain large Gypsy populations (Bogdanor 1994).

These ethnic divisions create internal problem for democratic stability. If there is a tradition of 'winner takes all,' and political parties are primarily based on ethnic and religious differences, the result of even free and fair elections might be devastating (Jonsson 1996). As the experience of Northern Ireland has shown, the swing of the pendulum, i.e. the alternation of power from one

party to another will be absent. "where political cleavages are based on fundamental loyalties, the ethnic minority will be a permanent political minority. It will be permanently out of power" (Bogdanor 1994, 87).

The risk of tensions and conflicts aroused or reinforced by a 'paralyzed democracy' can be addressed if alternative ways of democratic governance are practiced. "The leitmotif of democratic stability" in multiethnic societies such as Belgium, Switzerland, or the Netherlands is the acceptance of power sharing (Bogdanor 1994, 87).

Some critiques argue that the unsuccessful experience of Northern Ireland in solving the problem by power sharing shows it ineffectiveness. They point to the Anglo-American approach to the protection of minorities, which relies upon legal safeguards for minorities: thus the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has the Commissioner on minorities; the Council of Europe has initiated the Framework Convention on Minority Rights. However, as Bogdanor (1994, 89) holds, while these are valuable initiatives, their effect is likely to be limited: "the solutions to the problems posed by minorities must be found in the political and not the legal kingdom." European experience seems to show that the best protection for minorities lies not so much in statutory provisions as in institutional instruments which assist the sharing of power."

There are two main ways through which power sharing can be achieved__ the electoral and the governmental. The electoral system can play an important role in protecting minorities in a number of ways. Proportional systems can do a lot to accommodate minorities. Systems such as those in Finland or the Irish Republic allow voters to chose between candidates of the same party. Such system is much more likely to allow for minority representation since it allows voters from minority communities to select those representing their community (Bogdanor 1994).

However, fair representation in legislature does not ensure minority rights per se. A federal structure of government may do much to protect minorities where they are territorially concentrated. Power sharing can also be introduced at the level of the federal executive. Switzerland, Belgium and Canada are cases to the point. As Bogdanor (1994) observes, decision-making under such government maybe slower and more difficult, yet the decision made may be more lasting and more legitimate. Consequently they may be more conducive to social cohesion and abatement of tensions.

Of special interest for our context is the practice of *personal federalism*. Countries like Belgium and Estonia have sought to adapt the idea of federalism to a situation of territorially dispersed minorities. The idea is that a state can be divided into non-territorial associations, comprised of members of a given ethnic community. Belgium combines territorial federalism with personal federalism. Community powers include cultural, social affairs, health and welfare. Among the countries of the East-Central Europe Estonia was one, which sought to adopt this method of providing for the self-expression of minorities. This approach is worth consideration by other states in the area, "for it allows minorities to unite with fellow-members of their community without disrupting the state" (Bogdanor 1994, 94).

However, minority problem cannot be resolved by internal reforms alone, since they may give rise to problems of irredentism. "There must be power-sharing *between* countries as well as *within* them" (Bogdanor 1994, 94). Institutional links should be established between ethnic dyads by means of which ethnic identity can be expressed. Inter-regional cooperation in the East-Central Europe is highly important for diminishing ethnic tensions and for the integration of new democracies in Europe (Bogdanor 1994).

Critiques often argue that power-sharing mechanism intensify rather than abate inter-ethnic differences and tensions. They support this view by arguing that power sharing contributes to group cohesion and organizational potential. But the latter has proved not to necessarily lead to serious interethnic conflicts, but rather help ethnic groups play a constructive role in conflict resolutions (Lijphart 1995).

Another serious charge against power-sharing systems is that they are not enough democratic. This argument is based on the fact that power-sharing systems are characterized by compromises often agreed upon secretly by the leaders of different groups. However, elite domination hardly ever differs in different democracies. The difference between majority rule and power sharing is that in the former case the elites compete, while in the latter they cooperate (Lijphart 1995). And cooperation is obviously the only thing that will allow peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups.

Alongside the mighty argument for power sharing, the democratic peace theory provides another not less influential point for building security by civilian means, that on the positive role of civil society.

Civil society is "the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared values" (Diamond 1994, 4).

And highly important, in our context, distinguishing mark of civil society is that it encompasses pluralism and diversity. To the extent that an organization such as a religious fundamentalist, ethnic chauvinist, revolutionary, millenarian movement seeks to monopolize a functional or political space in society, claiming that it represents the only legitimate path, it contradicts the pluralist and market-oriented nature of civil society…no group in civil society

seeks to represent the whole of a person's or a community's interests. Rather different groups represent different interests (Diamond 1994, 4).

Research has shown that civil society has unique mediating and democracy-building functions (Diamond 1994, 4). Some of these functions have direct positive effect on diminishing the chances for interethnic tensions and conflicts. Firstly, civil society is crucial for development of tolerance, moderation, willingness to compromise and a respect for opposing viewpoints.

Secondly, civil society creates "channels… for articulation, aggregation and representation of interests" (Diamond 1994, 8). This provides excluded groups access to power.

Finally, a pluralistic civil society tends to generate an array of interests that cross-cut and thus mitigate the principle polarities of political conflict: "As new class-based organizations and issue-oriented movements arise, they draw together new constituencies that cut across long-standing regional, religious, ethnic, or partisan cleavages" (Diamond 1994, 9).

Besides, civil society can contribute to peace indirectly by consolidating democratic institutions, rule of law and protection of human rights. Thus, civil society provides for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions. Civil society stimulates political participation. Most importantly, it generates opportunities for participation and influence also at the local level. "The democratization of local government goes hand in hand with the development of civil society" (Diamond 1994, 9).

A cursory examination might lead one to the perception that in the context of mitigating ethnic tensions the arguments made for power sharing on the one hand, and for civil society on the other, contradict each other. The articulation, aggregation, and representation of interests through channels created by civil society might seem to collide with the idea of group representation in electoral or governmental bodies. Certainly, this theoretical inconsistency

requires further in-depth examination and research. Nevertheless, the historical cases of combined existence of strong civil society and power sharing in Switzerland, Belgium indicate its practical feasibility and effectiveness.

IV. Comparative Analysis of the Council of Europe Documents: The Concept of Democratic Security.

Shortly after the end of World War Two an understanding developed that European security could be achieved by means other than military ones, namely by economic, political and legal interdependence. There was an assumption, albeit an intuitive one, that the European continent would be constantly subjected to tensions and conflicts unless European countries were interlocked in a network of economic, political, social and undoubtedly, military cooperation.

The Council of Europe provides a sound basis for political dialogue. From the very outset, the idea of democratic security, albeit not yet clearly delineated, was present at the rationale of this dialogue, and at the Council of Europe activities. Thus, the greatest achievement of the Council of Europe__ the European Convention of Human Rights adopted in 1950, for the first time officially stressed a correlation between justice and peace, and the observance of human rights and an effective political democracy: "Reaffirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the foundation of *justice and peace* in the world and are best maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other hand by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend…" (ECHR, emphasis added).

In the following forty year, the Council of Europe was seized by the task of promoting the ECHR, and creating legal and cultural mechanisms for its actual implementation. In this period the protection of human rights was mainly associated with the protection of individual rights.

The developments since 1989 changed the perception of fundamental freedoms. New risks to European security aroused the necessity of new approaches. The ever heightened risk of ethnic tensions and nationalism called for a special attention to the minority rights. Notably, all of the European organizations __ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, European Union, Council of Europe, and Western European Union__ unanimously recognized the importance of minority issues in the context of overall European peace and security. In the Charter of Paris adopted in 1990, these organizations declared: "Determined to foster the rich contribution of national minorities to the right of our societies, we undertake further to improve their situation. We reaffirm our deep conviction that friendly relations among our peoples, as well as peace, justice, stability and democracy require that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities be protected, and conditions for the promotion of that identity be created. We declare that questions related to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework" (Charter of Paris).

By the Charter of Paris, the European structures expressed their commitment to united efforts and close cooperation; and ascribed each of the institution its proper role in these efforts. They recognized the important contribution of the Council of Europe to the promotion of human rights and the principles of democracy and the rule of law as well as to the development of cultural cooperation.

These yet uncertain initial references to the idea of providing European security by civilian means and by political dialogue evolved into the more clear-cut concept of democratic security.

The term made its first appearance in the Vienna Summit of 9 October 1993, where the Heads of States and Government of the Council of Europe member states committed the organization to promoting the formation of a Europe-wide area of democratic security. By the Vienna Declaration they declared: "The end of the division of Europe offers an historic opportunity to consolidate peace and stability on the continent. All our countries are committed to pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity. Europe can thus become a vast area of *democratic security"* (emphasis added).

By the Vienna Declaration, the Council of Europe delineated the main dimensions of the ideal of democratic security as necessitated by the European politics and developments of the time. These were:

➢ commitment to pluralist and parliamentary democracy;

➢ the rule of law;

➢ the indivisibility and universality of human rights, including minority rights.

As mentioned above, the protection of minority rights invited the Council of Europe attention still in 1990. By the Vienna Declaration, the Council of Europe officially and openly recognized the protection of national minorities as an essential element of stability and democratic security in the European continent:

> "This Europe is a source of immense hope which must in no event be destroyed by territorial ambitions, the resurgence of aggressive nationalism, the perpetuation of spheres of influence, intolerance or totalitarian ideologies. We condemn all such aberrations. They are plunging peoples of former Yugoslavia into hatred and war and threatening other regions. We call upon the leaders of these peoples to put an end to their conflicts. We invite these peoples to join us in constructing and consolidating the new Europe. We express our awareness that the protection of national minorities is an essential element of stability and democratic security in our continent."

This understanding fostered the initiation and development of the Framework Convention of National minorities later adopted by the Council of Europe. It might be said that by the Vienna

Declaration, the Council of Europe adopted democratic security as its official doctrine. This event was the cornerstone, from where on the idea of democratic security has underlay all of the organization's activities, and by evolving and becoming more sophisticated, has prompted the direction of these activities.

The necessity to cooperate with non-European states and organizations to the end of achieving a democratically secure Europe was implicitly recognized yet in the Charter of Paris in 1990. "The New Transatlantic Agenda" adopted at the December 1995 United States-European Union Summit in Madrid explicitly refers to "a new European security architecture in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Western European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe have *complementary and mutually reinforcing roles to play* " (emphasis added).

By its firm commitment since then to constructively cooperate with these organizations testifies to the Council of Europe's official recognition of the role of 'transatlantic security' in achieving the European security. The idea of transatlantic security has remained an essential element of the Council of Europe understanding of democratic security.

The philosophy underlying the 1995 United States-European Union declaration was that "No single European or Euro-Atlantic institution provides all the requirements for maintaining transatlantic security. Each makes a unique contribution: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Partnership for peace, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Western European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Europe, and the Council of Europe all play important roles."

The common political purpose of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Council of Europe came into the public eye for the first time on January 30, 1997, when North Atlantic

Treaty Organization secretary general Javier Solana addressed the council's Parliamentary Assembly. Reiterating the tenets of democratic peace theory, Solana asserted that stability and security are built on the foundations of pluralist democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, leading him to pay tribute to the work accomplished by the Council of Europe within the "architecture of European security":

> If there is today general agreement on the fundamental importance of security ensured through the respect of democracy, it is because the Council of Europe for so long, has entertained the vision of a Europe united around common democratic values . . .. The Council of Europe has played a leading role in spreading democratic value and practices to Central and Eastern Europe since the political watershed of 1989. It has given a powerful incentive to the process of democratization and reform among Central and Eastern European countries" (NATO SG Address 1997).

In this sense, Solana concluded that North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Council had a "joint agenda," namely, developing a "common security culture" across Europe.

As for the cooperation between the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, they are already viewed as true "partners for democratic security" (Klebes 2001). Over the years, good cooperative relations have been established between the Council of Europe and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, notably through the latter's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw.

Extended cooperation to the end of Democratic security in addition includes recognized need for cooperation with non-European states. Thus, in 1996 the Committee of Ministers granted observer status to the United States, Canada and Japan and in 1999 to Mexico. Cooperation with the CIS extends to former Soviet Central Asia, in particular Kirgiztan, which holds observer status. Cooperation geographically extends even further__ South Africa, and Latin American states, such as Uruguay and Argentina, both of which hold observer status.

Since 1993 till now, by its activities and by its political decision the Council of Europe has conceptualized democratic security, increasingly more clearly identifying the dimensions and

subdimensions of the concept. These dimensions have revealed themselves in the process of practical efforts. In its turn, simultaneously the idea of democratic security has been refined and further developed as affected by the organization's practical efforts.

The study of the Council of Europe official documents since 1993 shows that the following dimensions have been identified by the organization as indispensable from the aim of democratic security:

1. Building local and regional democracy;

2. Development of civil society;

3. Development of professional and independent media;

4. Educating democratic ideas and concepts;

5. Providing cultural cohesion and pluralism by cooperation;

6. Allowing religious diversity.

The dimension of building local and regional democracy technically appears in the Council of Europe documents together with a reference to democratic security most frequently of all. In 1994 the standing Conference on local and regional authorities was transformed into the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe (CLRAE). It viewed its objective of promoting local and regional democracy as a response to the fact that highly centralized administration in East Central Europe could fuel tensions and be a great risk to security. In 1994 its first Session Recommendation 6 stressed the importance of *regionalization* in Europe in the context of democratic security. Since then most of the CLRAE documents stress a positive interdependence between regionalization and democratic stability in Europe.

Transfrontier cooperation is another sub-dimension of building local and regional democracy. Transfrontier cooperation is viewed within the context of achieving social cohesion,

especially among different ethnic groups; and within the broader context of overall democratic stability in Europe.

The Final Declaration adopted in the Second Summit in 1997 in Strasbourg elaborated on the concept of democratic security as perceived and implemented by the organization. This document implies that the Council of Europe conceptualizes democratic security in Europe as determined by 'democratic stability,' and the latter in its turn by overall cohesion (see Chart 1).

CHART 1. Democratic Security as in the Final Declaration.

COHESION ⟹ **STABILITY** ⟹ **DEMOCRATIC SECURITY**

Determinants:

*-Protection of human
 rights;
-Abolition of death penalty;
-Fight against racism, xenophobia,
 antisemitism and intolerance;
-Balanced representation of men
 and women;
-Protection of national minorities;
-Development of local democracy;
-Promotion of social cohesion;
-Combating terrorism;
-Combating corruption,
 organized crime and drug-trafficking;
-Legal protection of children;
-Combating violence against
 women;
-Protection of European cultural
 heritage;
-Education of democratic
 citizenship.*

The Final Declaration confirmed that this stability and consequently security could be achieved by the protection of human rights; abolition of death penalty; fight against racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and intolerance; balanced representation of men and women; protection of national minorities; development of local democracy.

Social cohesion as an important element of overall cohesion, and hence security was also stressed (see Appendix 2: Final Declaration).

New dimensions of the threat to European security and hence new dimensions of the concept of democratic security were implicitly identified:

➢ Combating terrorism in all its manifestations;

➢ Responses to corruption, organized crime, and drug trafficking throughout Europe;

➢ Protection of children and women;

➢ Improving the quality of life in disadvantaged areas (urban and industrialized).

Another important dimension of cohesion and democratic security is identified by the Final Declaration to be the promotion of cultural diversity and democratic education. This includes the protection of European cultural and natural heritage; development for democratic citizenship based on the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and the participation of young people in civil society; recognition of the role of sport in promoting social integration.

The Final Declaration shows a far more clearly conceptualized definition of democratic security. Albeit it does not (either dose any other Council of Europe document) explicitly ascribe these dimensions to the concept of democratic security, it clearly shows that the Organization perceives the aim of democratic security inseparably and as a by-product of overall cohesion and stability.

The Final Declaration provides a rather well evolved and sophisticated elaboration on democratic security; and serves as a point from where on the Council of Europe has increasingly defused the concept in all spheres of its activity.

The idea of democratic security received a stimulating boost through the Pact for Stability proposed by the European Union to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe with the backing of the Council of Europe. The Stability Pact adopted in 1999 in Colonge, noted: "We still strive to achieve the objective of lasting peace, prosperity and stability for South Eastern Europe. We will reach this objective through a comprehensive and coherent approach to the region involving the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the OECD, the Western European Union, and the regional initiatives" (Stability Pact).

The role of the Council of Europe in this common project of building security in Europe by civilian means was described as follows: "We welcome the Council of Europe's readiness to integrate all countries into full membership on the basis of the principles of pluralist democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Council of Europe can make an important contribution to the objectives of the pact through its parliamentary and intergovernmental organs and institutions, its European norms imbodied in relevant legally binding Conventions, primarily the European Convention of Human Rights (and the Court), its instruments and assistance programs in the fields of democratic institutions, human rights, law, justice and education, as well as its strong links with civil society"(Stability Pact).

In the context of the Stability Pact the Council of Europe developed the Stability Program for South East Europe together and in close cooperation with the countries concerned and other

international and regional organizations active in the field. Democratic security was taken as a given ideal for all these activities.

Thus, to sum up, it can be said that the evolution of the concept of democratic security within the framework of the Council of Europe has undergone three main stages (see Table 1). The first stage may be said to have started in 1990 when the importance of building security by civilan means was stressed increasingly often and ended in 1993 when the term of democratic security was adopted by the Vienna Summit of 9 October 1993.

TABLE 1. Evolution of the Concept of Democratic Security

	Stage I	*Stage II*	*Stage III*
	Adoption of the Doctrine of Democratic Security (1990-1993)	Conceptualization and Elaboration of the Concept of Democratic Security (1993~1999)	Diffusion of the Concept in All Spheres of Activity; Further elaboration; Reassessment and Reform in Working Methods (1999-present).
Key Events/Documents	*Vienna Declaration (1993)*	*New Transatlantic Agenda (1995); Final Declaration of Second Summit (1997)*	*Stability Pact for East Central Europe (1999)*

The next stage may be said to have lasted from 1993 till about 1999. This was a period of conceptualization and elaboration of the concept. The dimensions were increasingly becoming more delineated and clear-cut along with appropriate practice and experience.

The third stage from 1999 on is has been a period when the concept has actually diffused in all the spheres of the Organization's activity. Even where the term is not explicitly present, the concept underlies all action as the fundamental rationale. This has also been a period of further elaboration, re-adaptation of policy, reassessment and reform in working methods. As the next section will show, here is were there is a strong need for retrospective evaluation of policies and working methods and reform on the basis of a deep analysis.

V. Practical Efforts to the End of Democratic Security

Now the discussion turns to the comparative advantages and the practical efforts taken by the Council of Europe in the legal and institutional levels to the end of building European democratic security.

A considerable part of the practical efforts falls in favor of the Parliamentary Assembly. Firstly, the Assembly has become a unique pan-European forum for parliamentary dialogue on a full range of socio-political issues. Secondly, it has developed the procedure to monitor the democratic behavior of the member states in a comprehensive and continuous manner. Thirdly, through parliamentary democracy the Assembly is making a significant, albeit often insufficiently recognized contribution to reducing internal and regional tensions in the Council of Europe area.

From the very outset the nature of the Council of Europe as an institution was conducive to the efforts taken to minimize security risks. Parliamentary Assembly provides a permanent framework for political debate among member states. Parliamentary representatives not only voice their concerns in the Parliamentary Assembly, but also provide a feedback mechanism to national parliaments, where the Council of Europe positions and concerns can be discussed The democratic nature of the Parliamentary Assembly provides the first lesson to those who wish to enter the school of democracy (Pinto 1993).

The institutional basis for the enhancement of democratic ideals is further provided by the political dialogue among governments in the Committee of Ministers (CM), and among the representatives of local and regional authorities in the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe. The latter body was established in 1994, incorporating the former Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities. Its objective was demanded by the highly centralized administration in East Central Europe countries, inherited by the communist era. The CLRAE aims at promoting political, administrative and financial autonomy of local and regional authorities (Europa 2000). The Congress monitors the implementation of the European Charter of Local Self-Government throughout Europe. This body provides a working mechanism to decentralize administration in European countries, thus enhance social integration and reduce tensions at local level. On the one hand, national representatives of local authorities through the Congress advice the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly on all aspects of local and regional policy. On the other hand, they take back the ideals and the know-how of building local democracy to their countries, and ensure that one of the main commitments of newly admitted states—local democracy—be successfully fulfilled.

Over 180 conventions and agreements provide the legal framework for the implementation of the Council of Europe democratic objectives. The most notable of these for our discussion is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The fact that the signing and ratifying of this convention has become a necessary precondition for admission indicates that the Council of Europe is practically committed to the end of a democratically stable and secure Europe.

As discussed earlier, in 1990s the Council of Europe extended its traditional image of the protector of individual human rights to include issues relating to national monitories. The main threat in the new landscape of Europe was the rise of nationalism with all its consequences; discrimination against ethnic minorities upsurges of xenophobia and racism.

Ethnic issues have been under the Council of Europe attention even before 1990. Only then the focus was on integrating ethnic groups that grew as a result of migration. Thus, the Community Relations Project of the Council of Europe explored the issue and sought to achieve the integration by a policy of several dimensions. In 1990s a shift of focus occurred in relation to ethnic issues as inseparable from security. The Council of Europe has increasingly included member states from East Central Europe and Former Soviet Union, where ethnic problems arise because of the multiethnic nature of societies that are in the transition from authoritarian regimes. Consequently, strategies and corresponding policies have changed (MG_CR (91) 1 final E).

Given the salience of the issue as a great risk to European security, and the pressing need for decisive action, the understanding of achieving community cohesion and security by civilian means became more clear-cut. Bearing its roots from the strategies for achieving an integration of migrants, the Council worked out a more comprehensive multidimensional strategy for loosening ethnic tensions. The risk of violations of the rights of national minorities pressed for

drawing up a new protocol to the ECHR in the Vienna Summit in 1993. This protocol established cultural rights of minorities and drew up a new Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities, which entered into force in 1998 as the first ever legally binding instrument devoted to the protection of national minorities (Europa 2001).

This convention is often criticized for its limitations regarding to the definition of minorities. Nevertheless, it provides necessary framework for further deliberation and creation of mechanisms for its implementation.

The Council of Europe is inclined to define minority rights as linked to the rights of individuals. That is why since the adoption of the policy of protecting national minorities as "an essential element of stability and democratic security" by the Vienna Declaration, the Council of Europe has done necessary revision and restructuring of mechanisms to strengthen the protection of individuals. A step to this end was the restructuring of the control mechanism for the protection of human rights. A single Court, working on a full time basis replaced the existing institutions, i.e. the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights (Europa 2001).

The creation of the Venice Commission in 1990 as a consultative body in matters of constitutional law was a response to a pressing need. As the totalitarian regimes broke down and new democracies emerged in Europe, the need for a forum where fundamental democratic options would be discussed, experiences would be exchanged and impartial advice could be sought became clearly discernible. Moreover, the conviction had been growing all over the continent that democracy is not a mere choice left to the national decision making power but rather "an international necessity" (SG Speech 1). Just like respect for human rights and the rule of law, democratic governance cannot be a matter ignored by the international community.

Democracy, by demanding an effective participation of citizens in public life, is a factor of stability, peace and long-standing development. Democracy is thus becoming a key issue to international relations and consequently democratic achievements and perspectives increasingly condition foreign policies. This is all the more so in Europe, where democratic traditions, those that the Venice Commission so rightly called "European constitutional heritage", are the pillar of European integration (SG Speech 1).

The Venice Commission—the European Commission for Democracy through Law was devised and established specially to work as a sort of ' service providing democratic know-how.' It gives opinion of independent experts to the Parliamentary Assembly and CM concerning practical questions relating to building democratic institutions. In addition, it gives opinion and expert assistance to member states requesting such assistance with a view to successfully fulfil their commitments and obligations.

Since its inception the Venice Commission has largely contributed to the creation or amendment of the legal field of a number of East Central European countries by constitutional assistance and cooperation with constitutional courts.

There is no such thing as a single-minded approach to the problems of democratization in the work of the Venice Commission. Its advice is the product of a rich experience, acknowledging the existence of varying traditions, of different needs, of diverging situations. In a word, the high quality of the Commission's work stems from its capacity to understand and respect diversity and differences albeit identifying and respecting the basic values and demands of European democratic public order. Another characteristic of the Commission is its working methods. Democracy as a subject of international co-operation was a new phenomenon and as such it required new forms of co-operation and mutual consultation.

The Venice Commission offered these new forms. Its flexibility allowed it to co-operate with all kinds of authorities in member states, be it the Parliament, the Government, the Constitutional Court or the local authorities. More than that, it was able to involve in its work not only those who hold the decision making power in a country but also those who challenge it, i.e. the opposition, minority groups of any kind, occasionally various social. Its work very rapidly stepped beyond mere advice and became a real dialectic process of finding suitable solutions to difficult democratization problems" (SG Speech 1).

Another commission, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) is more directly linked to security issues, by dealing with the most threatening risk to security—racism xenophobia, intolerance and ethnic tensions. Vienna Summit established this commission in 1993 with a mandate to examine and evaluate the effectiveness of the range of measures taken by member states against these risks, to stimulate further action, to formulate general policy recommendations to member states. At present, the ECRI is working on a country-by-country approach, examining the situation in each member state and preparing country-specific reports with analyses and proposals of ways to solve the problems.

It has been continuously stressed that the Council of Europe should use its mandate and the possibility of providing a forum for political debate so as to more directly involve in security building. In this light, the importance of the Political Affairs Committee of Parliamentary Assembly comes to the fore. The enlargement of the Council of Europe since 1989 has presented the Political Affairs Committee with a series of new challenges. While continuing to play a central role in the examination of the requests for accession to the organization, it progressively focused its work on the questions related to democratic security in Europe. These include

peaceful resolution of conflicts, dialogue and mediation to resolve constitutional and political crises, as well as the search for solutions to further develop the process of European construction.

The Committee has been following very closely developments in the Balkan region since the outbreak of the war in the former Yugoslavia in 1991. It has dealt with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of monitoring the Dayton Agreement, and examining the country's request for the Council of Europe membership. The need to introduce genuine democratic reforms in the whole of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was stressed as crucial for any lasting solution to the Kosovo crisis (Political Affairs Committee).

In recent years the Committee of Ministers as well, increasingly underscores the importance of taking advantage of political means available to affect conflict prevention, as well as resolution. In particular the Committee of Ministers has focused on its potential contribution to the democratic stability in the Southern Caucasus, following the accession of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and cooperation with the Russian Federation with regard to the restoration of the rule of law, human rights and democracy in Chechnya (CM Statutory Report 2001). The dialogue initiated within the framework of the Committee of Ministers between deputies of Armenia and Azerbaijan is a significant contribution per se.

The Committee of Ministers also gives priority to cooperation with non-member states, within the context of reinforcement of democratic stability in Europe

Following the important developments that took place in late 2000, the Committee of Ministers continued to give high priority to co-operation between the Council of Europe and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In his communication to the Parliamentary Assembly on 25 January 2001, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers welcomed the granting of special guest status to the Yugoslav Federal Parliament as the first important step in the Parliamentary

Assembly's examination of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's candidacy for accession to the Council of Europe.

They also instructed the Secretariat to continue to provide the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the appropriate expertise and so assist them in establishing the necessary legislative and policy framework in this field, and to pursue its contacts with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities with a view to their full participation in Council of Europe directed Stability Pact projects in the minorities field.

As has been identified above, cooperation with other international organizations has developed to be an inseparable element of the policies toward democratic security. By the Vienna Declaration in 1993, the Council of Europe adopted the policy of complimentarity and enhancement of the mutually reinforcing role of international organizations.

Since this declaration, the Council of Europe has proved to be ready to develop joint programs with other organizations. In an effort to maximize the efficiency of assistance to the East Central Europe countries, the European Union and the Council of Europe have developed joint programs. The complementarity of efforts is especially useful in the field of training. To this end they have established the THEMIS plan for the development of law and the LODE plan offering technical and legislative assistance in different fields to assist the East Central Europe countries in the process of reorganizing local and regional self-government.

Another example illustrating that institutional interaction works is the cooperation between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe in setting up of the Human Rights Commission in Sarajevo (Tarschys 1997).

Still another encouraging cooperation is that between UN and the Council of Europe undertaken in Eastern Slovenia. The Council of Europe has assisted the UNTAES program in the field of human rights and culture (Tarschys 1997).

Now there is a tendency of shifting cooperation to a more express involvement in building peace and security. Thus, by Recommendation 1411 (1999) 1 the Parliamentary Assembly considered that the current developments in Kosovo and the inability of the United Nations Security Council to force the Serb and Yugoslav authorities to abide by its relevant resolutions clearly demonstrate the need for a more active role for regional organizations in preventing and solving conflicts. In this connection, the Council of Europe, by providing a legal framework for the protection of human rights and supervising the monitoring of the obligations and commitments stemming from membership of the Organization, can contribute effectively to strengthening democratic security in Europe.

The Assembly underlines that the Council of Europe can also substantially contribute to the work of the United Nations in fields where its expertise is well recognized, in particular as regards building pluralistic democracies based on the rule of law and respect for human rights. Accordingly, the Assembly re-affirms the necessity to step up the cooperation between the Council of Europe and the United Nations with a view to making better use of available resources and avoiding duplication.

Close cooperation to the end of democratic security is under initiation between the Council of Europe and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. During their bilateral meeting, Walter Schwimmer proposed that North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General George Robertson take part in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-Council of

Europe-UN tripartite meetings to create a conflict prevention network. In this connection the Council of Europe Secretary General noted: "the root of all conflict is the violation of human rights and the rule of law. The cost of conflict prevention is much less than that of their resolution. Investing in democracy and human rights is the best solution for restoring peace and stability in the Conflict-stricken regions of Europe"(SG Speech 2).

The cooperation with the European Union is getting more sophisticated. In 2001 the European Commission and the Council of Europe have initiated joint programs. Political issues of common interest, particularly those concerning South East Europe and South Caucasus were brought to the Committee of Ministers agenda, with a view to use the potential of joint conflict prevention and crisis management (CM Statutory Report 2001).

The driving force of the cooperation among these organizations is the growing understanding that the root of all conflicts is the violation of human rights, major deficiencies in the rule of law and democratic institutions. Assigning the role of providing expertise and mechanisms for the promotion of human rights, the rule of law and pluralist democracy to the Council in the project of Stability Pact testifies that this understanding is already firm among the decision-makers in the world's most significant intergovernmental organizations. Thus, all these organizations find themselves engaged in the common project of building a multidimensional security, notably the foundation of democratic institutions and practices across Europe and Transatlantic.

By its firm commitment to constructively cooperate with the mentioned international organizations testifies to the Council's official recognition of the role of 'transatlantic security' in achieving the European security. Most significantly, within the same context of 'transatlantic security,' in September 2001 the Parliamentary Assembly called to international organizations and individual countries to cooperate in the fight against terrorism. Notably remaining consistent

with its democratic security doctrine, the Parliamentary Assembly called for the understanding of political, economic, social and religious roots of terrorism (PA Rec.1534 (2001)). The Parliamentary Assembly remains firmly committed to its democratic principles, and stresses the need to bring the terrorists to justice by legal means, and not by hasty revenge.

In order to effectively complete its mission in this common project, the Council of Europe needs to bring its policies in line with the risks posing European security on the one hand, and democratic peace research findings on the other. Table 2 summarizes the major consistencies and inconsistencies of the Council of Europe activities in this relation.

It should be noted that the distinction between the risks in relation to theory and practice is only conditional. Actually, the efforts are obviously addressing the risks to security cross-cutting across the list in a mutually reinforcing manner. Thus, for example, efforts taken in the direction of civil society contribute to the mitigation of all risks ranging from deficiencies in democratic institutions, to interethnic tensions to disparities at local level.

All in all, in major lines the Council of Europe efforts are responsive to the day's security risks, and significantly consistent with the democratic peace theory. Still there are some gaps between theory and Council of Europe efforts, namely theories of power sharing and Council of Europe constitution-building practices. A separate in depth research is needed to find the extent to which power-sharing mechanisms actually do and potentially can contribute to peace in Europe.

In this light, the Council of Europe will have to rethink its traditional fundamental concern of protecting individual human rights. It would presumably have to face the dilemma of choosing between priorities: protection of individual human rights and thus purely western democracy, or protection of group rights and thus alternative democratic models of political power sharing.

However, manifesting more flexibility, and more trust on research, the Council of Europe can manage to overcome this dilemma. Case-by-case approach to each country and employment of sophisticated multidimensional analysis of various country-specific factors will yield more possibilities to hit the target.

TABLE 2. Risks to Security and Practical Efforts Consistent with Theory

Risks to Security	**Democratic Peace Theory**	**Council of Europe Efforts**
1. Major deficiencies in the structures for the rule of law; 2. Risk of nationalism, hence irredentism; 3. Risk of nationalism, hence interethnic tensions; 4. Intolerance; social disintegration, disparities and tensions.	-Intrastate democratic peace; -Regional cooperation; -Preventive strategies: power-sharing mechanisms; -Protection of human rights by legal mechanisms; -Civil society; -'Personal federalism,' hence importance of religious and cultural expression.	• Democratization in East Central Europe & FSU; monitoring • Efforts toward tarns-frontier cooperation; • Constitution-building; • Confidence-building measures; • ECHR; Framework Convention on National Minorities. • Programs for civil society—educational, consultative; • Great emphasis on cultural & religious rights.

Realpolitik plays a great part within the Council of Europe, as perhaps within any intergovernmental organization. However, in the light of the recently changed perceptions of

security, realpolitik will most likely convert from considering short- or medium-term interests to long-term ones.

As Secretary General Walter Schwimmer has repeatedly noted, investing in democracy and human rights is the best solution for restoring peace and stability in Europe. "The experience of the Kosovo crisis has once more demonstrated how disproportionately more expensive crisis resolution is as opposed to crisis prevention. The total annual budget of the Organization is about 200 million United States dollars, which is considerably less than 1% of the immediate cost of the Kosovo crisis…. Supporting preventive measures through the Council of Europe would save costs and casualties"(SG Address, Strasbourg 1999).

Thus, in the light of the new understanding of the concept of security, it would be more logical to transfer money from the military sector to mobilizing civilian tools in building security. International organizations should sit around a table to weigh cost-efficient spending in a complimentary manner, considering long-term benefits, as well.

Not only should the Council of Europe seek additional sources of budget revenues. Reform of working methods in budgeting and spending should also be deemed essential.

Given the steadily increasing workload of the organization, as associated with enlargement of membership, as well as of functions, the Council of Europe runs the risk of becoming a mere 'house of rhetoric,' if its programs and projects are not backed by sufficient financial resources.

Conclusion

At present, when the world is pursuing the quest for fighting terrorism__ a major risk to peace and security, the need for alternative approaches to security issues acquires new significance.

The term of democratic security was launched by the Council of Europe at the 1993 Vienna Summit: the Council of Europe declared its commitment to the quest for the consolidation of peace and stability on the continent, and building "a vast area of democratic security."

The Council of Europe specifies the following risks to European security: serious and massive violations of human rights, including minority rights; major deficiencies in the structures for the rule of law; aggressive nationalism, racism, intolerance, interethnic tensions and conflicts; terrorism and organized crime; social disintegration, disparities and tensions at local level.

Proceeding from the democratic peace research findings on the interstate level, the Council of Europe has the potential protection of peace in the continent at least in two ways: first, interlocking its members into a legally and politically binding network of obligations; and secondly, consolidating democratic systems, thereby reducing chances of interstate wars.

Intrastate level: While the risk of interstate war is steadily declining in the world, the reverse is true of intrastate war. One of the so-called zones of conflict" in the world today is certainly the East-Central Europe. The comparative advantage of the Council of Europe is just the necessary input in the preventive strategies, the most effective and cost-efficient response to the threat to security in the intrastate level.

In each of the new democracies in the East-Central Europe there are large national minorities. International community has made some attempts to create legal safeguards for minorities. However, European experience seems to show that the best protection for minorities lies not so much in statutory provisions as in institutional instruments that assist the sharing of power.

Alongside the mighty argument for power sharing, the democratic peace theory provides another not less influential point for building security by civilian means, that on the positive role of civil society. A highly important, in our context, distinguishing mark of civil society is that it encompasses pluralism and diversity.

The study of the Council of Europe documents since 1993 shows that the following dimensions have been identified by the Organization as indispensable from the aim of democratic security: building local and regional democracy; development of civil society; development of professional and independent media; educating democratic ideas and concepts; providing cultural cohesion and pluralism by cooperation; allowing religious diversity.

The dimension of building local and regional democracy technically appears in the Council of Europe documents together with a reference to democratic security most frequently of all.

The evolution of the concept of democratic security within the framework of the Council of Europe has undergone three main stages. The first stage may be said to have started in 1990 when the importance of building security by civilian means was stressed increasingly often, and ended in 1993 when the term of democratic security was adopted by the Vienna Summit of 9 October 1993. The next stage lasted from 1993 till about 1999. This was a period of conceptualization and elaboration of the concept. The dimensions were increasingly becoming more delineated and clear-cut along with appropriate practice and experience. The third stage

from 1999 on has been a period when the concept has actually diffused in all the spheres of the Organization's activity.

The Council of Europe conceptualizes democratic security in Europe as determined by democratic stability, and the latter in its turn by overall cohesion and perceives the aim of democratic security as a by-product of overall cohesion and stability.

The idea of transatlantic security has remained an essential element of the Council of Europe understanding of democratic security. By its firm commitment to constructively cooperate with regional and global organizations testifies to the Council of Europe's official recognition of the role of 'transatlantic security' in achieving the European security.

The Parliamentary remains firmly committed to its democratic principles in the current state of world affairs. Thus it stresses the need to bring the terrorists to justice by legal means. Moreover, it underscores the necessity to combat terrorism in the long term and calls for the understanding of political, economic, social and religious roots of terrorism.

All in all, in major lines the Council of Europe efforts are responsive to the day's security risks, and significantly consistent with the democratic peace theory.

Still there are some gaps between theory and Council of Europe efforts, namely theories of power sharing and Council of Europe constitution-building practices. A separate in depth research is needed in this relation.

Given all the above-mentioned analysis and conclusions, the following policy recommendations are proposed to the Council:

1. The Council of Europe should give greater consideration to academic research in the field of democratic peace, and should seek to maximally bring its policies in consistency with research findings.

2. The Organization should remain firmly committed to the goal of democratic security in the current realities of world politics, namely the joint fight against terrorism. It should take measures to further strengthen its standard-setting role by developing legal means against terror.

3. The Council of Europe should further its close cooperation with other regional and global organizations. It should seek to elaborate a changed perception of security issues, and recognition that a long-term efficient combating of terrorism, along with other major risks to security, can be achieved by enhancing the three pillars of Western democracy__ protection of human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law.

4. The Organization must seek to receive greater financial contribution from member states, in order to carry out its mission effectively.

5. Closely related to recommendations 2 and 3, the Organization should see in its agenda the task of achieving the transfer of a portion of resources from military sector to mobilizing civilian tools in building security.

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3. The Vienna Declaration (1993)

4. The Final Declaration (1997)

5. Stability Pact For South East Europe (1999)

6. Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1411 (1999) 1 "Relations   with the United Nations.

7. Secretary General's Address to the Parliamentary Assembly "The Place of the Council of Europe" (1999)

8. Secretary General Speech "Tenth Anniversary of the Venice Commission" (2000)

9. Committee of Ministers Statutory Report (2001)

10. Secretary General Speech "Prevent Conflict By Promoting Democratic Security" (2001)

11. Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1534 (2001) 1 "Democracies Facing Terrorism."

Appendix A: Vienna Declaration (Vienna, 9 October 1993).

(Excerpts).

We, Heads of State and Government of the member States of the Council of Europe, meeting for the first time in our Organisation's history at this Vienna summit conference, solemnly declare the following:

The end of the division of Europe offers an historic opportunity to consolidate peace and stability on the continent. All our countries are committed to pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity. Europe can thus become a vast area of democratic security.

This Europe is a source of immense hope which must in no event be destroyed by territorial ambitions, the resurgence of aggressive nationalism, the perpetuation of spheres of influence, intolerance or totalitarian ideologies.

We condemn all such aberrations. They are plunging peoples of former Yugoslavia into hatred and war and threatening other regions. We call upon the leaders of these peoples to put an end to their conflicts. We invite these peoples to join us in constructing and consolidating the new Europe.

We express our awareness that the protection of national minorities is an essential element of stability and democratic security in our continent.

The Council of Europe is the pre-eminent European political institution capable of welcoming, on an equal footing and in permanent structures, the democracies of Europe freed from communist oppression. For that reason the accession of those countries to the Council of Europe is a central factor in the process of European construction based on our Organisation's values.

…We affirm our will to promote the integration of new member States and to undertake the necessary reforms of the Organization, taking account of the proposals of the Parliamentary Assembly and of the concerns of local and regional authorities, which are essential to the democratic expression of peoples.

…We intend to render the Council of Europe fully capable of thus contributing to democratic security as well as meeting the challenges of society in the 21st century, giving expression in the legal field to the values that define our European identity, and to fostering an improvement in the quality of life.

Attaining these objectives requires fuller co-ordination of the Council of Europe's activities with those of other organisations involved in the construction of a democratic and secure Europe, thus satisfying the need for complementarity and better use of resources.

…Similarly, to foster democratic security we are in favor of intensifying functional co-operation in the human dimension sphere between the Council of Europe and the CSCE.

Arrangements could usefully be concluded with the latter, including its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and its High Commissioner on National Minorities.

 …Our governments undertake to bear in mind the Council of Europe's priorities and guidelines in their bilateral and multilateral co-operation.

With the aim of contributing to the cohesion of our societies, we stress the importance of commitments accepted within the framework of the Council of Europe Social Charter and European Code of Social Security in order to provide member countries with an adequate system of social protection.

In the political context thus outlined, we, Heads of State and Government of the member States of the Council of Europe, resolve:

- to improve the effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights by establishing a single Court for ensuring compliance with undertakings given thereunder,

- to enter into political and legal commitments relating to the protection of national minorities in Europe and to instruct the Committee of Ministers to elaborate appropriate international legal instruments,

- to pursue a policy for combating racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and intolerance, and to adopt for this purpose a Declaration and a Plan of Actio,

- to approve the principle of creating a consultative organ genuinely representing both local and regional authorities in Europe,

- to invite the Council of Europe to study the provision of instruments for stimulating the development of European cultural schemes in a partnership, involving public authorities and the community at large,

- to instruct the Committee of Ministers to adapt the Organisation's Statute as necessary for its functioning, having regard to the proposals put forward by the Parliamentary Assembly.

National Minorities

We, Heads of State and Government of the member States of the Council of Europe, have agreed as follows, concerning the protection of national minorities:

The national minorities which the upheavals of history have established in Europe should be protected and respected so that they can contribute to stability and peace.

In this Europe which we wish to build, we must respond to this challenge: assuring the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities within the rule of law, respecting the territorial integrity and the national sovereignty of States. On these conditions, these minorities will make a valuable contribution to the life of our societies.

The creation of a climate of tolerance and dialogue is necessary for the participation of all in political life. In this regard an important contribution should be made by regional and local authorities.

In their actions, States should ensure the respect of the principles which are fundamental to our common European tradition: equality before the law, non-discrimination, equal opportunity, freedom of association and assembly as well as to participate actively in public life.

States should create the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to develop their culture, while preserving their religion, traditions and customs. These persons must be able to use their language both in private and in public and should be able to use it, under certain conditions, in their relations with the public authorities.

We stress the importance which bilateral agreements between States, aimed at assuring the protection of the national minorities concerned, can have for stability and peace in Europe.

We confirm our determination to implement fully the commitments concerning the protection of national minorities contained in the Copenhagen and other documents of the CSCE.

We consider that the Council of Europe should apply itself to transforming, to the greatest possible extent, these political commitments into legal obligations.

Having regard to its fundamental vocation, the Council of Europe is particularly well placed to contribute to the settlement of problems of national minorities. In this connection, we intend to pursue the close co-operation engaged between the Council of Europe and the CSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities.

In consequence, we decide to instruct the Committee of Ministers:

- to draw up confidence-building measures aimed at increasing tolerance and understanding among peoples;

- to respond to requests for assistance for the negotiation and implementation of treaties on questions concerning national minorities as well as agreements on transfrontier co-operation;

- to draft with minimum delay a framework convention specifying the principles which contracting States commit themselves to respect, in order to assure the protection of national minorities. This instrument would also be open for signature by non-member States;

- to begin work on drafting a protocol complementing the European Convention on Human Rights in the cultural field by provisions guaranteeing individual rights, in particular for persons belonging to national minorities.

Declaration on combating racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance

We, Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe member States,

Convinced that the diversity of traditions and cultures has for centuries been one of Europe's riches and that the principle of tolerance is the guarantee of the maintenance in Europe of an open society respecting the cultural diversity to which we are attached;

Convinced that to bring about a democratic and pluralist society respecting the equal dignity of all human beings remains one of the prime objectives of European construction;

Alarmed by the present resurgence of racism, xenophobia and antisemitism, the development of a climate of intolerance, the increase in acts of violence, notably against migrants and people of immigrant origin, and the degrading treatment and discriminatory practices accompanying them;

Equally alarmed also by the development of aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism which constitute new expressions of xenophobia;

…Convinced that these manifestations of intolerance threaten democratic societies and their fundamental values and undermine the foundations of European construction;

….Undertake to combat all ideologies, policies and practices constituting an incitement to racial hatred, violence and discrimination, as well as any action or language likely to strengthen fears and tensions between groups from different racial, ethnic, national, religious or social backgrounds;

Launch an urgent appeal to European peoples, groups and citizens, and young people in particular, that they resolutely engage in combating all forms of intolerance and that they actively participate in the construction of a European society based on common values, characterised by democracy, tolerance and solidarity.

Appendix B: The Final Declaration of the Second Summit (10-11 Oct. 1997, Strasbourg)

(Excerpts)

We, Heads of State and Governments of the member States of the Council of Europe, meeting in Strasbourg on 10-11 October 1997 for our Organisation's Second Summit,

Convinced that the far-reaching changes in Europe and the great challenges to our societies require intensified co-operation between all European democracies,

Encouraged by the significant enlargement of our Organisation which has created the basis for a wider area of democratic security in our continent,

Having reviewed the developments since our First Summit held in Vienna in 1993, as well as the implementation of our decisions concerning the establishment of a single European Court of Human Rights; the protection of national minorities; and the fight against racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance,

Welcoming the achievements of the Council of Europe in preparing candidate countries for membership and ensuring their full integration into the wider European family, and underlining the contribution of the Parliamentary Assembly, as well as that of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, to supporting democratic development in member States,

- solemnly reaffirm our attachment to the fundamental principles of the Council of Europe - pluralist democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law - and the commitment of our governments to comply fully with the requirements and meet the responsibilities arising from membership of our Organisation,

- underline the essential standard-setting role of the Council of Europe in the field of human rights and its contribution to the development of international law through European Conventions, and affirm our determination to ensure full implementation of these standards and conventions, particularly by strengthening the co-operation programmes for the consolidation of democracy in Europe,

- confirm our goal of achieving a greater unity between our member States, with a view to building a freer, more tolerant and just European society based on common values, such as freedom of expression and information, cultural diversity and the equal dignity of all human beings,

- decide consequently to give new impetus to those activities of the Council of Europe aimed at supporting member States in their efforts to respond to the changes in society on the threshold of a new century,

- give our full support to the Council of Europe with a view to intensifying its contribution to cohesion, stability and security in Europe, and welcome the development of its co-operation with other European and transatlantic Organisations, in particular the European Union and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe,

and, on this basis, declare the following:

Convinced that the promotion of human rights and the strengthening of pluralist democracy both contribute to stability in Europe:

- decide to reinforce the protection of human rights by ensuring that our institutions are capable of effectively defending the rights of individuals throughout Europe,

- call for the universal abolition of the death penalty and insist on the maintenance, in the meantime, of existing moratoria on executions in Europe,

- express our determination to reinforce the means to prevent and combat torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

- call for the intensification of the fight against racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance,

- stress the importance of a more balanced representation of men and women in all sectors of society, including political life, and call for continued progress with a view to achieving effective equality of opportunities between men and women,

- assert our determination to step up co-operation in respect of the protection of all persons belonging to national minorities,

- acknowledge the fundamental role of the institutions of local democracy in the preservation of stability in Europe,

- decide to continue active support for democratic development in all member States and to increase our efforts to promote an area of common legal standards throughout Europe;

Recognizing that social cohesion is one of the foremost needs of the wider Europe and should be pursued as an essential complement to the promotion of human rights and dignity:

- decide to promote and make full use of the instruments which are a reference and a means of action for States and for the social partners, in particular the European Social Charter in the legal field and the Social Development Fund in the financial field,

- agree to review our legislation in the social field with a view to combating all forms of exclusion and ensuring better protection for the weakest members of society,

- stress the importance of a common and balanced approach, based on international solidarity, to questions relating to refugees and asylum

seekers, and in this regard recall the obligation for the State of origin to readmit these persons to its territory, in accordance with international law,

- recall the protection due to victims of conflicts, as well as the importance of the respect for humanitarian international law and the knowledge of its rules at national level, in particular among the armed forces and the police,

- affirm our determination to protect the rights of lawfully residing migrant workers and to facilitate their integration in the societies in which they live;

Sharing the concern of citizens about the new dimension of threats to their security and the dangers which these threats constitute for democracy:

- reassert our strong condemnation of terrorism and our determination to make full use of the existing machinery to combat all of its manifestations, while ensuring respect for legality and human rights,

- decide to seek common responses to the challenges posed by the growth in corruption, organised crime and drug trafficking throughout Europe,

- decide to intensify our co-operation aiming at strengthening the legal protection of children,

- affirm our determination to combat violence against women and all forms of sexual exploitation of women;

- support the efforts of the Council of Europe and of local, regional and national authorities to improve the quality of life in disadvantaged areas: urban and industrialised;

Aware of the educational and cultural dimension of the main challenges to be faced by Europe in the future as well as of the essential role of culture and education in strengthening mutual understanding and confidence between our peoples:

- express our desire to develop education for democratic citizenship based on the rights and responsibilities of citizens, and the participation of young people in civil society,

- reaffirm the importance we attach to the protection of our European cultural and natural heritage and to the promotion of awareness of this heritage,

- decide to seek common responses to the development of the new information technologies, based on the standards and values of the Council of Europe, while ensuring a proper balance between the right to information and respect for private life,

- recognise the role of sport in promoting social integration, particularly among young people,

- encourage understanding between the citizens of the North and the South, in particular through information and civic education for young people, as well as initiatives aimed at promoting mutual respect and solidarity among peoples.

Having in mind the need to redefine our priorities and adapt the functions of our Organisation to the new European context, we have drawn up an Action Plan. This document, appended to the present Declaration, seeks to define the main tasks for the Council of Europe in the coming years, particularly in the period leading to its 50th Anniversary.