

What Theories Explain the Rise of Euroscepticism?

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ABSTRACT

The predictions of Henry Kissinger regarding the imminent collapse of the European Union did not happen. Nevertheless, painstakingly strengthening Euroscepticism totters the very idea and the foundations of unity in the Old Continent. The reasons behind Euroscepticism are variable from country to country stretching from concerns about democratic deficit of the EU to fears to lose the national identity. In almost all the EU member states the so-called Eurosceptic parties are operating. Notably, some of them have quite coarse approach towards European integration thus rejecting it outright. However, there are also so-called soft Eurosceptic parties that disagree with the Union institutions on certain issues. Moreover, the overall turnout in the EU Parliament elections shows decreasing tendency, while the Eurosceptic parties further reinforce their presence in the hemicycle after each and every election. The analysis based on the survey data shows that in 2014 EU Parliament elections, the UK voters voted for the Eurosceptic parties not because of drastic opposition towards government policy vector, but because of dissatisfaction of EU politics, policies and polity. Therefore, EU-issue voting theory has the biggest explanatory power to elucidate the considerations of the UK voters during 2014 EU Parliament elections.

What Theories Explain the Rise of Euroscepticism?

Introduction

Henry Kissinger's prediction that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany would bring an end to the European integration did not happen. EU institutions and the European political elite were much stronger than Kissinger, and like-minded scholars may think. However, the rising Eurosceptic parties posed a constant threat to the tottering Union, undermining its legitimacy and hindering further integration. (Leconte, 2010, 1) Throughout the entire history of European integration, there were three landmark cases when the Euroscepticism recorded traumatic victories. The first was Norway's referendum in 1972 that hindered the country's further European integration. As a corollary, the EU lost one of the wealthiest European nations with vast hydrocarbon resources, a country with a constant budget surplus and a potential net contributor to the EU budget. The second major victory of Euroscepticism was the historical defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in France and Netherlands. More than 50% of the French and 63% of the Danes rejected the EU Constitution in 2005, thus halting any vision about "the United States of Europe." As the following events showed the reason behind the rejection was simply the word "Constitution." As Valéry Giscard d'Estaing truly noticed, the difference between the original Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty was approach rather than the content. He continues that the only major difference was that the Constitution was drafted by the people who had a mandate, i.e. parliamentarians of both the EU and the national parliaments, while the Lisbon Treaty was drafted by experts (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, 2007). However, the Lisbon Treaty ratification process was not smooth either as it was defeated in Ireland, thus creating a desideratum of another referendum. And, finally, the third major victory of Euroscepticism is Brexit when the UK voters voted for leaving the Union.

However, in-between those three major victories, Eurosceptic parties managed to reinforce their positions by gaining more and more votes after each consecutive election of the EU Parliament. Moreover, the overall voter turnout of the 2014 EU Parliamentary elections noticeably plummeted vis-à-vis 2010 elections. The purpose of this essay is to figure out the considerations of the voters during the EU Parliamentary elections. Because of unavailability of robust secondary data as well as compelling time and space limitations, the study will be limited to the UK voters in 2014 Parliamentary elections. The choice of the country is not contingent as the UK is perceived as the most Eurosceptic country in the old continent. In particular, based on the survey data the following two theories would be testified - “EU-issue voting theory” and “second-order election theory” which are presented below.

Firstly, the main reasons behind Euroscepticism identified in the academic literature will be showcased. It will be followed by the brief illustration of the nexus between populism and Euroscepticism. The essay will also present the types of Euroscepticism and the theories explaining the considerations of the Eurosceptic voters as well as the performance of the Eurosceptic parties during 2014 elections of the EU Parliament. Two surveys conducted before and after the 2014 EU Parliament elections in the UK would enable to check the veracity of the theories.

Methodology, Data Collection and the Limitations of the Study

The methodology used in this essay is induction, i.e. theory testing. Putting à la Conan Doyle, “It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has all the facts. Inevitably one twists the facts to fit the theory rather than theory to fit the facts” (Baldwin, 1997, 866). Therefore, I will first present all the analysis based on the secondary data survey results administered by the Sunday Times and Lord Ashcroft and then illustrate the relevant theories. However, there is no ground to argue that the findings of this paper are generalizable, i.e. might explain the rise of Euroscepticism elsewhere other than the UK. Hence, the findings only refer to the 2014 EP elections of the UK.

Understanding Euroscepticism: What are the Main Reasons behind it?

Euroscepticism became more popular during the recent years. Paul Taggart defines Euroscepticism as: “contingent or qualified opposition as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (Taggart, 1998, 366). It became the most popular definition of Euroscepticism. Remarkably, several authors anchor their papers solely on this definition (Leconte, 2015, McLaren, 2007, Treib, 2014, Wild and Treiz, 2014). His later study with Szczerbiak, breaks the mentioned definition down and categorizes it in two types: hard and soft. Hard Euroscepticism rejects the entire process of European integration. However soft Euroscepticism rejects the policies xxximplemented by the European union fully or to some extend (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004, 3).

In the literature there were many authors who criticized Taggart’s definition. For example for Kopecky and Mude (2002), this definition was conceptually weak and too broad. The authors illustrate that the definition does not distinguish between the EU as entity and the possible opposition against the process of European integration (Kopecky and Mude, 2002,

300). However, this argument is not pertinent as one who is against the idea of European integration and the philosophy behind it is unlikely to feel anything positive towards the EU. Indeed, for Taggart the opposition towards the EU is “either binary or absolute” (Taggart, 1998, 365). However, for Krouwel and Abts (2007, 255) Euroscepticism is more disagreement than opposition. Krouwel and Abts call Euroscepticism Eurorejectism in spite of the fact that in the academic literature and media many authors called it Euroscepticism. . At the same time, researchers divide the pro/anti-EU continuum into the following parts: Euroenthusiasts, Europragmatists, Eurosceptics, Eurorejectists, and Eurocynicists (Krouwel and Abts, 2007, 255). The research of Krouwel and Abts is bi-dimensional. The first dimension refers to dissatisfaction of the European Union. The second dimension refers to the popular understanding of European Union (Krouwel and Abts, 2007, 255). The authors claim that Eurosceptics, Eurorejectists, and Eurocynicists are mainly political events and are not against the EU. The authors claim that those people are pessimistic feel more betrayed and this is the reason they are mainly Eurorejectists and have a suspicious mind. Thereby the rejection of European integration or the EU itself turns to be Eurocynicists (Krouwel and Abts, 2007, 255). However in the literature many authors call this kind of behavior as Euroscepticism. Mischler and Rose posit, “Democracy requires trust, but also presupposes an active and vigilant citizenry with healthy skepticism of government...” (Mischler and Rose, 1997, 419).

Another major contribution of Taggart to the body of existing literature was the categorization of Eurosceptic parties into three groups: single-issue Eurosceptic parties, protest-based parties and established parties with Eurosceptic positions. The only reason d'être of the single-issue Eurosceptic parties is thereof opposition to European integration and the EU. UKIP party considers on of the most brilliant example of single-issue Eurosceptic party. The leader of the UKIP party is Nigel Farage. Protest-based parties are those who have never

been in power and place themselves against the EU, since in other issues also they are in disagreement with the governments. On the other hand, established parties are those, which, were in power, and “parties which have attempted to promote themselves as worthy of support because of their proximity to the government parties” (Taggart, 1998, 368). And finally, non-Eurosceptic parties, according to Taggart might have strong Eurosceptic branches. The most notable example is the Conservative Party of the UK. Taggart claims that countries having single-issue Eurosceptic parties are more prone to put EU-related issues to the referendum (for examples the amendments of the founding Treaties, while those who don't have single-issue Eurosceptic parties refer the issue to their Parliaments). Surprisingly, Taggart who is British, is perplexed to see Ireland, not having a single-issue Eurosceptic party, holding referenda on EU Treaty amendments. In fact, it shows that Taggart is not aware of the fact that such referenda are constitutionally mandatory in Ireland (Irish Statute Book, 2009, Ireland Constitution, Article 46(2)). Taggart also highlights that political ideology matters less when it comes to Euroscepticism. For example, in one state socialist party might be Eurosceptic, while in another country very pro-European. As a notable example, one may take Social-Democratic parties in Sweden and Germany, with the former being Eurosceptic (Taggart, 1998, 377), while the latter – Eurocentric. Furthermore, opposition towards the EU can be a corollary of various, sometimes even mutually opposing reasons. For example, Green parties might oppose the EU for not being supranational enough, while on the other hand, conservatives might oppose it for being too supranational (Taggart, 1998, 378). Finally, Taggart maps political parties on a cross table. On the horizontal axis is the party's stance on nationalism, while on the horizontal – communism.

As it is mentioned Taggart posits that opposition to the EU might have different reasons. Some parties, example New Politics parties, oppose the EU for not being very inclusive enough to third countries and for not tackling the sufficient number of issues.

However, right wing parties, especially the Neo-Fascist ones, might blame the EU for being too much inclusive. Putting in short, the closer party is to the interaction points the, the less Eurosceptic it is and vice versa.

Figure 1. Mapping of the parties.



Source: Taggart, 1998,380

The Literature review and existing data shows that the phenomenon of Euroscepticism was mainly discussed recently. (Leconte, 2015, 251). In the 1960s there were few studies, which indicate the absence of opposition to EU and the integration process. That was the reason that there was the room left for speculations as well as the democratic deficit of the process. This phenomenon force different authors to discuss the Euroscepticism directly linked with the democratic deficit of the European Union. Moreover, Euroscepticism was studied mostly in Nordic or British countries so it can be argued that the phenomenon of Euroscepticism has country-specific context (Leconte, 2015, 252). The result of Eurobarometer survey changed the overall picture. Those surveys shows that the phenomenon of Euroscepticism as well as the support of the European integration process is law not only in in Nordic or British countries but also in Central Europe, (Leconte, 2015, 252). Leconte argues that the support of the process of European integration is law especially in Austria and

Hungary (Leconte, 2015, 252). So in order to understand the explanations behind the phenomenon of Euroscepticism different authors reveal the following reason.

1. The term Euroscepticism. According to Kaniok community method is the only way of integration (Kaniok, 2009, 163). Moreover, there is misunderstanding between the terms of Euroscepticism and Eurorejectism. It is hard to explain also what pro-Europeanism and Euroscepticism (Kaniok, 2009, 163).
2. The “Eurocrats” as well as other people connected with the process of European integration de-legitimize the history of the European integration (Crespy and Verschueren, 2009, 380). The researchers claim that “Eurocrats” illustrate their own narratives. So they distract the researchers and academic literature that wanted to discuss the existing issues from sociological point of view. (Leconte, 2009).
3. European society as well as the history of European integration. The history of European society and integration process has so far been the history without society. It is argued that the history of Europe was predominantly presented from the perspective of international relations, especially in accordance with the tenets of realism paradigm (Kaelble and Straschitz, 1988). It is noteworthy to mention that even now when the European integration is on its apogee (single market, single currency (in Eurazone-19), Treaty articles about Common Foreign and Security Policy, etc.) there is no pan-European history textbook thus paving a way for each and every European nation to present his own narrative (if not facts!) in the history textbooks. Furthermore, as Loth (1989) and Milward (1992) posit, the emphasis on the integration processes is a relatively recent phenomenon in the academic literature as the integration itself dates back to the second half of the 20th century. It makes history of Europe preponderantly history of continuous wars rather than history of integration and is mostly

contemplated through the nationalistic lenses thus further reinvigorating national rather than common European identity.

4. EU itself! The technocratic glossary of the European Union, such as “EU regulations”, “EU directives” further embedding the convictions on lack of democracy in the EU, which was used very frequently, insists people to be against the integration. Furthermore, the dominating neo-functionalists believe that integration in one domain causes that in the others making to believe that EU is a giant administrative “monster” (Diez, 1999, 7). Leconte, citing the studies of the other scholars, states that only 40% of surveyed employees of the EU commission stand for federal Europe while 8% even think that the leadership of the future Europe should exclusively be vested in member states (Leconte, 2015, 254).
5. Democratic deficit. Some authors claim that EU officials are unelected technocrats yearning to supersede legitimately elected national politicians (Wilde and Trenz, 2012, 538). Desmond even posits that it is one of the key reasons behind Euroscepticism. (Desmond, 2010). In this regard, it is necessary to single out the following important counter-arguments: since 1979 the only transnational institution of the EU – EU Parliament is elected directly by the EU citizens. Moreover, with each new Treaty, the powers of the EU Parliament enhanced covering more and more areas to co-legislate with the Council¹. Nevertheless, the enhancement of the power of the EU Parliament did not trigger higher turnout of elections of the EU Parliament, but in contrary less and less voters bother themselves to go and vote in the EU elections. Second argument is that the so-called unelected Ministers in the Council are appointed by the democratically elected leaders of countries in line with the principle of representative democracy. Furthermore, the so-called unelected EU Commissioners were nominated

¹ Not to be confused with the Council of the European Union consisting of Heads of States or Government

by the Council of the European Union (heads of states or governments) and endorsed by the democratically elected Parliament. In consideration of procedural similarity, labelling the EU Commissioner unelected is commensurable with putting such label on a national minister. Last but not least, after the end of the term of Jose Manuel Barroso as the President of the EU Commission, the EU Parliament and especially the leading European People's Party (EPP), availing itself of the opportunities envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty (it is mentioned that the Council of the European Union has to take into account the election results of the EU Parliament (Treaty on European Union, Article 17, 7), proposed its own favorite candidate (*spitzenkandidat*), Jean-Claude Juncker as a President of the EU Commission. The Council of the European Union had no choice, but to acquiesce.

6. Knowledge of the citizens about the institutions of the EU. The problem of information and poor knowledge about European Union became one of the biggest reasons behind the Euroscepticism. Those people, who have less understanding of the European Union, are more prone to be Eurosceptic than people who have more understanding of the institutions of European Union. Moreover there is empirical data, which verify this hypothesis (McLaren, 2007, 234).
7. EU as an alternative for national problems. This hypothesis argues that those citizens, who are dissatisfied with the domestic government and find their Government unable to deal with the facing issues, especially in Eastern European countries, try to find the solutions of the domestic problems on the European level (Anderson, 1998, Vresse and Bomgaarden, 2005, Abts et al, 2009, 5). And visa versa. On the other hand those citizens, who support the national Government are more prone to solve the issues in national level.

8. Identity-based issues. During the history of European integration there were many reasons behind the Euroscepticism. However the identity-based reasons became more common in recent years. The main explanation of this hypothesis is that the ordinary Europeans dare to lose the national identity as it may be subjugated to European identity. McLaren mentions: “Europeans are still very proud of their national identities and still identify themselves as nationality first” (McLaren, 2007, 237).

In order to tackle the Euroscepticism there were alternative methods other than above-mentioned main explanations. Wilde and Trenz (2012) illustrate that

“The efforts of European actors to provide public justifications and to set standards of legitimacy for the EU are not simply responsive to increasing negative attitudes of the public, but also provoke particular responses by making new conflicts salient and compelling political actors and the public to take position on European integration (Wilde and Trenz, 2012, 550).”

Besides the aforesaid theoretical studies, a number of empirical studies were conducted to understand the motives behind the Eurosceptic behavior. An interesting longitudinal research was conducted by Lubbers and Jaspers was published in 2010. The data is unique in a sense that the same people surveyed in 1990 were again re-surveyed in 2008. The purpose was to see to which direction was the opinion of the respondents shifted over 18 years. The study found that the majority of the respondents became more Eurosceptic throughout 18 years. The study found that the lower educated respondents became much more Eurosceptic in 2008 than in 1990 compared with higher educated respondents whose reservations towards the EU increased relatively slower. Furthermore, the study showed that in 1990 Euroscepticism was not associated with a direct threat to national identity, while in 2008, the same respondents were mostly concerned about the loss of the national identity as a result of both deepened and widened integration. Respondents believed that further European integration is related

to and derived from globalization, which is a direct threat to their national identity (Lubbers and Jaspers, 2010).

The empirical study conducted by Meijers gauged the impact of the Eurosceptic rhetoric of non-governing party on the behavior of the governing centrist parties. The study is based on expert surveys that shed a light on party's position. The results of time-series cross-sectional regression models show that electoral success of the Eurosceptic parties may make the mainstream parties to be more Eurosceptic. Furthermore, the study shows that center-left parties are more vulnerable to the Eurosceptic criticism than center-right parties (Meijers, 2015, 8-10). Such analyses are crucial to figure out, for instance, the impact of the rhetoric Hungarian far-right Jobbik Party on the rhetoric and policies of the ruling Fidesz Party. It is argued that the frequent usage of Eurosceptic rhetoric by Fidesz Party and especially its leader Victor Orban are conditioned with a concern of yielding part of extremist electorate to Jobbik.

Sorensen compared Euroscepticism level in three EU countries – Britain, Denmark and France with the EU average based on Eurobarometer's survey. He found that the main reason behind the French Euroscepticism is materialistic reasons, i.e. for French Eurosceptics EU is not a beneficial project from the economic point of view. On the other hand, Danes are mostly dissatisfied with the level of democratic accountability in the EU, and for the Britons the crucial reason for being against the EU was the perceived threat to country's sovereignty. The study found that the decrease of democratic deficit of the EU appeased Danes, while on the other hand reinforced British Euroscepticism (Sorensen, 2006)

Types of Euroscepticism and the performance of the Eurosceptic parties during 2014 election of the EU Parliament

Euroscepticism became a buzzword illustrating public's dislike towards decisions made by Brussels (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005, 2010). The phenomenon of Euroscepticism is multifaceted and multidimensional (Boomgaarden et al, 2011). Two models of political support were classified by Easton (1975). The first one is the specific model. According to the specific model of political support, specific policies need specific approval while the second model is diffusive and expresses general treatment towards it. More EU-relevant classification was proposed by Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, 40). According to the authors, there can be either utilitarian or affective motives that support further integration. Utilitarian motives endorse further integration taking the cost-benefit analysis as the base. Affective motives, on the other hand, consider the ideological basis.

Considering above mentioned scopes Euroscepticism is classified in two types: soft and hard. Hard Euroscepticism is the full rejection of the idea of European integration process. While Soft Euroscepticism rejects only a concrete policies of integration or some certain points of a specific policy based on specific reasons or arguments. In other words, Soft Euroscepticism compared to the hard one is contingent and issue-specific (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003). Four major reasons can enhance the existence of both hard and soft Euroscepticism. Therefore, ideological, utilitarian, sovereignty-based and principled types of Euroscepticism should be addressed first. In order to get a more comprehensive understanding of the main features of each type, Sorensen (2005;8) groups them in four groups, based on the sub-questions of his survey questionnaire (see table below).

Table 1. Types of Euroscepticism and thereof characteristic elements

Ideology	Utility	Sovereignty	Principled
Dissatisfaction with the level of democratic governance	Lack of visible benefit	Lack of support to supranational projects	No support to membership
Opposing certain EU	Fears connected with	Rejection of EU	Outright opposition

priorities	integration	decision-making	to EU constitution
Being against the enlargement criteria	Detrimental of enlargement criteria	Integration-related fears	Not participating in the elections of the only supranational and democratically elected EU institution- EU Parliament

Ideological Euroscepticism comes from Ronald Inglehart's first works. Ronald Inglehart(1971) differentiates the level of Euroscepticism in war-torn post-war societies. He argues that the societies who are more war-torn are Eurosceptic. And visa versa post-war societies mainly are not Eurosceptic. The author argued that over time more people are supporting the European Union (Inglehart, 1971). However, after Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty the ideas of this author were rejected (Sorensen, 2005; 4). So, on ideological grounds both hard and soft euroscepticism is possible. When Hungarian far-right Jobbik party completely denied the EU it illustrated an example of hard euroscepticism, while Greek Syriza party's soft and policy-specific opposition to austerity policy illustrates soft euroscepticism.

Utilitarian Euroscepticism, which is the second type, is mostly based on cost-benefit analysis. EU member states would show the support of the integration process linking it with the growth of the economic level (Sorensen, 2005; 5). German philosopher Jurgen Habermas coined the concept of "constitutional patriotism", Habermas argues:

"Citizens will come to identify with a constriction like the EU, when they realize the infrastructure by which all their other attachments (local, national, gender, sexual, occupational) can be merged and prevented from coming into excessive conflict with one another" (Sorensen, 2005; 5)

The third type of Euroscepticism is Sovereignty-based Euroscepticism. According to Smith states are the ultimate players and decision makers in domestic affairs (Smith, 1991). This argument is somehow similar to the idea of Habermas (Seorensen, 2005; 6). According to

Desmond nations are fixed enough to be transformed to European level (Desmond, 2010). On the other hand the external war between federalists and inter-governmentalists can be considered as hard Euroscepticism. The most remarkable example can be the speech of Margaret Thatcher delivered in College of Europe in 1988:

“We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.” (Thatcher, 1988).

Principled Euroscepticism is the last type. It is more considers as eurorejectionism than Euroscepticism.

Out of twenty-eight states Eurosceptic parties gained twenty-three seats In particular, 28% of deputies of the EP (212 out of 751) are representing parliamentary groups of Eurosceptics ideology (Treib, 2014, 1542). It is more than as a consequence of 2010 elections of the EP.

While looking at the previous statistics of European Parliamentary elections one can reveal that the number of the Eurosceptic parties have increased during last years. According to EU commission a very obvious example is the EFD (Europe for Freedom and Democracy), which got 6.39% in 2014 (EU Commission). It is approximately 50 % more in comparison with the 2009, when it was 4,05 %. The most recent examples are Brexit, when United Kingdom voters voted to leave the Union, and the election Marin Le Pen, who was anty-EU. The places and the arrangements of the Eurosceptic parties are illustrated in the table below.

Table 2. Hard Eurosceptic Parties of the EU Parliament after 2014 Parliamentary elections

Radical left	Centrist	Moderate right	Radical right
Communist party (Greece)	People’s movement against the EU (Denmark)	United Kingdom Independence Party (UK)	National Front (France)
		Danish people’s Party (Denmark)	Lega Nord (Italy)
		Finns Party	Freedom Party

		(Finland)	(Austria)
		Order and Justice (Latvia)	Party for freedom (Netherlands)
		Party of Free Citizens (Greece)	Congress of New Right (Poland)
		Reformed Political party (Netherlands)	Golden Dawn (Greece)
			Jobbik (Hungary)
			Bulgaria without Censorship (Bulgaria)
			Sweden Democrats (Sweden)
			Vlaams Belang (Belgium)
			National Democratic Party (Germany)
			Right Wing of the Republic (Poland)

Source: Treib, 2014, pp. 1544-1545

Overall hard Eurosceptic parties gain 92 seats, however soft Eurosceptics won 120 places. There is political ideology issue behind it. Two parties have common attitude toward the issues like sovereignty and national identity. But on the other hand they still have different view on economic governance, immigration, and other issues.

Table 3. Soft Eurosceptic Parties of the EU Parliament after 2014 Parliamentary elections

Radical left	Centrist	Moderate right	Radical right
The Left (Denmark)	Five Star Movement (Italy)	Conservative Party (UK)	
United Left (Spain)		Law and Justice (Poland)	
Syriza (Greece)		Alternative for Germany (Germany)	
Podemos (Spain)		Civic Democratic Party (Czech Republic)	
Left Front (France)		Party of Rights (Hungary)	
Communist Party (Czech Republic)		Democratic Unionist Party (UK)	
Sinn Fein (Ireland)		Electoral Action of Poles (Lithuania)	
The Other Europe		Christian Union	

(Italy)		(Netherlands)	
Democratic Utilitarian Coalition (Portugal)		Nova (Slovakia)	
Progressive Party of Working People (Cyprus)		Ordinary People (Slovakia)	
Socialist Party (Netherlands)			
Left Alliance (Finland)			
Socialist Party of Latvia (Latvia)			
Left Bloc (Portugal)			
Sinn Fein (Northern Ireland, UK)			
Left Party (Sweden)			

Source: Treib, 2014, pp. 1544-1545

As it is shown in the table above no soft Eurosceptic party is positioned in the radical right side of the continuum, which means that radical right parties are mostly hard rather than soft Eurosceptic parties. In total, radical left soft Eurosceptic parties got 49 seats and right soft Eurosceptics – 54 seats. The only centrist soft Eurosceptic party – Five Star Movement got 17 seats. Notably, soft Eurosceptic leftist parties did not fare well as a result of 2014 EU Parliamentary elections compared to the right parties. The only exception was Syriza Party of Greece and its leader Alexis Tsipras (Treib, 2014, 1543).

As one may notice Eurosceptic countries are is most of the EU countries and thereof success does not depend on the economic indicators of that country. However, hard Eurosceptic parties mostly come to the EU Parliament from old members of the EU, i.e. Western European countries that are doing good economically. On the other hand, soft Eurosceptic countries come both from East and from West, from both new and old EU member states and get considerable amount of votes in both rich (the UK) and poor (Greece and Poland) member states.

Populism and Euroscepticism

In the academic literature many researchers argue that politicians who are more populist prone to imitate the malfunctioning of one institution on the whole establishment. There are two elements, which explain the populist ideologies. 1. Homogeneous electorate led by a single leader 2. Aversion against the political elite appealing to pathos and claiming that the system is inherently faulty as a corollary of relentless politicians thinking about nothing but themselves (Krouwel and Abts, 2007, 564). Ruzza (2009) categorizes populists-Eurosceptics on par with fascists, white supremacists, radical Islamists, etc. he names all of them uncivil society. He considers Euroscepticism as a movement rather than political strategy like other said movements, i.e. it is a national movement stressing national identity (Ruzza, 2009, 95). Populist-Eurosceptics, according to him, equate extremist and marginal part of population with “people” and covet to vindicate their actions on behalf of “people”. The reason of his explicit antagonism against populist-Eurosceptics is that the latter, in his view “marsh against Brussels” sometimes very violently, thus undermining the very foundation of democracy. Leconte (2015, 255) shares the view of Ruzza that populism undermines the foundations of European integration. She addresses the point from discursive viewpoint. She argues that instead of being other to democracy, populism is consubstantial to it. She further argues that populists avail themselves of the fact that EU lacks democratic legitimacy. In particular, in academic literature it is argued that EU is often seen as polity without politics where there is no government and opposition (Leconte, 2015, 256).

Why Mainly Political Reasons?

One may argue that alongside with political reasons politicians appeal to economic arguments to justify their stance on the EU and that is true. The most salient example is


the strong obsession of Nigel Farage and likeminded politicians with migration flows. However, academia people in their attempt to identify the possible reasons behind Euroscepticism do not link it with economy. It will be shown that the reason is that pundits think intuitively-hypothetically and try to be objective. While thinking intuitively it is easy to understand that European integration is economically beneficial for the member states of the EU. I will firstly try to justify this statement intuitively-hypothetically and afterwards invoke a few studies conducted by the others. I will try to illustrate that migration flows are unlikely to be a threat to national identity in the EU countries including the UK.


Rome Treaty was a free trade agreement among six states and in 1967 they introduced a single external tariff. The reason is that free trade agreements are unstable in reality. The country (countries) that set the lowest tariff would be better off at the expense of the others since product from third countries (if transport-costs don't outweigh the possible gains) will enter to country with low tariff. Thus, country with higher tariff would not only be unable to protect its producers, but also would not gain tariff revenue. Indeed, the so-called rule of "country of origin" might be applied. However, in this case country with lower tariff, if it is more competitive, will still benefit as its producers might compensate losses in domestic market with more export to partner countries and the government is likely to get high tariff revenue since the outside world, in all other circumstances being equal will be more willing to trade with low-tariff country. Of course the more are the assumptions the more room is left for speculations. Customs union is second best option to completely free trade with everyone since it might create welfare loss, i.e. inefficient allocation of resources.

Petersen et al argue that EU integration had positive growth effects for all the countries of the EU. Only in case of Greece in 1992 integration-caused growth effects were

more than in 2012 (Petersen et al, 2014). The article is based on empirical data and regression analysis. Hence, it is really difficult to argue that austerity policies advocated by neo-liberalist theorists increased Eurosceptic moods among population. Furthermore, Neueder argues that 2004 enlargement was beneficial both sides. It is beneficial first of all for German labor market since the supply is low and the migrants are associated with additional growth effect. Furthermore, it is argued that the border regions of Germany with Czech Republic are sparsely populated hence enlargement was not fraught with job loss for German people living in regions adjacent to Czech Republic (Neuder, 2003, 191-193).

The graph below shows that the number of the EU workers residing in another EU country is less than 3%.





Source: EU Commission, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-115_en.htm

The indices above illustrate that although the free movement of people is guaranteed under Treaty (Article 46 of the TFEU prescribes to abolish all kind of administrative barriers to freedom of movement) and notwithstanding to the fact that the CJEU established very robust case law to prevent any violation of it the “border effect” still remains significant, i.e. nationals of the Member States are less enthusiastic to work outside the Member State because of linguistic and cultural differences.

Analysis of the considerations of the UK voters during 2014 EU Parliament elections

The analysis is mainly predicated upon the surveys administered by Lord Ashcroft, a backbencher² (2014) and YouGov/Sunday Times (2014). The peculiarity of Archson’s survey is that voters could choose multiple answers at the same time, which is why he divided them into three groups- large part, small part, no part. As it is mentioned above the purpose of the

² A parliamentarian, who does not hold any office in government or opposition and who seats behind the front benches in the House of Commons.

survey was to unearth the motives and considerations of UK voters participated in 2014 Parliamentary elections. In particular, YouGov/Sunday Times is pre-election survey, while Lord Ashcroft - post election. Interestingly, before elections only 25% of the voters were willing to vote for the main Eurosceptic party, the UKIP (YouGov/Sunday Times, 2014, 1) while after the elections 28% (Ashcroft, 2014, 5). Moreover, before elections although people mostly tended to believe that then incumbent Prime Minister (Cameron) is not faring well, the approval records of the other leaders were even lower, except Nigel Farage, UKIP leader whose rating was the highest – 53% (YouGov/Sunday Times, 2014, 5-6). Interestingly, voters were well informed about UKIP’s policies and believe regarding European affairs, but little informed about how the latter views the solution of domestic affairs. More importantly, 39 % of respondents illustrate that most of the leaders of UKIP party did not want UK’s membership and were unhappy of that. The second reason was migration level (22%). Lord Archson survey (2014, 7) shows that the voters primarily considers party’s stance on the EU (63%). However, when it comes to the UKIP, the figure is even higher – 79%, while only 48% stressed the importance of party’s stance on domestic affairs (Archson, 2014, 11). The table below shows the consideration behind the large part of the voters who voted for UKIP (as it is stated respondents could choose more than one answer, for example to the question “How many, if any, of the following reasons applied to why you voted for” respondent could have marked both “they had the best approach to Europe” and “they had best leader nationally”, so the sum is not expected to be 100%).

Table 4. How many, if any, of the following reasons applied to why you voted for

They had the best policy on national issues	48%
They had the best leader nationally	31%
They had the best approach to Europe	79%
They are the party you'd like to win the next General Election nationally	34%

To send a message that you are unhappy with the party you usually support	60%
As a general protest that I'm unhappy with all established political parties at the moment	62%

Source: <http://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/LORD-ASHCROFT-POLLS-Post-Euro-Election-Poll-Summary-May-2014.pdf>

As it is evident from the table above, the primary reason for the voters to vote for the UKIP party is their approach to EU-related issues. Another question asked to point out the single most important issue that the voters took into account while voting. The table below illustrates the results of the UKIP voters during 2014 Parliamentary elections.

Table 5. What will be the most important issue in determining which party you vote for in the next UK General Election due to be held in May 2015?

Europe/EU	39%
Immigration	25%
Economy/jobs	14%
Poverty/inequality	2%
Taxes	2%
Cost of living	4%
Other	14%

Source: <http://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/LORD-ASHCROFT-POLLS-Post-Euro-Election-Poll-Summary-May-2014.pdf>

The table above shows that “EU opposition” and “anti-immigration” are the flagships of the UKIP. Its electorate mainly consists of those voters from whom EU and EU-associated migration flaws are critical.

To crown, it is shown that the majority of the UK voters who voted for UKIP during 2014 elections of the EP prioritizes EU-related issues. The reasons behind dissatisfaction with the EU are illustrated above. However, both of the surveys lack data to enable us to showcase

which of the reasons in particular matters the most. Nevertheless, data completely suffices to test the validity of the theories formulated below.

Theories Explaining Euroscepticism

Among many theories in academic literature two of them have been chosen in order to explain the Euroscepticism. The first theory is second-order elections theory. Reif and Schmit (1980) formulated the theory and after that it was elaborated and discussed by Marsh and Mikhaylov (2010). The authors argue that the European Parliamentary elections are secondary. The explanation of this hypothesis is that the candidates who were nominated as candidates for the European Union Parliament are different but the idea, which leads them is the same. Most of the candidates did not discuss the national issues thus getting to the point that people ignore the European agenda and were indifferent to their competences on the Union level. So most of the voters voted as if they would have voted in national level elections. In addition in 2012 European Parliamentary elections, the pro-EU party of Holland got more votes than in 2014 European Parliamentary elections. The party lost 27 percent in 2014. The main reason behind that was the dissatisfaction of the voters of the issues not related to the European Union (Treib, 2014; 1547).

The second theory, which explains the rise of Euroscepticism was developed in response to second-order elections theory (Vries et al 2011). The main point of EU-issue voting theory is that the voters are not satisfied with the policies implemented by the European Union. The reason is not linked to the dissatisfaction of national government work. One of the best examples is United Kingdom election in 2014 when voters voted for United

Kingdom Independent Party, which mostly took into account the EU-related issues (Treib, 2014; 1547).

Conclusion

Euroscepticism is a buzzword used to describe a complex phenomenon. It is both multi-layered and multi-faceted. One may aver that it increased hand-in-hand with consecutive EU enlargements. Scholars mostly single out eight reasons that explain the rise of Euroscepticism in the EU. However, the most discussed reasons are identity-related issue and the democratic legitimacy of the EU. It should be emphasized that the case studies discussed above link Euroscepticism with the phobia from rising globalization, which is fraught with the loss of national identity. Furthermore, Euroscepticism is closely connected with populism as populist leaders speculate national identity issues and economic factors to demonize the EU thus securing the support of the Eurosceptic electorate. In addition, although economic factors are very much speculated, the studies show that the furthering of the European integration was overall economically beneficial for all the participating nations.

The reasons that explain the rise of Euroscepticism are grouped in two major theories – EU-issue voting theory and second-order elections theory. The first one incorporates all the reasons that are intertwined with the politics, policies and polity of the EU. The second one discusses the EU as a proxy of the national politics. The veracity of the theories was checked based on the survey data of 2014 Parliamentary elections of the UK. In particular, surveys conducted both before and after the elections were used. It was proven that the reasons behind the support to UKIP party are not linked with the protest/dissatisfaction with the leading party of the UK. It was mainly because the voters are not satisfied with the European Union, and the European Union has a huge influence of on the domestic politics of the United Kingdom. Hence, the theory that explains the

behavior of the UK voters during 2014 parliamentary elections is the EU-issue voting theory. Consequently, second-order elections theory is rejected. However, there is no ground to generalize the findings to other countries. Further research may show what theory might best explain the considerations of the UK voters during the Brexit referendum. Furthermore, survey conducted throughout the EU in an application of the same methodology would enable to test the mentioned theories on the level of the EU.

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