

American University of Armenia

**United States – Russia Relations during and after the Cold War: Has a New
Cold War Emerged?**

A MASTER’S ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE
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BY

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Abstract

The Master's Essay explores the relations between the United States and Russia during and after the Cold War in order to find out if a New Cold War has emerged. The essay uses the theory of classical realism to explain US – Russia relations during the Cold War and the theory of structural realism to explain the relations between these two countries after the Cold War. The theory of constructivism explains the difference of identities between Russia and the United States of America. The essay explores the world system and political conditions during and after the Cold War, provides evidence on world nuclear powers, the polarity of the world, intervention policies of the United States, the involvement of Russia and the United States in the Middle East, in Syrian and Ukrainian crises. The essay gives deep and comprehensive analysis of the US – Russia relations during both periods by linking and synthesizing the literature review, theory and evidence parts and concludes that the confrontation between Russia and the United States has not ended and a New Cold War has started.

Introduction

The relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America during the Cold War were a curious enigma. In the bipolar world system dominated by these two superpowers antagonism was persistent between the East and the West. The enmity generated strong competition in almost every domain and was accompanied by intense nuclear arms race, space exploration, economic and technological race, ideological rivalry, spread of spheres of influence and outburst of minor wars which took place outside the territory of the USA and USSR.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact the Cold War officially ended between the two superpowers. After these events the United States remained the only superpower in the world until Russia, China and other states began to develop and emerged as a menace to the unipolar predominance of the United States. Despite the end of the Cold War, the antagonism between Russia and the United States has not been eliminated. They continued to perceive each other as a threat because of their dissimilar identities and their desire to be dominating powers in the world. This essay aims to find out if a New Cold War has emerged between Russia and the United States, and if it has, when it has started to develop and why it is considered a New Cold War and not the continuation of the Old One. The essay uses the theory of realism to analyze the relations between Russia and the United States and the change in the world system after the Cold War.

In the post-Cold War era Russia did not integrate with the West and did not become part of the EU or NATO, but continued to struggle for the return of its influence in the ex-Soviet countries, many of which, as a matter of destiny, shifted their political orientation towards the West, being incorporated into the structures of EU and NATO. The recent events in international

politics, especially the Ukrainian crisis and the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West made many scholars and politicians voice their concerns about the revival of the Cold War.

The hypothesis of this Master's Essay is the following:

Hypothesis: Despite the changing world conditions since the end of the Cold War, the interests of individual states, including Russia and the United States, remain as before, best captured by realism theory that emphasizes the balance of power, self-protection and pursuit of either alliances or self-help toward maintaining stability and security.

The ***research questions*** of this essay are the following:

RQ 1: Has the confrontation between the United States and Russia ended?

RQ 2: How has the external politics of Russia and the United States changed since the end of the Cold War?

RQ 3: How has the polarity of the world changed since the end of the Cold War?

RQ 4: How have the alliances changed after the Cold War?

RQ 5: Has the Balance of Power been eliminated?

RQ 6: Is there a civilizational clash between Russia and the United States?

RQ 7: Does the theory of constructivism explain the antagonism between Russia and the United States?

RQ 8: Is there a New Cold War between Russia and the United States?

To answer these questions the essay gives a brief background of Cold War History, and a literature review to see what others have found on this topic. Afterwards the theory of realism is explained, a brief overview of constructivism is given and evidence is provided on the world nuclear powers, the polarity of the world, US intervention policies after the Cold War, the role of Russia and the US in the Arab Spring, in the Syrian and Ukrainian crises. In the analysis part the literature review, the evidence part and the theory are linked to explain the relations between the United States and Russia and to find out if a New Cold War has emerged. Subsequently, corresponding conclusions are drawn.

The method of this study is qualitative and comparative. The essay compares the changes in the relations and external politics of the United States and Russia and those in the world system during and after the Cold War. The essay is relied on secondary data to observe the topic and to answer the research questions and prove the hypothesis. As secondary data books, reports, magazines, journals, newspapers and academic articles are used.

Brief Background of Cold War History

By the end of the Second World War the economy of the Soviet Union was devastated and needed to be rebuilt. In contrast, the industry of the United States had reached a high level of development giving rise to the production of war equipment used by the US and its allies (Gaddis, 1972). The United States was seeking for new markets. The factories in the US were empty by the end of the war and there was a high level of unemployment which could turn into another depression, and the US wanted to solve this issue by giving a loan to the Soviet Union to reconstruct its economy. By the donation of such a loan and supply of heavy industrial equipment to the Soviets, the United States could provide American businessman the new foreign market they were seeking for to sustain complete employment (Gaddis, 1972). Thus, both the United States and the USSR needed cooperation with each other.

The United States believed that by this economic dependence it would eliminate Soviet Union's dominating power in Eastern Europe and the Balkans (Gaddis, 1972). Communist Russia, in its turn, did not want to rely on the economic assistance of the United States. It wanted to rebuild its economy in another way: by deriving vast reparations from Germany. Soviet Russia did not want to receive American aid at the price of concessions demanded by the United States. These inconsistent political objectives left the economic cooperation behind and began to lead to the fragmentation of the big allies of the Second World War. In March 1945 the policy on lend-lease was amended: its use for postwar rehabilitation was banned, and now, at peacetime, all the military equipment and goods received had to be paid for. And in April 17, 1945, the new President Truman signed the newly amended lend-lease bill into law (Gaddis, 1972).

Similar to other confrontations in the past that took place among the big powers of the world, the Cold War also had major preoccupations about territory and spread of control. That is why The United States and the Soviet Union were competing to enforce their own political systems outside their boundaries (Mandelbaum 1989). The US fostered the outbreak of the Cold War as its external politics was prejudiced by economic and ideological contemplations. The spread of capitalism and market economy was the main goal of the US (Hopkins 2007). For this reason the US was greatly concerned about the self-determination of the Eastern European countries where the Soviets wanted to establish communist rule (Gaddis, 1972). And this struggle was accompanied by the possession and control of nuclear arms by each bloc and the danger of universal destruction. The existence of nuclear armament was the main cause why the conflict stayed a cold one (Hopkins 2007).

One of the noteworthy incidents at the beginning of the Cold War was the famous “long telegram” of George Kennan who was a senior Foreign Service official in Moscow. In 1946 he sent the comprehensive examination of the Soviet policies to Washington which came to be known as the “long telegram” where he emphasized the need of solid state policies to contain the Soviets. The strategy of containment brought forward by Kennan was central in the new doctrine of the Truman Administration, the Truman Doctrine which was declared in 1947 (Hartmann, Wendzel, 1994). The next action derived from the Doctrine was the introduction of the Marshall Plan that presupposed financial assistance to Turkey and Greece. The latter was being menaced by Communist movements from inside. And Turkey was being forced by the USSR to reconsider the convention on Dardanelles Straits so that the Soviet warships would have an easier entrée and exit to the Black Sea and Mediterranean (Hartmann, Wendzel, 1994).

Another well-known document that highlighted the antagonism between USSR and the USA was the National Security Council report released in the United States in 1950 and known as NSC 68. The document stated that the Soviet Union was spreading communist regime all over the world and that a fast military development and robust policies were needed to stop the USSR from dominating the world (Fordham, 1998). By the creation of the atomic bomb the United States seemed to have found the path leading to global hegemony (Maier, 1991). The atomic diplomacy after the events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki sought to resist the Soviet Union and Western Europe and to show the world that the US was able to use the bomb if there was a need to do so (Maier, 1991).

Moreover, the US hoped to use the atomic diplomacy as a tool to maneuver the actions of the USSR in Eastern Europe and Germany. Nevertheless, this diplomacy did not achieve its desired effects: the Soviet Union strengthened its inclination to spread control in its buffer area in East Europe. Moreover, the result of this policy was the acceleration of the creation of an atomic bomb by the USSR itself (Maier, 1991). Though the atomic diplomacy of the US did not succeed against the Soviet Union, it succeeded in making Europe more controllable: the threat of the bomb was more influential than the presence of the Red Army in the east from the River Elbe. The collaboration with the US would provide Europe with a nuclear parasol and security while the United States would be able to realize its plans of reconstructing the European industry. Furthermore, the US had used the atomic bomb in the war with Japan to stop the USSR from engagement and demanding of share of control or possessions on Japan (Maier, 1991). However, in 1949 the Soviet Union acquired its own atomic bomb and accelerated its efforts in creating a defense against an atomic air attack and advancing intercontinental nuclear capabilities (Holloway, 1994).

After 1945 the blankness of power in Europe ultimately persuaded the USSR and USA to search for European associates against each other. In the United States many officials and politicians were not willing to uphold a stable military attendance in Europe. They envisaged aiding the countries in Western Europe so that they were able to ensure a feasible equilibrium against the USSR (Kramer 1999).

Throughout the Cold War there have been of course some small-scale minor wars but no use of nuclear power has taken place, despite the huge threat of its employment as it was during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 (Siracusa 2009). However, despite the hazard that menaced the world during this crisis Kennedy and Khrushchev were able to prevent the nuclear war and end the conflict peacefully (Hartmann, Wendzel, 1994). During the Second World War the West did not do anything to inhibit the spread of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, but it denied its acceptance at the end of the war. After the war the strategies of the West were firstly defensive, but gradually they began to bear offensive nature, especially after the introduction of containment tactics (Siracusa 2009). The strategy of containment of the United States was a way to administer the margins of identity during the Cold War. During the first stages of the Cold War the national strength was perceived as the aptitude of powerful people to confront the communist menace (Campbell, 1998).

By the outburst of the Korean War in June 1950 the United States understood the significance of possessing a far-reaching system of military bases in the West of Europe. Only in this way it would be able to prevent Soviet investigations. Thus, an intense placement of US troops and arms into Europe began from 1950, aiming to show their strength and liability to protect which had been established by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO). However, only after the Korean War the United States started the supply of the equipment necessary to realize its military responsibilities to NATO (Kramer 1999).

Another important event of the Cold era was the crisis over the Suez Canal which had started in Egypt. The latter became concerned by the creation of the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) which united Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Britain and Iran. Being incapable of getting weapons from the West, the Egyptian leader Nasser signed an agreement with Moscow in 1955 to obtain armament, recognized Communist China in 1956 and put the Suez Canal Company under state control, planning to build a High Dam at Aswan from the earnings of the canal operation the stockholders of which were Britain and France. Here again the US started viewing the situation from the prism of the Cold War, seeing a threat of Soviet influence which put the interests of the two superpowers into a clash one more time (Hartmann, Wendzel, 1994).

Among the tensest periods of the Cold War it is noteworthy to mention the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) created in 1954 embraced the USA, UK, France, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand. This ensured a legal basis for the protection of Indochina. SEATO was very exact about the communist aggression on the nations of Indochina (Kissinger, 1994). After the War in Indochina which ended in 1954, the US involvement in Vietnam from 1963-1968 turned into an explicit war against the communist influence in North Vietnam aiming to prevent South Vietnam from falling under the control of the Communists (Hartmann, Wendzel, 1994). In 1979 Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan which propelled the rebellion of the local radical Islamic fighters which, in their turn, started to get the support of the United States (Darraj, 2010).

The Soviet Union, as the prevailing country in Europe, did not have a basic necessity to set up troops far from its western frontiers. Nevertheless, until the very end of the Cold War a few hundred thousand Soviet warriors were placed in “East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania (until 1958), and Czechoslovakia (after 1968)” (Kramer 1999, p. 547). The reason for this was quite strategic: the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact which was created in May 1955 was operating as a buffer zone for the Soviet Union against Germany, rather than a full-grown military pact. The Warsaw Pact began offensive procedures to keep every combat in distance from the territory of the USSR (Kramer 1999).

The World System and Political Conditions during the Cold War




Chart 1 (source: author – Arshaluys Barseghyan)

From the events mentioned above it is possible to gain insight what the world system was like during the Cold War and highlight the key points that characterized the major Cold War features (See Chart 1). Firstly, the world was bipolar, dominated by two superpowers – the United States of America and the Soviet Union. This era was characterized by fixed “borders”. By saying borders the author (Arshaluys Barseghyan) implies not the geographical borders but the political borders - the existing stable membership of the countries that were included in the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The Cold War era was famous by the creation of alliances by each side – NATO, initiated by the West and the Warsaw Pact, initiated by the USSR. Some minor wars occurred during the Cold War, such as the Korean War, the wars in Indochina, Vietnam and Afghanistan, and perilous crises took place such as the Suez Canal crisis, the Cuban missile crisis. And the world did not speak of terrorism during this period.

Literature Review

Barry Buzan (2006) proposes the possibility that the **Global War on Terrorism (GWOt) can be considered as the new Cold War**. As a basis for this assumption he takes the willingness of the United States to convince its people and the world that this war will be a long one, claiming that such kind of a long war can be associated with the Cold War for the following reasons. Firstly, Buzan links this to the Cold War from the perspective of the fight against the anti-tolerant and anti-progressive ideological radicals – terrorists, craving to govern the world. Such as the struggle against the Communist regime was the main goal and strategy of the West during the Cold War, the ideological and security threat posed by the terrorists after the events of September 11 is menacing the West now. That is why the GWOt is similar to the Cold War.

Secondly, the Global War on Terrorism gives the United States the opportunity to reiterate and put in the state of legitimacy its leading role in the **preservation of global security**. Here it is possible to draw parallels with the strategy of the US aiming to struggle for the self-determination of nations in Eastern Europe and the Far East during the Cold War with the only exception that at that time US did not have a unipolar predominance.

Buzan (2006) suggests that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War the United States had a shortage of threat which was filled a little bit by the rise of China and Japan. However, this could not be compared to the threat imposed by the Communists and this was not enough to put forward the leadership of the United States. But the terrorist attacks of September 11 put an end to the shortage of threat that US had and created a new space for a global struggle which would help the United States preserve the validity of its unipolarity. The latter, by the way, had a strategic importance for the United States.

Nuclear weapons were important to preserve the international security during the Cold War: they had a deterring effect. The end of the Cold War made this mutual Soviet-American deterrence outdated. Of course many states continue to take this into account and increase the nuclear proliferation seeing a threat from other states. But leaning on nuclear weapons for this reason is becoming very risky. The latest nuclear test of North Korea and Iran's rejection to stop the enrichment of uranium emphasize that the world is now on the edge of a new and more perilous nuclear era (Shultz et al. 2007).

There was no use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, but no one can ensure that the atomic diplomacy, started by the US and SU and continuing now by other states, will be carried on the same way. The most dangerous assumption is that non-state terrorists can try to get their hands on nuclear armament which is the biggest threat to humanity (Shultz et al. 2007). For this reason the essay assumes that the decision of the United States to start the GWoT is justified and that is why it is realistic to regard this campaign as a *global* war because the danger that the terrorists can create their own nuclear weapons is menacing the whole mankind. However, the United States was able to use the GWoT as a political tool to establish its leading role of a “world policeman” in confronting the East. Hence, it becomes quite obvious why Buzan suggests the possibility of considering the GWoT as the new Cold War.

Furthermore, Buzan (2006) supports his assumption by the fact that in this war led by United States against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after the events of September 11, NATO – the military coalition created at the beginning of the Cold War to resist the Soviet Union and its expansionist motives, has the starring role in stabilization and reconstruction attempts in that country. Moreover, NATO’s part in assisting the legitimization of the securitization of the GWoT has been central.

While Buzan talks about the lack of threat that the US had and the pertinence of the emergence of terrorism to fill this shortage and politicize the GWoT, Gray (2004) points out that it was the United States, that had, of course unintentionally, fostered **the rise of Al-Qaeda** by its large support for the holy combatants who beat the Soviets in Afghanistan. However, as Gray states, even the emergence of this terrorism does not display a major change in the character of warfare since the end of the Cold War. Neither do the Gulf War of 1991, the strategic downfall of the United States in Somalia, the ambiguous success attained in Bosnia, the inept war in Kosovo in 1999, the victory of 2001 in Afghanistan and the Iraq war in 2003 which shows that all of these were wars that the United States could not fail: the only exception was the defeat in Somalia.

Roberts (2008) argues that the intervention policies of the United States do not correspond to **the new international order** about which US and Western Europe talk. And if they do not fit into the new world order, it is feasible to assume that these policies have not changed much since the Cold War. The only thing that has changed is the elimination of the Soviet threat which has been replaced with the threat posed mainly by terrorism. However, the US intervention in Yugoslavia through NATO in 1990s also shows that the U.S. was still defending **the self-determination of the nations or ethnic groups**, something that was persistent throughout the Cold War.

Huntington (1993) argues that in the post-Cold War era the conflicts between the states will not be ideological or economic, but mainly cultural, and the conflict will occur primarily not between states, but between civilizations – cultural entities that have common identity, religion, history, language, customs and institutions. He states that **the differences between the civilizations** are much deeper than those across political regimes and beliefs. As the interactions

among various peoples increase, the cognizance of civilizations concerning the differences among them deepens. Kwon (2010) also refers to the scholarly views which argue that the ideological conflict between the East and the West would turn into a **clash of cultures** after the Cold War. He interprets Huntington's clash of civilizations as a confrontation between the liberal civil models and universal social ideals of the West and the undemocratic and illiberal civilizations of East.

Huntington (1993) supports his assumption by leaning on the essence of the Gulf War, highlighting that the Saddam Hussein regime was largely supported by the Arab peoples and "Islamic fundamentalist movements" which were not in favor of the "governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait" backed by the West. Then he backs his argument with the existing conflicts in the post-Soviet countries, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict where Turkey turned to its religious and ethnic comrade Azerbaijan, while Russians were fighting on the side of Christian Armenia; or the conflicts in Yugoslavia where Iran and Saudi Arabia were supporting the Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs. Meanwhile, Kwon brings the critique of others on the clash of cultures to show that in fact, Huntington demonstrates that the Cold War worldview which dominated the bipolar world is persistent till now and both the West and the East have **different self** and refer to each other as distinct. This is even similar to the thinking of colonial times when there was much talk about **the civilized world and the uncivilized other** (Kwon, 2010).

Both Roberts (2008) and Buzan (2006) indicate that after the end of the Cold War the world was perceived as **unipolar**, implying the predominance of the United States as a superpower and the rise of globalization tendencies. However, they state that this perception did not last long and the world even started to refer to this order as just a "unipolar moment" for the reason that very soon new forms of polarities emerged, and the world began to be considered as

multi-polar, especially by countries such as Russia, China, Iran, India, France, etc. for whom multi-polarity is a favored arrangement of power (Roberts, 2008; Buzan, 2006). So, despite the theories of Roberts and Buzan that the Cold War might be continuing, both of them emphasize the major change in the world-system during and after the Cold War – the transition from a bipolar world to a unipolar or multipolar one.

By the collapse of the USSR and the Yugoslavia many new countries emerged, and Russia suffered an imperial loss, especially after these countries entered the **EU and NATO** (Deighton, 2002). Besides, after the Cold War an institutional competition emerged between NATO and EU, especially in the membership domain. Both the EU and NATO faced new challenges after the Cold War: the main threat for NATO – the SU was eliminated; what refers to the EU, it never represented the whole Europe, but only the part of it, that is why both of the organizations started the enlargement processes. Moreover, to strengthen their *raison d'être*, NATO started formulating a European security and defense identity (ESDI), and the EU started the promotion of human rights, “good governance, economic development and conflict prevention” (Deighton, 2002).

When talking about the multi-polarity of the world, it is worth discussing **the rise of China as a superpower**. After the end of the Cold War this idea and the fear of its likelihood was very persistent in the United States. And only the assumption that this would not happen very quickly stopped the U.S. from making the securitization against China a dominant one (Buzan, 2006). Glaser (2011) and Buzan (2006) argue that China’s rise as a superpower will remain peaceful unless China poses a threat to the stability of its neighbors, the international society, starts a perilous skirmish to reverse the existing international system and establishes a new order satisfying its interests. Although there is some tension between the US and China such

as the strong competition in the area of nuclear proliferation, the US presence in Northeast Asia and its alliances with Japan and South Korea, the issue of Taiwan, the countries are still keeping the balance (Glaser, 2011). Nevertheless, both Glaser (2011) and Buzan (2006) do not exclude the possibility that the tension between China and the United States can restore a Cold War rhetoric, taking into notice that China is a Communistic state and that it is continuing to strengthen its nuclear arsenal.

Sakwa (2008) and Mackinnon (2007) claim that **Russia's foreign policy**, especially during the presidency of Putin, had some features that were similar to the Cold War era. Both of them emphasize the existence of economic and political hardships in Russia when Putin came to power: the war in Chechnya, the durable democratic transition, the economic depression. They indicate that the raise of democratic standards by the United States, its struggle against terrorism and dictatorial capitalism in Europe and Middle East and the self-rule Russia requires and maintains in international relations, its efforts to regain political or territorial influence over its neighboring countries contain **Cold War rhetoric** in them.

Mackinnon (2007) points out that the assistance of the US to GUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), the Rose Revolution in Georgia which brought into power the pro-American President Mikhail Saakashvili, the activities launched by the US against Milosevic regime, Russia's support for the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia show that the status quo after the Cold War has not been sustained. Besides, the clumsy interventions of Russia in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine to support Yanukovych against Yushchenko also show that Russia was afraid of losing its grip over Ukraine, as a pro-Western Ukraine might finally enter the EU and NATO. This would enclose Russia and reduce much of its entrée to the Black Sea. The location of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimean port of

Sevastopol with the Russian flags and buildings were looking very menacing for the Ukrainians, as if demonstrating Russia's postcolonial grip over Ukraine. Eventually, the Orange Revolution made Yushchenko President and Russia's efforts appeared to be inutile (Mackinnon, 2007).

Russia has put much effort to sustain its leading position in the **Commonwealth of Independent States** (Sakwa, 2008). Moreover, as Frost (2009) points out, the creation of **CSTO (The Collective Security Treaty Organization)** which included ex-Soviet countries aimed to counterbalance NATO and EU. The bases of this organization had the capacity of backing the regimes of the region not only militarily, but also economically. The organization offers a big quantity of money, employments and services to local areas, thus fostering the local admiration of Russians and the governments linked to it (Frost, 2009). These events only highlight that Russia seeks to regain its influence in the former Soviet area, and US aspires to expand its influence in Europe, Middle East (including the former Soviet countries) through NATO and EU.

Furthermore, the membership of Russia in **Shanghai Cooperation Organization** also counterbalances the role of the US in Central Asia. Besides, Russia uses the CSTO to counterweight the rising role of China in the region; that is why it is involved in both organizations – to exclude Chinese and American authority (Frost, 2009).

Although in the 1990s Russia still had a big power which was reflected in its status of a permanent member in the UN Security Council and the possession of the second biggest nuclear arsenal of the world, its economy was very weak (Sakwa, 2008). For this reason and for the reason that China's power was rising and the situation in the Islamic south continued to be unstable, Russia had to find new geopolitical relationships with the developed West. However,

Putin's Russia had unique aspirations: it wanted to be "part of the West, but on its own terms", and although the West wanted Russia to be its inferior companion, Russia asserted that it was a "separate power in its own right" (Sakwa, 2008).

Nevertheless, despite the fact that Russia wanted to be to some extent integrated into the West, it regarded itself very dissimilar to the other post-Communist states and did not accept the custodial role of western institutions, thus never becoming a part of EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) or NATO's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) (Sakwa, 2008). Nonetheless, Russia has been engaged in deep discussions with both NATO and EU concerning the issues of weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons and anti-terror processes (Deighton, 2002). So Russia, craving for autonomy, was able to preserve its status as a separate power and overcome the economic depression under Putin. The reliance on oil and gas industry saved Russian economy, and by the end of Putin's presidency Russia rose to the tenth place in the classification of world's largest economic power. Russia's exceptional role in the "global energy market" troubled the United States which tried to strengthen its political influence in the heart of Europe (Sakwa, 2008).

Additionally, both Mackinnon (2007) and Sakwa (2008) indicate that the existence of NATO, its enlargement, its growing engagement in the countries that are bordering Russia also demonstrate the fact that the West desires to resist Russia like it was resisting the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. But now there is neither Warsaw Pact, nor Communists. As Wallander (2000) points out, the main reason of **NATO's persistence after the Cold War** was the fear of the US that Russia would emerge as a threat. Another reason for NATO's persistence and US commitment to stay involved in the European security was the acknowledgement that the organization could be used for a wider array of post-Cold War missions. The events in Bosnia in

1990s made it clear for the NATO member states that it could be used for post-war security goals. And finally, NATO's endurance was conditioned with the fact that it is a consensus-building foundation which has special norms and procedures to adopt and carry out decisions (Wallander, 2000).

Nazemroaya (2009) also questions the end of the Cold War, **highlighting the existence of many Cold war remnants**, such as the conflict in Korea, the presence of NATO and its recent tense relations with Russia, as well as the problems of missile defense. The strategy of the US launched during the Cold War and aiming to deploy missiles and military bases throughout the world under the project entitled "Star Wars" has invoked the antagonism of Russia. Although the United States was asserting the imaginary threat from Iranian and North Korean ballistic missile assaults, Russia was regarding the establishment of the American missile shield project as a threat to itself which is really justifiable. With this missile shield project Russia would not be able to respond to a "nuclear first strike" by the United States and its nuclear arsenal would practically be inoperable (Nazemroaya, 2009).

Sakwa (2008) also indicates that besides the continuing economic race and the race for zones of influence, a **new nuclear age** has come into being. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 pointed out that those countries which do not possess nuclear armaments are likely to be attacked while those who possess them, such as North Korea, Israel, India, Pakistan, are being treated through diplomatic networks. Some countries do not follow the rules of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 2007 US even had a plan to place missile defense in Poland and radar in Czech Republic to trail missile launches, while Putin was suggesting to make the Gabala radar base in Azerbaijan disposable, but these ideas were not put into action. The nuclear superiority of the US over Russia and China was being asserted all the time, by the United States (Sakwa, 2008). The

withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that placed limitations on the amount of these missiles of the US and Russia, also demonstrates the existence of a tense nuclear period (Nazemroaya, 2009).

Nazemroaya (2009) does not dismiss the possibility of war between Russia, US and NATO, by stating that **the August war of 2008 between Georgia and Russia** was a proof for this as Russia was always regarding Georgia as a pro-American country. Besides, the United States had declared during that same war that South Caucasus was strategically a very significant region for it, while Russia had declared that it would not change its mind about waging the war even if Georgia was a member of NATO. Moreover, the plans of the US about placing missile defense satellites in Poland and Czech Republic, and the response of the Polish official to these plans stating that Poland was never threatened by Iran only indicate that the assumptions of Nazemroaya are not far from reality.

Theory

All the assumptions and facts demonstrated in the literature review are important descriptors of the period that followed the end of the Cold War. And to understand whether this period is the modified continuation of the Cold War era or a completely new epoch, there is a need to understand how the international relations were explained during the Cold War. The oldest theory of international relations – the realism theory was dominant during this time, however at the end of the 1970s a new approach was developed in the international system – structural realism which identified the existing relations from a new insight.

Classical realism was mainly developed by Thucydides in 400s BC, Machiavelli in 1532 and Morgenthau in 1948, and *structural realism* was mainly advanced by Waltz in 1979 and Mearsheimer in 2001 (Dunne and Schmidt, 2011).

Thucydides and Machiavelli highlight the needs and prerequisites that countries face in international relations, necessities that are embedded in the “human nature” and do not always walk in line with morality (Forde, 1992). Morgenthau also emphasizes these necessities which are the interests of the states and are defined as power (Morgenthau, Thompson and Clinton, 2005). Thucydides raises the issue of threat which is actual and existent, but not instant; however it validates a preventive assault, and this kind of reflection falls into the basis of balance of power which has been central in realist school (Forde, 1992). Machiavelli justifies the craving of countries to obtain more and the politics of imperialism by ordinary motivations and security threats.

What is the *balance of power*? Morgenthau states that it is an equilibrium that ensures steadiness in the structure which includes different independent units. And when this equilibrium

appears in a disorder, no matter from an outside actor or a change in one of the components of the system, the latter inclines to reset it or create a new one. Thus, the purpose of the balance of power is not only ensuring stability, but also maintaining all the components in the system. Rynning and Ringsmose (2008) indicate that classical realism regards states as dissimilar from the viewpoint of their power and principal incentives. Small nations have been able to preserve their independence due to the balance of power, the supremacy of one guarding power or because of not representing any interest to imperialistic powers. The same conditions are applied to buffer states who were situated near powerful states and serving their and economic military securities (Morgenthau, Thompson and Clinton, 2005).

Generally, classical realists argue that states are like human beings, egoistic in their desires and actions, putting forward their interests and seeking for more power in all possible ways, including the use of armed forces and war. And in contrast to human beings who are able to follow moral values and sacrifice their possessions and lives, states are not supposed to sacrifice their interests in political actions or decisions and are justified to carry out any policy that will ensure their safety, security, sovereignty and self-defense.

Morgenthau argues that there are several methods of balance of power: one of them is the “*divide and rule*” method which supposes that states make their rivals and adversaries frail by dividing them (Morgenthau, Thompson and Clinton, 2005). Such were the policies of France towards Germany and Soviet Union towards Europe after the Second World War. Other methods of balance of power are the *territorial compensations*, the *possession of armaments* by the states, however the latter ensures very unstable balance of power which has to be improved by disarmament. Another method of balancing the power is the formation of *alliances*. States form alliances to strengthen their power, to use the power of other nations or restrain the power of

other states from the enemy. Morgenthau states that alliances also aim to prevent a state to achieve world domination. Furthermore, in the balance of power system counter-alliances are formed against alliances to confront each other's imperialistic ambitions. Most of the time they are created to ensure collective security and be safe from the attacks of the other coalition (Morgenthau, Thompson and Clinton, 2005).

Realism was the leading academic paradigm during the Cold War because it demonstrated the egoistic aspirations of states to achieve power and did not exclude the possibility of war and conflict (Walt, 1998). Moreover, realism had satisfactory elucidations about alliances, confrontation, war, impediments of collaborating, and the Soviet-American competition was fitting in the framework of realism which put out forward the competing interests of countries. Morgenthau represented the multipolar balance of power system and viewed the bipolar world and existing tension at that time as very perilous (Walt, 1998).

What do structural realists argue? Kenneth Waltz (2000) indicates that classical realism mainly supposed confrontation and war, that is why when peace dominates, people start claiming that realism has ended. But in fact realism is not over, it has just changed as the international system and relations have altered. Structural realism argues that the change in the structure of international politics influences the performance and actions of states and the results of that conduct. However, the structural change does not mean a "transformation of international politics" (Waltz, 2000). Transformation would mean that countries are not the main components of international system and do not desire power and security. Waltz's structural realism (neo-realism) presumes that the strategies and actions of states are derived from *anarchic conditions* aiming to satisfy their short-term *interests* and relying on the expectations that the future will

continue to stream by the flow – something that is not similar to the behavior that is rooted in the human nature.

Waltz (2000) regards the unipolar structure of the international system as the least enduring among all others for two main reasons. Firstly, superpowers get engaged in too many issues beyond their frontiers, thinking that it performs in the sake of stability, peace and prosperity of the world and this gradually weakens them. Secondly, when there is only one superpower, it cannot fill the vacuum of power, and the international politics remains unbalanced. Waltz states that during the bipolar world system, the two blocks – the SU and US restrained each other and by and large kept the balance, however, this cannot be said about the unipolar world. In a unipolar system, other states seek to bring the balance into being and form alliances with others to be more secure and fortify their positions.

Dunne and Schmidt (2011) also emphasize that structural realism presumes competition for security and conflict between countries because of the lack of an all-embracing authority and disproportionate dissemination of power in the world system. So, in case of structural realism states do not seek for power, but for security. This is exactly what Waltz argues, that is why his theory is often named as *defensive realism*, while Mearsheimer's theory is named *offensive realism* under which he agrees with Waltz that under anarchy states mainly seek for self-help and security, but he states that all countries have some offensive military competences and the intentions of different states are very uncertain. So, Mearsheimer argues that countries are, in fact, never satisfied with any status quo and they always seek to obtain more power at the cost of other states' capabilities and possessions. But he also indicates that global hegemony is not feasible and thus puts the main emphasis on the eternal competition between great powers (Dunne and Schmidt, 2011).

Offensive realists argue that many significant circumstances in international relations are similar to the prisoner's dilemma: sometimes common security is not pursued or cannot be obtained; a country or several countries are not afraid of hazards of war and want to risk in order to satisfy their own needs of security which may not correspond to the needs of other countries (Jervis, 1999). Whereas defensive realists argue that the interests of the states concerning the security issues can vary widely which can cause tension among them, and only in this case conflict is inevitable (Jervis, 1999).

Despite these categorizations of realism, Dunne and Schmidt (2011) state that there are three main elements that dominate in all the categories of realism and those are *statism*, *survival* and *self-help*. Statism means that states are the most important actors in international politics; the other actors such as transnational corporations, international organizations or terrorist groups are of lesser prominence. Moreover, this implies that the sovereignty of states' gives them the authority to enforce laws, to control the society and the territory that belongs to them. Survival has been central in all three paradigms of realism as it is the ultimate interest of every state. And the self-help supposes that the no alliances, institutions or other states can give full warranties for the survival of a state. Whereas, Lamy (2011) points out the structural realism advanced by Waltz is only one category of neo-realism; the other form was advanced by Joseph Grieco who mixed the views of Waltz and classical realists such as Morgenthau, creating modern realism. The other type of neo-realism is seen in security studies, especially in the discussions of offensive and defensive realism.

According to Lamy (2011), some recent factors have been added to the theory of realism by scholars such as Joseph Grieco, and these are the relative and absolute gains of the states. All states desire to advance their power and influence and for this reason they cooperate with other

states or players of international arena in order to augment their capabilities. These are the absolute gains. But states are also interested in the extent of the power that other states may obtain in the result of cooperation. And these are the relative gains.

Neo-realists do not agree with traditional realists that anarchy is a state of the system; they argue that it is the anarchy that delineates the system. Neo-realists do not see the military resources as the only means of power; they state that power ensures the position of states in the international system by determining their conduct. According to neo-realists, the positioning of the US and SU as superpowers during the Cold War was a depiction of the similitudes of their behavior (Lamy, 2011).

How are confrontations of ideologies and civilizations explained? The only thing that explains this is the identity issue which is illustrated in theory of constructivism.

Barnett (2011) states that *constructivism* was developed from the existing social theories in 1990s to show how social science entailed the capacity to elucidate the significance of norms, values and identity in political affairs. It was advanced by scholars such as Alexander Wendt, John Meyer and John Ruggie. After the end of the Cold War when the world became unipolar, there was much discussion about the future behavior of the United States: no one was sure whether it would pursue global hegemony or continue to act and cooperate with international institutions. Thus, debates about national interests and identity came into international arena. As sociology had been discussing the relationship between the man and society for a century, constructivists relied heavily on this to theorize the relationship between states and the international system.

Barnett (2011) suggests that constructivism leans on *idealism and holism*. Idealism claims that ideas play a vital role in world politics as they shape the collective identity of people, such as language, norms and standards. Here states try to understand the meaning of balance of power and how to react to it. Whereas holism claims that agents have certain autonomy, and with the support of their interactions the structures of the world order are being modified. For instance, during the Cold War the US and SU were encircled into a dreadful fight, but both of them changed their relations which led to the alteration of the structure of world politics. Constructivists claim that the actors are shaped by the cultural environment. According to them, identity is the social perception of the self in respect to an “other”. They state that identities form interests – nations cannot have specific goals unless they know who they are and where they come from. Moreover, identities can alter as they are social and created through reciprocal communications. Campbell argues that the identity of a country is “the effect of ritualized performances and formalized practices that operate in its name or in the service of its ideals” (Campbell 1998, p. 130).

Adler (1997) argues that peace ensured by democracy can be explained only through constructivism. Democratic peace is a historical advancement that was spread from the West as a “liberal identity” and has crossed national frontiers, becoming the identity of others and the depiction of mutual peaceful plans.

Campbell (1998) states that in order to understand the Cold War rivalry between the US and SU, it is necessary to explore their identities. The formation of the American identity dates back to its discovery. The history of its discovery, colonization and revolution show that there are special characteristics in America’s *identity* that exist till now. America’s identity is characterized by the relation to otherness having roots in Puritan experience, spiritual dimensions

and the fast colonial expansion. The periods of revolutions in America were like an internal cold war. That is why it is possible to think about the Cold War as another extract of the continuing representation of American identity via the performance of its foreign policy (Campbell 1998).

After the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union did not share the domestic challenges of the United States that is why it began to be considered as a threat to the US. Campbell (1998) argues that Americanism and Bolshevism were quite contradicting: “Americanism stands for liberty, while Bolshevism is premeditated slavery, Americanism is synonym for self-government, while Bolshevism is a dictatorship of tyrants, Americanism means increased production and prosperity for all while Bolshevism stands for restriction of output and compulsory poverty” (Campbell 1998, p. 143).

Evidence

World Nuclear Powers

The strategic steadiness of the Cold era that kept the nuclear balance is now enfeebled or even does not exist. Some nuclear states aspire to defy the world order, some at a global level and some at regional. The existing international order led and controlled by the West does not meet the needs of **Russia and China**. The conflicted frontiers with nuclear warheads on both borders between India and both Pakistan and China only escalate the tension (The Economist, 2015). The **NFU (No-First -Use)** policies of nuclear weapons established during the Cold War, witnessed a major shift by Russia in the post-Soviet period: the 1997 Military Doctrine was stating that Russia had the right to use all of its forces, comprising nuclear weapons, if an attack on Russian Federation threatened its existence (Evans, 2003). This Doctrine revised Russia's intention not to use nuclear force against states that did not have nuclear weapons. However, the 1999 Doctrine not only revised these intentions but also stated that Russia would use nuclear weapons in reply to the use of **Weapons of Mass Destruction** against itself or its allies and in reply to large-scale employment of conventional weapons (Evans, 2003).

Russia's current Military Doctrine adopted in 2014 again puts the emphasis on the use of nuclear weapons in case of slight incitement that can be caused by the application of chemical, biological, nuclear weapons or colossal conventional weapons both against Russia and its allies (Thranert, 2015). Although Russian Doctrines seem to have a defensive positioning, their rhetoric invokes concerns about the decreased proficiencies of its conventional weaponry, and subsequently, Russian strategies rely on nuclear armament as a redress (Evans, 2003; Thranert, 2015). During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union used their nuclear aptitudes

to test conventional skirmishes, while now Russia is putting emphasis on its nuclear arsenal (Stratfor, 2015). Russia has been renovating its nuclear forces, meanwhile the West has not. Moreover, Russia's present statistical advantage over NATO in nuclear arms symbolizes Russian superiority in the close neighborhood and farther along (Thranert, 2015). One of Russia's new intercontinental ballistic missiles – “the liquid-fuelled Sarmat” is thought to be designed for a first-strike use (The Economist, 2015). Furthermore, Russia is developing new nuclear weapons for being carried on “cruise missiles”. Meanwhile, the United States is developing a warhead that would match on both submarine and ground-launched missiles (The Economist, 2015).

In 2008 the foreign policy of the United States witnessed a major alteration: the US sealed a **civilian nuclear agreement with India** – a country which has nuclear arsenal but is a party neither to the **NPT - Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty** nor to the **Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty**. This agreement donates India access to civilian nuclear technology and envisages aiding the country in meeting its energy needs. After signing this treaty, India signed a nuclear cooperation deal with Russia, France and Canada (Hosur, 2010). India is now developing a nuclear triplet that comprises “nuclear forces on land, sea and in the air” (Thranert, 2015). This is explained by the fears of India which sees a nuclear threat from China. Besides, India wants to use this as a political leverage on its roguish rival Pakistan. Moreover, in case of war India aspires to attack Pakistani or Chinese nuclear targets with conventional arms, and this increases the likelihood of nuclear escalation (Thranert, 2015).

The civilian nuclear deal with the US does not oblige India to abandon its nuclear weapons program, but according to the US law, nuclear testing by India in the future will put an end to the US's nuclear trade with it (Hosur, 2010). Nevertheless, the Indian government was claiming that this agreement theoretically did not hold India back from future testing. Moreover,

one of the publications of the Council of Foreign Relations stated that the US Senate rejected the adjustment concerning the cut off of US nuclear provisions to India in case of nuclear testing (Hosur, 2010). Having in mind the fact that India and Pakistan were very close to a nuclear war in the course of the **Kargil crisis in 1999**, the situation in South Asia still remains bothering, especially when noticing that Pakistan leans on nuclear first use in its doctrines in case of crisis (Thranert, 2015).

In general, the agreement between India and US was signed because of concerns that India would never sign the Nonproliferation Treaty and the sanctions levied on it have not had any consequences (Hosur, 2010). At first glance it seems that this treaty weakens the struggle of nonproliferation, but in fact, it ensures more transparent environment in the nuclear domain of India and reduces the hazards of nuclear calamities. In contrast to other countries, such as Iran, China and North Korea, which are signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty, but still continue the proliferation, India has never signed this treaty not to put deterring procedures on itself. Indeed, why should countries sign the NPT if they do not abandon their proliferation policies?

After the Cold War, the Bush administration decreased the protrusion of the nuclear weapons for the US plan of action, introducing the “**New Triad**” which consisted of nuclear and non-nuclear strike abilities, defense entailing operations and a unit of laboratories, plants and labor force (Thranert, 2015). Obama changed the nuclear policy of the US to the degree that the US would not use nuclear arms against non-nuclear states that have signed the NPT, it would apply them only in the case of dangerous conditions to protect the interests of the US and its associates. NATO has also reduced the role of nuclear forces in its strategy. However, NATO members have agreed that until there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance (Thranert, 2015).

Presently, there are nine countries that are officially considered as owners of nuclear arsenals: those are Russia, the United States, China, France, Britain, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea (The Economist, 2015). However, there are other countries which pursue nuclear policies, such as Iran, and some that did not reach success in attaining nuclear weapons and abandoned these policies: among those are Libya, Iraq, South Korea, Taiwan (Kroenig, 2009). For instance, Iraq made numerous attempts to generate highly enriched uranium by various methods from 1981-1991, but did not succeed. Table 1 shows the estimated total warheads of the official nuclear states:

Table 1.

Country	Estimated Total Warheads	The Space Where Nuclear Weapons Are Deployed
United States	4764	Sea, air, land, other (reserve/unspecified)
Russia	4300	Sea, air, land, other (reserve/unspecified)
China	250	Other (reserve/unspecified)
France	300	Sea, air, other (reserve/unspecified)
Britain	225	Sea, other (reserve/unspecified)
Pakistan	120	Other (reserve/unspecified)
India	110	Other (reserve/unspecified)
Israel	80	Other (reserve/unspecified)
North Korea	10	Other (reserve/unspecified)

Data taken from the Economist Journal, 2015, SIPRI

There are big debates in **China** whether its no-first-use doctrine which has dominated there for a long time is still suitable. Prompted by the missile defense of the US and conventional rapid universal strike ideas, China is discussing that nuclear weapons should prevent and even defeat non-nuclear assaults which will threaten its interests (Thranert, 2015). Some Chinese officials even argue that China should threaten with nuclear strikes in the event of US military assistance for a Taiwanese declaration of independence.

Generally, it seems that after the Cold War India, China, Pakistan and Russia have had a very active nuclear agenda, but the NATO and the US are still passive, as they were busy with their interventions in the Balkans and Afghanistan and they possess overpowering conventional supremacy (Thranert, 2015).

The economic and industrial development of a country is an important measure for creating its own nuclear weapons. Countries with high-level industrial growth are more likely to develop nuclear programs and weapons than those with less-advanced infrastructure. However, the “sensitive nuclear assistance” from older nuclear states is also very crucial as states face many obstacles when creating nuclear weapons (Kroenig, 2009). Firstly, many subtle nuclear technologies, such as uranium enrichment plants, are not accessible in the public field. Secondly, the building and functioning of nuclear accommodations needs much testing and experiments.

Thirdly, constructing nuclear infrastructure from the beginning, without relying on resources or some advantages is very expensive. For instance, without the entrée to the Chinese nuclear bomb designs, it is unlikely that Pakistan would be able to work out a design for the “implosion-type nuclear weapon” (Kroenig, 2009). Likewise, from 1958-1960 the Soviet Union lent China major constituent parts for the uranium enrichment facility: Moscow feared of the US assault on China, therefore was helping strengthen the self-protective and restraining abilities of China. Fourthly, other states and international organizations that are against the nuclear proliferation employ a number of diplomatic, economic or military pressures on those states that aspire to become nuclear powers. Iran, for example, has rejected the worries of the international community and continues to advance the uranium enrichment technologies (Jackson, 2009).

Recently, from 1987-2002 Pakistan has supplied sensitive nuclear technologies to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Only Libya has gave up its nuclear program after the end of the collaboration in 2002. But Iran and North Korea have greatly advanced in their nuclear development. There are also other states that have shown interest in acquiring nuclear weapons such as Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Syria, South Korea, Iraq and Taiwan (Kroenig, 2009). Japan and Egypt are pursuing civilian nuclear industries (Thranert, 2008). It is interesting to mention that Israel, Pakistan and India have not signed the NPT. The ASEAN countries are also very interested in pursuing nuclear programs, particularly; Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam have ideas for building nuclear power generation while the Philippines and Malaysia are considering the opportunity (Symon, 2008). Although there are no “commercial nuclear power plants” functioning in the region, there are not big research reactors.

The research of Koenig (2009) has shown that countries which are in a defense pact with a nuclear state are less likely to obtain nuclear weapons. According to him, sensitive nuclear assistance is being provided mainly under three strategic circumstances. Firstly, if the assistance provider is a more powerful state, it is less likely to grant sensitive assistance. Secondly, states are more likely to give sensitive nuclear assistance to those countries with which they share a mutual foe. And thirdly, countries that are less susceptible to superpower burdens are more likely to give sensitive nuclear aid. In 2008 Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates declared that they had agreed on a strategy to develop “nuclear power generation in the region” (Ong, 2008). Most of the Arab countries that abandoned their nuclear programs in the 1980s now seem to regret, especially when in front of their eyes the nuclear advance of India, Pakistan, Israel and Iran which use their status for the implementation of their strategic goals.

The US, Russia and France have been competing in signing nuclear cooperation deals along the Middle East. The US has forged such agreements with the Arab countries, hoping to counterbalance Iran. In 2008 Russia signed a nuclear agreement with Egypt, and declared that it would take part in the development of Morocco's first nuclear power plant. France has signed civilian nuclear agreements with Algeria, Libya, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates (Ong, 2008). However, the civilian nuclear cooperation does not reduce the risk of proliferation as it provides the states with necessary equipment and raw materials for a nuclear program and helps to create corresponding proficiencies (Fuhrmann, 2009). **The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)** itself is a technically good but regrettably powerless watchdog. Its power ground is extracted mostly from its diplomatic and political authority within the United Nations. The IAEA can examine countries' civilian nuclear provisions under optional assurance agreements but it has no real enforcing and coercive might (Jackson, 2009).

The Complexity of the Multipolar World

Roberts (2008) demonstrates that today's world processes that have begun and persisted during the Cold War continue to take place. One of them is the universal transfer towards democracy, the fast development of international network and robust challenges to the preceding supremacy of western designs about how the world should be ordered. The changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War seemed to provide a new world order where the international law, international organizations, cooperation of Great Powers and "democratic political systems" would have a bigger role than they had before the end of the Cold War (Roberts 2008). Saull (2007) also emphasizes that after the collapse of the SU the United States and its Western associates had the competence to foster **the rise of capitalism** in post-Soviet and other countries

through “**Washington Consensus**” and they were free to employ military force without sparking a major war.

The ideas of totally reshaping the world found new types of manifestation one of which was the “neo-conservatism” – a mass of ideas that had common elements more with the radical French Bonapartism than with traditional conservatism (Roberts 2008). The events in Iraq 2003, however, cast doubt on the effectiveness of the changes these new ideas were considered to bring. Furthermore, the relations between the United States and the United Nations have become complicated because of the **humanitarian intervention disagreements** and problems in the cases of Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. It seems that the United States uses force without the approval of UN Security Council (Roberts 2008). Even before the events of 9/11 there were signs that the hopes of the West concerning the spread of “liberal democracy, human rights and economic liberalization” with the US at the midpoint were not likely to be implemented at a universal layer (Saull, 2007). Some regions, especially the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia continued to stay outside this integration.

Saull (2007) states that the failure of **the new world order** was conditioned with the way how the Cold War ended. He asserts that the end of the Cold War was diverse in different areas. And in some places, this manner did not provide the needed social and political strength for the creation of democratic and liberal societies that could be incorporated into the existing area of liberal harmony. Conversely, the Cold War strategies of the United States resulted in the rise of rightist and illiberal forms of anti-communism, particularly in the Islamic world and the Middle East which became increasingly antagonistic against the liberal transformation. This eventually resulted in the overthrow of the leftist wings in these areas and creation of societies which did not accept the universalistic motions and regimes stimulated by the US. And here lies the reason

of the emergence of the War on Terror (Saull, 2007). However, Kwon (2010) thinks that there should not be any differentiation between the societies of the East and West, like post-socialist transition which dominates mainly in the East; contrariwise, he states that the East and the West should be referred to as post-Cold War societies in order to be able to address the transition process in all the societies.

Howorth (2010) has clear-cut definitions of the global system which he divides into three parts: from **1949-1989** when the world was bipolar and steady, from **1989-2004** when the world was unipolar and highly unstable, and after **2004** when the world began to transform into a multipolar one with several global actors one of which, according to Howorth, is the **EU as a civilian power**.

Howorth puts forward the idea that the use of civilian instruments has become as essential as military tools that is why the EU has much to suggest. However, he also states that the EU is not only a civilian power with normative tools, it has also a military power which was strengthened by the creation of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) project. The initiative of the CFSP (formerly ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy) was that the European Council should be able to lean on the armed forces of member states or NATO in order to realize some “military security operations” (Deighton, 2002). Nevertheless, Zielonka (2008) argues that EU’s influence is based more on economic, political and bureaucratic instruments rather than military ones, and its territorial attainments occur by invitation, not by invasion. Indeed, the post-Soviet countries were not invaded, but requested to enter the EU which they have done fairly willingly. But, of course, before the accession the candidate countries had to adopt all the European laws and regulations imposed on them via conditionality (Zielonka, 2008).

What refers to the economic power of the EU, it is entailed in the tools of sanctions, bribes and coercion. As a normative power, the EU acts completely differently from other global players, such as the United States. For example, in contrast to the US, the EU has never scored a regime change in a country for the advancement of democracy and human rights (Zielonka, 2008). The EU's enlargement process is the result of its economic leverage plus the membership prospect which together constitute the political power of the EU over different peripheral actors. Both Zielonka (2008) and Deighton (2002) agree that the EU lacks the role of a security actor. Deighton states that the EU does not possess any means or sufficient political determination to conduct a separate foreign policy with military competencies, and its relations with NATO and US will always be vital for its strategic advance.

Both **NATO and EU** have integrated into their structures as members 10 former Communist countries through their enlargement processes since 2004 (Sakwa, 2008). In 2004 Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia became member states, and in 2007 Romania, Bulgaria, and in 2013 Croatia became members (European Union, 2015). NATO has welcomed as member states the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia in 2004, Croatia in 2009 (NATO, 2014). It is interesting to mention that in order to counterbalance the role of the EU; the Eurasian Economic Union has been created by Russia and includes post-Soviet countries Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. It was formed to reaffirm the influence of Moscow in the former Soviet countries and counterweight the European Union comprised of twenty eight member states, which has moved closer towards Russia's borders during the last decade (Standish, 2015).

China also has a very significant role in the economy of the world: it disposes of almost 25% of the total supply of steel, copper, aluminum and iron. It is responsible for one-third of the world's augmentation in request for oil. A lot of foreign direct investment is being placed in Chinese firms by many countries, especially the USA. The US imports more merchandises and goods from China than from other states. The United States has trade and government shortfalls, it borrows big quantities of capital to solve its financial problems. And for this aim the US relies mainly on China that carries on the finance of its debt (Lotta, 2009).

US Intervention Policies after the Cold War

One year after the end of the Cold War **the Persian Gulf War** started. And this was not surprising: the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 did not eliminate the antagonism and tension in the region. The US officials misjudged the profoundness of Iraqi disaffection against Kuwait as well as the desire of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to remove that disillusionment and broaden Iraq's power (Brands, 2004). And Hussein undervalued the insult he would give the United States and the international community by the annexation of its neighbor in 1990. The most important issue here was oil. The administration of George Herbert Bush did not want to allow Iraq to seize the oil reserves of Kuwait (Brands, 2004). In August 1990 the US deployed at about 200.000 troops in Saudi Arabia (Salinger, 1995). This aimed to defend Saudi Arabia if Iraq went beyond Kuwait. However, in November the US deployed another 200.000 troops. And this was not a defense anymore: this was a strategy to liberate Kuwait.

The European Community and Japan had joined the US to put embargo on oil supplies from Iraq and Kuwait (Brands, 2004). The coalition that was created to fight Iraq comprised 39 countries, including the United States, Saudi Arabia, France, Britain and other NATO allies,

Afghanistan, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and others (CNN, 2013). With the backing of the UN the United States together with the coalition troops invaded Kuwait in February 1991 (Salinger, 1995). The Gulf war impacted negatively the world economies, including the US. Many countries such as Germany, Japan, US and others cut off the trade credits with Iraq (Brands, 2004). The latter suffered many sanctions from the international community after the war. Nevertheless, the Bush administration could have prevented Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait knowing about the existing tension along the border with Kuwait by commencing a tough military action that President Clinton did four years later (Salinger, 1995).

In 1996 the Clinton administration ordered missile attacks against Iraq in reply to the assault of the Iraqi forces against the **Kurdish led city of Irbil in northern Iraq**. The cruise missile attacks in 1996 segregated Clinton from allies that had backed the wide-ranging coalition that started the war against Iraq in 1991. In 1996, Britain was the only country that intensely supported Clinton. The UN resolutions forbidding the persecution of Iraqi minorities would be quite reasonable in this case. But dispatching cruise missiles on its own to a country for not being able to solve an internal problem peacefully, would definitely make all the allies withdraw from cooperating (Fisher, 1998). In 1998 Clinton threatened once more to bomb Iraq because of its refusal to give the UN full entrée to inspect its spots for plausible existence of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The strikes did not take place as settlement was achieved between Iraq and UN on the above mentioned provisions. However, the US made it obvious that the use of force would remain an alternative if Iraq did not act in accordance with with the UN rules and inspections. This set a ground for the Iraq War of 2003.

On the rise of 21st century after the events of September 11, the President of the United States George Walker Bush declared that the world would not be safe from terrorists until the Middle East was safe for democracy. The administration of Bush was considering that a demonstrated aptitude for retaliation and preemptive actions and inhibition in **Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq 2003** would convince Al-Qaeda that the United States could not be driven out from the Middle East (Gaddis 2005). And this would also prevent other states in the region from supporting terrorism in the future. Thus, after the events of 9/11 the defensive strategies of the US attained an aggressive nature, even ignoring the international law (Yordán, 2006).

Who, after all, besides the United States could topple down Saddam Hussein – the dictator who had started wars, abusing his people, aiding the terrorists, ignoring the resolutions of the United Nations? However, this grand strategy of Bush's administration did not succeed. The war in Iraq obtained much lesser international support than the administration expected. The reasons were numerous: the absence of proof that the dictator of Iraq had **WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction**, the hardship of setting a reliable link between **Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda**, Bush's decision to go to war despite the **disapproval of the UN Security Council** (Gaddis 2005). Bush's decision to invade Iraq without taking into account the international opinion was explained as a component of a strategy aiming to create an American empire (Yordán, 2006). The second goal was the abolition of the Al-Qaeda network. The US was arguing that the democratization of Iraq would become a precedent for the other Middle Eastern countries and promote values which would reduce people's desires to join terroristic establishments and would make them more inclined towards the partnership with the US.

Moreover, the US military presence in the Middle East would create a possibility to respond to the challenges in Central and South Asia and in the Caucasus. Besides, the US's

supremacy in Europe and East Asia would hold back the latent challengers from challenging its hegemony. These tactics emerged because of the fear that Russia or China could dominate Central or South Asia (Yordán, 2006). The economic reason was the following: the oil industry of Iraq would augment the world oil supplies, thus reducing the price of oil and strengthening the economy of the US which was another step towards universal hegemony.

Another country affected by the intervention of the United States after the Gulf War was the **former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia**. The Yugoslavian conflicts began in 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia, propelling the Serb forces in Croatia and Bosnia to use arms against the Croats and Muslims (Alexander, 1999). At the outset, Croats and Serbs stretched their territorial control at the expense of the Bosnian state with the Serbs backed by Serbia and the Yugoslav National Army which soon took the seventy percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory under their control (Office of the Historian, 2013). These advancements were accompanied by ethnic clashes.

The UN was largely involved in the defense against ethnic cleansing and has dispatched a Protection Force in Bosnia to restore the peace. The organization established a **no-fly-zone over Bosnia in 1992** to ensure the safety of the transfer of humanitarian assistance and created "safe areas" in the Muslim districts of several cities (Alexander, 1999). **NATO** was charged by the **UN** with the duty to ensure there were no flights in the zone. For the first time NATO was authorized by the UN to intervene in a conflict for humanitarian purposes (Alexander, 1999). However, in the summer of 1993 the attacks of Serbs launched attacks against UN peacekeepers in the safe area of Srebrenica gave the US the possibility to initiate the airstrikes with its NATO allies (Sobel, 1998). The United States even guided the creation of a Contact group the aim of which was to formulate peace agreements (Office of the Historian, 2013). The conflict continued till

1995 and ended with a cease-fire and the signing of Dayton Accords which was establishing peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Mackinnon (2007) demonstrates the way of NATO's intervention in **Kosovo**. He states that the West with the help of NATO was demanding the overthrow of Yugoslavia's Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in 1999. The ethnic Albanians in Kosovo situated in the territory of Serbia were refused to be given independence by Milosevic which turned into a clash between Serbian authorities and Kosovar population (Alexander, 1999). NATO was threatening with military airstrikes in case Milosevic did not take out his soldiers from Kosovo. The US embassy in Belgrade had even closed down (Mackinnon, 2007). The massacres of about fifty ethnic Albanians in Kosovo which Milosevic's government was justifying as a police operation, prepared a ground for the United States and NATO to intervene.

Seventy-eight days of NATO's bombing of Serbia ended by such developments that were being prepared long ago: the exiled American embassy did not have any contacts with Milosevic's government, only with the opposition. Even Russia had a role in negotiating a ceasefire, however, Milosevic was overthrown and the opposition came to power (Mackinnon, 2007). Not similar to other post-Cold War humanitarian interventions approved by the UN, NATO did not have a clear instruction from the Security Council to do so. Eventually the Council had endorsed the action, but this did not happen before the end of the bombings which had resulted in the expulsion of million refugees from the province (Alexander, 1999).

It is noteworthy to mention that during the mass bombings of Belgrade and other cities and towns of Serbia by NATO which took place from March 24 to June 11, 1999 and which was called Operation Allied Force, **the Chinese embassy in Belgrade** was bombed too (Trojanovic,

2013). However, this mission was envisioned to bomb targets such as ammunition loadings, fuel storages, military airstrips, important infrastructure, but embassies were not included in their plans. Many analysts link this incident to the “not friendly” relations of US and China, having in mind that the US was responsible for the eighty three percent of all the military actions in Operation Allied Force. During the night the embassy was bombed an American aircraft was on call, that is why the Americans took most of the blame, and not NATO. Moreover, it was the American company “The National Imagery and Mapping Agency” that released maps in the US that were out of date (Trojanovic, 2013).

The intrusion of NATO in Yugoslavia put an end to the aspirations of Croatia and Serbia for regional hegemony. NATO’s presence in the Balkans is accompanied by the creation of hardships that aim to turn aside the domestic challenges (Vogel, 2000). The issue of Kosovo was a big threat to regional stability, and NATO took up again the role of the peacekeeper, even though through military operations.

As the Iraq War of 2003, so the **Afghanistan War of 2001** was launched as a response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In the framework of the “War on Terror” the Bush administration began a combat against the **Taliban government of Afghanistan** (Jacobson, 2010). The Taliban had been controlling most of the country since 1996, allowing the organization of **Al-Qaeda** to have training camps in the country, but the government was defeated and ousted in November 2001 by the American and British armed forces and a number of Afghan fighters from the so-called group “Northern Alliance” (BBC, 2012). The US believed that **Osama Bin Laden** – the head of Al-Qaeda was responsible for the terrorist attacks of 9/11. There was a huge international pressure on Taliban to hand him over, but as the Afghan leaders did not do anything, the US made a decision to use armed forces, and this is how the bombing of Afghanistan began,

targeting Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda fighters and the Taliban. By the end of November the allied forces took Kabul under their control and banished the Taliban from the city (BBC, 2012).

Nonetheless, the the United States was incapable of outspreading its control on most of the country which gave the Taliban the opportunity to reorganize and start a guerilla insurrection that developed highly operative after 2005 (Jacobson, 2010). The troops from the UK, US and other NATO countries have been staying in Afghanistan since 2001, putting efforts in the stabilization of the country (BBC, 2012). In 2011, after ten years, Osama Bin Laden was finally found in Pakistan by American forces and killed (BBC, 2012).

The United States, Russia and the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring was a chain of uprisings and demonstrations that rose in Tunisia in the winter of 2010-2011 and spread to Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and other Arab countries (Rozsa, 2012). The main causes that fostered this turmoil were more or less the same – domestic dissatisfaction with high unemployment rates, human rights violations, deep poverty and lack of democracy (Rozsa, 2012).

In August of 2012 the governments of four countries – **Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen** were already ousted. President Ben Ali of Tunisia escaped from the country in January 2011 in the rouse of the protests, the President of Egypt Hosni Mubarak resigned in February 2011, the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi was toppled down after wide-spread revolts and international military intervention and was killed in October 2011. The President of Yemen also resigned in February. In March 2011 vast protests started demanding the removal of President Bashar Al-Assad which turned into a bloody and long civil war between Assad's forces and the opposition (Rozsa, 2012). In Egypt and Tunisia the neutral role of the military had taken away

the vital instrument of suppression from the government, and the opposition demonstrators did not apply for or obtain outside engagement (Keiswetter, 2012). In both occasions, the temper of the military is partially a result of the soft power consequence of the substantial training and support by the US and the West over decades.

NATO's military intervention in Libya was rapid and decisive. In March 2011 under the authority of Security Council Resolution of the UN the organization launched military activities to defend the people of Libya from the assaults of Qaddafi (Rasmussen, 2011). Why NATO acted particularly in Libya and not in the other countries, the Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen explains by the strong directive of the Security Council and firm support from the countries in the region. According to the words of the General, the Arab spring has shown the significance of strengthening the political dialogue between NATO and Middle Eastern countries (Rasmussen, 2011). However, it is remarkable to mention that the US, France and Britain have operated as the chief driving powers in the Libyan crisis. President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister David Cameron had a great contribution in setting the vote for the UN Security Council Resolution №1973 (Gomis, 2011).

Even though the bilateral headship of France and UK has been enabled by the durable strategic settlement between the two main guarantors of European defense, some variances have emerged among their defensive strategies during the international summits on Libya. France was insisting that a Franco-British military directive should have a guiding role in the operations. This was not consistent with UK's assertion that NATO is the most suitable organization that duty (Gomis, 2011). Moreover, international negotiations on Libya created political confrontations among other countries, including Germany, Italy, France and Turkey. The latter

has had a big role in the international negotiations, reaffirming its own global influence, by remarkably proposing to perform as an intermediary between NATO and Libya.

For half a century, the policy of the United States in the Middle East has been led by a number of essential security goals. Firstly, it aimed to deter any country in the region from becoming a hegemon. Secondly, it intended to safeguard the free movement of energy resources which was very important for the performance of world economy. And thirdly, it envisioned mediating a long-lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors, comprising the Palestinian Arabs (Kissinger, 2012). During the last decade, Iran has risen as the main withstanding power to all these three goals. With the start of the Arab Spring; the enactment of these objectives has become more imperative.

From a political standpoint, the Libyan crisis has uncovered vital strategic tasks within NATO. Firstly, economic concerns have been a remarkably significant worry. In the United States and Europe, the leaders and exterior spectators signaled the monetary limitations that the countries had to face before getting involved in another military action (Gomis, 2011). Moreover, the latest budget cuts carried out throughout the Alliance have supposedly restricted the capabilities of many countries to fulfill progressive and noteworthy changes in the long term.

For a long time wars were claimed to have a positive impact on the economic rise of the country. Currently, when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have cost more than a trillion dollars since 2001, these suppositions obviously need to be reconsidered (Gomis, 2011). The United States, which previously took the lead of the initial actions in Libya, has left the political guidance to France and Britain, while handing over military directive to NATO on March 27.

During the Arab Spring Turkey arose as a tougher player and an important US ally in its Middle Eastern diplomacy (Keiswetter, 2012).

The operation in Libya has exposed three central realities about military intrusion nowadays. Firstly, the assertions that Afghanistan was to be NATO's last out-of-zone undertaking, have turned up to be false, showing that security is always unforeseeable. Secondly, it was demonstrated that besides the "frontline capabilities, such as fighter-bombers and warships, so-called enablers, such as surveillance and refueling aircraft, as well as drones, are critical parts of any modern operation" (Rasmussen, 2011, p. 3). And thirdly, it was revealed that NATO allies do not have a shortage of military facilities. To put it another way, Libya is a notice of how essential it is for NATO.

Throughout the Arab Spring Russia did not initiate any active involvement in the Middle East. During the uprisings in Tunisia Moscow's reactions and attitudes towards the developments was more or less coincided with those of the West (Katz and Fairfax, 2011). Despite the fact that many Russian observers and analysts were labelling the protests in the Arab world as US-backed "color revolutions"; the government adopted a very cautious stance on these events. Moscow was all the time urging the peaceful resolution of the conflicts. Despite the fact that the Russia had more support for the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak before his demise, it rapidly understood the essence of a steady and democratic Egypt. However, Russia demonstrated a different approach towards the uprisings in Libya. On the contrary to Egypt and Tunisia where the change of the regimes took place peacefully with no outside intervention, Libya's President Muammar Qaddafi was struggling against its challengers and was on the edge of defeating them (Katz and Fairfax, 2011).

During the uprisings in Libya Russia's Medvedev pointed out that the foreign players were propelling the uprisings aiming to spread the political change in Russia. Prime Minister Putin was also emphasizing the the external intrusion could foster the rise of Islamists which, in its turn, could have a negative impact for other regions, comprising Russia's **North Caucasus**. Nonetheless, Russia together with China abstained from using their veto on the UN Security Council Resolution №1973 that authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone in Libya, and the resolution passed (Katz and Fairfax, 2011). Russia is a conservative actor with a traditional insight of sovereignty and the tenet of non-intervention (Erenler, 2012). This approach makes Russia lean on the wait-and-see policy during the changes in international arena which has shaped Russian foreign policy towards being responsive rather than revolutionary (Erenler, 2012).

It was clear that Russia's good relations with the West, the US and the Arab League were very valuable for it, despite its initial disaffection with the Western military interventions. Later on Medvedev also claimed that Qaddafi should leave, and even put forward its mediation and sent its representatives to Libya for the talks with both Qaddafi and the insurgents (Katz and Fairfax, 2011). Since the Collapse of the Soviet Union Russia avoids a direct confrontation with the West, even when their interests diverge in many situations. Instead of direct clash, Russia works on the extension of the struggle for its interests over time which is seen in its policies towards Georgia, Ukraine and other countries (Erenler, 2012). **Russia's passive politics** during the Arab Spring and its non-intervention in the Middle East was an allusion for the West to keep out from Caucasus and Central Asia Besides, Russia' passive behavior was conditioned with the fact that it has over 20 million Muslim population and is surrounded by Muslim-populated Asian

countries where it is important to strengthen Russian influence in order to sustain its energy empire (Erenler, 2012).

The Syrian and Ukrainian Crises

Despite the fierce suppressions, extensive resistance and hostility against the Assad regime was continuing. **The West** was harshly condemning the regime and demanding imposition of **sanctions against Syria** (Katz and Fairfax, 2011). Under the rule of Bashar al-Assad Syria supported Iran's policies in the Levant and Mediterranean. It assisted Hamas that does not recognize the state of Israel, and Hezbollah, which weakens Lebanon's unity and coherence. Thus, the strategic interests of the United States dictated to act against the Assad regime and to reassure the similar attitude of the international community (Kissinger, 2012).

In contrast to the West, Russia was supporting the Assad regime and regarding it as an ally. Moreover, **Russia and China** prevented the approval of the UN Security Council resolution which aimed to put economic sanctions on the Assad regime in reaction to its handling of the insurgencies. This was conditioned by Russia's worries that the approval of such kind of a resolution would lead to the intervention of NATO in Syria as it had happened in Libya. In this case Russia would suffer the loss of its greatest associate in the Middle East, its entrée to naval facilities at Tartus, the intense arms dealings and its shares in oil and other segments of Syria's economy (Katz and Fairfax, 2011). It is in the interests of Russia to preserve a military base in the Middle East and Tartus is considered to be Russia's preference as a location for this aim (Malashenko, 2013).

Since the start of the Arab Spring and the overthrow of Qaddafi the political conditions did not seem favorable for Russia - the new government of Libya was dissatisfied with Moscow

for which the only existing associate in the region was the leader of Syria. But Russia's support for the existent regime in Syria obtained international disapproval and destroyed its influence in the Arab countries, by turning it into an enemy for many Sunni Muslims. Apart from the geopolitical interests **Russia** also had economic concerns which required **backing Assad's regime**. The major concern was the issue of Russia's gas exports. The insecure situation in Syria would disable the plans of Qatar and Iran to construct gas pipelines through Syria, depriving Russia of additional time to advance its own gas projects - Nord Stream and South Stream (Malashenko, 2013).

The West supposed that the overthrow of Assad would result in the establishment of a democratic government. However, Russia was worried that this would foster the rise of a fundamentalist Sunni regime which is both anti-Western and anti-Russian. These fears were especially conditioned by the efforts of Saudi Arabia to spread **radical Sunni Islamism** to Chechnya and the territory of the former USSR before the 2003 Saudi-Russian rapprochement after which Saudi Arabia welcomed Russia's solution for Chechnya. Nevertheless, now Saudi Arabia was trying to use the Arab Spring for its own political interests by assisting Salafists in Egypt and Libya, repressing Shias in Bahrain, and putting forward the pro-Saudi Sunni regime in Syria instead of pro-Iranian Alawite minority regime (Katz and Fairfax, 2011).

In the eyes of Russia the Western interventions in Syria would have the same disastrous results as they had in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya and that this would have a long-term negative impact on Russian interests. Russia believed that if the intentions of the United States to struggle against the overthrow of the Assad were serious, it would have organized a coalition and intervened without taking into consideration the approval of **UN Security Council** (Katz and Fairfax, 2011). Trying to regain its influence in the Arab countries and prevent the armed

intervention of the West in Syria Russia took up a mediating role to forge an agreement by which Assad would hand in the chemical weapons of its regime. And this was suggested in September 2013 after President Obama had declared that the United States was going to set up a military strike against Assad's regime which had used regularly used chemical weapons against civilians (Malashenko, 2013).

Ukraine's most lengthy and dreadful crisis since it became independent from the Soviet Union began as a protest against the reluctance of the government to establish closer trade connections with the EU and this fomented a global stalemate between Russia and the West. The crisis originated from nearly twenty years of frail governance, oligarch – ruled economy, strong dependence on Russia, and harsh ethnic, religious and other variances between the eastern and western parts of Ukraine. After the overthrow of President Yanukovich in February 2014, Russia took the grip of the **Crimean Peninsula**. This gestured Moscow's aim to regain its zone of influence and cast a doubt on the aptitude of the new frontrunners of the country to ensure steadiness and a route to effective transformations (McMahon, 2014).

As Kissinger points out, the West must realize that Ukraine can never become just an overseas country for Russia. It was a part of the Kievan-Rus where from the Russian religion disseminated. Their histories were interwoven. Many of the vital battles for the liberty of Russia, including the Battle of Poltava in 1709, were fought on the territory of Ukraine (Kissinger, 2012). The Black Sea Fleet, symbolizing Russia's power in the Mediterranean, has been based and present in Sevastopol, a port city in Crimea according to a bilateral accord between the two countries (Kissinger, 2012; McMahon, 2014). The European Union must comprehend that its negotiations with Ukraine to establish closer ties between them resulted in a crisis (Kissinger, 2012). Ukraine is vital for Russia in terms of energy trade; it is a significant market for Russia

and is a transit for the eighty percent of Russia's natural gas which is being sent to Europe (McMahon, 2014).

The Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated the inadequacy of the EU as a soft power and the fact that the United States has become very aloof and detached from the region. The severe sanctions which are being added and carried out, are surely a great harm for Russia's economy, but from future perspective, the world is moving away from Western supremacy (Wilson, 2014).

Moscow has depicted the unification of Crimea with Russia as a legal and valid settlement between two sovereign governments. Russian leaders were claiming that the separation of Crimea from Ukraine and the referendum by which the population of Crimea decided to unite with Russia were arrangements that completely corresponded to the international law. However, the Western powers were strongly at loggerheads with these claims. They considered this an annexation - infringement of international lawful principles, and many politicians regarded this as one of the most substantial challenges to the existing world order after the end of the Cold War. Many territories throughout the world have proclaimed independence in the last decades, but mainly have not been formally united with other states. For instance, **Abkhazia and South Ossetia** separated from Georgia which was followed by **Georgia's brief war with Russia in 2008**, and Russian armed forces are still present in these territories, but Russia has not launched any actions towards making them part of it (Sukhov, 2014).

The annexation of Crimea followed by the separatist movements in **Donetsk and Lugansk** which turned into a severe war between them and the government fomented more tension between Russia and the West. Reports that the White House might provide direct

military support to Kiev first appeared in February, after the fast advances of the separatists that strongly alarmed the Pentagon (Freeman et al, 2015).

After having signed the **New START nuclear arms reduction treaty** five years earlier, the US and Russia have witnessed a stalemate in their relations. The Ukrainian crisis stimulates reciprocal allegations and lightly oblique hazards of nuclear war (Bodner, 2015).

The prolonged conflict the costly consequences of which have impacted the economy of both Europe and Russia, together with Ukraine, had led to long-lasting negotiations between the Kiev government, Germany, Russia, and France who were trying to find a way out of the conflict. **The Minsk II ceasefire**, which was put into practice from February 15, 2015, is centered on **Minsk I peace contract of September 2014**, which was unsuccessful. The agreement presupposed instantaneous two-sided ceasefire; removal of all substantial weapons by the two sides; effective monitoring of the points mentioned above by the OSCE. As the contract stated, from the first day of the removal a dialogue must have been started on conducting local elections in the self-proclaimed independent regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, amnesty must have been fulfilled that would prohibit the prosecution of the persons involved in the conflict, and all the captives and illegally imprisoned people must be released (Talukdar, 2015). However, these provisions have not been fully sustained.

The World System and Political Conditions after the Cold War

After having examined the details and events that took place after the end of the Cold War, it is possible to gain insight how the world politics was shaped during this period (See Chart 2). The world after the Cold War was characterized by being multipolar, by changing

“borders”, active terrorism and the the launch of a global war against it. Many large-scale crises took place during this era, such as the former Yugoslavian crises, Middle East crises, the Syrian and Ukrainian crises. New alliances were formed: the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the NATO and EU have started enlargement processes as a result of which they encircled the borders of Russia, by accepting as members many ex-Communist countries.



Chart 2 (source: author – Arshaluys Barseghyan)

Analysis

Hypothesis: Despite the changing world conditions since the end of the Cold War, the interests of individual states remain as before, best captured by realism theory that emphasizes the balance of power, self-protection and pursuit of either alliances or self-help toward maintaining stability and security.

As the literature review suggests, there are several issues and conditions which point to a certain change in the international relations after the Cold War and at the same time reveal some tendencies leading to the revival of the Cold War, but this seems to be a new Cold War, as the actors in the international arena have changed, the polarity of the world has changed. Then, the question is why this should be considered a New *Cold War*? The study suggests that the tactics, the policies and the worldview that persisted during the Cold War era, are merely the same now, only with different interpretations and different global players and unions: that is why the years following the Cold War era can be considered as a New Cold War.

However, all these assumptions and all the issues derived from the literature review require a wide deliberation, elucidation and analysis to be supported and proved.

Thus, what has been put forward for consideration till now? Firstly, the bipolar world system has crashed down by the fall of the Soviet Union, after which the world continued to be unipolar; however, this did not last long as new regional players emerged that began to aspire for global power. And this has led to a multipolar world system where Russia, the United States, China, Japan, the EU, NATO and other states, blocks and alliances have a key role in the international arena.

Secondly, if during the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union were competing in an arms race and developed their own nuclear weapons the existence of which was preventing a major war to escalate; now new states have entered the nuclear period. Countries such as India, Pakistan, China, Israel, North Korea, and Iran pursue nuclear policies and continue nuclear enrichment programs. And while the nuclear arms race between the US and SU was more or less balancing the situation, the increasing number of nuclear states does not provide any balance in the world.

Thirdly, the nuclear age is becoming far more perilous compared with the Cold War era, as unprecedented terroristic movements have risen and entail the danger of creating their own nuclear armaments.

Fourthly, the global struggle of the United States against the Islamic terrorists supports its intervention policies in the Middle East aiming to overthrow the existing dictatorial regimes – something that reminds of the Cold War policies of the US that sought to protect the self-determination of the nations. By the war on terror the United States acquired a leading position in safeguarding the global security. Besides, the war against terrorism entails some ideological components as it is directed towards extremists and militants who have their own beliefs and dogmas and do not share those of the West.

Fifthly, Russia's foreign policy after the Cold War has not changed much either: the autonomy that Russia has sought to preserve, the establishment of the CIS, the unwillingness to be integrated into Western institutional structures and be included in NATO and EU point out that antagonism towards the West has not disappeared. Besides, the EU and NATO enlargement through ex-Soviet states, NATO's engagement in Yugoslavian conflicts still indicate that there

are some remnants from the ideological conflict of the Cold War or maybe this is just a struggle for spheres of influence which was also a dominant state of affairs throughout the Cold War.

Sixthly, the spread of capitalistic regime and democratic standards by the US that are confronted by some Asian states, also signify that identity issues have not been overcome yet, and different civilizations continue to see otherness towards each other.

Seventhly, China's upswing to a superpower position challenges to alter the world system and awakes the concerns of the United States which becomes more engaged in the competition with China, entailing nuclear, economic and political areas, such as the tension over Taiwan which is one of the largest trade partners of the US.

And eighthly, since the end of the Cold War, states have not stopped seeing a threat in each other. As states got involved into alliances to secure themselves during the Cold War, so they do now. The only fact that after the nullification of the Soviet threat and the fall of the Warsaw Pact NATO survived and continued to expand, seeing some minor security threats, proves that the Cold War thinking is present till now. So does the creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Eurasian Economic Union.

The polarity of the world is explained in realism by the balance of power. As indicated above, all states seek for power and maximization of their interests. During the Cold War the bipolar world has mostly ensured stability and balance in the world and the possession of nuclear power also helped deter the global-scale wars. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the predominance of the US came into being, however it did not last long as there could be no balance in a unipolar world, and other states started countervailing the US by fostering the rise of

their material power and pursuing nuclear policies, and this balance was gradually filled by the emergence of multiple global players.

The existence of alliances during the Cold War and after it indicates that defensive realism has always persisted. Even after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact NATO survived because states were seeking maximization of their security. And later on new alliances emerged.

However, the state of affairs was not limited to ensuring security. Many wars have taken place since the end of the Cold War, such as the war in Iraq in 2003, the Gulf-War, GWoT which indicate that the policies of the United States entailed features of offensive realism. Russia's policies in Georgia also fall into this category.

Despite the fact that the terroristic movements have advanced since the end of the Cold War, states still remain the main actors in international relations and there is a tendency among terrorists to incorporate terrorism into the ruling system of a country, and thus terrorists stop to remain non-state actors.

Meanwhile, constructivists argue that material reality shaped by the human ideas and cognizance represents the behavior of states in international affairs, how they perform and interact and how their dealings change the structure of the world system. The identity of the nations created by the milieu, in which they live, determines their self and makes them distinct from other nations. This distinction often fosters misunderstanding and hostility between nations of different identities, and they begin seeing threats in each other. This invokes a desire for each identity to spread its own principles and norms and make them dominant. This is what happened with the identities of the US and SU during the Cold War. The fact that it was also called an ideological war finds its explanation in the identity of each block. Russia's imperialistic motives

which were transformed into Communism and US's liberal values were incompatible, thus creating aspirations of eliminating each other which has actually taken place by the collapse of the SU.

Moreover, the misunderstanding between the West and the Islamic world can also be explained through constructivist thought: the difference of civilizations makes for each of them unacceptable the values and norms of the other which leads to a confrontation.

Despite the fact that the Cold War has ended officially in 1989 by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the tactics and the policies pursued by the states have not, in fact, changed much. What have really changed are the world political conditions. Chart 1 and Chart 2 demonstrate the change in these conditions during and after the Cold War, highlighting the most important events and facts. As already mentioned, during the Cold War, the world was categorized as being bipolar, having the United States and the Soviet Union as the central world superpowers that were competing in almost every sphere: political, economic, nuclear, ideological, territorial, etc. Each of these two blocks was trying to spread its own ideology, its own ruling system and its spheres of influence. The world was divided into two parts – countries that were aligning themselves either to the US or to the SU. Of course, there were the Third World countries, too. These were the ones that did not align themselves neither to the East nor to the West. The developing countries of Africa, Latin America, Oceania and Asia were among these states which had neutral political orientation.

When the Cold War was on the edge of its start, the United States was in a very favorable situation: it has participated in the World War 2 mainly by the supply of arms and weaponry which has fostered the rise of its industrial and economic development. Meanwhile, the Soviet

Union has walked out from the war with completely devastated economy. And the US was using this situation to put pressure on the USSR and to gain more spheres of influence, especially in Eastern Europe. However, the Soviets were not retreating either and were using their own political tools to dictate their own rules of the game. But the economic conditions were not the only leverage that the United States of America was using against the Soviets. The atomic diplomacy started by the United States and then continued by the Soviet Union was decisive in determining the power of each side, thus polarizing the world and making the rivalry between them even more perilous. However, despite the existing hazards, the history has shown that the nuclear arms did have a deterring influence, and the fact that each of the blocs had its own nuclear weapons, was balancing the situation in the world.

It is interesting to notice that after the end of the Cold War the economic conditions in the United States and the former Soviet Union were the same: the economy of the USSR was ruined, but the United States, again, was witnessing economic rise. There was no Soviet Union anymore, and its former member states, including Russia, had to reconstruct their economy. And by the collapse of the USSR, only one superpower remained in the world, the United States. The world became unipolar; however, Russia still remained the only nuclear country that was able to destroy the United States geographically.

But according to realism, the unipolar world system cannot last for a long time, as the superpower gets involved in many activities outside its boundaries in order to maintain the stability of the world, and thus gets enfeebled. Secondly, in spite of its efforts to preserve the stability, only one superpower cannot fill the blankness of power and keep the balance. During the Cold War the US and USSR were more or less keeping the balance by the presence of the

nuclear weapons, by their allies or by having simply divided the world into the East and the West.

During the Cold War the the policies of the two superpowers to spread their own ideology, to gain more spheres of influence, and the minor wars that took place outside the territory of the United States and Soviet Union, indicate that they were seeking for more power. Of course, the alliances that they have created (the NATO and Warsaw Pact) were formally seeking to ensure the security of each side; however, when exploring the history in more detail, it becomes obvious that the wars in Vietnam, Korea or Afghanistan were conducted to expand the zones of influence. As China had become Communistic, the United States could not stay apart from intervening in Korea or Vietnam and letting them being captured by the Communist regime. And the interventions in the countries in the Far East were seeking to strengthen their power in the region. That is why the period of the Cold War is mainly explained by classical realism.

By using the advantage of its multipolar predominance, during the first years following the Cold War, the US began its humanitarian intervention policies in different regions to strengthen its influence in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and the Balkans. At this time-period the former Soviet bloc was not participating in the interventions, as it was busy with the reconstruction of its economy.

Besides, during the mentioned period other states began to pursue nuclear policies and acquire nuclear weapons which made the situation even dangerous. The more nuclear powers there are in the world, the more difficult it is to preserve the balance of power. The bipolar system was working like a scale which had two weights. But how can the scale which has several

weights or more weights on one side than on the other, function sufficiently and then keep the balance? This is impossible. That is why the multipolar world system is so complicated.

In the present multipolar system the world nuclear powers try to use their nuclear possessions as a political leverage on their enemies or rivals to solve the existing political, territorial or economic issues in their own favor. And those states which do not possess nuclear armament or do not have an alliance with any nuclear states are being attacked or intervened by others. It seems that a complete anarchy reigns the world. This is also supported by the fact that terroristic organizations have emerged, such as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban which have made the world system unbalanced and even threaten the existence of other nations or ethnic minorities as it is in the case of ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant).

Even the international organizations which were supposed to preserve the peace in the world are not able to keep the balance, as they do not possess sufficient enforcing institutions. And even if they do, their requirements are not always being respected. For instance, how many times the UN resolutions have been ignored by different states at war or during the humanitarian interventions of NATO?

As long as it seems that the mess of the multi-polarity continues, the political conditions seem to return to the East-West confrontation. Maybe this is being done to restore the balance in world affairs. And the preserver of this balance is Russia, together with China.

During the interventions of the United States in Yugoslavia and the Gulf region, including the Iraq war of 2003, the politics of the US was more characterized as offensive. Even the Global War on Terrorism which was claimed to be a defensive response to the terrorist

attacks of 9/11 is not defensive in its nature because it gives the US the opportunity to attack terrorists or terroristic states all over the world even if there is not a direct threat toward itself.

Throughout this time Russia was being silent in international arena, but still putting much effort in the strengthening of its borders and in the restoration of its influence upon the former Soviet countries. The war in Chechnya, the war over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and its policies avoiding direct confrontation with the West are proving these.

However, despite the elimination of the ideological threat, the East and the West have not ever stopped seeing an enemy in each other. This fact is supported by the perseverance of NATO alliance after the Cold War which continued its expansionist policies till reaching Russia's zones of influence. And it was at this moment when Russia abandoned its silent politics and returned to the struggle. Nevertheless, despite being silent, Russia has also been viewing the West as rival. This is supported by Russia's non-integration into the structures of NATO and EU.

Moreover, Russia has been engaged in creating its own regional alliances such as the CIS, the CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization. The same refers to China which is engaged in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which aims to counterbalance the role of the United States in Central Asia. And then the Eurasian Economic Union was created to counterbalance the EU and its influence. It is interesting that all these three organizations initiated by Russia (CIS, CSTO, EEU) include countries that were formerly Communistic which indicates once more that Russia has always been seeking to preserve its prior leading role in the region.

When the Western intervention policies have come closer to the Russian zones of influence, Russia became more engaged in the international arena, and the East-West confrontation began to revive.

By the emergence of the Arab Spring and NATO's intervention in Libya Russia already became very concerned and started blaming the West in organizing the "color revolutions" of the Middle East. However, it did not want to be confronted with the West, so it did not oppose to these policies.

Nonetheless, the situation deteriorated when the Syrian crisis appeared in the history of international affairs. It was in this instant that Russia began to act more seriously. The reason is that Syria was one of the strategic partners of Russia in the region. Besides, the fall of the Assad regime and its replacement with a democracy would foster the upswing of the radical Sunni regime which did not except neither Western nor Russian policies. This is the reason why Russia began providing large support for Assad's regime. However, this even worsened Russia's relations with the Arab world which regarded Assad as an enemy.

The conflict in Syria with Russian and American engagement resembled very much the Soviet-US led wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan and other places. This proved once more that Russia's aspirations and reactions upon international affairs have only been defensive. It was just striving to keep the West out of its spheres of influence, particularly Central Asia and South Caucasus. Russia would not get involved in the Syrian crisis if it did not have such a big number of Muslim population inside and outside its territory and if did not fear that Islamic movements could have a contagious effect throughout its borders or even in Russia.

Yet, in contrast to Russia's defensive policies, the same cannot be said about the West and the United States. The interventions from the other hemisphere of the planet cannot be seen as defensive because the threat imposed by the disturbances in the East is not direct.

The relations between Russia and the United States deteriorated even more when the Ukrainian crisis and the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West came into being. The annexation of Crimea by Russia can also be characterized as part of a defensive strategy. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine which brought to power Yushchenko left Russia armless. However, the return of Yanukovych in 2010 restored the Russian influence in the country. In the aftermath, the revolution in Maidan which brought to power Poroshenko, resulted in the loss of Russia's influence which, in turn, resulted in the annexation of Crimea where the Russian naval base has always been persistent. However, it is the West that sees this as an annexation: the Russians and Crimeans keep stating that the Crimea has entered into the structure of Russia by a referendum.

The hostility between Russia and the West continues as the West accuses Russia in supporting the separatist wars in Ukraine over Donetsk and Lugansk. Besides, a hot information war has been hosted by both sides against each other. Furthermore, the claims over nuclear superiority of Russia over the United States and the conventional arms superiority of the US over Russia have been persistent throughout this time. This takes us back to the time when the Cold War ideological war was active.

It was clear since the end of the Cold War which has been a start of a new nuclear era, that one day the confrontation between Russia and the US would again explode. The relations between them resembled a dormant volcano which was going to erupt one day. This was

inevitable because a country that has once been a superpower and an imperialistic empire, could not forget its past that easily and could not stop regarding its adversary – the West as an enemy immediately. All these understandings were present in Russia's policies when it was firstly recovering from the economic burdens of the Soviet times, then it was creating regional alliances and intervening in South Ossetia after some years of pro-American Saakashvili's rise to power.

Even the multi-polarity of the world and the existence of such great powers as China, Israel, India, Pakistan and EU, the upswing of Islamic radical terrorism and the ISIL did not put an end to the rival relations of the US and Russia which were curved and sealed in their identity. The Cold War which officially ended in 1989 had just cooled down even more until it turned hot again very recently.

Furthermore, the constructivist view also explains the reasons of antagonism between Russia and the United States of America. The main reason for the tension was the difference of the identities and how they perceived each other. The United States and Russia have different norms, values and standards in their societies. They perceive the role of the man and society differently in the state. Because of these differences the Soviets had adopted Communism, and the United States aligned itself to the liberal values of capitalism which it wanted to spread all over the world.

Finally, as Chart 1 and Chart 2 and the analysis above point out, after the Cold War era, the political system has altered: the polarity changed, the number of world nuclear powers increased, the fixed political "borders" began to change because of NATO and EU encirclement which put Russia in a concerned situation as a result of which it began implementing defensive policies. The alliances have also altered: new economic and military coalitions have been created

as demonstrated above. And terrorism has emerged, especially in the Islamic world the radicalism and active actions of which were unprecedented during the Cold War.

However, despite all these changes, there are some similitudes too that persisted both during and after the Cold War. The struggle of the United States to spread democracy has never stopped and augmented even more after the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in the framework of “Washington Consensus”. During the Cold War the interventions of the USSR have been more numerous than in its aftermath. Nevertheless, those of the United States began to bear more offensive and frequent nature which has increased especially after the launch of the Global War on Terrorism that gave the United States the opportunity to play the role of the “world policeman”.

But the existence of these military interventions, no matter how changed they are, shows that the Cold War mentality has been persistent till now, and the United States and Russia do not stop from regarding each other as distinct, rival and competing powers. But as both during and after the Cold War the wars were happening outside the territories of the United States and Russia. And each of these countries wants to have a dominating influence in the Middle East, Caucasus and Far East. But the cooled relations between Russia, the United States and the EU, the imposition of sanctions against Russia by them demonstrate that the world is again becoming divided into East and West. For this reason and for the reasons mentioned above the essay concludes that this is a New Cold War in a new world system, but with old tactics and the same interests.

Conclusion

The events mentioned in the evidence and analysis showed that the confrontation between the United States and Russia did not end. Although during the first years succeeding the Cold War the antagonism has cooled down, the offensive policies of the United States, propelled by the spread of liberal democracy and its values, were continuing outside of its territories. And in this period the balance of power was not preserved, as the US was the only superpower. But after the emergence of new nuclear and economic powers and after Russia's active engagement in world politics the world began to become more stable and balanced. Russia became more involved in international arena only after it saw a threat from the West against the security its country.

The world was not characterized as being unipolar anymore. New actors appeared in the international arena: China, Russia, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The EU started to play a big role in world politics, especially in the economy, by launching its Association Agreements that proposed free trade area between the signatory countries and EU. NATO started moving closer to Russia's frontiers by which Russia began to feel concerned and launched the creation of the CSTO, Eurasian Economic Union and became included in Shanghai Cooperation Organization to counterbalance the role of the West and not to lose its full influence in former Soviet countries. This shows the major shift in the alliances and polarities of the world, giving an answer to the third and fourth research questions.

The formation of new alliances after the end of the Cold War only indicate that Russia and the US continued to see a threat in each other and were very concerned with their security. The sanctions imposed by the West on Russia have demonstrated the start of a new tense period

in the relations between the US and Russia. And Russian accusations of propelling the Middle East crises by the West were also highlighting the rivalry.

Russia's inclinations towards returning back its influence and power in the territory of the former Soviet Union verified that Russia had not stopped from perceiving itself as a dominant power and did not want to be integrated with the West. The creation of CSTO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Union and the persistence and enlargement of EU and NATO proved the existence of the distrust among Russia towards the West.

In a multipolar world it is very difficult to sustain the balance of power which was not so during the Cold War era. Now instead of two superpowers, there are more regional and global actors which have nuclear weapons. And this makes the political even more complicated, that is why the balance of power has been shaky until the 21st century. But the tense relations between Russia and United States, the Middle Eastern and Ukrainian crises into which they have fallen, have come to move all the attention of the world politics towards their rivalry between the West and Russia. And Russia began searching for new allies in East such as China which demonstrates that the US and Russia are again trying to divide the world into East and West, and this gets closer to establishing a balance of power which gives an answer to the fifth and first research questions.

In the analysis part structural realism has been used to explain the alteration in the policies of the United States and Russia, putting the main emphasis on defensive and offensive realism. Russia's policies were more defen

sive as it had to reconstruct its economy after the end of the Cold War, to solve the problems in Chechnya and other issues. That is why it did not launch offensive interventions except taking

control of the Crimean Peninsula and engaging in wars in South Ossetia. What refers to the United States, it has conducted many interventions former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan either separately or through NATO. This shows the alteration in the external politics of Russia and the USA, answering the second research question.

The difference in the perceptions of values, norms and standards between the USA and Russia indicate that they have different identities and each of them donates a special and unique attitude to its “self” and regards the opposite side as “other”. Russia’s transition from Communism to capitalism does not mean that it has got rid of Soviet mentality. Russians and the Americans have different pasts, different traditional values which makes them diverse civilizations the norms and living standards of which are clashing all the time, that is why the antagonism does not disappear between these two countries which elucidates the sixth and seventh research questions.

All these facts show that the hypothesis suggested above is proven, that the aspirations of the United States and Russia have not changed, the Cold War mentality has not changed, and that both of these powers were seeking for security, although the policies of the United States were more offensive than the ones of Russia. And the truth is that the Cold War between Russia and the US is continuing, but in the world where they are the only superpowers, but in a new multi-polar world, which is characterized by augmenting numbers of nuclear countries, large-scale terrorism coming from Asia, and other numerous territorial, economic and other tensions between various states. But this is a completely a New Cold War, as the political conditions and the world conditions have changed. The only things that remained unchanged are the tactics and perceptions of the Russia and the US towards their desires to dominate the world.

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