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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MIGRATION INTENTIONS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

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Abstract

The aim of this Master's thesis is to study political and economic factors affecting temporary and permanent emigration intentions in the countries of the South Caucasus. Through logistic analysis the study attempts to find out the differences of importance of the economic and political factors in the shaping people's intentions to emigrate temporarily or permanently. Although many researchers focus on the economic factors affecting people's migration intentions, our study shows that people's political attitudes can be more decisive for the permanent migration intentions than economic conditions. Our study also tries to understand whether in more authoritarian countries people's political attitudes are more important in determining the emigration intentions than economic factors.

Introduction

Migration is a widespread human activity dating back to the origin of our species. Developments in genetic sequencing have significantly improved our ability to observe the progress of the movements of prehistoric and historic population and have allowed to explain the migration both as a biological and as a socioeconomic process (Crawford and Campbell 2012).

Migration is a phenomenon which has always characterized and shaped human evolution since the early ages. Human being has persistently sought a location for better condition to live. In essence this complicated process of international migration have included and continues to include almost all countries, which can be both receiving or sending countries in this whole system (Pânzaru, 2013). The countries of the South Caucasus are not exceptions, and considered to be the part of this whole process.

It is important to understand the concept of “migration”. It was mostly associated with international replacement of people, involving both labor migrants and refugees. “Migration is defined as residential moves across an administrative border, which can just as well be a municipal or county border as international borders between states” (Schærström 2000, 7).

Since our analyze will compare the importance of economic and political factors on both types of migration movements, i.e. permanent and temporary migration, it is noteworthy to give the definition of that terms. "Temporary mobility is perhaps most readily defined as the complement of permanent migration: that is, as any form of territorial movement which does not represent a permanent, or lasting, change of usual residence" (Bell and Ward, 2000).

For the testing the theories of international migration two prevailing methods are used in social sciences such as revealed preferences which are the actions of people and stated preferences which are the intentions to take that action (Dalen and Henkens 2008). We use the latter methods for our analysis. Research on international migration employs the instruments of surveys in which people

answered the questions about their intention to emigrate. Why are the intentions studied? The results of the research conducted by Dalen and Henkens (2008) shows that the intentions are considered to be good predictors of future migration.

The aim of our research is to investigate the factors which affect the emigration intentions in three countries of the South Caucasus separately. We will go beyond the economic and socio-demographic factors and will accentuate the political factors as well. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and independence this countries experienced mass emigration flows, which was conditioned by the ethnic conflicts with its chaotic consequences. However now when there are relatively peaceful political circumstances, therefore it is interesting to examine and compare the motivations and the factors of current permanent and temporary emigration intentions of each country. We will attempt to find out some tendencies, to compare the economic and political determinants of the permanent and temporary migration intentions. Many researchers have focused on the economic and socio-demographic aspects of the migration and people's intentions. We will try to give an attention to people's political attitudes towards their countries' current situation and investigate how those kinds of factors can determine the intentions to migrate. In our research political factors are the people's attitude towards their current political institution like government, parliament or the court system, or the perception of the level of democracy existing in the country and opinions about the fairness of the recent national elections conducted in their country. So in the countries of the South Caucasus where there is lack of democracy with its possible negative consequences, besides economic factors, political attitudes can be decisive for the individual's decisions to migrate. In our paper we will compare the differences of importance of political factors for both permanent and temporary emigration intentions for all three countries. Furthermore we will examine the political situation in the three countries in order to rank them by their democratic level,

and we will observe depending on the regime of the country what factors play decisive role in the shaping of the people's intentions to migrate permanently or temporarily.

So, here are the hypotheses of our research which we will try to accept or reject in our conclusion.

The following are the hypotheses:

- H1: In countries with less political freedom and democratic values, political attitudes have more decisive impact on emigration intentions than economic conditions do.
- H2: For the permanent emigration intention political factors are more decisive than the economic conditions
- H3: Economic factors are more decisive for the temporary migration intention than political attitudes are

Here are the research questions that will provide a path through which we will be able to accept or reject our hypotheses. Our research questions are the following:

RQ1: What are the main variables that have a significant impact on permanent and temporary emigration intentions?

RQ2: Are the dissatisfactions with current political environment decisive for considering emigration as a permanent exit option?

RQ3: Are the economic conditions more important for the temporary migration than political attitude?

In the first part of our thesis we will discuss the socio-economic background and migrations outflows in the three countries, and then we will examine the political situation to understand the role of political environment in the shaping people's migration intentions and will rank them according their democratic level. Then we will introduce the results of our analysis and the main conclusions.

Literature Review

The wide social, economic and political bases of this mobility are various and not always identified, although they are often connected to the concept of globalization in broad terms. They comprise factors as different as international forms of labor demand and supply, the lower price of international transport, demand for and supply of labor, the relative cheapness of international transport, the emergence of systems of electronic communication, and the formation of transnational family networks (UN 2012, Philip and Zürcher 2008).

At the beginning of the twenty-first century all developed industrial nations in the world have turned into countries of immigration. Consequently, policies that rule over the number, characteristics, and terms under which immigrants enter a country have become most important political challenges throughout the world (Massey 2009). Mass flows of migrants have thus caused significant economic gains for poor countries, although these benefits were at the cost of increasing income distributions in the New World. Compared to the nineteenth century's unprecedented flows of international migration which included mostly low-skilled labor forces, the twentieth century witnessed much stricter immigration controls. Rich countries preferred the immigration of skilled and professional labor forces, i.e. they encourage the brain drain from developing countries (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2003). Besides immigration control, there was hostility towards immigrants and that could not be explained by only economic reasons. Patriotism and chauvinism can be considered as non-economic reasons for that hostility in a receiving country (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2003).

However, especially migrant workers are always exposed to social, economic, and political changes and are vulnerable in the host country. They are in uneven competition for jobs and other resources compared to the natives and are also more vulnerable to the influence of growths or falls in

international labor market. But taking into consideration all these pitfalls they prefer living in these conditions in receiving countries rather than staying in their home country (Ballard 1987).

The vast majority of all these participants of movement are stimulated by economic considerations seeking better standards of life. The one non-economic effect of these mass migrations is the formation of great social strains. Besides the migrants who are motivated by economic factors, there are people who have been moved by famine and war or who try to find a political asylum (Arnold 2011).

Most policymakers and citizens in developed countries believe they comprehend why foreigners try to find ways to enter their countries (Massey 2009). Socio-economic, political and environmental issues are core bases for migration. Concerning the labor market, migration is a kind of indicator of the imbalances in the sending countries, such as high levels of unemployment and underemployment among low-skilled workers, low salaries of skillful employees, the unemployment of low-skilled labor force and an unsatisfied demand for education and gaining of skills (Dayton-Johnson et al. 2009)

The difference of standards of living between developing and developed countries is significant, and taking into consideration cost-benefit analysis people decide to emigrate and work in developed country, where they can gain more profit (Massey 2009, Shiff and Özden 2005). According to the neoclassical economic theory degree of differences in wages among regions, or countries, and that is the reason for people to move from the regions with low-wage, high-unemployment rate to regions with high-wage, low-unemployment regions. But there is another theory called “the new economics of migration,” which do not use markets as a unit of analysis; instead it concentrates on the households, families, or other groups of connected people as unit of analysis. These units act jointly to maximize the profit and minimize the risk, therefore the particular members of family who

migrate raise their overall family income rather than markets themselves, as their unit of analysis (Mansoor and Quillin 2007, Root and De Jong 1991).

As the migration has complex nature, it is important to draw attention on the causes of the migration decision both at the micro and macro levels. At the micro level most empirical researches have tried to test microeconomic models of migration which will find out the individuals or families make their migration decision by comparing the income opportunities at other places. Through the micro level data it is possible to find a relationship between age and labor migration. Empirical analysis showed that younger people are more mobile than older worker (Stark and Bloom 1985).

One can mention the various social benefits and costs originating from labor emigration.

On the one hand, mainly in the case of the permanent emigration of skillful and professional labor force, it is clear that their departure from the country may entail serious costs for the people who stay in the country. The benefits from the emigration of professional labor are inclined to be minimal. On the other hand, the temporary emigration of unskilled and unemployed labor could produce considerable developmental gains. On the whole, the emigrated worker sent remittances which may enhance consumption standards and increase investment in their homeland (Stahl 1982). Remittances have also turned into the permanent means of income which give migrants' families opportunity to have higher standards of living, better education and health for their children (Arnold 2011).

The three models offered by the migration theory helps to explain the reasons why people choose to migrate. Those three models are “the gravity of distance models, the probability or transition matrix models on the lines of the Markov chain or the socio-logically explained chain migration, and the push-pull or cost-benefit models”. Examining the differences between these three models, it will be clear that the push-pull or cost-benefit models are most applicable models and are more of the used in the context of international labor migration. The cost-benefit model gives an opportunity to do

regression with the several independent variables of migration flows at the same time. The other two models are descriptive models rather than an explanatory and have several other pitfalls as well (Straubhaar 1986).

The push-pull theory of migration explains the economic causes of migration both in the sending and in the receiving countries. The push and pull factors cause the migration movements. The push factors can be high unemployment level, the high degree of poverty rate, lower standards of living low, demographic pressure. However these factors are not the all. The pull factors of migration considered to be the higher demand for labor forces, broader economic opportunities and political freedom in the country where migrants decides to migrate. These factors in the receiving countries are the pull factors. While from the viewpoint of economics the major factor which has an influence on the decision to emigrate is the expected high income. But there are other variables that impact significantly on the migrant's decision, such as war, ethnic discrimination and political discrimination in the home countries (Ahmad et al 2008).

The relationship between migration and development has two sides. At first economic development decrease the level of migration. The economic gap between countries promotes the migration from poor to rich countries (Koser 2007, Martin 1992, UN 2012). The other side is that the migration has influence on the development. The migrants send huge amount of money and make contributions from receiving country, and after their return to the home country they can use their knowledge, new skills and experiences (Koser 2007). On the one hand, remittances can decrease poverty and inequality, promote high levels of household savings and investment. On the other hand remittance may have upward influence on the real exchange rate and therefore decrease the competitiveness of exports. In addition there is a debate about the real impact of the remittance on the economic growth, because the part of this flow of remittances can be used for consumption rather than investment or savings.

With the help of migrating people in many cases seek to save themselves and their families from the negative effect of fragile and underdeveloped economy, from unstable market system, political and financial downturns, armed conflicts, and other potential risks. In some cases people had to leave the country by force, i.e. as a refugees (Koser 2007).

Through the example of the migration within and from Eastern Europe Carter (1993) showed that migration has conditioned by the role of ethnicity as well. Ethnic problems in the region are crucial for the stability and development, and the permanent military and ethnic conflict, political and economic instability can lead to the mass migration from the region (Carter1993).

We already have mentioned migration motivated by the differences of the standards of living or job opportunities in two geographical areas. Throughout the time the factors of migration have changed in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. After the transition, not only economic factors promoted migration, but also the desire to avoid the dangerous outcomes of conflicts and to move to a new place(Mansoor and Quillin 2007).

The former Soviet states, as a specific area of developing world, have experienced mass flows of migration in the early phase of independence. This migration tendency is promoted by the weakened traditional trade relations, mutual territorial claims, civil wars and ethnic cleansing (Grigoryan 2013). The former Soviet Union countries which are countries with high tendency of migration, concluded that there was growing role of socio-economic factors which motivated migration flows. The only solution for this continuing migration from those small countries with weak economies is government's special policy toward migration. According to them government should improve the living standards of migrant's household and it definitely will have positive impacts on labor migration (Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia 2004)

There are few research efforts which try to show the determinants of the emigration from the countries of the South Caucasus.

Based on Dermendzhieva's research, the target country for migrants from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is Russia; the most widespread reason of migration is to work abroad. According to the analysis of demographic and socio-economic causal factors of migration, the migration from these three countries in 2011 does not include mass migration of the skilled labor. And the reason for this is considered to be the high cost of migration to high-income countries. So in this region the high cost of migration hampers the brain drain from these countries (Dermendzhieva 2011).

Another author proposed to study the impact of political factors on the decision to migrate in South Caucasus. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have many shared aspects because of the common legacy of socio-economic culture during the Soviet era. However, present differences in democracy and economic conditions can provide a natural experiment how inclination to migrate reacts to diverse sets of politico-economic institutions. In 2009-2012 none of the countries in South Caucasus has experienced structural break in politico-economic institutions. If intentions to migrate for a particular class of households vary among the countries, then it should be thanks to the constant differences in political and economic determinants. So in this way Grigoryan (2013) will try to demonstrate the cross country distinctions in migration under the different not only economic but political conditions as well (Grigoryan 2013).

Armen Asatryan (2007) in his report revealed the main causes for migration from the South Caucasus. The results of the research showed that economic factors are the major basis for the migration. In general, one or more migrant of a household supports the other members of household financially. This explains the fact that people who have at least one migrant from their household are not inclined to migrate. But if the economic situation does not recover the rate of migration will increase rapidly. In this case the existence of a network of relatives and friends in the countries would make easier to migrate (Asatryan 2007)

Over the recent fifteen years the majority of migration flows from Georgia and Armenia was

directed toward Russia. In the case of Armenia, these great flows of migration are conditioned by the three factors, which are the Armenian Diaspora in Russia, the linguistic ties, and historic relations and current political relations between Russia and Armenia (Derderyan 2006).

Armenia, which was one of the developed countries during the Soviet era, had been given minimum opportunities to start creating an independent, rapidly growing country with promising future. Post Soviet legacy differentiates several phases of migration in Armenia, quite diverse in terms of causes and effects. In the findings of his research Grigoryan (2013) has found out that there is a positive relationship between migration and remittances. The macroeconomic analysis shows that the extra remittances lead to a new flow of emigration. In addition, Grigorian and Melkonyan (2008) use a nationally representative sample from Armenia to exhibit the strongly negative influence of remittances on remittance recipients work activity. This refutes the fact that remittances help to expand recipient families' production possibilities to the extent that capital and labor are compliments in the production process. However, the authors suggest that in the Armenian case households that invest more (due to remittances) would work fewer hours.

It is noteworthy to mention that in the case of Armenia, respondents' education degree had no impact on their decisions to migrate (Grigoryan 2013)

Socio-economic situation and emigration in the countries of the South Caucasus

Armenia

Both Georgia and Armenia had net immigration rates in the part of Soviet till 1980s when the economy started to deteriorate and after the breakdown of Soviet Union the situation became worse, which in its turn caused the growth of emigration. Now the economy of these countries now heavily depends on the remittances, which is the result of the increased emigration flows (ETF 2013).

A wide range of coexisting economic, social, military-political and other determinants were the reasons of these chaotic flows of migration throughout the previous two decade. From 1990 to 2005 alone almost 700,000-1,300,000 people emigrate from Armenia and settled abroad, which is 22-40% of Armenia's 2008 nominal population (UNDP 2009).

After independence in 1991, the rates of emigration increased in frequency. The period between 1992 and 1994 was characterized by massive emigration. That phase is distinguished by the change of political and societal order, and the outset of new market economy system. Emigration decisions were mostly influenced not only by social concerns, but also by mere economic issues. The general temporary (and seasonal) labor migration tendency is highly emphasized in Armenia. The main receiving country for these labor migrants is considered to be Russia. Russia is efficient destination for Armenian labors due to several 'pull' factors, such as geographically closeness, there is free visa regime, the existence of social networks, the lack of language difficulties, friendly relationship and other factors (Gevorkyan et al. 2006, Makaryan & Galstyan 2013)

The second phase was described by a noticeable decrease in emigration rate compared to the following years of independence. The net migration was about 250000 persons or 7, 8% of Armenia's population during this period. The decline of emigration flows was conditioned by the fact that the ceasefire was declared in 1994 between Azerbaijan and Armenia brokered by Russia and socioeconomic situation became more stable in Armenia (Manasyan & Poghosyan 2012).

The third period from 2000 to 2010 was characterized by less emigration flows (Manasyan & Poghosyan 2012). In this period the proportion of the net foreign direct investment in GDP increased from 3.3% in 2001 to 8.1 % in 2008. From 2000 to 2008 the economic growth accelerated, but after financial crisis decrease of remittances and exports hit Armenia's economy (Makaryan & Galsyan 2013, p. 15). The growth after crises recovered but already at slower rates.

Due to the stable economic growth in the decade before the crisis Armenia became middle-income countries. As a result economic real wages increased and the level of employment became stable (Makaryan & Galsyan 2013). The economic stabilization of this period led to the modest rate of the emigration. However, though the steady growth of GDP of Armenia has many structural difficulties concerning the economy and job opportunities which lead to the high emigration flows (Makaryan & Galsyan 2013).

The statistics on emigration from Armenia demonstrates that there are no large-scale permanent migration movements in this period. The tendency has been changed compared to the mass permanent migration in 1990s. At present the migratory tendency are characterized by the temporary labor migration. In general these types of migrants come back to Armenia in order to visit their family. In most cases they do not want to settle in Russia with their families permanently, but do not want to return to Armenia because of unemployment and low wages. Nonetheless, there would come to their homeland if they had a chance to find a job. For instance, starting from 2002 about 55000 migrants have returned to Armenia to live permanently, and the large part of these migrants were temporary labor migrant (ILO 2009).

Beside the fact that these mass outflows have their quantitative impact on population, it has an influence on public life and development in a different ways and has several consequences. For instance, the emigration can produce socio-demographic consequences, such as reduction of birth rate, distortion of the demographic balance (UNDP 2009). Generally, the consequence of this

phenomenon in Armenia lead to the decrease of population growth about 5 times in 2004 compared with 1990.

The essence of socio-economic and political effects of emigrations is that the emigration of more active and high skilled part of the population shrinks the speed or development of society.

The reduction of population is considered to a danger to national security because the number of army also reduces. Moreover there will not be enough number of consumers of goods and services to provide an effective size of production and social service infrastructure to cause be distributed the resources required for the socio-economic development of the country (UNDP 2009).

The other consequence of the migration is the moral-psychological. People are becoming more inclined to emigrate. Indifference towards the future and perspectives of the country lead to the fact that they stop to fight for the development of their own country or fight against the vicious phenomena such as injustice or violation of law. So the tolerance of such various negative phenomena cause the increase of the number of cases of violation of human right and freedom (UNDP 2009). So people prefer just to find easy way to release themselves from such obligations through emigration.

However, it is noteworthy to mention that the Armenians' intention to migrate increased during recent years. According to the survey conducted in 2007 by the National Statistical Service of RA and the Ministry of Labor and Social Issues of RA with the help of funding provided by The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 83,1 % of the people have answered that they had "no intention" or "little intention" to migrate permanently or for a long-term period, and only 5,3% of respondents have mentioned that they "definitely determined" or "probably would" to leave the country (UNFPA, 2008, p. 5).

Georgia

After the Soviet Union for Georgia emigration was a mean to survive. As a result of internal wars, secession movements and after that following economic decline and political disorder, about a million of Georgians leave their country till 2002 (about 20–25% of the total population) (Labadze & Tukhashvili 2013).

There were decisive factors that bring about the decline of the national economic output of Georgia from the beginning to the middle of 1990s. Mass flows of emigrants who leave the country permanently complemented this severe and sudden economic decline. Based on history, the Georgian civil war in the beginning of the nineties as well as ethnic clashes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have a considerably impact on the migration patterns in Georgia. Destination country for Georgia's emigrants were mainly the EU countries, the US and Russia (MPC 2013).

Although after 1995 the economy of Georgia started to grow, productivity continued to be very low, which in its turn made people emigrate to find new opportunities abroad. Moreover the rapidly growing economy of Russia after the financial crisis of 1998 was considered to be a pull factor for the Georgian emigrants (Labadze & Tukhashvili 2013). If early outflows of Georgian emigrants to Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union were ethnic in nature and involved mostly ethnic Russians who lived in Georgia. But the number of native Georgians among the emigrants increased in result of economic concerns. However, the political tense relation between these two countries and growth of irregular migration movements to Russia became the obstacles for Georgian emigrants. In 2000 Russia initiated a visa regime for Georgians while majority of CIS countries have free visa regime with Russia (IOM 2008).

Georgia's emigration flows could also be discussed by the phases. Although the first wave largely engaged ethnic factor, the second phase of migration from 1995 to 2003 was mainly characterized by the looking for better economic opportunities in other countries (Labadze & Tukhashvili 2013).

Economic decline and disorientation of the state-owned enterprises in Georgia due to the moving from planned to free market economy, reduction of the wages and increased unemployment rate have brought about the large flows of labor emigrants in this period. These flows already encompass not only ethnic groups, but also whole population of Georgia. The amount of the temporary emigrants was rising from year to year and labor migration and the remittances considered to be one of the important economic determining factor. Economic determinants are the key factors of the growth of the scales of international migration. And the impact of these determinants grows even more in the period of transition or crisis. Georgia is not an exception, especially when the temporary movements abroad are taken into consideration (Badurashvili 2004).

The study of Badurashvili (2004) showed that the economic concerns are the main factors for the irregular migrants. However, the survey conducted during the study demonstrated majority of the Georgians will prefer to live in Georgia than to migrate if the economic situation gets better. So the main pushing factors for Georgian emigrants were relevant to socio-economic conditions, the desire to get more income in order to provide enough money for their families by sending them remittances (Badurashvili 2004).

Third phase could be discussed after Rose revolution. From 2003 to 2011 the gross national disposable income grew about three times, and so did its GDP per capita (Labadze & Tukhashvili 2013).

Official statistics from Georgia shows that in 2000s migration balance in Georgia was positive except for the year of “Rose” revolution in 2000 and for the years from 2009 to 2011. Nevertheless, these data do not take into consideration the temporary migration, especially to Russia, which is a considerable phenomenon for Georgia (MPC 2013).

At the end of 2003 when after the Rose Revolution the liberalization reforms started to be implemented, the economy of Georgia gets a chance to create new opportunities for its

development. The business environment became more developed and favorable which stimulate Georgian emigrants to come back their homeland and invest their capital in Georgia (Labadze & Tukhashvili 2013). Due to the implemented fundamental reforms the corruption and criminal violence were considerably decreased. The indices of The Ease of Doing Business and Corruption Perception showed the drastic change after these reforms (Labadze & Tukhashvili 2013).

Georgian emigrant and the representatives of Georgian Diaspora have actively find ways to use the opportunity of founding new businesses. In the consequences of the Rose Revolution in 2003 which reinforced Georgia's democratic governance. For the Georgian government investment of financial and human capital of the members of Georgian Diaspora is considered to be a substantial tool for the development of Georgia. The extent of liberalization policies in Georgia was unprecedented.

The government of Georgia reduced bureaucratic red tape and decrease direct and indirect taxes creating advantageous environment for entrepreneurial activities. These improvements could perhaps lessen the emigration flows and encourage high-skilled and educated emigrants to return home (CRRC/ISET 2010).

Although the accurate data on emigration flows are not accessible, most common belief among migration experts is that labor migration, in essence, continues to be much more circular (Labadze & Tukhashvili 2013).

To sum up we can classify of emigration tendencies as a result of these three phases. 1. Collapse and conflict from 1990 to 1995, 2. Economic struggle from 1996 to 2004, 3. Hope and economic rebuilding after 2004 (CRRC 2007, p. 7)

Each wave of migration flows distinguished by its characteristics and has results caused by distinctiveness of socio-economic and political developments of Georgia in the certain period of time.

Azerbaijan

Migration in Azerbaijan continues to be a concern for Azerbaijan, which can lead to risks both for the migrant and their families and for the stable development of Azerbaijan (IOM 2013).

Emigration flow from Azerbaijan after the breakdown of the Soviet Union experienced several phases, each of them, as in the case of Georgia, has its own peculiarities and had different influences on socio-economic and political life. In general, mass labour emigration started in 1995, when the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict came to an end. Before the financial crisis in Russia in 1998, which reduced job opportunities for labor emigrants, the destination country for these flows was also Russia. After crisis flows of Azerbaijani emigrants has been directed to the US, Germany and Turkey. However Russia till now is considered to be a main destination country for Azeri emigrants (MPC 2013).

Since 1991 Azerbaijan has gone through the different migration flows, such as external or internal, permanent or temporary, regular or irregular, could be classified by three phases. The first phase of the evolution of migration trends lasted from 1990 to 1995. Forced migration with ethnic components are the main peculiarities of this period as a result of the long lasting conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. This conflict caused the migration of Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The breakdown of Soviet Union and following economic decline also made Russians, Jews and other ethnic communities to leave Azerbaijan. These were the reason that the emigration has the permanent pattern (IOM 2013).

The second period of time was from 1996 to 2000, which characterized by economic factors. Unemployment and low wages were the main reasons that triggered Azerbaijani migrants to direct towards neighboring countries for searching new job opportunities (IOM 2013).

The third stage of migration flows has started from 2001 to the present. This is the period of stabilization of emigration rates (IOM 2013).

Among the countries of the South Caucasus Azerbaijan is possibly the most advanced in the changes of migration movements, as this country has moved from the country of sending of labor migrants to the country with net immigration. This characteristic is the direct characteristic of the economic achievements of the previous decade. The economic stability was restored and since 1995 positive economic growth was recorded. Due to the stabilization reforms assisted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), the foreign direct investment in the oil and gas sector and the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) major export oil pipeline contributed to the increase of the revenues from export of oil and gas. Poverty rate also reduced significantly over the decade due to the recovery of the economic stability (Allahveranov & Huseynov 2013).

In the long term period the statistics shows that the emigration has reduced. The economic growth and the development of economic activities in the oil sector has caused a growth of immigration flows to Azerbaijan. In this period Azerbaijan even became receiving country for foreign labor emigrants (IOM 2013).

To sum up this part of my thesis, we can state that research and studies on migration in all three countries are mainly concentrated on the economic and socio-demographic aspects of the emigration. But how can the political situation affect on the people's decision to migrate, we will discuss according to the results of our analysis. Before that it is important to examine the current political situation in three countries of the South Caucasus.

Political situation and democracy ranking of the countries in the South Caucasus

Sudden economic transition and deterioration in living standards in Armenia after the collapse of Soviet Union, led to social disappointment and political indifference. When political and economic interests overlap disproportionately and the public witnessed undemocratic elections and corrupt administrative practice, their trust towards political elite started to reduce. Since 1995, each national election in Armenia recognized by opposition to be not legitimate. In 2008 mass protests after election bring to the violent reaction which caused the death of ten protestors. Even though in May 2012 before national elections there were fair media coverage and all parties campaigned effectively, the cases of buying votes or the cases of pressures on voters remained too widespread. Overall Armenia's political system functions according to the agreement between elite groups which have control over economic and political resources. Society has a modest influence on legislative processes and in the processes of political decision-making (Iskandaryan 2013).

So, gradually increasing socio-economic polarization, decreasing public services accompanying all this with prevalent corruption and election frauds have generated distrust among Armenians towards their government. The president has leverage over army, police and intelligence services while parliament has restricted power, there are restriction in media field and the absence of justice and impartiality in judiciary system. Political parties include networks of relatives, friends, and acquaintances and operate ineffectively after electoral periods. Both returnees and the other Armenians complain about the widespread corruption in almost every sector and accentuate the fact they do not feel secure in Armenia, they are ignored by the government and that only the network of their family and relatives provide that security for them (Johansson 2008).

However in Armenia there is active and diversified civil society. In 2012 the number of nongovernmental organization kept on growing, widened their scope of activity and gradually started to give more attention to human rights and abuse of power. Although the initiatives of civil

society in some cases have certain achievements but they are not always successful in changing government policy (Iskandaryan 2013).

While in Armenia and Georgia the parliamentary elections were held under new electoral laws that accentuated that the all parties' equal right to use campaign resources and media coverage, in Azerbaijan political opposition was violently repressed. In independent Georgia the victory of the coalition of former opposition was the first peaceful change of power via election. And the gap of democratic level between Azerbaijan and neighbor-countries persist to widen in 2012 (Freedom House 2013).

Azerbaijan is governed by an authoritarian regime which is distinguished by its intolerance towards the protests or disagreements for civil freedom and political rights. In 1993 when President Heydar Aliiev took up office, he set up a Soviet-style, from top to bottom power system based on the stifling of political protests. Successor of Heydar was his son, which persisted to strengthen the most suppressive features of his father's rule. After this the considerable revenues gained from the oil sector have reinforced the power of the state's security system and to some degree repressed both domestic and foreign criticism of the regime. Azerbaijan juridical system is mainly tool for the protection of economic and political interests of the regime. The significant leverage of executive branch weakens the judicial branch's capacity to make available the equality for citizens (Freedom House 2013).

Although Azerbaijan is a member of various major human right organizations such as UN Human Right Council and the Council of Europe, different organizations have criticized the ruling system of Aliiev for commonly occurring violation of human rights and for its authoritarian type of regime (UNPO 2013).

The peaceful and nonviolent election conducted in Georgia and Armenian, however, cannot be compared with the violent repression of public protest after the Eurovision song contest in Baku,

which followed by the presenting of huge fines for any person who will involve in unauthorized rallies in Azerbaijan (Freedom House, 2013).

Compared with Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia's willingness and potentials to undertake democratic changes are more optimistic. Six years after the Rose revolution, and after the short war with Russia, Georgia again could achieve a sufficient level of stability (Boonstra, 2010).

The West perceived the color revolutions like the Rose Revolution as a success of civil society, a victory for freedom and democracy and at last for democratization. They brought to the power new leaders and the old political elites were replaced by new ones (Lutsevych, 2013). After gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia went through a chaotic decade characterized by civil war and two secessionist conflicts. Until 2003 many described Georgia as "a failed state" because its power has been concentrated in its executive body and the corruption was spread widely in all sectors of society. In 2003 Rose revolution made President Shevardnadze yield its positions and give opportunity Mikheil Saakashvili to undertake democratic reforms. Saakashvili's administration recorded development in fighting against corruption by initiating economic reforms and etc. (Freedom House, 2013).

Table 1

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Georgia
Regime classification	Semi-consolidated authoritarian regime	Consolidated authoritarian regime	Transitional government of hybrid regime
Freedom of rating (1=best, 7=worst)	5	5.5	3.5
Civil liberty (1=best, 7=worst)	4	5	3
Political Rights (1=best, 7=worst)	6	6	4
Electoral process	5.75	7.00	5.00
Democracy score	6.57	5.39	4.82

Source: Freedom House

Examining the status of each country in the Freedom House's report called Nations in Transit 2012 we can say that according to it Armenia is ruled by a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime and its democracy score is 5.3 on a scale of 1 to 7m where 1 represents the highest score of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. Compare to the previous year Armenia's score decreased, i.e. there was some democratic progress. In this report Georgia is considered to be a transitional government of hybrid regime and its democracy score is 4.82 which mean that democratic values, this mean that it has more democratic progress than Armenia. Azerbaijan's regime in this report considered most authoritarian in South Caucasus. It is a country with consolidated authoritarian regime, and democracy score is 6.57 which is close to the worst, i.e. lowest score on the scale.

To sum up, after comparing the political situation in three countries and then the democratic scores that they have received from the report of Freedom House, we conclude that we can rank these three countries by their democratic level- from authoritarian to more democratic. Among these three countries Azerbaijan is definitely the most authoritarian one, than Armenia with its semi-consolidated authoritarian regime, and third more democratic country which is Georgia with its relatively highest democratic score.

Data description and Methodology

Our data came from a survey conducted by Caucasian Research Resource Center in 2012 . We use this dataset, which is called Caucasian Barometer (CB), in order to analyse temporary and permanent migration intentions in three countries of South Caucasus- Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Since we are going to find out the effects of economic and political variables and compare the importance of these explanatory variables on the temporary and permanent migration intentions, from the dataset we use the following questions as our dependant variables: “If you had a chance, would you leave the country for a certain period of time to live somewhere else?” and “If you had a chance, would you leave the country forever to live somewhere else?”. These both variables have a dichotomous outcome coded 1 if the respondent answered “Yes” and 0 if “No”.

Since our analyses is concentrated on the economic and political factors that affect temporary and permanent migration intentions, besides social and demographic control variables, we chose sets of economic and political variables as predicted variables. As political variables we use several questions from the dataset in order to compare the importance of people’s perception of their domestic politics, the attitude towards their legislative, executive and judicial bodies, and their opinion about the fairness of their recent elections on shaping their migration intention in these three countries. In order to create such political independent variables we use following questions: “Tell me how much do you trust or distrust country’s parliament/court system...? The responses to these questions have Likert-type scales, coded 1 if “Fully trust” and coded 5 if “Fully distrust”. From the question “Do you completely agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or completely disagree that people like yourself are treated fairly by the government? we create our next political variable, and the outcomes are coded 1 if respondent completely agree and coded 4 if completely disagree. The next question is following: “There are different opinions regarding the direction in which country’s domestic politics are going. Which of the following would you personally agree

with?”. The responses of this question coded 1 if a respondent considers that ‘Politics is definitely going in the wrong direction’ and coded 5 if ‘Politics is definitely going in the right direction’. And 5th question regarding fairness of recent election is ‘‘Would you say that the most recent (type of election) election was conducted’’ which have outcomes coded 1 if it was ‘‘Completely fairly’’, 2 if ‘‘To some extent fairly’’ and 3 if ‘‘Not at all fairly’’. The last political variable we created to find out whether the perception of democracy among the people can be decisive for shaping their intention. The question for creating that variable is following: ‘‘In your opinion, how much of a democracy is your country today?’’ . The responds to the question is coded 4 if they believe that it is ‘‘ A full democracy’’ 3 if ‘‘A democracy but with minor problems’’, 2 when they answer that it is ‘‘A democracy but with major problems’’ and at last 1 when the answer is ‘‘Not a democracy’’

As regards the economic set of variables, we create economic controlled variables in our models by using questions from the dataset about respondents' personal income, household income. These are the categorical variables coded from 1 to 8, from highest income which we recoded as 1 to 0 which is recoded 8. The other economic variable we have chosen the relative household, because besides the absolute income, people's feeling of relative deprivation can be influential in their decision to migrate. The outcomes of this variable vary from 1, which is coded from 5 if the respondent's answer is ‘‘Very good’’ to 1 if the answer is ‘‘Very poor’’. If respondent has personal debt or not is our next economic variable, which is binary variable and coded 1 if ‘‘Yes’’ and 0 if ‘‘No’’. Another economic variable is derived from the following question: ‘‘What do you think is the most important issue facing /country/ at the moment? We created dummy variables, and coded 1 if respondents think that the main concerns for their country are economic issues, such as poverty, unemployment, low wages or inflation, and coded 0 if they think that their country is facing other non-economic issues. The other economic variable we have created by using one of the responses of this question: ‘‘Which of the following best describes your situation? Please think about the activity or situation

which is primary for you” The answers we have recoded as 1 if the respondent is “Retired and not working”, 2 if “Student and not working” coded 2, “Housewife and not working” 3, “Unemployed” respondents are coded 4, “Working either part-time or full time (even if the respondent is retired / is a student) including seasonal work” 5, “Self-employed (even if the respondent is retired / is a student), including seasonal work” 6, “Disabled” 7 and respondents who do not belong to these categories could choose other which is coded 8. From these employment types we have chosen the dummy variable of unemployed people as an economic variable in order to examine the intentions of those people who suffer from one of the main economic concerns which is unemployment. The other types of employment we consider as socio-demographic controlled variables. Besides the economic and political variables we include in our model the following influential socio-demographic controlled variables too:

- 1) Age of respondent, which is a continuous variable in our dataset;
- 2) Gender, which is a dichotomous variable and coded 1 if the respondent is “Female”, and 0 if “Male”;
- 3) Education level, which is also a continuous variable, because outcomes derived from the following question: "Starting with elementary school and counting up to the highest level of education you have achieved to date, how many years of study have you completed?";
- 4) Marital status, we created a dummy variable, which outcomes coded 1 if a respondent is married or cohabited without civil or religious marriage, and coded 0 if not married, divorced or separated.
- 5) Remittances- we created a dummy variable, for which we use the following question from the dataset: "Which one was your household's largest (second largest, third and so on) source of income?". The outcomes coded 1 if receiving remittances is among the first three income sources of a respondent, and 0 if it does not occupy the first three positions among the respondent's main sources of income.


Since our dependent variables have binary outcomes, we use logistic regression for modeling them. In the logit model the log odds of the outcome is modeled as a linear combination of the explanatory variables.

For each country We have made two models with same above discussed economic, political and socio-demographic explanatory variables, and dependant variable is the intentions to migrate temporarily or permanently which, we have already mentioned, derived from the questions from dataset. Each model includes all the three set of variable into one model to analyze them as a one model rather than to analyze them in separate models for each set of predicted variables. In one model each independent variable are interconnected with the other and its influence on dependant variable is also conditioned by the existence of the other predicted variables, while in separate models we could not have that interaction between deferent sets of independent variables. The dependent variable has a binary outcome, and we will try to examine how our selected predicted variables determine the probability of intentions to migrate permanently or temporarily. The values of the coefficients of those independent variables, which we have got as a result of logistic regression, will help us to predict the independent variables.


Results

In the beginning, it is important to discuss the respondents' answers to the questions "If you had a chance, would you leave the country for a certain period of time to live somewhere else?" and "If you had a chance, would you leave the country forever to live somewhere else?" and compare the proportions of the intended and non-intended people in three countries of the South Caucasus. The graphs presents the frequencies of the answers from which we can see that in all three countries the percentage of the people who have an intention to leave a country forever are noticeably less than percentage of those who have an intention to emigrate temporarily. However Armenians are more inclined to migrate both forever and temporarily. As refer to the Azerbaijanis, the proportion of them who have intentions to migrate permanently exceeds that of Georgians, but in the case of having temporary emigration intentions, the percentage of Georgians are 2.23 percent more than Azerbaijanis.

Graph 1



Graph 2



We will analyze the results, which we got after logistic regression analysis through Stata for three countries separately. With the help of the coefficients we will attempt to understand the differences of importance of political and variables on the shaping temporary and permanent emigration

intention across these three countries. Although we will concentrate on the political and economic covariates, we cannot ignore the considerable influence of the demographic and social controlled variables on the people's decision to migrate. Among these variables the coefficients of education in the case of three countries show that it has a significant influence especially on temporary migration intention. Since the coefficients' signs are positive, educated people are more inclined to emigrate temporary than less educated ones. However, in the case of the permanent migration intention the coefficients of education are statistically insignificant in all three countries. The gender is an important predicted variable in the case of Georgia, it can significantly affect especially temporary migration intentions; males are much more inclined to have intentions to migrate temporarily. The same picture we have in the case of Azerbaijan, but here gender is an important explanatory variable for permanent migration. This can be considered to be typical for Caucasian countries, especially among more conservative Muslims, when the intentions and opportunities of women are constrained. In the case of Armenia gender is not significant variable, but males have again a stronger association with both temporary and permanent emigration intentions. As regards the factor of age it is worth to mention that it is statistically significant in the case of all models of three countries. In all models this demographic controlled variable has a negative sign, which means that the younger people are more likely to migrate both permanently and temporarily in all three countries.

From the social variables marital status is not decisive for shaping either temporary or permanent migration intentions in none of these three countries. Another social variable is the existence of social network abroad. Having a family member abroad has a statistically significant influence on temporary migration intentions, especially in the case of Azerbaijan. In Georgia having member abroad increases the likelihood of intentions to migrate both permanently and temporarily. It is interesting to notice that in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan this social variable have a negative

sign in the permanent migration intention model, i.e. it discourages people to migrate permanently, while it encourages to migrate temporarily. Remittances appeared to have a strong, statistically significant impact on shaping migrations inclinations. In Georgia and Azerbaijan people who receive remittances are more prone to have permanent emigration intentions in Georgia and Azerbaijan, those are more inclined to migrate temporarily, while in Armenia this variable is significant for the temporary migration intentions. However in all models this variable has positive sign, which means that in all three countries those whose main source of income depends on remittances are more inclined to migrate.

Table 2: Results of logistic regression

	Armenia		Azerbaijan		Georgia	
	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary	Permanet
Perception of country democracy	-0.001(-0.02)	0.15(1.49)	0.60(3.46)	-0.07(-0.34)	0.11(0.80)	0.30(1.16)
Trust towards court system	-0.05(-0.59)	-0.086(1.05)	0.01(0.04)	-0.06(-0.44)	0.02(0.27)	0.15(0.83)
Perception of political direction	-0.03(-0.29)	0.217(2.50)	0.62(4.02)	0.11(0.70)	-0.09(-0.81)	0.07(0.39)
Trust towards parliament	0.05(0.55)	0.112(1.26)	0.04(0.35)	0.49(3.20)	-0.09(-0.84)	0.32(1.52)
Government treats fairly	0.32(2.72)	0.31(2.70)	-0.19(-1.08)	0.57(2.61)	-0.03(-0.28)	0.29(1.16)
Elections	-0.06(-0.37)	0.12(0.90)	0.76(3.75)	0.24(0.91)	0.30(1.66)	0.55(1.65)
Number of obs	835	1141	648	787	832	880
LR chi2(24)	169.59	128.24	145.61	240.43	179.85	48.76
Prob>chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002
Pseudo R2	0.1472	0.0955	0.1667	0.3223	0.1645	0.1350

Now we can refer to the main part of our analysis. We can notice from the tables that in the case of Armenia and Georgia coefficients of almost all political variables are near 0, which means that changes in their political attitude do not matter in terms of their temporary migration intentions. Only Georgian's attitude towards fairness of recent elections can make a difference in their intention to migrate temporarily. Those who believe that elections were not fair are more likely to leave the country. Armenian's temporary migration inclinations are more sensitive to their perception of government's fair treatment towards people. Those Armenians who agree that people are treated unfairly by their government, the likelihood of their temporary emigration intentions significantly increases. With regard to Azerbaijanis, in both permanent and temporary models political variables mainly increase the likelihood of migration intentions. Some of them are statistically noticeable. Among them is the unfairness of recently conducted elections that make people have intentions to emigrate temporarily. It is also have an effect on the permanent migration inclination of Azerbaijanis, but not as strong as it do have on the permanent intentions. The likelihood of intending to migrate temporarily increases when Azerbaijanis agree with the fact that the recent elections were conducted unfairly, or that the domestic politics of their country has chosen the wrong direction, or when they believe that their country has not democracy at all. The probability of intending to migrate permanently increases when Azerbaijanis again are prone to think that the recent elections were unfair or their government does not treat people fairly or when they more incline not to trust their country's legislative body. Compared to Azerbaijanis, Armenians' and Georgians' intentions to migrate temporarily are not noticeably affected by the political factors, while likelihood of intending to migrate permanently can be raised by these factors. For instance, probability of Armenians' intentions to migrate permanently affected and increased by all political factors, except the trust towards court system, which shows no influence. Especially people's perception of government's

unfair treatment towards its people and perception of wrong political directions are statistically significant for the probability of having permanent migration intentions in Armenia. In the case of Georgia people's perception of political direction does not matter, but all other political variables have a strong effect on shaping Georgians' permanent migration inclinations.

Economic factors affecting on emigration intentions

Now we can discuss the economic factors on shaping South Caucasus's people's migration intentions and we will try to find out the differences of importance of these variables for shaping both permanent and temporary migration across the three countries.

Table 3: Results of logistic regression

	Armenia		Azerbaijan		Georgia	
	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary	Permanet
Relative household condition	0.33(2.25)	0.16(1.32)	0.07(0.47)	0.02(0.13)	0.23(1.39)	0.00(0.00)
Personal Income	0.25(1.42)	-0.17(1.19)	-0.01(-0.06)	0.08(0.35)	0.13(0.78)	0.07(0.22)
Household income	0.21(1.25)	0.08(0.57)	0.39(1.94)	0.24(0.96)	0.12(0.80)	-0.12(-0.41)
Personal debt	0.18(1.06)	0.32(2.08)	0.21(0.86)	0.51(1.91)	0.39(2.12)	0.22(0.62)
Perception of main economic concerns	0.22(1.13)	0.24(-1.39)	-0.02(-0.10)	0.47(1.76)	0.12(0.64)	0.03(0.08)
Unemployed people	0.24(0.69)	0.40(1.20)	0.51(1.17)	-0.28(-0.54)	0.94(2.23)	0.72(0.79)

Let's start from Azerbaijan. In Azerbaijan's model selected economic variables have a weak influence on the changes of migration intentions. Even respondents who are unemployed are more likely not migrating permanently. Those who are in economically bad conditions are more prone to migrate. Moreover, those Azerbaijanis who think that the most important concerns that their country


is facing are economic issues such as poverty, unemployment, inflation or low wages, are more likely to migrate permanently rather than temporarily. In Azerbaijan, intentions to migrate temporarily are also not affected by personal income at all, however household income deprivation make Azerbaijanis to have both temporary and permanent intentions. The other main economic factors that make changes in the probability of intentions to migrate both permanently and temporarily are the existence of respondent's personal debt. By the way the effect of personal debt on our selected independent variables can be noticed in all six models, it is somehow expected because in the case of the existence of personal debt one of the best solutions for the individuals can be the migration and the finding new opportunities for payments.

The cases of Armenia and Georgia are slightly different from Azerbaijan but somewhat similar to each other. Almost all economic variables have their contribution to the changes of the likelihood of migration intentions both permanently and temporarily. Personal and household income deprivation increase likelihood of both the Armenian's and the Georgian's intentions to migrate temporarily, but in Armenia it causes more changes in emigration intentions than in Georgia. We see that those who think that the main concerns that their country facing are the economic issues are more prone to migrate in Armenia rather than in Georgia. In Georgia unemployment people are more inclined to migrate temporarily. Overall, we can notice that in Georgia and Armenia the coefficients of economic variables in temporary models are bigger than in the permanent model, which lead us to the point that the temporary emigration intentions are more sensitive to the economic conditions, while in Azerbaijan's model we cannot see such tendency.

In order to make this whole picture more obvious and visual, and to accept or reject our hypotheses, only looking for the coefficients of separate variables cannot be complete and convincing. So, in order to compare the influence of the economic and political variable on the temporary and permanent intentions, and then compare which set of variables are more influential in each country,

we take the z-values of the each coefficient of the economic and political variables, squared them and compare the sum of all this squared Z-values of political variables with the sum of Z-values of the economic variables both for the temporary and permanent intentions and for each country separately. The result of these calculations I presented in form of graph to make the differences clearer.

Graph 3: The sum of the Squared Z-values of the coefficients of economic and political variables




From the graph we can clearly see that the sum of the squared Z-values of economic variables is more decisive for the temporary migration intention than political ones only in Armenia and Georgia. In Azerbaijan political factors for both temporary and permanent migration are influential than economic factors. So our suggested hypothesis can accept only partly, because Azerbaijan is an exemption from these three countries and even for the temporary migration intentions political attitudes are more decisive.

As refer to the permanent migration, the graph clearly shows that the political factors, political attitude towards institutions or political perception about fairness of elections or government treatment etc. are more decisive for the people's intentions to migrate. It means if people have intentions to migrate permanently the economic factors becomes less important. So we can accept

our second suggested hypotheses since our selected political variables are more decisive than the economic ones for all countries in the South Caucasus.

Graph 4: The sum of the Squared Z-values of the coefficients of economic and political variables



In order to accept or reject my first hypothesis we have already ranked these three countries from authoritarian to more democratic, and since we have already studied the political situation in these countries and according to their democratic score we have ranked Azerbaijan as a most authoritarian country among these three countries. Armenia with its status of semi-consolidated authoritarian regime is second and Georgia which has better democratic score and is more democratic than the other two neighboring countries. So from the two graphs it is clear that in Azerbaijan, which compare to the other two countries are more authoritarian, the intentions of people to migrate both temporarily and permanently are heavily influenced by political attitudes rather than by economic conditions. In Armenia especially the political factors are more decisive for the permanent migration intentions than in Georgia, where there is more political freedom and better democratic values than in the case of Georgia.

Conclusion

In conclusion, based on our cross-country analysis we have tried to determine whether our suggested hypotheses are acceptable or not. We show that economic and socio-demographic factors are not the only determinants in shaping people's emigration intentions. People's political attitudes towards their political institutions like parliament, government or court system can play an important role in their migration intentions. Their perception about the democracy level in their country, opinion about the right or wrong directions of their country's politics or the fairness of the recent national election can also play a decisive role in forming people's intentions to migrate. We study the influence of economic and political variables on both temporary and permanent emigration intentions to find out which differences of the importance and decisiveness of these variables on the type of emigration intentions people have. The sum of the Z values of the coefficients of these variables gives us the overall picture, that the economic factors are more decisive than political attitudes for the changes in the temporary migration intentions only in the case of Armenia and Georgia, so we can accept our third hypothesis only partially. However, in the case of permanent emigration intentions political variables play more decisive role than economic ones in all three countries so we can accept our second hypothesis. We see that in Azerbaijan, which we have ranked as the most authoritarian country among the countries in South Caucasus, the political variables are noticeably decisive for both permanent and temporary emigrations intentions than economic ones compared with Armenia and Georgia. In Armenia which according to the ranking is less democratic than Georgia, political factors are more decisive than in Georgia. This result allows us to accept our first hypothesis, that accept in countries with less political freedom and democratic values, political attitudes have more decisive impact on emigration intentions than economic conditions do.

So, the results of our analysis shows that the role of people's political attitude towards their political institutions or political situations could not be undermine, especially in countries with lack of democracy.

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