

**AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA**

**CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES**

**THE CASE OF LEBANON**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This essay explores the crisis management in deeply divided societies, as the actuality of the subject is vital under the light of rapidly changing relations on the international arena. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, in 1990s, conflict resolution in divided societies has taken the attention by growing number of separatist movements around the World. Thus, market liberalization and the scarcity of natural resources has changed the struggling states' approaches toward power-sharing rules, resulting in political and financial crises. Consequently, the problem of crisis management in divided societies is thought to be resolved through the Consociational Democracy.

The actuality to discuss the Lebanese case is proposed by the current crisis, which began in March 2013, when the Prime Minister Najib Mikati was forced to resign and the Parliamentary Elections were postponed until November 2014. This event endangered the Presidential Elections, as the term of the current President, Michel Suleiman will expire on May 25, 2014. Nevertheless, the insufficient Electoral Law became the main source of the inefficient governance system reproduction, which experiences a deadlock almost for several times since the independence of the state.

Lebanon's historical background that legalized the system of elitism and foreign inclination are driving the state into crisis environment, which supports the hypotheses of the current master's essay.

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ADF- Arab Deterrent Force  
FPM – Free Patriotic Movement, lead by General M. Aoun  
GC -Geneva Convention  
KDC- Khiyam Detention Center  
LAA -Lebanese Arab Army  
LCP -Lebanese Communist Party  
LF -Lebanese Forces (Lebanese Front), established by Pierre Gemayel  
MP- Member of Parliament  
MNF- Multinational Force  
NM -National Movement  
NLP -National Liberal Party, established by Camill Sham'un  
NSF – National Salvation Front  
PRCS- Palestine Red Crescent Society  
PFLP -Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine  
PHRO- Palestinian Human Rights Organization  
PLA -Palestinian Liberation Army  
PLO -Palestinian Liberation Organization  
PM- Prime Minister  
PNO- Popular Nasserist Organization  
PSP -Progressive Socialist Party  
SCEC-Supervisory Commission on the Election Campaign  
SLA -South Lebanon Army  
STL – Special Tribunal for Lebanon  
SSNP- Syrian Social Nationalist Party  
UN -United Nations  
UNESCO- United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  
UNHRC -United Nations Human Rights Council  
UNICEF -United Nations Children's Fund  
UNIFIL -United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon  
UNRWA- United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East

## INTRODUCTION

The challenge of market liberalization has had a tremendous impact on international relations worldwide. Scarcity and aggressiveness of markets changed the struggling states' approaches toward power-sharing rules. Each new rule adjustment provokes a stressful situation and causes a minor or major crisis in a current society or state. Rapid changes on the international arena challenge International Relations scholars. One of these challenges is the problem of *crisis management*.

The concept of “crisis” has two dimensions: *an event* and *a process*. For instance, it has around 30 definitions, gathered by Bernard Forgues and Christophe Roux-Dufort in 1998 in the report *Crises: Events or Processes?* Nevertheless, “crisis” is also seen as a process of eruption of something that was kept locked for a long time. Moreover, crisis as a process and event has its pre- and post- phases that is seen most clearly in pre- and post-revolution or war. Furthermore, this process has its specific solutions depending on its causes and the existing political system (Forgues & Roux-Dufort 1998).

This paper explores the crisis management in divided societies. Developments of political crises, their management and conflict resolution in divided societies depend on many factors like, religion, ethnicity, the governing system, electoral law, and foreign intervention among others. The solution for each case usually has its specifics, but in most cases – a third party existence in managing the peace process is essential. The most comprehensive definition that was made in 1993 by Forgues will be taken as a base to proceed with this research: “Crisis is an event, that provokes or may provoke tremendous damages (material or immaterial), where multiple stakeholders are involved and that demands an immediate attention” (Forgues & Roux-Dufort 1998).

Divided societies have been distinguished as a separate group of political system by many researchers since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Finally, in 1969, Arend Lijphart defined and gathered them under the term of Consociational Democracy. The paper analyzes the features of consociational democracy and the methods of conflict resolution through a deeper analysis of the crises in Lebanese politics. Nevertheless, the actuality to study the Lebanese case is in its current situation, where the existing plurality-majority system already rejected and out of favor since March 2013 by boycotting of the parliamentary elections and their postponement until November 2014. Boycott of the parliamentary elections might endanger the upcoming presidential elections of 2014 that are due to May 25, 2014.

The political instability in Lebanon generated by sectarian disagreements since its independence of 1943, and caused replacement of some sects from the majority to opposition and the vice versa. Lebanese society can be characterized by its pluralistic frame (there are 17 officially recognized sectarian groups (*confessions*) and all of them are involved in the political processes of the country).

“In political science terminology, “confessionalism” is a system of government that proportionally allocates political power among a country's communities—whether religious or ethnic—according to their percentage of the population” (Harb 2006). For this reason, the Lebanese system of governance has been placed under the *consociational* form of governance. To fulfill this research, the definition of the term “consociationalism” should be provided by Arend Lijphart’s words, the developer of this theory: “Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a framed political culture into a stable democracy” (1969, 216).



Many scholars suggest that the ongoing tensions between Lebanese confessions (*Taifiyya* in Arabic) are the results of the Electoral Law. Still others are inclined to see the cause of the crises in the foreign intervention into Lebanese affairs. The aim of this master essay is to study the features of Lebanese political system and explore the degree of the foreign influence on the example of Syria, if it ever exists, on the crisis management.

This research paper will analyze the modern Lebanese history since 1820s through a few decisive periods: pre-independency 1820-1920, post independency 1943-1989 and the Tai'f Agreement repercussions since 1989. The background of the of the Lebanese system will be done in the first chapter. The second chapter will discuss the Lebanese political system and some crises with elaboration on management ways since 1943 until 1975. The third chapter will provide the useful data since 1975, trying to clarify the foreign influence, if it exists, particularly from Syria, on the political developments in Lebanon. The findings will be summarized in the final part as a conclusion. To discover more about crisis management in divided societies, this paper will analyze the case of Lebanon and will attempt to answer to the following questions:

*Research Questions:*

- R.Q. 1 - Which features of Lebanese political system cause the rise of consociationalism?
- R.Q. 2 - What are the factors influencing the management of recurrent crises in Lebanon?
- R.Q. 3 - Why the political stability in Lebanon is not sustainable?

There is an assumption that Lebanese current sectarian disagreements are the reflections of the past peace agreements. To fulfill the purpose of the present paper the study proposes the following hypotheses:

*Hypotheses:*

H1 – Lebanese state consociational power-sharing system allows foreign interference, which in its turn impedes consolidation of democracy.

H2 - The Lebanese Electoral Law is an exemplification of the foreign influence in the country's internal affairs.

## RESEARCH DESIGN

With attempt to analyze crisis management in divided societies, the Lebanese case study chosen. Due to distance limitations, the qualitative research design selected. In order to examine the preconditions to the political crises, which occur in Lebanon, their solutions and the reflection of the solution ways on the lives of Lebanese people, it was necessary to conduct an exploratory research by using the data from primary and secondary sources. Moreover, in order to interview few Lebanese politicians, a questionnaire with an introductory Cover Letter was sent to 13 deputies and 4 Lebanese political websites. Finally, to discover the causality of the foreign involvement the following variables were selected:

### Independent variables

- An involvement of foreign countries in the arrangement of a particular peace process (their interests and influence)

### Dependent variables

- Domestic players and system of governance;
- Peace agreements;
- The conditions of the each peace agreements;
- Each peace agreement lasting time period;
- The next crisis after each previous peace agreement

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Gabriel A. Almond (1956) divided democratic systems into three types: 1) Anglo-American; 2) Continental European; 3) Scandinavian and Low Countries. According to him, the Anglo-American type is homogeneous; Continental European type is fragmented; and the Scandinavian and Low countries possess some features of both of the first two types. Moreover, Almond, has found a relationship between the political culture and social structure that plays a decisive role in political stability. Accordingly, the homogeneous Anglo-American democracies are stable in comparison with unstable Continental European fragmented societies that characterized as politically immobile (Lijphart 1969). Furthermore, the difference of the first type also in its secular democracy, while the second type difference in its fragmentation on sub-cultures.

Arend Lijphart (1969), analyzing all of the features of political systems in the divided societies has proved that the peace is reachable, because each political system has its own ways of crises developments and resolutions. Developing his theory Lijphart re-defined the fragmented Continental European type to *centrifugal* democracy, represented by the French Third and Fourth Republics, Austrian First Republic, Weimar Germany, Italy and Spanish Republic of 1930's. On the other hand, the homogeneous Anglo-American type renamed as *centripetal* democracy of United States, Scandinavian states, post-war Germany, old Commonwealth countries and Great Britain (Lijphart 1969). The model was determined on small European countries, like Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and Netherlands with the exception of Lebanon that is representing the Middle East and

Malaysia that represents the Asia. All of these countries “with sub-cultures divided from each other by mutually reinforcing cleavages” and stable despite their fragmentations, were called *consociational democracies* (Lijphart 1969, 211). Moreover, “...consociation has become the prescribed method of conflict regulation of the ‘international community’” (O’Leary 2003, 2). This power-sharing system supported by the United Nations, European Union and United States and it been implemented in Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia (O’Leary 2003, 2).

To be able to distinguish the type of democracy, Lijphart suggests measuring the cultural fragmentation and the degree of cooperative or competitive behavior of elites by their continuity. Almond distinguished “high subsystem autonomy; limited subsystem autonomy; and fragmentation of political culture” (Lijphart 1969, 209-210). To define the functionality of the party-systems, Almond used role-structure and political-culture criteria. Almond, suggested determining the political system unit as the role, which developed from some “complementary expectations concerning his own actions and those of others with whom he interacts”, thus; specific interacting roles are establishing a political system, or a “structure of roles” (1956, 393-394). What Almond is suggesting is that each political system has a specific pattern of roles interaction and any change in the pattern affects the interdependent role structure, which is simply saying, changes the whole system. Almond, suggested using the concept of *political culture* for two reasons: 1) it doesn’t have the same meaning as the concept of culture in general; 2) it doesn’t have to homologate with the current political system. For example, there is no adaptation of the political culture pattern in fragmented Continental European countries, like France, Germany and Italy to the political system. Moreover, he criticized the political actors of these countries, who are instead of manifesting compromise and adaptation displaying

bargaining, which is modifying the political system into a trade agency. Thus, according to Almond (1956, 397), “political culture” is determined by the “particular pattern of orientations to political action”. Moreover, he concluded that the best performance been reached through two-party systems, while multi-party systems are less effective due to their small size and large number.

Political scientists who study consociationalism define themselves as *social constructionists* because they believe in constructing of identities according to the purpose, which derives from realist perspective and based on political necessity where an alternative to consociationalism is an armed expulsion (O’Leary 2003). There are some requirements for successful fulfillment of consociational democracy defined by Lijphart:

- 1) ...the elites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures;
- 2) This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and to join in a common effort with the elites of rival subcultures;
- 3) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the empowerment of its cohesion and stability;
- 4) Finally, all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the elites understand the perils of political fragmentation. (1969, 216)

In order to understand the relationships that exist inside of divided societies could be appropriate to recognize the existing types of groups first: primordial, instrumental, and the synthesis of these two. The primordial explanation is underlining the cultural roots of human needs. The instrumental approach is explaining the human beings rationality to maximize his gains. The third type is synthesizing human needs with his rationality.

Those who present a synthesis of these two approaches argue that ethnic groups possess both "primordial" and "instrumental" characteristics: while each group indeed has an "inventory" of shared myths, memories, symbols, and values, these inventories are constantly adapted to changing circumstances by being accorded new meanings and functions. (Barak 2002, 621)

Moreover, another type of relationship that exists inside of divided societies is the *overlapping membership* effect, defined by political scientists Arthur F. Bentley and

David B. Truman, which means that membership in groups with diverse interests, creates pressure, which could overcome by adopting a moderate approach (Lijphart 1969). In deeply divided societies the moderate approach is absent and that is why there is a tendency toward “revolution, degeneration, and decay” as suggested by Truman (Lijphart 1969, 209). Barry R. Posen, in his article *The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict* (1993), reassures that cultural, religious or ethnic groups pay attention to their security which causes the environment to become competitive. As power is difficult to measure, some competing groups are prone to exceed it and become a threat to the other groups, who will try to restore the shaken balance by generating more power. This process is continues and it is about escalation of legislative and military means between the competing groups (Posen 1993).

Furthermore, analyzing political democracy in fragmented societies the factor of political elite was discussed. For example, Pierre Du Toi (1987) based his article “Consociational Democracy and Bargaining Power”, on the Lijphart’s definition of Consociational Democracy:

...a coalescent style of elite behavior in plural societies where elite cooperation is characterized by power sharing and consensus decision making. Unanimity is reached by leaders who engage in mutual compromises in order to avoid deadlocks and find common ground. (Du Toi 1987, 419)

The behavior of political elite in critical situations is characterized by some constructive efforts to overcome the crises, arguing that the competitive tensions do not always lead to political instability (Lijphart 1969). The examples could be: the Austrian First Republic that after the Second World War converted from its unstable state into the stable Second Republic; Independence of Belgium in 1830 and the current federal government; Uruguay is ruled by multiparty system; Switzerland represented by the mix

of parliamentary and presidential systems with its four major parties in the government. The further analysis suggests that in some cases, like in Colombia and Lebanon, the desire to overcome the crises became so vital that the elites agreed to amend the electoral laws according to consociational principles. For example, in the case of Lebanon, the National Pact of 1943 ended the French Mandate; the Ta'if Agreement ended the 1975-1989 Civil War; the Doha Agreement ended the crisis with Hezbollah in 2008. Almost the same happened in 1958 in Colombia, when the conservatives and Liberals agreed to cooperate on the bases of consociationalism to end the civil war (Lijphart 1969, 213). In 1917, the Dutch parliamentary elections were the result of elites' agreement to solve the sensitive issues. The identical situation happened in Belgium in 1919 (Lijphart 1969).

In divided societies under the consociational democracy rule governance established by consensus, which sometimes needs more adjustments than a simple majority. While the majority rule is the major principle of democracy it might be violated in consociational democracy, when the stakes are high and the need in extended coalitions are required (Lijphart 1969, 214). Even the most homogeneous societies overcame the hardest crises through the formation of the extended coalitions, as happened in Sweden and Great Britain during the Second World War; and in 1961 happened in Tanganyika (Lijphart 1969; Nyerere 1963). Switzerland is the best example of *grand coalition executives* (Lijphart 1969, 222).

In search for the theory of consociational democracy, Lijphart has analyzed the concept of the *size principle* (1969, 215). This concept suggests that the gathering of opposing parties into large coalitions to overcome the common crises based on the common advantages, the disadvantages simply excluded and the number of participants defines the size, which is necessary to win. Riker identified a *minimum winning coalition*,

which in other words acts like the *majority vote* in majoritarian system (Lijphart 1969, 215). This theory derived as a conclusion to Gabriel Almond's attempt to define the homogeneous societies as stable democracies, and the fragmented societies, as the instable ones (Lustick 1997).

Nevertheless, one of the most important features of deeply fragmented societies is their actual immobilization. As the founder of the theory, Lijphart (1969) demonstrates that consociational democracy solves this issue by allowing all the minorities to be actively involved in all decision-making processes. By this extended involvement the pressure on the decision making process is relatively low, but it may increase at any time when the "burdens on the system increase" (Lijphart 1969, 219). The obstacle could be the size of the government: a larger government handles its burden easier, than a disproportionately loaded small government. In the contrary, in the small governments inter-governmental stability avoids the external pressures. Moreover, this assumption is based on the argument that democracy is more achievable in smaller states, because it is easier to control and operate (Lijphart 1969; Lehmbruch 1967).

In order to understand the conditions that lead to successful implementation of this theory the analysis of inter-elite relations, inter-masses relations, and elite-mass relations should be done. The relations between the competitive elite are somehow affected by the time frame: the longer they interact, more cooperative the relations become (Lijphart 1969; Lehmbruch 1967). The cooperation of elites is also evident during a foreign intervention, when the national mobilization is the only way to survival: the First and Second World Wars were the strongest mobilizing factors that gave a beginning to the consociational system in Lebanon, Switzerland, and Austria. The same factor is vital in elite-mass cooperation. "Multiple balances of power" is another feature that causes the



elites to cooperate rather than let some majority to become hegemony (Lijphart 1969, 217). The logic of a group that is currently in majority is the domination instead of cooperation with the other groups. This follows the emphasis that the multiparty is the best solution for a stable balance of power, like the coalition of multiple minorities such as in Netherlands, Switzerland, and Lebanon is more desirable (Lijphart 1969; Lehmbruch 1967). In this case, a multiparty system is the best expression of consociational democracy. At the same time, it is doubtful that two-party system will stay stable for long, because the desire to dominate will prevail (Lijphart 1969).

The next feature is the “inter-subculture relations at the mass level” (Lijphart 1969, 219). Divided societies are conflicting when they are interacting, and live peacefully if there are no contacts between them. The conflicting ideologies are raising tension while reciprocation. Lijphart (1969) supports his conclusion by stating that the time of interaction between the contradicting subcultures plays very important role: longer they interact, less conflicting the interactions become. At the same time Lijphart (1969) suggests that there is a positive relation between the subculture homogeneity and interactions, thus, to reach stability the interactions should be minimized.

The elite-mass relation is another, yet complicated feature of consociational democracy: elites should be able to lead their masses continuously despite of their interactions with other subcultures. For example, the French Fourth Republic distinguished as a fragmented society, but not politicized, which caused the elites lack of support. At the same time, as Liphart suggests, the distinguished subcultures should be organized at the highest level of representation, in other words – institutionalized.

...consociational settlements are naturally recurrent phenomena-generated through negotiations by politicians, and not necessarily engineered into existence by political scientists. (O’Leary 2003, 8)

Nevertheless, some researchers have found the original model universal for deeply divided societies, because the model with some deviations is seems to be applicable in many countries and actual for nowadays. For example, Luigi Graziano, in his article *The Historic Compromise and Consociational Democracy: Toward a 'New Democracy'?* (1980), analyzed the application of consociational democracy in Italy in 1980, after the 1979 elections, when the bourgeoisie was weakened, even though it was the ruling party. He concludes that the original model with some deviations is very much applicable in the polarized societies. Graziano, suggests that the efficiency of the official institutions has much bigger role in application of the consociational type of democracy. Other sensitive issues for Graziano became proportionality and unanimity. Here the author refers to the slow pace of the system operational abilities and argue that this is just a visual illusion. Moreover, Graziano supports his conclusion by illustrating the decision making process to overcome a war or a crisis through the necessary consensus as the main aim of the system establishment.

McGarry and O'Leary (2006) also wrote about a deviation from the original consociational democracy system model on the case of the Northern Ireland. As a deviation they mentioned the fact that "...eight Northern Irish political parties were able, largely voluntarily, to agree on a settlement with important consociational components, and to win endorsement for that agreement in simultaneous referendums in both parts of Ireland" (McGarry and O'Leary 2006, 47). At the same time, McGarry and O'Leary underlined some weaknesses of the original model like, "The Neglected Role of External Actors in the Promotion and Operation of Consociational Settlements" (McGarry and O'Leary 2006, 48). McGarry and O'Leary argue that the original model constructed according to the small European states that were unifying their efforts under the much

larger neighboring states. Furthermore, the model does not elaborate on the cases, where the exogenous intervention could be facilitated by a mediation, or pressure, even “...incentives to induce or encourage warring or potentially warring parties to reach agreement” (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 48).

The second argument is “Consociationalism and Trans-State Self-Determination Disputes” (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 54). McGarry and O’Leary also argue that the original model has ignored ethno-national communities that are competing for the challenged homeland (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 54-55). The third argument is defined like, “The Complexity of Internal Consociational Settlements” (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 58). This point is about the agreements that go beyond the state institutions, like: “...the design of the police, demilitarization, the return exiles to their homes, the management of prisoners, education reform, economic policy and the promotion of language and other group rights” (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 58). The next suggestion is “The Merits of PR-STV versus PR-Party List Electoral Systems” (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 59). Here, McGarry and O’Leary argue that the Northern Ireland Assembly elections were held according to the PR (proportional representation) system, the STV (single transferable vote), and with the number of the constituencies reaching to six and not the proportional representation party list electoral system as Lijphart suggests (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 59),

Furthermore, the fifth argument is described as “Allocating Ministerial Portfolios through Sequential Proportionality Rules” (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 61). This point underlines the institutional weakness of the consociational system that represents a major challenge for the power-sharing groups, that unlikely to form a coalition to overcome this issue through the inter-party negotiations (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 61). Finally, the

sixth point is “Conceptual Refinements” (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 62). By this deviation McGarry and O’Leary argue that the Northern Ireland Assembly was formed through the “...joint consent across the significant communities with the emphasis on ‘joint-ness’ and not through a grand coalition as emphasized in the Lijphart’s original model (McGarry and O’Leary 2006, 62).

To summarize, it could be stated that the consociationalism, as political system of governance, has its huge impact on crisis management in divided societies. For this reason, consociationalism should be seen as one of the main tools in conflict resolution strategies, even though there are some disagreements around the core issues. For example, to some extent consociationalism is not democratic; it is “a loser-takes-all system”; it also excludes the opposition; it delays the democratization; it promotes *clubism* (O’Leary 2003, 5). There are also concerns about how consociational system is established, how is it maintained, and how it breaks down. With the aim to find answers to most of these debatable issues, this paper analyzes the case of Lebanese system of governance, which been placed under the consociational type of democracy.

## CHAPTER I

### LEBANESE POLITICAL CULTURE OF 1820-1943

#### *Features of Lebanese Political System: 1820-1920*

Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel and Palestinian territories had always been a part of *Bilad al Sham*. In ancient times Syria was much larger and used to have many names: for centuries it was known as “Bilad al Sham” (Countries or Cities of the left side of the rising sun in Arabic); or Levant; or *Dimashq* (in Arabic), with Damascus as a capital of the caliphate (Hasdrubal 2014). During the Ottoman Empire Lebanon was given autonomy and re-called *Mount Lebanon*, but it was still a part of “Bilad al Sham”.

Today the Lebanese political system is based on pluralism of 17 minorities and represents the crossroad of all major and minor religions of the Middle East. The governing system by proportional representation was legalized in 1926 by the first written Constitution through Article 95 “that provided for equitable representation in public service positions among the various religious denominations” (The Lebanese Constitution, Art. 95; Saliba, Library of Congress 2010). It was amended in 1990 with the aim to abolish confessionalism (representation in accordance to the religious affiliation), but it is still unchanged and remains at the heart of today's conflicts. The same text of the first-written constitution is still in power, even though it was amended several times. The specificity of this constitution is in its pragmatic power-sharing nature: the president of Lebanese republic should be a Maronite-Christian; the prime minister must be a Sunni-Muslim; and the parliament speaker must be from Shi'a-Muslim community. The Lebanese call this three party legislature *troika* (Nelson 2013, 360).

On the ground, Lebanon is presented by thirteen Christian communities and four-Islamic. There was also a little Jewish community until 1973-75. Among the Catholic Christians, the Maronite community is the largest, and the Greek-Melkite holds the second place, and then come the Armenian, Syrian, Roman, Chaldean and Coptic communities. “The non-Catholic communities are: Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Assyrian...” Orthodox Coptic and Armenian Protestants (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). The Muslim communities represented by the Shiites in majority, Sunnies, Druze, Alawites and Nusayri. Lebanon is the only Arab country represented by a Christian president. Nevertheless, only the representatives of Maronite, Grec Catholic, Grec Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Evangelical and Christian Minorities, Alawite, Shia, Sunni, and Druze are presented in the legislative body. The latest numbers suggest that “...Christians account for 41.08% of registered voters and yet hold 50% of the seats, while Muslims make up 58.92% of the voting population and also hold 50% of the seats” (Nelson 2013, 350). On the other hand, the role of the parties was never legalized (Nelson 2013, 351).

The Lebanese 10, 452 square kilometers soil combined from many communities, for this reason to reach to a consensus was never easy. The clashes between the Maronite peasants against their Druze-masters registered since 1820s. The matter became more violent in 1858, and in 1860, it ended by the Druze-lords victory (Zahar 2005, 15). Moreover, some foreign forces became engaged to restore the peace. The involvement of European powers, especially France, who was protecting the Maronite Christian community, gave the inter-class conflict inter-confessional dimension (inter-sectarian). Nevertheless, peace settlement was regulated “by the Ottoman Empire, backed by a

consortium of European powers, on 9 June 1861” through the *Règlement Organique*, after which the Mount Lebanon was granted autonomy (Zahar 2005, 15, 4).

The problematic first foreign-backed power sharing brought the next crisis. The seats in the Lebanese parliament were dispersed between all major communities equally, 2 seats to each of the largest ones. The Maronites, who were in actual majority, complained that they had the same number of seats as the other communities that were much smaller. Rearrangement over the shares became a necessity as the tension was rising between the communities (Zahar 2005, 15). In 1864 the rearrangement was negotiated by the same foreign brokers and lasted until the very last day of the Ottoman Empire, distributing the seats in the administrative council as following: “four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodoxes, one Greek Catholic, one Sunni Muslim, and one Shi’a Muslim” (Zahar 2005, 15, 5).

### *The French Mandate 1920-1943*

After World War I, in 1920, Syria has transferred under the French Mandate and divided into many pieces. Lebanon became a separate entity known as the “Great Lebanon”. The French were obliged to organize pre-independence stage for Syria and Lebanon. Thus, the Great Lebanon granted a larger territory that implicated an even wider heterogeneity. As the researchers imply, the Muslim community consisted predominantly of Sunnies. Moreover, 51% out of 80% of the newborn country’s population used to be populated by Christians. As Arsenian---Ekmekji (2013, 15) implies, Lebanon “was artificially created by the French to house and shelter to a large Christian minority in the Middle East.” Since then, Druze bourgeoisie lost their privileged status of lords forever (Zahar 2005, 15, 6). French protectorate extended the

administrative body to 17 members from different confessions. Moreover, in 1922 based on the census of 1921, the 30 deputies were elected to the Lebanese Representative Council, where the seats were distributed according to their proportional weight on the confessional bases (sectarian affiliation). The confessional system became legalized and the newborn state was officially imposed sectarianism, which on the other hand legalized the sectarian elites' influence over the state's institutions (Saliba, U.S. Library of Congress; Zahar 2005, 15; Dekmejian 1978; Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; El-Khazen 1991).

An atmosphere of struggle between the confessions continued until 1926. In 1926, with the gathered efforts, a successful uprising has pressured the French authorities to accept the aspirations of the Great Lebanon's people toward the independent state. The fact was hardly accepted despite the establishment of an independent state apart from the Great Syria and the first Lebanese constitution, which favored the "confessional politics throughout all levels of governance" (Zahar 2005, 15, 7). Lebanon proclaimed independence and became the *Republic of Lebanon* with its first constitution adopted on May 23, 1926.

It took until 1943 National Pact, where each community sacrificed just to obtain an independent state, out of French Mandate (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; Zahar 2005, 15; Nelson 2013; Harb 2006). The unification of pro-Western Christians and pro-Arab Muslims settled new rules for the Lebanese state. Christians were convinced to agree to terminate the French protectorate, and Muslims were obliged to cease their formal dependence from Syria.

In 1943, two political leaders, Bechara al-Khoury, the Maronite Christian President, and Riad al-Solh, the Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, orally agreed to end the French mandate. Their agreement became known as *al Mithaq al-Watani* or the National Pact. (Saliba, U.S. Library of Congress).



The unification of competing elites was a necessary act to eliminate the foreign patronage. The new adjustment was based on the three points: 1) *segmental proportionality*, which implies proportional representation according to the demographic weight; 2) *segmental autonomy* that was the guarantee to religion, education and culture without the government interference; and 3) *foreign policy neutrality*, which meant eliminating the formal ties with France and Syria for Christians and Muslims equally (Zahar 2005, 15; Saliba, U.S. Library of Congress).

The first constitution approved the confessional misbalance that the foreign powers were trying to fix according to their own interests (Zahar 2005, 15, 7). This power-sharing system was adopted for 2 reasons: 1) according to the ratio of the population of the main sects by 1932 census, where the Christian population was in majority and the Shia population holding the third place after the Sunni population; 2) because the French have agreed with the Lebanese politicians to keep their influence on the country affairs through the Mironite community which was the most pro-Western faction of Lebanese society (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; Zahar 2005,15). Even though, the political system was proclaimed to be established on bases of separation, balance, cooperation and rule of law, in the constitution it is also declared a sectarian representation (The Lebanese Constitution, Art. 22). Moreover, the constitution insists that "...the sectarian groups shall be represented in a just and equitable manner..." and the public service jobs, judiciary, military and security institutions', in public and mixed agencies should be divided on principles of confessional representation (The Lebanese Constitution, Art. 95). This system of ratio representation is essential in every state institutions and based on the religious grouping mentioned in the citizen's identity card (Nelson 2013, 333).

The significant power of the president on one hand, and the confessional elite's access to the public wealth on the other hand were provoking the environment of corruption and conflicting situations (Zahar 2005, 15. 8). Furthermore, the power sharing formula was imposed and closely monitored by the French authorities and was irritating feelings of Lebanese Muslims and the Syrian state. The Republic of Lebanon was still far from being independent in reality. Senior Foreign Law Specialist of Lebanese origin Issam Saliba (U.S. Library of Congress), like many other researchers, unveiled the French authorities' reason to include into the Lebanese Constitution the Article 90. The article was giving the mandatory entity the right to maintain its rights and obligations under the Article 22 of the Charter of the League of Nations, which for the French were their future aspirations to cease the Constitution, terminate the House of Deputies, dissolve the Cabinet and remove the President (Saliba, Library of Congress).

Thus, there is an assumption that the adjustments were done in July 1943, based on decision of the French representative, and not in November through the National Pact (Saliba, U.S. Library of Congress; El-Khazen 1991).

Although Khoury and Edde held the Premiership and the Presidency in the 1920s and 1930s, they did not gain their seat in Parliament through election prior to 1943. Instead they were appointed by the French authorities... (El-Khazen 1991, 25)

The act of independency announced the Lebanese sectarian elites as the officially chosen leaders of each confession that exists on this soil by proclaiming them legitimized officials of the Lebanese Republic (The Lebanese Constitution, Art. 101). Even though the elitism is a negative phenomenon, but in some systems, like consociationalism, it has a positive outcome, when the divided elites gather to prevent an external threat (Dekmejian 1978; Lijphart 1969; Lehbruch 1967). Moreover, Du Toi clarifies that the

efforts of the consensual membership members depends on the other members readiness to reach to a common outcome (1987, 419).

Reshaping the power sharing under new circumstances was done on the bases of the 1932 census six-to-five ratio Christians to Muslims. The census of 1932 considered to remain the Presidency after the Maronites, the post of the Prime Minister also remained as it was declared earlier, after the Sunnis, and thus, the extension was done to the post of the speaker of the Parliament, by fixing it after the Shi'its (Dekmejian 1978; Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; Zahar 2005, 15; Appendix A).

The 1943 National Pact once more reassured the confessional base of the power sharing and the further growing alienation of the Lebanese communities, reassuring the monopoly of the ruling elite and turned them into a hereditary family business (Salamey 2009). Nevertheless, France used the fact that the Christians were claimed as a majority, and sects divided the high-official positions according to the ratio of the population, six-Christians toward five-Muslims (Zahar 2005, 15; Appendix B).

In the Lebanese Constitution is mentioned: "Lebanon is Arab in its identity and in its affiliation" (The Lebanese Constitution, Preamble, B). Nevertheless, in reality the search for Lebanese Identity never has been stopped, and never forgotten since the first 1926 pre-constitution debates, where Christians were inclined toward the West, and Muslims were trying to keep their pro-Syrian Arab identity. While Syria was representing a territorial entity for missionaries, the Lebanese Christian-Maronites saw a danger to their exclusiveness in Syrian Arabism (Firro 2004; B. and L. 1940). To prove the complexity of Lebanese Identity there is an example of the first crisis of Presidency that happened after the first President, Charles Dabbas, Greek Orthodox, who was elected in 1926 for the next 6 years. In 1932, there were two presidential candidates: Bishara Al Khoury and

Emile Edde. To avoid the crisis from deepening, Sheikh Muhammad Al Jisr, Muslim leader, who was a chairperson of the Council of Ministers, was proposed as a president. Thus, the French representative, Henri Ponsot, extended the term of the first president for one year, to avoid the Muslim candidate of being elected. For the same reason, fear of losing the Christian proclaimed presidency, Lebanon never again held an official census since 1932 (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; Dekmejian 1978).

### *Consociationalism in Lebanon*

Taking to the account the system of power sharing, based on the country's constitution, Lebanon ruled by its elites that are strong enough to impose their influence on the governmental institutions (Lijphart 1969; Kerr 2007; Salamey 2009).

Theoretically, consociationalism is the only system that can survive in a country where the ruling entities represent confessional communities. Almost the four characteristics of the consociational democracy type are present in the Lebanese political system:

1. Proportional allocation of political posts among communities according to their numerical representation in the population;
2. A grand coalition between communities' leaders on common policies that serve all;
3. Communal autonomy whereby each community is free to determine its own affairs such as personal status laws; and
4. Mutual veto power, so that any decisions deemed detrimental by any community can be voted down (Harb 2006)

“Absolutely central to Lebanon’s political organization is confessionalism, a model of government that divides political power along religious lines” (Nelson 2013, 333). “The composition of the Lebanese Parliament is based on the allocation of a specific number of seats to each of the various minority groups in Lebanon (confessions). Within each community, the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes represents the current community in the Parliament (IFES 2009; Arsenian-- Ekmekji 2012, 2). Salamey (2009,

85), suggests that the Lebanese system of governance is a “corporate consociationalism” that agrees in advance about the positions for each “...ethnic and sectarian national groups, such as predetermining the presidency to a Maronite in Lebanon or to a Kurd in Iraq” and distributes through the state institutions.

Michael C. Hudson (1976, 112) analyzing A. Lijphart’s theory points out the main characteristics of consociational democracy to succeed:

- 1) Distinct lines of cleavage
- 2) A multiple balance of power
- 3) Popular attitudes favorable toward a grand coalition
- 4) An external threat
- 5) Moderate nationalism
- 6) Relatively low total load on the system

Gebara & Kibranian (2008), suggest that for the Lebanese state institutions to function properly primordial form of associations is a necessity. Oren Barak (2002), points out the positive outcome of intra-communal actors whose rational motives directed toward overcoming the competing groups’ efforts in gaining higher political and social status in the state institutions. The ongoing process based on permanent mobilization of competing groups. At the same time, this explains re-balancing of power sharing motives that challenge Lebanon’s political institutions. Thus, on the other hand, Du Toi (1987, 420) clarifies the motivation of the conflicting groups to bargain the settlement as the main strategy to reach the desired outcome, which on the other hand includes competition and cooperation at some extent. Moreover, he summarized three concepts of the power, which is essential in reaching a desirable outcome:

- 1) Power is the Essence of Bargaining;
- 2) Bargaining is a Process of Tactical Action;
- 3) Bargaining Power is Subjective Power. (Du Toi 1987, 420)

Describing the Lebanese case, Richard Dekmejian (1978) argues about the inter-elite lack of cohesion, which exposed also by Arend Lijphart (1969) and Gerhard Lehmbruch

(1967). Moreover, in the Lebanese case, there is further segmentation inside of each sectarian group based on its geographical, class and clan belongingness. Dekmejian concurs with Lijphart's and Lehmbruch's claims that the existence of horizontal and vertical struggles appear as well. Dekmejian claims the horizontal struggle as more moderate and the vertical as more radical. This controversy is provoking a conflicting behavior of the followers and makes almost impossible for the elites to control their own crowd.

Salamey (2009, 84), watching the historical developments of the Lebanese state, argues the national accountability of the political sectarian elite. At the same time, he underlines the cause of the confessional elitism as powered by the electoral system that enables the sectarian elite "to trade votes across sectarian lines without necessary soliciting votes from their own social grouping" (2009, 84). Salamey states that this system allows elite to secure their victory and gives a freedom to make coalitions toward the division and exploitation of the state recourses that makes them to become oligopolies with the inheriting public offices option. Another negative outcome of corporate consociationalism is the option of veto power that elite uses over the state decisions, at the same time weakening the state power.

Some researchers argue that there are some reasons to suggest that the Lebanese political system is not a typical consociational democracy and has some deviations from the model (Hudson 1976; Dekmejian 1978; Salamey 2009; Arsenian-- Ekmekji 2013; Nelson 2013). For example, to support his arguments, Dekmejian illustrated the unwillingness of the Maronite-Christian community, which was in dominance in the Chamber of Deputies until the 1980s, to accept the changes in representation that would affect the balance of power. He is also critical toward the Lebanese government that was

trying to keep control over the state for almost thirty years, by frequently changing its Cabinet (Dekmejian 1978, 260). Thus, Du Toi points out on the fact that the dependence to the bargaining stake shows the importance of the outcome and determine the strategy (1987, 420). Moreover, Nelson argues that Lijphart does not give a sufficient credit to “the transnational nature of religious and ethnic identities in contemporary society” and “...by allowing the sect to replace the role of the state, consociational democracy weakens central government so much that Lebanon’s territorial sovereignty is repeatedly undermined by both non-state actors and foreign states” (2013, 368).

Another issue is the class polarization where the upper class been represented by Maronites and Sunnies dominate over other less wealthy confessions, especially Shi’as and Palestinians. The insufficiency of the tools and means to impose its influence and control over the state as a unit by the elites is the next issue, which is not fitting into the typical case of consociational democracy model. Thus, Dekmejian is emphasizing the near impossibility of maintaining the credibility of the army and the police, while there is defragmentation inside of these institutions: the low rank positions belong mostly to the Muslim community, and the high ranks dominated by the Maronite community. On the hand, Dekmejian (1978, 254, 257) assumes that the failure of the Lebanese system is in these, mentioned above, deviations from the original consociational model. It is evident that the sectarianism is an inseparable part of the Lebanese political system (Nelson 2013, 342).

Nevertheless, Hudson also mentions some features of the consociational model that have changed with time: the “popular attitudes favorable to a grand coalition” became debatable in case of Lebanon (1976, 113). For example, a feature, like *moderate nationalism*, challenged by the Arab identification of Muslim communities, and the

immoderate stance of the Christian “Phalange” party, as the Muslim community demographically became a real majority and the Maronite-Christian community was struggling to keep its dominance in the government institutions. As El-Khazen explains: “Indeed, Christian ‘concession to Arabism was a *marriage de raison* based on pragmatism, interest, and especially, belief in the secular dimension of Arabism” (1991, 17). Moreover, the Lebanese system became extensively loaded that argues one of the Lijphart’s theory conditions about the less loaded small size of the government for successful consociationalism. At the same time, with growing modernization as the political field expands, the elite enlargement increased the internal conflicts that at the same time generated new ideologies and involved the masses in politics (Hudson 1976).

Lijphart and Lehmbruch suggest that divided communities coexist peacefully when they separated, for this reason, they should be separated. Dekmejian (1978), in the contrary, argues that this is not the case in Lebanon, where interconnectedness of all confessional communities at its all levels and without any geographical divisions or restrictions is not the threat to peaceful existence. He goes further and suggests that the interconnectedness of Lebanese communities results integration in some cases. The daily contacts of Lebanese population of different factions are representing the Lebanese lifestyle (Dekmejian 1978, 256, 258).

The next distinguishing feature of Lebanese system is the *turbulent environment* and the Palestinian question (Dekmejian 1978, 261). The original model of consociational system does not assume any external party involvement. The peaceful coexistence of Lebanese confessions (sectarian communities) positively related to the Arab-Israeli conflict settlement. Furthermore, the Palestinian question and everything related to this issue used by many states to destabilize Lebanon by heavily overloading the governing



system (Zahar 2005; Dekmejian 1978; Kerr 2007; Gebara & Kibranian 2008; Hudson 1976; Salamey 2009).

Analyzing Lebanese political system some researchers acknowledge that there is a foreign involvement and bargaining behind the closed doors at the bottom of political instability (Zahar 2005; Salamey 2009; Dekmejian 1978; Kerr 2007; Gebara & Kibranian 2008; Hudson 1976; El-Khazen 1991). For example, Salamey (2009, 86), analyzing the corporate consociationalism, underlines one of its characteristics as the *detritorialization*, which is causing the *denationalization* and being "...subjected by the various ethno-sectarian groups to the direct influences of transnational groups and foreign governments." Salamey underlines the role of foreign influence into state affairs as the ethno-sectarian polarization deepens, which leads into sectarian cleansing (2009, 89). He also argues that "Sectarian consociationalism within the corporate confessional state has only weakened the ability of state security and military forces to take decisive actions to end sectarian violence or assert territorial state sovereignty" (Salamey 2009, 89). After all, it seems that the state is unable to impose its will under the corporate confessional system to stop the sectarianism of geopolitical dimension to influence the state affairs. As Khazen (1991, 17) suggests, the controversy of the Lebanese society is extremely deep on the bases of the sectarian division, that in 1943 consensus would be never reached without direct foreign intervention through the National Pact. Moreover, the Lebanese state has been always open for the proxy geopolitical crises like, post- World War I, the Arab-Israeli struggle, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, and Iranian-Israeli confrontation (Salamey 2009). For example, as the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 divided the Arab world between the British and French, it was natural to see these European allies struggling for the influence in the Arab countries. However, Syria

and Lebanon fell under the French Mandate, thus, to eliminate the French influence, the British General Edward Spears, who was appointed as British Minister to the Lebanese and Syrian governments in 1942, played a significant role in pushing the Lebanese (later also the Syrian) elite to eliminate the French influence and proclaim independence (El-Khazen 1991, 21-22).

Dekmejian (1978, 255), on the other hand, explains this by the fact that elites are slipping into a conflict and asking the foreign supporters to protect them or to help them to achieve their goals. For example, the Ta'if Agreement of 1989 was made behind the closed doors and far from the media: "...under the auspices of US/Saudi mediation and amidst allegations of bribery" (Kerr 2007, 12). Dekmejian (1978, 255), argues: "The civil war of 1975 has brought even a larger number of external participants-Libya, Iraq, Syria, Israel, Egypt, U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and Jordan to mention the most obvious ones." Furthermore, "... state weakness has prevented the emergence of an authoritarian regime as occurred in neighboring countries, it has simultaneously left the country highly vulnerable to penetration from foreign powers who seek to mold it into their particular vision of Lebanon" (Nelson 2013, 367).

Another viewpoint supporting the foreign influence suggests that the roots of establishment of the Lebanese state system were a result of the Western powers interference into the Ottoman Empire affairs with the aim to weaken it (Gebara and Kibranian 2008). Moreover, the French authorities' involvement in designing the Lebanese state system favored some of the local elites, especially Maronite-Christians and provoked at the same time the controversial reaction of the pro-Arab, pro-Syrian camp opposing sentiments to stay alert. "Having all kinds of religious communities meant an eventual extension of regional politics into domestic affairs" (Harb 2006).

While the veto power brought democracy, the polarization toward the foreign protectors directing Lebanon into the regional streams.

Marie-Joell Zahar in *Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic Peace, and Democratic Failure* (2005), justifies the Syrian intervention in Lebanese affairs by claiming that the French authorities provoked the pro-Arab sentiments of Muslim communities by favoring the Christian communities. Moreover, in 2005 February 14, assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri once again affirmed polarization of Lebanese society toward its foreign protectors, thus politics, and is still affecting the country's affairs (Arsenian---Ekmekji 2012, 2). Violence is more feasible when a current protector has already begun to withdraw or wakened, or there is an establishment of a new protectorate (Zahar 2005, 15). Anti-Syrian protests turned into the Cedar Revolution that pressed Syria to withdraw its military presence from the Lebanese soil.

At the same time, analyzing the comparison of Northern Ireland (short-lasting) and Lebanese (long-lasting) sectarian divisions and disagreements, Kerr (2007), claims the influence of a third party essential in a peace-making process. Moreover, Kerr is mentioning the September 11 of 2001 and 2003 US-Iraq invasion as the major regional destabilizing events that deeply affected Lebanon and brought political instability. After each crises the re-distribution of the sharing power is re-destabilizing the country: "...the Lebanese factions had very little power to influence the outcome of this process" (Kerr 2007, 10). Tom Najem (2012, 123) points on the sectarian tensions, the weakness of the state, and the external involvement as the core conditions of the government failure that were present at 1975, and are present in nowadays Lebanon.

## CHAPTER II

### LEBANESE POLITICAL CULTURE OF 1943-1975

#### *Trying to preserve the state authority 1943-1975*

The fact, that the future of Lebanon was decided through the agreement of the Lebanese heads of the clans and the French commissioner, became the first legalization of *elitism* (Salamey 2009). Dekmejian (1978) divides the post-independence elites on *cartels*. The first “cartel” includes the era of the first president that lasted until 1952. Bshara Khouri, the first president had often changed the PMs and the Cabinet instead of stabilizing the system. He appointed nine Prime Ministers until 1952. In 1944, September 25, the Cabinet led by Riad al-Sulh presented Lebanon to join the Arab League. In 1945, Abd al-Hamid Karami took the responsibility over the Cabinet and in the same year, the French authorities were inclined to bind Lebanon by a bilateral agreement. However, the U.S.A. destroyed that illusion and in September 19, Lebanon became an independent state, which was also supported by the U.S.S.R. (Traboulsi 2007, 112).

In May 1945, the French deployed some troops in Syria and Lebanon, which erupted into violent clashes with the bombardment of Damascus. Thus, due to British involvement the French retreated. Moreover, the U.S.A. brokered a peace compromise through the UN on 13 December 1945. Nevertheless, it was an agreement to pull out British and French troops from Lebanon and Syria, which was completed on 31 December 1946 (Traboulsi 2007, 113). On 10 July 1947, Syria and Lebanon were united by the Syrian-Lebanese monetary union, which insured a bigger share for Syria. In 1948, the union was abolished by the Lebanese side, which united itself with the French monetary alliance (Traboulsi 2007, 122).

Nevertheless, Lebanon participated in the Arab-Israeli War, in 1948, backing Syrian troops. The Lebanese-Israeli cease-fire was signed on 23 March 1949 (Traboulsi 2007, 113). Some 100 000-170 000 Palestinian refugees, the economic burden on the state, and the threatened security challenged Lebanon for many years to come. On the other hand, as Jaber Suleiman (1999, 67) states, that for Palestinians, the first phase was called “Adaptation and Hope (1948-58)”.

In 1949, March 31, in Syria through “...a military coup in which the CIA was heavily implicated”, Husni al-Zaim, a commander-in-chief of the Syrian army, came to the power (Traboulsi 2007, 114). During the same period, an armed revolt organized by the Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party (SNSP) in Lebanon, failed, headed by Antoun Sa’adeh. Nevertheless, as Zaim showed support for Sa’adeh, in 1949, June 9, the Christian Maronite Phalange party clashed with the SNSP and forced out Sa’adeh from Lebanon (Traboulsi 2007, 115). Granted asylum from the Syrian government, Sa’adeh orchestrated a new revolt in July 1949, which was defeated by the Lebanese army. Meanwhile, foreign pressure, specifically from Egypt and Saudi Arabia brought Syria and Lebanon to sign an economic union treaty in June 1949 (Ibid, 115).

Furthermore, the executive and legislative power of the Lebanese president enabled him to be always at the heart of the country’s economic activities. Since then, this executive power created a tradition to be involved into the state’s political economy, which in turn created an oligarchy comprised from some 30 Lebanese families (Traboulsi 2007, 115). This is why, in 1952, Social National Front (SNF) organized a strike to repel the president. This was the first major political crisis since independence. Bishara al-Khuri resigned on September 18 (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress).

The next president, who was appointed in 1952, was Camille Sham'un, who just continued the tradition to change the PMs (Dekmejian 1978, 253). During his presidency, five Prime Ministers lead the government. Nevertheless:

During the presidency of Kamil Sham'un, Lebanon witnessed period of economic prosperity that drew on favorable regional conditions: the boom in the oil economies of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia; the economic effects of the creation of the state Israel; and the flow of Arab capital to Lebanese banks fleeing the first wave of nationalisations in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. (Traboulsi 2007, 128)

During Sham'un presidency, in November 1952, a new electoral law divided the country onto 33 electoral districts, and reduced the number of deputies to 44. By the previous law, there were 9 districts and 77 deputies. Moreover, the United States granted Lebanon arms and economic assistance of \$6 million. Lebanon, in response, allowed the US to use its air space for special missions. Despite his pro-West orientation, Sham'un rejected binding Lebanon to the anti-Soviet *Baghdad Pact* in 1955, which was signed between Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran (Traboulsi 2007, 132).

Nevertheless, on the one hand, the growth of the Muslim population brought demographic changes. Muslims were concerned about an unfair distribution of high public positions and the Christians refusal to conduct a census. On the other hand, Egypt's revolution of 1956-58, wakes up the pan-Arabism in the Arab World. United Arab Republic, formed by Egypt and Syria, empowered the Lebanese Muslim population by pro-Arab sentiments (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). However, the Lebanese Christians were against unification with the pan-Arab states. "...the Lebanese commercial/financial oligarchy established itself as an intermediary between Western markets and the entire Arab hinterland", and Beirut soon became a pivot "...for international communications" (Traboulsi 2007, 118). Moreover, "...in January-February 1957, the government adopted the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' and took on itself a pro-west

obligation” (Nir 2004, 110). This fact irritated the Lebanese-Muslims (Salibi 1966; Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). Furthermore, in May 1957, the CIA pressured Sham’un to hold national elections that raised the number of seats from 44 to 66 (Traboulsi 2007, 132). The Christian majority reelected Sham’un, and since 1956 the government was led by anti-Egypt, pro-West Sami al-Sulh.

Nonetheless, corruption was growing and the pro-US elite was flourishing. The fear that President Sham’un was going to be re-elected, united the opposition in March 1958. Fear of a bloody revolt pushed the President Sham’un to ask for an intervention from U.S.A., France and Britain. The United States sends its forces on July 15, but they were never involved in the Lebanese conflict: “In the four day that followed, 15,00 American soldiers landed, backed by another 40,00 on the 70 warships of the US Navy’s Sixth fleet, in the first operation of its kind since the War” (Traboulsi 2007, 136). The operation was called “The Blue Bat”. “In the course of the 1958 Civil War, in which United States forces were not involved, between 2,000 and 4,000 casualties occurred, primarily in the Muslim areas of Beirut and in Tripoli” (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). The US intervention brought a peaceful solution: to elect the military man, Fu’ad Shihab on 31 July 1958 (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; Nir 2004, 111).

The next “cartel” was brought to the government by the third president, General Fuad Shihab in 1958. On the first place, Shihab asked the US troops to pull out and adopted neutrality, which was dictated by the Lebanese-Muslims 1958 revolt against the previous president’s anti-Abd al-Nasir policies (Traboulsi 2007, 138). The leader of the rebellion, Rashid Karami, was appointed to lead the government. The troops withdraw in October 1958. The Chamber of Deputies size was enlarged from sixty-six to ninety-nine. Moreover, Shihab brought reforms to the field “of social security, civil service reform,

agricultural development and planning”, but “treated some of the traditional politicians roughly and violated the liberal norms of Lebanon’s free-wheeling, open, parliamentary system” (Hudson 1976, 114-115). However, being unhappy with the 1958 crisis resolution, the Syrian National Socialist Party (SNSP) organized a military coup d’état on the eve of 1962, which was quickly neutralized by the army. As Traboulsi suggests, “Regionally, there were serious suspicions that the SNSP’s anti-Nasserite and anti-Communist coup was encouraged and even financed by the British and Jordanians desiring to form an anti-Nasser federation comprising Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq” (2007, 139). Furthermore, as Shihab as President in the spring of 1964 by majority voices, a new crisis arose: anti-Shihab Christians opposed the renewal of his mandate. Forced by opposition, the President withdrew his candidacy from the post (Traboulsi 2007, 143).

The next president, Charles Helou, stepped on presidency in 1964 and faced with weakened army and ineffectiveness of the elites to deal with the country’s major problems. The significance of this time is in the growing impact of the Palestinian guerrillas and the efforts to keep in balance the Christians and Muslims of Lebanon (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). The amount of Palestinian refugees increased in 1967 after the Arab-Israeli June war, the Israeli attacks on Lebanon in response to the Palestinian activities. Moreover, some Lebanese Muslims, specifically Shi’as, were sympathizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) activities, while Maronite Christians entered in an open confrontation in October 1969 (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). To regulate Palestinians’ military activities, in 1969 was signed the Cairo Agreement between the Lebanese state and the PLO. The unofficial restrictions spread



then in other spheres like, permits to work or travel, keeping the living level of Palestinian refugees at the poverty line (Jones, 2013).

The fifth “cartel” of Lebanese elite kept its position as a *centrist* and was led by the next president, Suleyman Franjeh since August 1970 (Dekmejian 1978, 254).

Conservative Franjeh won over the Shihabist candidate by one vote, which shows the high competitiveness of the elite (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). The cabinet was formed from twenty-two ministers that were led by Taqi al-Din Sulh in 1973 and was promised to respond to the needs of the larger portion of the Lebanese citizens.

One of the major challenges became the enormous growth of the Palestinian refugees, expelled from Jordan due to their anti-Israeli activities in 1970s. It was not only about the approximately 400 000 refugees, but it were their anti-Israeli attacks under the Palestinian Liberation Organization that the Cairo Agreement was aimed to seize in exchange to relative autonomy inside of the refugee camps (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; Jones, 2013).

“The guerrillas tended to ally themselves with existing leftist Lebanese organizations or to form various new leftist groups that received support from the Lebanese Muslim community and caused further splintering in the Lebanese body politic.” (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress 1987)

Nevertheless, 1971- 72 were years of unemployment and inflation growth, demonstrations and clashes between the Lebanese right-wing groups and the Palestinians. The government tried to implement some economic and social programs but the Palestinian-Israeli irritations were harming the whole climate. The Lebanese and Israeli were trying to prevent and seize the PLO activities and have met on January 18 with a proposed draft, which the Lebanese side re-drafted and approved on January 23 (Dahl 2006, 72). Moreover, “Syria became involved in an internal conflict” and was engaged in mediations between the Lebanese authorities and the PLO (Dahl 2006, 68). Nevertheless,

Lebanon had to pay the price of massacred Israeli athletes that were participating in Munich Olympic Games in 1972 by the Israeli attack on Beirut during the April of 1973. Furthermore, on May 2 of the same year, PLO members kidnapped two army soldiers in response to the tough measures against the PLO anti-Israeli activities. The clashes of the Lebanese army against the Palestinian guerrillas, that took some 50 lives from the army and some 100 Palestinians, ended by the adaptation of the martial law and an agreement that limited the Palestinian military activities (Dahl 2006; Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). The crisis involved Syria-based Yarmouk Brigade on the PLO side, and the Lebanese called for the help the US ambassador. On the other hand, the Egyptian president pressured the Syrian government, while the Lebanese Air Forces were striking the Palestinian fedayeen. The Lebanese Air Forces bombarded the Palestinian refugee camp in Burj al-Barajina on May 3<sup>rd</sup>. The ceasefire was reached on May 5, unifying the Muslims that were complaining the government actions: “From May onward, both Jumblatt<sup>1</sup> and the Muslim camp grew increasingly dissatisfied with the Lebanese government and used the Palestinian cause as an instrument to express that discontent” (Dahl 2006, 82-83). However, to resolve the crisis, the Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese and the Arab League leaders gathered through the 5-7<sup>th</sup> May and restored the right of stressing the Lebanese authority over the Palestinian camps. Thus, unsatisfied some “third party”, erupted as “a rain of indiscriminate rocket attacks” to which the Lebanese government responded by the announcement of the state of emergency, followed by the air strikes of the Palestinians’ Sabra and Satila camps on 8<sup>th</sup> May (Dahl 2006, 85-86). The first response came from the Syrian side, that closed the Syrian-Lebanese border, and on

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<sup>1</sup> Jumblatt (known also as Joumblatt, Junblatt) - Kamal Jumblatt, one of the leading figures of the Lebanese-Druze community elite, who was pro-Palestinian revolution and a socialist.

the same day Egyptians declared their support to Palestinian cause, blaming Lebanese state in supporting Israel: Syria's direct involvement through some militia supported heavy fights that inflamed all over the Lebanon until the 10<sup>th</sup>, when the ceasefire was reached. Whatsoever, the peace negotiating took until May 17, when the Melkart Protocol between the Lebanese and the PLO announced demilitarization of Palestinian guerrillas, but never was implemented and brought to further escalation and "to a non-recognition of the Lebanese sovereignty" (Dahl 2006, 95).

However, because of being a pivot in the Arab world and its economy reasons, Lebanon accepted non-involvement policy during the 1973 Arab-Israeli October war. Thus, the impact of the war been seen through the growing influence of the PLO in the south of Lebanon. Populated mainly by the Shiites, the south became a target for the Israeli responses toward PLO military activities and growing antipathy of the Lebanese citizens. Nonetheless, the Lebanese Beqaa mountainous region was used by the Israeli air forces to bombard the Syrian cities (Traboulsi 2007, 182).

Despite all, in 1973-1975, the Orthodox community was very unhappy by growing power of the Maronite and Sunni factions. Each sect was trying to preserve its dominance demographically and through the public position distribution. Furthermore, as Traboulsi states, the influence of the elite, majority of which was representing the parliament, was increasing:

Parliament, ... was being increasingly dominated by moneyed interests, and the landed notables themselves (the 'political feudalists') were rapidly transformed into capitalist businessmen, shareholders in joint stock companies and holders of import quotas distributed by the state. (2007, 171)

For this reason, some researchers see the roots of Lebanese drama in its electoral system, as it had turn into an elites' club, where they had a veto power over the state

decisions and a monopoly over legislative representation. The constitutional law was amended several times: 1927, 1929, 1943, 1947, 1990, 1995, 1998, and 2004. The abolition of the political confessionalism had to be a priority and the greatest challenge for all Lebanese governments since its independence, as it mentioned in the Lebanese Constitution Article 95 amended in 1945 and 1990 (The Lebanese Constitution, Art. 95). Nevertheless, the struggle for sectarian dominance over the neighborhoods, a bigger share or private interests, led to the sectarian cleansing and the 1975 inter-confessional war inflamed, where “Syria, Israel and the PLO had their proxy wars” (Jones 2013; Salamey 2009; Dekmejian 1978; Zahar 2005).

#### *The Civil War 1975-1989 and the Israeli aggressions*

In the beginning of 1975, Lebanese state was drawn into corruption and favoritism that pervaded the whole system, including the bureaucracy and parliament, as well as the presidency. No doubt, bending the rules conferred certain benefits in terms of "greasing the wheels" efficiency, but on balance corruption weakened system legitimacy (Hudson 1976, 115). The rise of the Lebanese state been conditioned by a weak state, ruled by elite-based bourgeoisie, oriented on West (Gates 1989). The oil boom in the Arab states made Lebanese banks the main transitional body. Thus, the weakness of the Lebanese army was conditioned by the state preferences toward the economic objectives, and as a state, Lebanon was trying to preserve neutrality toward any of its neighboring conflicts. The internal stage was the only place where the army could be used, but the parties involved in the conflict conditioned even this duty. On the other hand, the army was preparing to confront the Palestinian fedayeen, as the PLO activities never stopped and the Lebanese were concerned about the situation in the sought. Once again, one of the

Druze leaders, Kamal Jumblatt, the leftist, supported by the Egyptians and the Syrians, tried to bargain on some socio-economic reforms in exchange to seize the PLO activities (Traboulsi 2007).

However, the 1974-75 were the years of mobilization of all the contradicting forces inside the Lebanese state, including the new slogans of the Maronite church, the birth of a new Shia ideology, and the small or large militia factions. The *Phalange Party*, organized by Pierre Gemayel, one of the Maronite-Christian leaders, has "...its function as defenders of narrow sectarian privileges in the service of the big class interests" (Traboulsi 2007, 176). The party aimed to organize the Maronite youth, and formed on the bases of the fascist organization, in 1936. They were West-oriented, anti-Arab, anti-Palestinians, and pro-Israeli. Moreover, established in 1974, the *Rally of Committed Christians*, being close to *Lebanese National Movement* and the *Communists* "...called for an open democratic and secular form of Arabism" (Traboulsi 2007, 177). Furthermore, the Maronite Church new slogans since 1968 were also calling the Christian youth to organize itself toward establishing the new, more developed state-society, belonging to all its citizens and supporting the Palestinian cause.

Nonetheless, the Iranian cleric, Musa al-Sadr, tried to bring some positive changes into the poor Shia community through the implementation of the Iranian-funded social projects. He raised the Shias' voice to demand a share of the state budget for development of the sought and construction of the schools and hospitals, at the same time emphasized the need to protect Lebanese borders by the Arabs in whole. Moreover, the Shia deputies threatened to resign if their demands will disregarded. Furthermore, "in 1974, Sadr threatened civil disobedience if his demands were not met" (Traboulsi 2007, 179). However, in 1975 he created the al-*Amal* movement.

Nevertheless, in the same 1974, in January, Syria and Lebanon signed a joint defense treaty, and in September – an armed confrontation between the Maronite Phalagists and the Jumblatists occurred in Tarshish area. Demonstrations to protest the weak defense of the sought (Nabatiya and Kfar Shuba), and the question of the Palestinians presence in whole were held through the beginning of 1975 (Chamie 1976-77, 175). Moreover, a minor confrontation of fisherman toward an elite-held corporation in February with few death and wounded, and another violent one – in March, between the army and the PLO, and finally, on 13 April 1975, the most devastating Civil War that lasted for 15 years, began (Traboulsi 2007, 183).

On 13 April Palestinians outside PLO control made an attack, small but of a particularly insulting character, on the Kataeb, who in turn killed the passengers, mainly Palestinian, of a bus. The Palestinians claimed that these were unarmed civilians, the Kataeb that they were armed guerrillas intent on renewing the attack. Both sides took these events as the signal to commence hostilities. (Stoakes 1976, 12)

The first part, the *Two-Year War* or Christian-Palestinian War began, ruining infrastructure and services, remembered by assassinations and massacres from the both sides. The main sides were Christians versus Muslims, but with the time, other groups were involved, spreading the war allover Lebanon, and pushing the mixed areas population to relocate to the areas where their sect was dominating. On one side was the *Lebanese National Movement*, led by Kamal Jumblatt, who was a leftist pro-reformist. On the opposite side, “those in favor of maintaining the status quo came to be known as the *Lebanese Front*” that was led by the Maronite-Christian elite (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; Traboulsi 2007). The ability of the Phalange Party (*Kataeb* in Arabic) to organize its members brought a success in between the nationalist Lebanese groups, thus the government support was insured through such groups mobilization. Internal transformation from the scouts group to the militia organization of inter-regionally

represented Maronite-Christians made the Kataeb Party to become a political power (Entelis 1973, 148). The transformation of the Party was done in response to the Arabism.

However, some information from the newspapers suggests that around "...300 people were killed, 1,500 buildings destroyed, and losses amounting to \$200 million were reported by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry" during the first 3 days alone (Maalouf et al. 2003, 8). In May, the military operations spread all over Beirut. In West Beirut, militias established checkpoints that divided the city on two sides. Widespread atrocities remembered by the "Black Thursday" in May 1975 and by the "Black Saturday" in December 1975. On May 30 1975, as an answer for killing a Palestinian, around 50 Christians were executed by mutilation. Thus, on December 6 1975, as a response to the mutilated bodies of five young Christians on the previous day, around 50-70 unarmed Muslim or Palestinian employees of the port were killed and around 300 were kidnapped (Maalouf et al. 2003, 9).

However, when the government tried to take the control over the war it was impossible to decide the army's role. Moreover, even the Syrian diplomatic involvement was unable to enforce peace at the beginning. Nevertheless, this conflict been seen as unwillingness of the Maronites to share the power with Muslims. Thus, the attempts to isolate the Phalangists by the leftists, gathered other Christian factions around Phalangists in response (Traboulsi 2007; Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). The reformists-leftists, led by Jumblatt, were proposing "...the abolition of the system of political and administrative sectarian quotas; a voluntary civil code for personal status; a new electoral law based on proportional representation in which Lebanon would become a single electoral district; extensive administrative decentralization; and the convocation of a constituent assembly on a non-sectarian basis" (Traboulsi 2007, 189). Moreover, they were demanding

“...greater participation of the Muslims in the government and military” (Chamie 1976-77, 178). On August 24 1975, the Phalangists issued the statement that the electoral law should be amended, and “...the state should become secularized”, moreover, the National Pact of 1943 and the constitution must be never modified (Chamie 1976-77, 177; Traboulsi 2007). Thus, the center of Beirut was bombarded in response to the Army deployment to restore calm. Moreover, Israel invaded the south once again in August and December of 1975, killing not only Palestinians, but also many from the Shia community.

As the war was spreading, few times the Syrians tried to restore the calm: “By the end of January 1976, some 14,000 Syrian soldiers were in Lebanon, with 5,000 to 6,000 Sa’iqa<sup>2</sup> and PLA units” (Maalouf et al. 2003, 16). Finally, in January 1976 they managed to organize a ceasefire, and on February 14 assisted in negotiations around *Constitutional Document* reform program. Nonetheless, the Kataeb called for distribution of Palestinian refugees among the all Arab states (Traboulsi 2007, 193). Despite all, in March, was created the *Lebanese Arab Army* (also known as *Joint Forces*) that gathered efforts of the *Lebanese National Movement* and the PLO, managed to attack the presidential palace and forced out the president on March 25 (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; Maalouf et al. 2003, 14; Traboulsi 2007, 194). Furthermore, mass killings in the Christians villages throughout the spring of 1976, followed by lootings and distortion, had an aim to displace the Christian population from its areas of location: “...95 villages were looted and their inhabitants displaced, 250,000 people were homeless, and 750,000 were in urgent need of food” (Maalouf et al. 2003, 17).

However, despite the war, in May of 1976, backed by Syria, Lebanese Central Bank principal, Elias Sarkis, was elected as the next President of Lebanon. At the same time,



the Mount Lebanon was immersing as an independent autonomy. Thus, taking control over the 80% of the Lebanon, Jumblatt proposed to the Syrian president, Hafez al-Asad, to lead a coalition from Lebanon, Jordan, Palestinians and Syria to oppose the Egypt peace with Israel (Traboulsi 2007, 194). Nevertheless, Asad changed his preferences and Syria managed a military intervention to avoid the creation of the “second Israel”, using almost 6,000 Syrian soldiers, but was resisted (Maalouf et al. 2003; Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). The *Economic and Political Weekly*, of 5<sup>th</sup> June 1976, analyzed the Syrian intervention, and have no answer to whom to address the initiative:

It is true that the Syrian Communist Party is a partner to the ruling National Front Coalition in Syria; but a few days ago, there were reports that the Syrian CP was not happy over the government's actions, and that president Hafez Assad had imposed sever restrictions on the Syrian CP. (Syrian Invasion 1976)

Later, Syria was accused in taking side with the Lebanese Christians by the Arab world. Thus, in late July with the Syrian military help the Lebanese National Movement was suppressed.

Nonetheless, in June, the US Ambassador and his adviser along with their driver, were kidnapped and killed, signaling to foreigners to leave Lebanon. Moreover, Christian civilians, on their way of escaping the fighters, were burned alive, trapped in their cars by Palestinians and radical Muslim faction *Jund Allah*, while passing through the tunnel road (Maalouf et al. 2003, 19).

The formal end of the Civil War was brought through the Riyadh Conference on 16 October 1976. By the Arab League meeting in Cairo in the same 1976 October, was established the *Arab Deterrent Force* (ADF) and by this was legalized the Syrian

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Sa'iqat<sup>2</sup> - in Arabic means Thunderbolt, was formed in late 1967 to represent the Syrian Palestinian section.

presence in Lebanon, counting 27,000 Syrian citizens out of 30,000 soldiers deployed for the peacekeeping mission at the beginning of 1977. The mandate of the ADF was renewed several times. Nevertheless, through the ADF presence, Syria became deeply involved in the war and in the Lebanese internal affairs (Maalouf et al. 2003; Collelo, Library of Congress).

The normal life returned to Lebanon for a while encouraged by the ceasefire. The new president appointed new Prime Minister Salim Al-Hoss, on December 8, 1976. As a result, of having a weaker army, the south became almost under control of Palestinian militia until 1982. Nonetheless, on March 16 1977, the leftists and the Druze community leader Kamal Jumblatt were assassinated and in response, 177 Christians were killed (Maalouf et al. 2003, 23). Nevertheless, small or big operations, terrorizing civil population were held from both of the sides through the 1977-1978.

The confrontations on the border between the PLO and the villagers were happening regularly and causing civilian casualties. Along the southern borders, the regular confrontations were also happening between the PLO and the Israeli. Finally, during November 9-11 1977, Israel answered by an air and sea attack to the rockets, fired from the South Lebanon, heavily bombarding Nabatieh city, destroying villages and killing over 100 civilians (Maalouf et al. 2003, 24). The next full-scale operation took place on March 1978, also as a response to the Palestinian operation in Tel Aviv. However, 25,000-30,000 Israeli soldiers, invading Lebanon who took control of the border area along the river Litani, carried out the *Operation Litani*. On March 19, the Israeli used cluster bombs for the first time. On June 13 1978, when Israel withdrew its military forces under the Resolution 425 of the United Nations Security Council, the UNIFIL peacekeepers were deployed all along the Litani river, and the “security belt”, which was

controlled by Israel and financed by Israel-Christian militia. Moreover, "...between 700 – 1,000 Lebanese and Palestinians were killed during the operation, and between 160,000 and 250,000 fled" from that area (Maalouf et al. 2003, 25).

During 1977, as Egypt became engaged in peace negotiations with Israel, and Syrian-Palestinian relations had some positive changes, in the contrary, Lebanese-Syrian relations cooled down. The Christian leaders Sham'un and Franjieh asked Syria to eliminate its military presence as the strategic alliance between them came to an end (Maalouf et al. 2003). Moreover, during the 1977-78, the clashes between the Christian militia and the ADF were happening in the north regularly. However, the assassination of Franjieh's son on June 13 1978 provoked the Hundred-Day War. On July 1, 1978, Syrian peacekeeping forces bombarded Christian areas of Beirut for three months, destroying infrastructure and killing hundreds of people. The ceasefire was reached on October 7, 1978, thus, the ADF mandate was renewed (Maalouf et al. 2003, 26). Despite all this, on January 4, 1979, the Sought Lebanese Army, supported by the Israeli Army, bombarded Nabatieh and Hasbaya towns, causing the population to leave the area. Thus, Israeli Air Forces, supported by the land and sea military troops, heavily bombarded the whole South Lebanon in January and May 1979 (Ibid, 28).

Furthermore, as the Syrian troops withdrew from Beirut and relocated in Beqaa, the inter-Christian and Palestinians versus Al-Amal Shia movement struggles were going on. Moreover, in May and September 1979, the Armenian Revolutionary Party (Dashnaksutyun) clashed with the Kataeb Party and NLP (Maalouf et al. 2003, 27). Nonetheless, the fight in the North was going on between the Phalange and Marada Christian parties with the participation of the Syrian Special Forces during some 10 days

in the mid February 1980, killing of some and displacing of others (Maalouf et al. 2003, 27).

Nevertheless, the *Battle of Zahle*, that took place during the 1981, began in March. It was between the Lebanese Forces and the Syrian Army, and had an aim to regain the control over the Lebanese Christian city, not very far from the Syrian border. Moreover, on April 28 1981, the Israeli Army joined the Battle, and it turned into a direct confrontation of Syrian and Israeli armies, that was resolved through the US negotiations, and the siege was lifted on June 30 (Maalouf et al. 2003, 28).

However, the Syrian Army was shelling the East Beirut, and the Christian based Lebanese Forces bombed Muslim-populated areas. The fight inflamed suburbs of the capital, moreover, the LF shelled the airport. Thus, on April 6 1981, the Syrian and the Lebanese armies also went into an open confrontation that continued through May 1981 (Maalouf et al. 2003). It was also during the spring of 1981, when Israel attacked the South Lebanon PLO positions. The most intensive bombing took place on July 17, during which the PLO positions were destroyed and around 150 civilians killed. The result was a negotiated ceasefire on July 24, which lasted until April 1982 (Maalouf et al. 2003, 34).

However, the ceasefire was broken on April 5 1982, by shelling of Palestinian camps Sabra, Chatila, Buj al-Barajneh, and the Cite Sportive by Israeli Air Forces. Nonetheless, Palestinians responded by sending rockets toward north Israel. However, the massive Israeli full invasion, *Operation Peace for Galilee*, took place only in June 1982, after the assassination attempt of Shlomo Argov, Israeli Ambassador in London on June 3<sup>rd</sup> (Maalouf et al. 2003).

Moreover, Beirut fell under the siege since June 15 until the very late September, causing the total destruction of infrastructure of West Beirut due to heavy bombardments.

Nevertheless, the ceasefire was reached through the UN Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509 that were aimed to stop all the military activities from all of the fighting sides (Maalouf et al. 2003, 35).

Nevertheless, significance of these events is in full participation of the Lebanese Forces alongside with Israeli Army. For example, Israeli Army advancement enabled the Lebanese Forces to enter into Aley and Shuf, Druze dominated area. Moreover, the LF also conducted the massacre that took place during September 16-18, in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in response to assassination, on September 14, 1982, of newly elected Lebanese president on August 23, Bashir Gemayel, who was leading the Lebanese Forces. To be not forgotten, while the mandate of the ADF was ended by July 1982, using the U.S. brokered ceasefire, on August 21, 15,000 Palestinian militia and few thousands of Syrian soldiers were evacuated and replaced by the U.S. Italian and French battalions. After this, it is clear that the main population existing in Sabra and Shatila camps were civilians (Maalouf et al. 2003, 37).

The Lebanese Forces engagement in the killings of Lebanese belonging to other religions continued, and during the fall of 1982, it was transferred into the South Lebanon. Furthermore, the year of 1982 opened a new resistance page for the Lebanese, by establishment of the National Salvation Front backed by Syria, which succeeded the Lebanese National Movement, and creation of Hezbollah Party, backed by Iran (Maalouf et al. 2003, 39).

However, Amine Gemayel, became a President on September 21, 1982. He signed an agreement with the participation of Israel and the U.S., obliging the withdrawal of all foreign fighters, including Israeli, Palestinians, and Syrians, from Lebanon (Maalouf et al. 2003). Syria and its ally, the NSF opposed the agreement. Despite all, Israel withdrew

partially, and re-arranged its positions deploying in the south once again (Maalouf et al. 2003, 40). Nonetheless, Israel never stopped attacking Palestinians and Lebanese until 2000.

However, the *War of the Mountain* began in September 1983, when the LF engaged into the killings of the members of the Druze PSP until December 1983. (Maalouf et al. 2003, 43). As it has always been, the foreign intervention was not late: the U.S. Air Force bombed the Palestinian and Druze positions on December 4, 1983; later – the Syrian military station; on February 8, 1984, PSP positions were bombed from the USS New Jersey (Maalouf et al. 2003, 43).

Nevertheless, March of 1985 is remembered by the battle between the Lebanese Army and the Lebanese Forces in the Saida. The significance of the battle is in the support of the PSP, PNO, and the PLO to the Lebanese Army. However, the pro-Israel LF surrendered their positions and withdrew from the region. Moreover, in 1983, the battle in Tripoli was taking place between Palestinian Fatah al-Intifada, their Lebanese allies and the Syrian Army. However, after two month heavy bombardments, on December 19, 1983, causing many loses, the PLO capitulated (Maalouf et al. 2003, 46).

However, another war, which has significance in Lebanese history, is the *War of the Camps*, which began in 1984. Its significance is in the fighting sides: on one side, it was Syria and its allies, on the other – the PLO. After an intensive fight in June-July 1984, and after Israeli partial withdrawal in 1985, pro-Syria al-Amal, Shia organization, took control of a part of the South Lebanon. Already in May of 1985, Amal and Lebanese Army besieged ones again Sabra and Chatila Palestinian refugee camps. Thus, this fight took place for 21 hours, but it was too far from declaring the end to the struggle: the same camps continued their confrontations until January 1988 (Maalouf et al. 2003, 52).

Nevertheless, the resistance sentiments against the U.S. and the Western countries will be always remembered by the suicide operations, like: on April 18, 1983. Over 100 people were injured and 63 were killed, as a result of a car explosion in the U.S. embassy yard. On October 23, 1983, by two suicide explosions were killed around 241 Marines and 58 French paratroopers (Maalouf et al. 2003). Furthermore, the President of American University of Beirut, Malcolm Kerr, was killed on January 18, 1984, and on September 20, 1984, a suicide attack injured the U.S. and U.K. ambassadors and 100 people, killing eight others (Maalouf et al. 2003, 53).

However, there was no consensus toward any successor to the presidency after the President Amine Gemayel. As it was still a wartime, the end of 1988, it was a very convenient move to appoint the Army commander in chief, General Michel Aoun, as a "...prime minister for a provisional military council" (Ibid, 64). Thus, Sunni, Salim Al-Hoss, appointed after Prime Minister Rashid Karami assassination in June 1987, led the civil cabinet. However, Lebanese in East Beirut were supporting Aoun, as the head of Lebanese Army presenting Christian military government, fighting against Syrian Army, and in the West Beirut the Lebanese were supporting the 1943 National Pact driven Constitution, by which only Sunni community representative could be appointed as a prime minister.

In March 1992 the Lebanese government issued a report estimating the total number of war casualties, as follows: 144,240 killed; 197,506 wounded, including 13,455 with permanent disabilities; 17,415 missing, among whom 13,968 were "kidnapped and presumed dead." (Maalouf et al. 2003, 70)

Analyzing the causes of the Civil War, Chamie (1976-77), distinguished few factors that were hidden and became obvious during the war. One of the factors is the clan-based elite leadership, which is lasting as long as the current leader exists and his political orientation and principles. The second factor was the differences between the confronting

parties in demographic, economic, social, and ideology issues, like the different rate of demographic growth and the 6:5 ratio of participation in public representation based on 1932 census (Appendixes A, B). The third cause was distinguished as “the existence of sharp and deep societal cleavages based on religious affiliation...” like identification of Maronite-Christians with Europe, mainly France, while Muslims identifying themselves with the Arab nations. Nevertheless, the Palestinian refugees by their involvement in the local politics, like supporting the leftists, played a crucial role too. Thus, the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and the military aid by the Arab states (Chamie 1976-77, 178-84).

Frank Stoakes (1976, 11), in its place, analyzing the causes of the 1975 Civil War, gives one of the central roles to the Kataib (Phalangist) Party. He explains this by the large number of the Party members (60,000 mainly Maronite - Christians) dedicated to the Lebanese cause, who possess the best organization capacities ready to act by military means. Certainly, the military action was going to be directed against the Palestinians, who were threatening Lebanese stability by their military activities against Israel and were supporting the Lebanese leftists, mainly Muslims, who demographically became a majority and were struggling for reforms that will allow more equal representation in the public administration positions (Stoakes 1976, 9-10). However, Stoakes underline the immobility of the government and the army, and their failure to control the PLO military activities.



## CHAPTER III

### CONSEQUENCES OF LEBANESE ELITISM SINCE 1989

#### *1989 Ta'if Agreement repercussions*

The first major changes were done in 1989 through the Ta'if Agreement that put an end to the 1975 Civil War (Gebara & Kibranian 2008). Thereby, Lebanon became divided into five big provinces, which at the same time, divided into smaller constituencies (Appendix D). Thus, the maximal number of votes is deciding the winner-candidate within the community that will represent the current community in the Parliament. Moreover, the amendment to the Article 17 of the Lebanese Constitution re-balanced the major political players through extending the power of the Council of Ministers by limiting the power of Presidency (Saliba, U.S. Library of Congress; Dekmejian 1978). Nonetheless, the Lebanese electoral law has been always based on unicameral majority system. Nevertheless, the legislative branch, the House of Deputies, was changed from being *appointed* to being *elected* and the total number was decided to be 108 members that represent the nation (Saliba, U.S. Library of Congress). Thus, in 2000, this number was revised and raised to 128 deputies (Arsenian--- Ekmekji 2012). Thereby, the meetings can take place if the majority attended, thus, the decisions could be taken only if the two-third of the total number of deputies voted in person (The Lebanese Constitution, Art. 77; Saliba, U.S. Library of Congress). Thus, the Taif Agreement “...reasserted the confessional formula but changed parliamentary representation to a 50:50 Christian/Muslim ratio” (Harb 2006).

...the distribution of seats shall be according to the following principles:

- a. Equal representation between Christians and Muslims
- b. Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each of the two religious communities
- c. Proportional representation among geographic regions (The Lebanese Constitution, Art. 24).

However, in reality, most of the country's problems remained unsolved, the Saudi-Syrian sponsored agreement allowed Syrian troops officially being grounded on the Lebanese soil through the peacekeeping mission, which been seen always as an invasion. Moreover, General Michel Aoun, the commander-in-chief of the Lebanese Army, being appointed as the head of the Government by amending the Constitution, opposed to the pro-Syrian Prime Minister, Selim Al-Hoss, who was running the parallel government. Aoun took the responsibility of the Prime Minister, when no candidate for the next president post was chosen after Amin Gemayel, and Salim Hoss resigned in protest from the Premiership. Thus, appointment of Aoun by Gemayel, angered the Muslims and brought back the Sunni Premier, establishing two parallel Cabinets (Traboulsi 2007, 240). Mainly for this reason, since March 14, 1989, Aoun engaged the Lebanese Army in a war against the Syrian Army presence, *War of Liberationa* that lasted until September 23, 1989, causing 850 death and 3,000 wounded (Maalouf et al. 2003, 65). At the same time, Aoun engaged Lebanese Army in the war against Lebanese Forces that took place since January 30, 1990, because, after a while LF took a positive stance toward the pro-Syrian Ta'if Agreement. Since then, the battle became an inter-Christian war that lasted until May 1990, causing many civilian casualties.

Nevertheless, Rene Moawad was elected as a President, as the agreement in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, was reached in October 1989, the Lebanese Parliament ratified it in November, thus, he was assassinated three weeks later (Maalouf et al. 2003, 64). Elias Hrawi, promoted by the Syrian government, became the next Lebanese president. Furthermore, the Israeli attacks never stopped in South Lebanon. Moreover, Shia community was also engaged in a fight for influence, but it was an internecine fight, between Amal Movement and Hezbollah Party, to control the South Lebanon and Beirut.

However, all wars ended, when the Syrian Army held massive air strike against the Lebanese Army, in October 1990, and pushed Aoun to surrender, at the same time assigned to Hezbollah control over Beirut, leaving the South Lebanon after Amal influence (Maalouf et al. 2003, 66).

However, the peace was reached, but the economy was devastated, infrastructure – ruined, education system became a bygone style, and the state institutions were almost not existing. Under such conditions and with still fresh memories of the atrocities in the air, neither the peace, nor the Ta'if Agreement, were incapable "...to resolve deep-seated political problems" (Maalouf et al. 2003, 72). Whatsoever, the President was appointed, the government was formed, and the declaration of disarmament was signed in March of 1991, excluding Hezbollah and the SLA. Moreover, the amnesty law was issued, which allowed some fighters to be enrolled in the state institutions, thus, allowing Michel Aoun to leave to France in exile (Maalouf et al. 2003).

The recovery, after such devastating war was not passing very calmly: Israel decided to do not lose a moment and raided the eastern Saida on June 3-4, killing around 13, and injuring some 59 people (Maalouf et al. 2003, 73). Then, on June 28, 1991 raid, Hezbollah decided to respond. Furthermore, the confrontations between the Lebanese Army and the PLO brought to the handing over Palestinians' weapons in July 1991. Moreover, Israel's *Seven-Day War* or *Operation Accountability* destroyed once more the South Lebanon infrastructure of 55 villages, displacing some 300,000 locals, and caused 118 lives of civilians, wounding almost some other 500 (Maalouf et al. 2003). Later, an Israeli officer confessed that the Israeli gave a warning to the civilian population of the region, but doesn't insure enough time to let them leave their homes for shelter. Hezbollah response was accordingly (Maalouf et al. 2003). However, Abbas Musawi,

Secretary-General of Hezbollah, was assassinated in 1992 by Israel. Then, his successor, Hassan Nasrallah, adopted tactic of answering to Israel the same way as Israel acted toward Lebanon. Nevertheless, Hezbollah was becoming a political force, as it was able to obtain parliamentary seats since 1992 (Norton 2000, 28). Nevertheless, Rafic Hariri, a Lebanese-Saudi billionaire, who undertook the Prime Minister Office through a legislative elections in 1992, showed his continues support for Hezbollah (Núria 2008, 8).

However, the Palestinian factor was always in the air. As the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, signed the Declaration of Principles on interim Self-Government Arrangements (the Oslo Accord) in September 1993, an agreement with Israeli side, Hezbollah held demonstration protesting this agreement conditions (Traboulsi 2007; Norton 2000; Maalouf et al. 2003). The result was an agreement between the government (the elite of six major minorities) and the Hezbollah, that they would stop irritating Israel by rockets, fired from the Lebanese soil. Nevertheless, the Hezbollah obedience to do not irritate Israel does not save the fragile calm. On April 8, 1996, by a roadside Israeli bomb, thrown in Baraachit, on the north of the occupied area of South Lebanon, a boy was killed and his three friends were wounded, an event, which started the *April War*. Israeli called it the *Operation Grapes of Wrath*, that took fifteen days (April 11-26, 1996), killing 154, wounding 351, and displacing 300, 000 (Maalouf et al. 2003, 75; Norton 2000, 27). The Israeli side used air and sea forces, and artillery fire, destroying electricity power plant and roads, blockading the ports, even bombing UNIFIL station of Qana battalion. Thus, to end the Israeli terror, a written agreement was issued and the monitoring group was established, supported by U.S., Syria, Lebanon, France and Israel.

However, the exchanging fire and kidnappings from the Israeli side never stopped, until 2000 withdrawal from the South Lebanon. Norton (2000), explains the Hezbollah's

success by organizing its actions on all fronts, as military, thus, on social level. For example, the Hezbollah Al-Manar television station, by reaching Israeli viewers was able to show the events from different perspective. Israeli society finally was able to see the number of killed Lebanese, successive assaults of Hezbollah, wounded Israeli soldiers, all, that became a part of psychological war (Norton 2000, 27, 31). More than this, in March 2000, Syrian-U.S. summit in Geneva destroyed the hopes of Israeli administration to reach an agreement with Syria: “The Clinton-Assad meeting was likely intended by American officials not to reinvigorate the peace process, but to give Barak a dignified exit from the Syrian track of the peace process” (Gambill 2000, 1). Following its calculations, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the South Lebanon at the end of May 2000, and the Lebanese Army deployed on August. This was a full victory of resistance (Norton 2000, 32). Nonetheless, the Lebanese, supporting Israel and fighting from South Lebanon Army, mostly withdrew to Israel, despite the fact that Lebanese authorities issued amnesty for such cases (Maalouf et al. 2003, 77).

#### *2005 Assassinations & Syrian withdrawal*

The assassination of the Prime Minister took place as a response to the 2004 crisis that was about the presidency: Syrian patronage pressured the Lebanese Parliament to extend the presidency of General Emile Lahoud for the coming three years (Harb 2006). To explain this a look, back to 1998, the PM Rafic Hariri replacement, while serving his second term, by Salim Al-Hoss, is needed. Replacement took place because he was criticized over his enormous borrowings from the international agencies for the post-war reconstruction of the Lebanese infrastructure (Núria 2008, 8). However, in 1998, General Emil Lahoud, ex-commander-in-chief of the Lebanese Army, was inaugurated as a

President. He was appointed by the Syrian government through the amendment in the Constitution of Article 49 in order to escape the Presidential crisis (Bosco 2009, 352). Thus, in 2000, Rafic Hariri was re-elected on the post of the Prime Minister on the third time. The tension between Hariri and the President Lahoud was rising based on their political alliance and other sensitive issues like, privatization of national infrastructure for Hariri has an aim to escape the Syrian monitoring, thus, for the President Emil Lahoud it meant stealing from the nation (Bosco 2009, 352). Hariri tried to introduce some economic reforms, but later, he was accused in large borrowings that led the country drown in an enormous debt. Moreover, the PM Hariri was inclined toward the West and pro-Saudi Arabia, while the President was pro-Syria (Núria 2008; Bosco 2009, 352). However, in 2003 new cabinet was formed mostly from pro-Syrian camp (Núria 2008, 10).

Whatsoever, the 2004 presidential crisis arose, mainly because of the tension in relations between the U.S. and Syria over 2003 Iraq invasion, as Syria openly opposed it (Núria 2008, 8). Mostly for this reason, in September 2004, the UN Security Council declared the Resolution 1559, which was aimed to terminate the foreign presence in Lebanon and disarm Hezbollah, at the same time, isolating Syria internationally (U.N. 2004; Núria 2008, 8). Thus, for Syria, keeping friendly relations with Lebanon, by extending the term of the current president in the office for three additional years by amending the Article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution, meant to build its own coalition (Bosco 2009, 353; The Lebanese Constitution (as amended up to September 4, 2004). However, even though Hariri opposed to disarmament of Hezbollah, thus, he openly opposed to the idea of extending Lahoud's term, and by this, two confronting camps were formed (Núria 2008, 8). Despite all, Hariri finally accepted Lahoud's term extension, but

resigned from his post on the fifth day, on October 20, 2004. Thus, one day before, the ministers of environment, culture, economy, and refugee affairs have resigned already (Bosco 2009, 354).

The assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and 22 others, on February 14, 2005, by a car bomb, was used to eliminate the Syrian presence on the Lebanese soil. It was very natural to ask Syrian troops to leave Lebanon, after many claimed the peacekeeping mission of Syrian Army as an *invasion* into Lebanon (Nelson 2013; Bosco 2009, 351; Ministry of Finance 2013, 13).

However, the vacuum after Syrian withdrawal was due to the Syria-regulated political system. Moreover, as the time passed it has been already a forgotten fact that Lebanon for centuries was an inseparable part of Syria, and used to belong to the *Bilad al-Sham*. Nevertheless, it's been forgotten already, that it was separated from the Great Syria and became a Great Lebanon only through the French mandate in 1920:

Due to its present religious divisions and the state of mind among its populations, its heritage of tyranny for several centuries, Syria cannot but be formed into three parts, or four - if Palestine has to remain separate. Greater Lebanon or Phoenicia, the region of Damascus and that of Aleppo. (Firro 2004, 5)

As some suggestions imply that at the beginning, Syria played just a mediatory role and in events of 1958-62, and at the beginning of the 1975 Civil War (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; Bosco 2009; Núria 2008). Moreover, originally, the idea of Lebanese independency came from the Syrian National Bloc that promoted the Sunni-Christian cooperation during the 1930-40s (El-Khazen 1991, 18). However, Bosco (2009, 351), argues that Syria was managing the Lebanese foreign policy. Thus, Nelson (2013, 367), clarifies: "...Lebanon's sovereignty was essentially absent for the entire period from the Civil War until 2005 due to Syrian occupation". While Collelo (U.S. Library of

Congress), presents the situation in a different way, suggesting taking to the account the entire 1970-1980s context, where the different camps militia were on the stage, including Israel and Syria, and the Lebanese government was weak enough to take the lead in the foreign policy. Moreover, the events of 1950-1960s, are seen sometimes as Syrian intervention aspiration. Nevertheless, throughout 1950-1990, Syria was more concerned to preserve the integrity of the Lebanese state, by opposing to the formation of "...a Maronite ministate" in 1976 that could become later "...another Israel", and by opposing to the formation of "...a radical Islamic state in Lebanon" through the leftists activities that would harm Syria itself (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress).

Nevertheless, it was exclusively because of the Syrian involvement that the 1976 ceasefire was reached and the reforms package was introduced, more than this, the Arab Deterrent Forces were formed and deployed to protect the Lebanese peace: "In 1976, the Syrian army became involved as an interventional force, by request of the Lebanese government and by mandate of Arab League..." (Núria 2008, 7; Ministry of Finance 2013). Moreover, in 1981-82, among the Arab nations, Syria alone opposed the Israeli troops' invasion into Lebanon (Maalouf et al. 2003). Furthermore, in 1985, Syria mediated the Tripartite Accord between the Amal, PSP, and LF to restore the peace and reorganize the Lebanese Army. More than this, in 1989, Syria mediated the peace agreement in coordination with the Saudi Arabia, in Ta'if: "As of late 1987, Syrian troops were back in Beirut trying to preserve the peace, and Syrian influence was again significant. Even so, a true Syrian-imposed stability had not been achieved" (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). Moreover, since the Ta'if Agreement, legal status of the Syrian troops, and the multilevel cooperation agreements like the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination agreements, signed in 1991, and later the Defense and



Security Agreement, bounded these two states, causing some general institutional interdependency (Jewish Virtual Library 2014; Traboulsi 2007). Thus under the Defense and Security Agreement, as many Lebanese argue, the repression of the people and institutions was held by the Syrian authorities, detaining Lebanese in the Syrian prisons (Traboulsi 2007, 243-44). However, the detainees were mostly those who were supporting General Aoun anti-Syria stance (around 400), and some 1,500 Palestinians (Maalouf et al. 2003, 77). Created Syrian-Lebanese security apparatus was seen later as the main suspect in Rafic Hariri assassination (Bosco 2009, 352).

However, Syrian withdrawal brought the country into the next crisis. The political separation on the ground happened on the bases of foreign polarization as it always used to be, but some confessions have changed their camps. The country became divided onto pro-West (*14 March camp*) and pro-Syria-Iran (*March 8 camp*). Moreover, the cabinet of Omar Karami was pressed to resign.

The *March 8* alliance was formed in response to the growing anti-Syrian protests that finally evolved into the *Cedar Revolution* on March 14. The newly formed pro-Syrian (anti-Israeli) camp involved the Shiite community Hezbollah and Amal parties; Christian Change and Reform block; Armenian Tashnag Party; and some of Palestinian parties. Furthermore, on March 14, 2005 Cedar Revolution, which took place in response to assassination of PM Rafic Hariri, the alliance of *March 14* anti-Syrian and pro-West camp was formed. The camp gathered "...the former Prime Minister Saad Hariri (son of Rafic Hariri), his Future Movement and its Sunni allies (including Islamic fundamentalists); Dr. Samir Geagea's Christian Lebanese Forces; the Phalangist Party, headed by former Maronite President Amin Gemayel; the liberal democratic Armenian Ramgavar Party; the social-democrat Hnchak Party; as well as a number of Orthodox,

Protestant, and other Christian minority groups” (Arsenian-- Ekmekji 2012, 5).

Moreover, the Progressive Socialist Party, which consists in majority from Druze community representatives and is led by Walid Jumblat, always plays a decisive role in the critical situations: they often change their allies. However, in May-June of 2005 were organized parliamentary elections, were the opposition, Maich 14 anti-Syrian coalition won the majority (EU EOM 2005).

However, the 2005 elections were held according to the 2000 Electoral Law, which was arranged by Syria to enable the government effectively promote different districting in different regions (Salem 2006, 2; Appendix E). While, on May 28, 2005, the parliamentary session was held to choose the electoral law for the upcoming elections between the pre-war law of 1960, or 1996, or 2000. The session has failed to reach to an agreement. Thus, the Lebanese *The Daily Star* newspaper quoted the Deputy Speaker Michel Mur, saying that:

I opened the session and 15 MPs asked to speak. Instead of going straight to the issue at hand, everyone spoke on points of procedure and then left the hall and never came back, leaving (only) 19 MPs in attendance. (El-Ghoul 2005)

While, another detail was published in the same article, stating that the opposition camp was concerned with the changes that would question the release of Samir Geagea, the Lebanese Forces leader, from the prison. Thus, Samir Geagea, a very active commander of the Phalangist militia during the 1970-80s, became a leader of the Lebanese forces in 1986. He fought alongside the Lebanese Army Forces under the General Aoun command in 1989 anti-Syria War of Liberation. However, in 1990, Geagea accepted the Ta'if Agreement, which turned Aoun to fight against him (Samir Geagea n. d.). Moreover, Geagea was arrested in 1994, in attempt to undermine the government by continuing the militia activities (Ibid). Thereby, he was charged in being held crimes

during the 1975-90 Civil War, accused in assassination of Rashid Karami in 1987, and unsuccessful assassination of Michel Murr in 1991. Despite all, Geagea was imprisoned only in 1994, after the blast in the Notre Dame church, during the Sunday service on February 27 (Amnesty International 1997). Despite all, Geagea was released on 26 July 2005 (Samir Geagea n. d.).

However,

Under a law drawn up in 2000 under Syrian rule, Lebanon is divided into a complex web of districts and provinces designed to give each of 18 different Muslim and Christian sects a fixed number of seats in parliament. These seats were gerrymandered to elect pro-Syrian politicians and do not reflect current demographic realities. (Pan 2005; Appendix E)

Moreover, the number of Deputies was revised and raised to 128, instead of 108 designed by Ta'if Accord (Arsenian-- Ekmekji 2012; Salem 2006, 2; Gambill and Aoun 2000, 2; EU EOM 2005, 16). Moreover, the coalition of March 14 forces won the elections of 2005 by 69 seats in Parliament, the 56 seats went to the March 8 block, 3 seats went to non-affiliated and 1 seat stood vacant (DRI and LADE 2008, Table 2, 12). By this, March 8 coalition shifted to opposition. The elections' result was debatable, which gave ground to many groups to question how fair the elections were representing the true will of the Lebanese real majority. Moreover, 2005 parliamentary elections "...were a great missed opportunity for the holding of elections away from foreign manipulation, intimidation, and bargaining practices" (Salem 2006, 1).

Nevertheless, the 6:5 ratio of Christians toward Sunnas, as it is used to be in 1926 and 1943, has been lost forever. The high rate of Christian migrants and a high rate of Shi'a newborns changed the demographic situation on the ground. Demographically, the Shi'as became a majority, Sunnis were pushed to hold the second place, Christians held the third place, and Druzes were pushed to hold the fourth place, even though no more official

census was held since 1932 (Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress; Núria 2008). Imad Salamey (2009) explains the division of Lebanese society and its polarization by the public posts and jobs distribution, which is arranged according to the legalized formula of 6 Christians toward 5 Muslims, where Sunnies were in majority, thus, more privileged than Druzes or Shi'as. Moreover, as the Shiite community used to be the smallest among the other Muslims at the beginning stages of the independent Lebanese state, they were often ignored and became outliers (Dekmejian 1978). Thus, rapidly growing and now the largest Shiite community used to be always undermined and ignored by legal formula of public positions and jobs distribution, as well as at the major decision making moments, even though Hezbollah already won nine seats in the parliament in 1992, and eleven seats in 1996 elections (Norton 2000, 28). However, the Article 22 of the Lebanese Constitution was aimed to promote a shift to a different system, which never happened yet (EU EOM 2005, 36).

With the current developments the new electoral law became an urgent necessity. For this reason in 2006 May 31, the Lebanese parliament formed the National Commission on the Parliamentary Electoral Law of twelve members that proposed the new law to replace the “medium-size district majoritarian system in place by a ‘mixed system’ combining the small constituency majoritarian system and the large constituency proportional model” (Seiermann 2009, 1; Salem 2006; Arsenian-- Ekmekji 2012). This means that some of the seats are going to be elected according to majoritarian system based on small constituencies, others – on proportional bases, which comprise large constituencies. The draft was providing also a proposal to reduce the voting age to 18; allow expatriates to vote; “...grant women the 30 percent quota on electoral list; and assure “...a fair political representation of all groups and generations” according to the

current Lebanese demographic situation (Arsenian-- Ekmekji 2012, 9; Salem 2006). Here should be mentioned the fact that the draft was never ratified.

### *2008 Doha Agreement*

On February 6, 2006, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah signed *Memorandum of Understanding*<sup>4</sup> with the Free Patriotic Movement lead by Michel Aoun. The agreement included necessity to hold a national dialog, addressed to the state building issues, raised question of the missing Lebanese during and because of the war, and most imported, stressed the issue of cooperation and the issue of liberation Lebanese lands, occupied by Israel.

Nonetheless, the inter-Lebanese *National Dialogue* was initiated since the beginning of the March 2006 and was held periodically since that, which aimed to gather the elite and to try reaching to national unity around the core issues. During the second session, on March 22, 2006, the participants, Nasrallah, Berri, Aoun, Jumblatt, Hariri (son), Gemayel, Geagea, and the current PM, Fuad Seniora, agreed to restore Syrian-Lebanese relations by opening embassies in both countries, and disarmament Palestinians out of the refugee camps (Schenker 2006, 1). The demand of March 14 to remove Syrian-appointed president, Emil Lahoud was rejected. Finally, instead of directly demanding to disarm Hezbollah, like during the first session, when Hezbollah warned to withdraw from the talks, the March 14 block discussed the point about the Shebaa Farms, occupied by Israel (Ibid). However, in general, the sessions were not productive, as the March 14 coalition

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<sup>4</sup>Général Michel Aoun and Hassan Nasrallah, "Memorandum of understanding by Hezbollah and Free patriotic movement" (the first meeting ever between the head of the Change and Reform Bloc, MP Michel Aoun, and the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, St. Michael Church in Shiah, Beirut, February 6, 2006), accessed April 22, 2014, <http://www.voltairenet.org/article163916.html>.

was mainly concerned with disarming the Hezbollah.

Furthermore, Israel launched full-scale war during the 2006 summer. Thus, the 2006 Summer War or the 33 Days War against Hezbollah has its pre-text: at the end of June 2006, Palestinians kidnapped an Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, provoking full-scale war, the *Operation Summer Rain*, on the Gaza Strip since June 28. Moreover, on June 29, 64 members of the Palestinian government officials were arrested (Palestine History n. d.). Heavy bombardments and ongoing ground operations of Israeli forces killed more than 400 people from Palestinian side, killing only five Israeli (Maalouf et al. 2003, 83). It was at that exact time, when kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah on July 12, 2006, opened a full-scale war on Lebanon, shifting the warfare from haphazardly bombing Palestinians. Whatever, the Israeli Army responded in few hours, by dropping bombs all over Lebanon, destroying roads, buildings, infrastructure in whole, especially destroying bridges, trying to isolate Hezbollah and prevent anybody from moving along the country.

During the 33 days, 1,109 Lebanese were killed, the large majority of whom were civilians. The injured number 4,399, and approximately 1 million civilians were displaced. An estimated one third of the casualties were children. The displaced, mostly from South Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs, represented approximately one fourth of the Lebanese population; there were around 735,000 internally displaced people and 230,000 who fled from the country. (Maalouf et al. 2003, 83)

The *33 Days War* or the *2006 Summer War* ended on August 14, 2006. Nevertheless, Israel imposed on Lebanon air, land and sea full blockade until September 2006; directly and indirectly, the Lebanese relief and medical property and personnel were targeted; Lebanese UNIFIL positions were targeted several times; around one million cluster bombs were dropped on the South Lebanon (Maalouf et al. 2003, 88).

However, another outcome of the War became a deeper division within the Lebanese society on two camps: March 14 and March 8 coalitions. This controversy evoked into another crisis. Hezbollah announced boycott of the existing government and demanded its resignation, because the parliament failed to elect the new President, after the termination of the term of Emil Lahoud in November 2007. Moreover, resignation of Shia ministers in protest, followed paralysis of the government institutions for almost 18 month (Núria 2008, 10). As many considered, the bottom issue was the urge to revise the electoral law, thus in reality, there were other issues too. In April 2005, the UN passed the Resolution 1595, which established the Independent Tribunal to investigate the assassination of Rafic Hariri, demanded by his son, Saad Hariri and all the March 14 anti-Syria block that was accusing Syria and Hezbollah in assassination of Hariri father (Núria 2008, 9). Another much deeper issue was bound into internationalization of the Lebanese polarization, Hezbollah affiliation with Syria and Iran that was aimed to be repressed. Thus, another major issue: accusations of Hezbollah side of Seniora's led government in intentionally prolonging the war were the other reasons for the sit-in (Núria 2008).

However, Kerr (2007, 9), implies that the foreign intervention in divided societies is an essential feature to the peaceful existence (Appendix F). Moreover, Kerr insists that polarization was geopolitically imposed, as the Shi'a community was pro-Syrian-Iranian, and the Sunnis were pro-West and pro-Saudi, thus the Christian community became divided between these two camps, the same happened to Druze and the other minorities, like the Armenian:

The divide, which came to a head with the Israeli-Hizballah war in the summer of 2006 and remained at the heart of Lebanon's 2009 parliamentary contest, mirrored the wider regional conflict over whether the Middle East would succumb to Iranian or US influence, and it was fundamentally defined by what sort of political state Lebanon should become. (Ibid, 19)

However, Hezbollah sit-in began on December 1, 2006 by occupying the whole area in front of the Grand Serail, at Downtown, the heart of Beirut, and *The Washington Post* cited Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah public speech from the previous day:

We have found that negotiations and consultations have hit a wall because the ruling group insists on monopolizing power....We have no choice left but that of a popular movement to put pressure and to achieve this goal. (Shadid 2006)

Whatsoever, the summer of 2007 added new crisis, the fight between the Lebanese Army and Fatah al-Islam, a Sunni militia that settled itself inside the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp, in North Lebanon. The armed conflict lasted for 3 month (May 20-September 2), during which 108 Lebanese Army soldiers and 40 Palestinians were killed, the camp, heavily bombed, was destroyed, and the refugees of the camp displaced, another large number was detained (Maalouf et al. 2003, 88). However, now the camp is partially reconstructed, and proclaimed a “military zone”, according to the Palestinian Human Rights Organization (PHRO) monitoring organization (Maalouf et al. 2003).

Nevertheless, the presidency crisis affected the Lebanese society, as it occur because of deeply divided two parliamentary blocks that were not able to elect the president, which needed a clear two-third of the 128 parliamentary votes that were necessary by the law (Seiermann 2009). Moreover, on May 30, 2007, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1757 under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter to investigate Hariri’s assassination, thus internationalizing Lebanese political camps polarization and further isolating Syria (Bosco 2009, 357; Núria 2008, 9).

Nonetheless, 2008 May events are tightened to the replacement of the senior security officer, affiliated with Hezbollah by the sectarian elite-based government. However, the issue of the Hezbollah communication system was proclaimed suspicious by the Druze



leader Walid Jumblatt, and was declared under the investigation. These two events provoked clashes on May 7, 2008 between Hezbollah and the Future (*Mustaqbal* in Arabic) Movement, which is the core member of the 14 March alliance. The violence that took place looked like a beginning of a new civil war. The conflict took for two weeks, during which around 71 people were killed, and the West Beirut was taken under the control of Hezbollah, Amal and SSNP (Maalouf et al. 2003, 90).

However, while the National Dialogue was not able to unite the Lebanese political elites, the next peace-making foreign involvement was arranged in Doha, in 2008, during May 16-21, patronized by Qatar. The outcome of Doha Agreement was vital in all means. The consensual President of the state was elected in the next 24 hours, on May 25, 2008, after six months of the deadlock, under the amendment of the Constitution Article 49, appointing the General-in-Chief Michael Suleiman (Ministry of Finance 2013). Three days later the President appointed the Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora. Furthermore, on October 8, 2008, the new electoral law granted the veto power to the political opposition, which was represented in the Parliament by Hezbollah, Amal, and FPM (Ministry of Finance 2013; Collelo, U.S. Library of Congress). It was promulgated on the base of the 1960 electoral law with small constituencies (Appendix F):

“...creating smaller districts that had the effect of increasing the ability of Christian communities to elect their own leaders. Under the 2000 electoral law, which also governed the 2005 parliamentary elections, Christian communities were grouped into larger Muslim districts. The redistricting, however, had the effect of creating districts of very different sizes, which resulted in significant disparities in the number of votes required to be elected in different constituencies. (NDI 2009, 14)

Moreover, the Parliamentary elections were held in June 2009, forming the national unity government, based on 30 ministers: 16 went to majority (March 14 coalition), 11 ministerial seats were granted to the opposition, March 8 alliance, and three ministers

represented the President (Ministry of Finance 2013, 12; Seiermann 2009). Nevertheless, Saad (Saaddine) Hariri was nominated to hold the Prime Minister position, who failed to form the new Cabinet during the following 10 weeks. He stepped down on September 10, 2009, but on September 18 was re-nominated, thus, gaining vote of confidence only on December 10, 2009 (Ministry of Finance 2013, 8).

However, the 2008 Doha Agreement reassured the Lebanese population that no major decision will be taken by the government if there is no agreement between all of the major religious communities. Furthermore, the 2009 elections were held according to plurality-majority system (Arsenian---Ekmekji 2012). The system implies the right to stand as confessional; the right to vote – non-confessional, which means that regardless of one’s own confession, the voter can give its vote for any of the available confessional seats; multi-member electoral districts (block vote system); using single ballot paper (IFES March 2009, 3; Appendix D).

The relatively stable political and security environment following the Doha Agreement resulted in a growth in tourism activities in 2008, with a total of 1,332,551 tourist arrivals, a 31% increase as compared to 2007. (Ministry of Finance 2013)

However, the Cabinet appointed ten-member Commission to monitor the 2009 elections. The European Union assigned to provide training for fifty media monitors. Nevertheless, the Supervisory Commission on the Election Campaign (SCEC) was not invited to monitor the 2010 municipal elections held in May. Moreover, the idea of creating an independent electoral-monitoring commission to monitor the candidates’ expenditure and the media during the elections was abandoned. At the same time, the mixed electoral law, proposed by Boutros Harb in 2006 was rejected and claimed complicated, and the proportional electoral system, proposed by Marwan Charbel in 2011

was declined by some minorities, which were concerned about being swallowed by larger sects (Arsenian-- Ekmekji 2012, 11).

Nonetheless, another major crisis happened on January 12, 2011, when 11 ministers of March 8 coalition resigned, because of the STL announcement that the Hezbollah members are seen as the suspects in the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri (Ministry of Finance 2013, 9). Moreover, the BBC highlighted:

On Tuesday, officials said efforts by the Syrian and Saudi Arabian governments to reach a political compromise had failed. The opposition has claimed that a potential deal was blocked by the US. (BBC News 2011)

Under the light of the resignations of the March 8 ministers, the Government was seen as resigned (Ministry of Finance 2013, 9). Following the legislation steps, on January 25 Najib Mikati was appointed to hold the post of the Prime Minister, thus, the Government was formed only after 5 month of ongoing negotiations, on 13 June 2011, and the confidence vote of the Parliament was reached on 7 July 2011 (Ministry of Finance 2013, 9). However, the significance of this crisis was in the fact that the new Government was formed without the March 14 members, who "...withdrew from the parliamentary session prior to the vote" (Ministry of Finance 2013, 9).

#### *P.S. 2013 Parliamentary elections postponement*

While preparing this research paper, another crisis occurred in Lebanon, which began on March 22, 2013, by resignation of the current Prime Minister, Najib Mikati.

Mikati resigned just two hours after a cabinet meeting in which Shi'it group Hezbollah and its allies blocked the creation of a supervisory body for the parliamentary vote and opposed extending the term of a senior security official. (Bassam 2013)

Dispute about the extension of the Sunni Senior Security officer, Major General Ashraf Rifi, who is supported by March 14 block is came to the surface, because of the already existing other factors: Hariri-Hezbollah deep confrontation and competition in controlling the security apparatus of country (Saab 2013). Moreover, the war-like situation in Tripoli, has no end, where the different, mostly Sunni, militia factions fighting Alewives and Shias. Another point is tighten into the UN International Tribunal on the assassination of Rafic Hariri, by which the pro-Syria forces, mainly 5 Hezbollah members are suspected, while on October 22, 2012, the director of the intelligence branch of Lebanon's internal security forces, Wissam al-Hassan, who was the main source of Lebanese intelligence data, was assassinated (Saab 2013).

However, the Caretaker PM Najib Mikati appointed Tamam Salam on April 6, 2013 "...to designate a Prime Minister to form a new cabinet" (Caretaker PM Mikati: I will name MP Tamam Salam for the Prime Ministry 2013). Thus, the new cabinet was formed only after 11 month of postponement, on February 15, 2014, as the main obstacle was the March 14 alliance to form a cabinet with Hezbollah participation:

The process of forming a new government was met with local and regional obstacles, most notably the conflict in Syria and various conditions set by the rival March 8 and 14 camps. Salam was appointed to his post in April after receiving the backing of 124 lawmakers out of 128. (Salam's Path to Form Cabinet Plagued by Local, Regional Obstacles 2014)

The Cabinet formula was changed from 15-10-5 of 30 ministers, to 24 ministers 8-8-8, equally dividing seats between the March 14, March 8 and centrists lead by Jumblatt. Ever since, the new task came forward: electing a new President, which is due on 25 May, 2014. However, the first election was set on 23<sup>rd</sup> April, which failed to elect Samir Geagea, who received just 48 votes, which is far from the necessary two-third of 128 parliamentary votes, as the March 8 camp voted with blank ballots, holding 52 votes, and

centrists gave their 16 voices to their candidate (Parliament fails to elect a new president 2014). Moreover, the Parliament failed to elect the new President also on April 30 and May 7. However, the next session is scheduled to be held on May 15, 2014.

## CONCLUSION

The purpose of this master's essay was to clarify what causes the rise of consociationalism, how the political crises are managed in such states, like Lebanon, and how the foreign involvement is affecting divided societies.

The results of this research analyzed the Lebanese society interactions since 1820, while the Lebanese state was not formed yet and was a part of Syria, which in its place was under the Ottoman rule. The analysis revealed multilayer controversies like, confessional belonging versus state citizenship; state citizenship versus foreign alliance. The interstate hatred versus foreign inclination has shown throughout the history of independent Lebanese state.

Furthermore, the 1940s, are seen as the most cooperative years, as the outcome was the 1943 National Pact and independence. In the contrary, the outcome of Syrian monitored peace, 1990-2005, could be seen as artificial, showing the deep confessional hatred inside of the Lebanese society after Syrian withdrawal, since 2005. Thus, the outcome of the Cedar Revolution on March 14, itself, could be equal to the result of 1943 National Pact, as it ended the Syrian protectorate.

Nevertheless, the foreign involvement in Lebanese internal affairs is clearly seen throughout the history and Lebanon has been drowning in regional and international

politics since the Ottoman times, as the Western powers were seeking to eliminate the Empire. Later, since the declaration of Israeli state, most probably, a special feature that reveals the foreign factor, which was a cause and a result of some of Lebanese crises, is the Palestinian refugees' burden and all the issues that are tighten to them. This feature includes: the economic and social burden of more than 447,328 Palestinian refugees on the Lebanese state, their military activities, the Israeli attacks and invasions in response that resulted in ruining economy, infrastructure, and the most sensitive point, deeply dividing almost divided Lebanese society on pro-West Christians and pro-Arab Muslims. Moreover, the post 1989 Ta'if period is tighten to the International Politics in whole.

Furthermore, the study reveals that Syria played mostly a mediatory role with inclination toward its own foreign policy, which is not excluding serving her own interests. Thus, this is not meaning that Syria was intentionally engaging herself in the Lebanese affairs. In the contrary, Syria was invited to resolve the Lebanese political disputes for several times: in 1976, to reach the ceasefire, deploy the peacekeeping Arab Deterrent Forces, and to promote reforms; in 1981-82, Syria opposed the Israeli intervention into Lebanon; in 1985, to restore the peace between the Lebanese players (Amal, PSP, and LF); in 1989, to restore the peace after devastating 1975 Civil War. Moreover, the Ta'if Accord, sponsored by Saudi Arabia and Syria, drastically changed the administrative structure of the Lebanese government, by delegating more power to the Sunni-Prime Minister, reducing some of it from the Maronite-Christian President. Thus, it is not the case with the 2008 Doha Accord, which gave the veto right to the opposition, and established the rule of *consensual voting*, which is assuring all the parties participation in decision making process.

Moreover, the history reveals that the West was engaged in the Middle East politics since the Ottoman times, then through the French and British Mandate, and until nowadays. The Lebanese-Christian elite used this fact in their favor during the 1858-60 revolt to reach to their goals that were changing over the history: to insure their rights, to declare autonomy, to proclaim independence, to oppose pro-Arabism, and to win high posts. Moreover, the Muslim-Sunna, Druze, Armenians and other Lebanese minorities aligned themselves to this camp through the Cedar Revolution of 2005, with their anti-Syrian stance. These developments established new type of inter-Lebanese relations, officially recognized opposition, March 8 alliance, which gathered the rest of the same minorities despite of their religious affiliation, who were against the Western powers. Furthermore, the research revealed the fact that the Lebanese legal documents, like the Constitution and the Electoral Law, were amended and enforced to resolve a specific crisis, and with specific foreign players' involvement.

The summarized conclusion reveals:

***Power sharing:***

1. 1820-1920 struggle of the Maronite peasants against their Druze landlords;
2. 1920-1943 cooperation to seize the French Mandate;
3. 1943-1989 struggle of pro-West vs. pro-Arab camps;
4. 1989 Ta'if imposed cooperation (6:5 ratio was replaced by 50/50 ratio of Christian Muslims, and reduced some power from the President (Christian-Maronite) in favor to the Prime Minister (Sunni-Muslim);
5. 2005 division on Mar14 vs. March 8 in the Parliament and through the whole country;
6. 2008 Doha Accord granted veto power to the opposition;

7. 2009 elections were held according to the 1960 Electoral Law.

***Factors that shaped Lebanese politics:***

- a) Confessional belonging vs. state citizenship
- b) State citizenship vs. foreign alliance;
- c) Dramatic impact of Palestinian refugees on Lebanese politics.

Finally, should be stated that the paper is indeed not void of limitations, like the distance limitation between Armenia and Lebanon, which resulted to avoid a large masses survey, or the insufficiency to reach the Deputies just by emailing them. Thus, the outcome of the exposed evidence is supporting both hypotheses:

**H1** – Lebanese state consociational power-sharing system allows foreign interference, which in its turn impedes consolidation of democracy.

**H2** - The Lebanese Electoral Law is an exemplification of the foreign influence in the country's internal affairs.

Nevertheless, a deeper discussion of how the proxy wars affecting Lebanese elite in their decision-making, or an analysis of a more cooperative social system for deeply divided societies could be suggested for a future research.



## Appendix A

**Table1.** Population of the Lebanon by Sects 1932

Sunnites	178,100
Shiites	155,035
Druses	53,334
Maronites	227,800
Greek Catholics	46,709
“ Orthodox	77,312
Protestants	6,869
Armenian Orthodox	26,102
“ Catholics	5,890
Syrian Catholics & Orthodox	738
Israelites	3,588
Chaldeans Catholics & Orthodox	738
Miscellaneous (including Alawaytes & Latins)	6,393
-----	
Total	793,396

*Source:* M. B. and H. G. L., “Syria and Lebanon: The States of the Levant under French Mandate”, *Bulletin of International News* 17, no. 14 (July 13, 1940): p. 844.

## APPENDIX B

**Table 2.** Confessional Representation, Cabinet and Parliament in Lebanon


Sect	Parliamentary		Cabinet		Cabinet Posts	
	Representation		Representation*			
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Maronites.....	30	30.3	886	25.9	105	25.5
Sunni.....	20	20.2	806	23.7	102	24.7
Shi'ite.....	19	19.2	480	14.1	55	13.3
Orthodox.....	11	11.1	421	12.3	52	12.6
Catholics.....	6	6.1	376	11.0	46	11.1
Druze.....	6	6.1	408	11.9	48	11.6
Armenian Orthodox.....	4	4.0	32	0.9	4	0.96
Armenian Catholics.....	1	1.0	7	0.2	1	0.2
Protestants.....	1	1.0	---	---	---	---
Minorities.....	1	1.0	----	----	----	----

- Cabinet representation is determined by the total number of months each denomination has spent in cabinet office.

*Source:* Richard Hrair Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy in Crisis: The Case of Lebanon", *Comparative Politics* 10, no. 2 (Jan., 1978): p. 255

## Appendix C

Sectarian representation of parliamentary seats since Ta'if



Source: Fawwaz Traboulsi, *The History of Modern Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 421.

## Appendix D

### The Electoral System in Use

Under the Constitution, parliamentary seats are held equally between the Muslim and Christian communities. The distribution of seats is among the confessional groups of both communities and among the different geographical regions of Lebanon.

The 2008 Election Law establishes that 128 parliamentary seats are distributed among 26 election districts and among eleven confessional groups. Voters can vote for all seats in the electoral district in which they are registered, regardless of the confession of the voter.

Seats are won by whichever candidate from that confession gains the plurality (i.e. the highest number) of the votes cast. If there is more than one seat allocated to a confession, the seats are won by as many candidates as there are seats available.

#### Example:

The electoral district of Baabda has 6 seats allocated to it, distributed amongst three confessions that represent the electorate in that district:


<b>Seats in Baabada</b>
3 Maronite seats
2 Shia seats
1 Druze seat

- All voters in Baabda can vote for up to 6 candidates within this electoral district. Of those six votes, the voter can only vote for up to three Maronite Candidates, two Shia candidates and 1 Druze candidate.
- The three Maronite seats in Baabada will be won by the three Maronite candidates with the highest number of votes.
- The two Shia seats will be won by the two Shia candidates with the highest number of votes.
- The single Druze seat will be won by the Druze candidate with the highest number of votes.

Source: Elections 2013: The Electoral System. <http://www.elections.gov.lb/Voters-Corner/How-Does-The-Electoral-System-Work-.aspx>

## Appendix E


### Electoral Districts under the 1990, 1996 and 2000 Electoral Laws




Source: IFES, *Elections in Lebanon* (Lebanon: IFES, 2011), accessed May 13, 2014, [http://www.ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2011/Lebanon\\_electoral\\_districts\\_2011.pdf](http://www.ifes.org/~media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2011/Lebanon_electoral_districts_2011.pdf).

## APPENDIX F

### 2008 Doha Agreement



Source: NDI, *Final Report on The Lebanese Parliamentary Election* (Washington D.C.: NDI, 2009), accessed May 13, 2014, [https://www.ndi.org/files/Lebanese\\_Elections\\_Report\\_2009.pdf](https://www.ndi.org/files/Lebanese_Elections_Report_2009.pdf).



Source: IFES, *Lebanon's 2009 Parliamentary Elections: The Lebanese Electoral System* (Lebanon: IFES, 2009), accessed May 13, 2014, [http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Papers/2009/~media/Files/Publications/SpeechCommentary/2009/1382/IFES\\_Lebanon\\_ESB\\_Paper030209.pdf](http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Papers/2009/~media/Files/Publications/SpeechCommentary/2009/1382/IFES_Lebanon_ESB_Paper030209.pdf).

## APPENDIX G

### Sample Questionnaire

Dear Mr. /Mrs. \_\_\_\_\_,

My name is Nouné Sakabedoyan, accept my Best Regards from Armenia.

Dear Sir/Md., as I am currently a student of the American University of Armenia, and in order to fulfill my study I am obliged to write a Master Thesis, which in my case is devoted to “Crisis Management in Deeply Divided Societies. Case Study: Lebanon”.

Dear Sir/Md., if to take to account the distance between Lebanon and Armenia, would you be willing to excuse the way I approach you (by mailing), and fill my questionnaire leaflet, which includes 11 questions ONLY?

Dear Sir/Md., if you will not wish to participate or have no time to fill my questionnaire, I will understand you, my Best Regards and good luck in your work.

Dear Sir/Md., in case, if you are willing to do so, I would like to introduce you to the topic.

#### **Crisis Management in Deeply Divided Societies Case Study: Lebanon**

This paper explores the crisis management in divided societies. Developments of political crises, their management and conflict resolution in divided societies depend on many factors like, religion, ethnicity, the governing system, electoral law, and foreign intervention among others. The solution for each case usually has its specifics, but in most cases – a third party existence in managing the peace process is essential.

The paper analyzes the features of consociational democracy and the ways of conflict resolutions through a deeper analysis of the crises developments in Lebanese politics. Nevertheless, the actuality to study the Lebanese case is in its current situation, where the existing plurality-majority system already rejected and out of favor since March 2013 by boycotting of the parliamentary elections and their postponement. The boycott of the parliamentary elections could endanger the upcoming presidential elections of 2014 that are due in May...

The political instability in Lebanon generated by sectarian disagreements since its independence of 1943, and caused replacement of some sects from the majority to opposition and the vice versa. Lebanese society can be characterized by its pluralistic frame (there are 17 officially recognized sectarian groups (confessions) and all of them are involved in the political processes of the country).

Many scholars suggest that the ongoing tensions between Lebanese confessions are the results of the Electoral Law. Still others are inclined to see the cause of the crises in the foreign intervention into Lebanese affairs. The aim of this master essay is to study the features of Lebanese political system and explore the degree of the foreign influence, if it ever exists, on the crisis management. The paper consists of a literature review, two chapters, a conclusion, a reference list, and an appendix.

With the aim to discover more about the crisis management in deeply divided societies, the paper will analyze the case of Lebanon and will try to answer to the following questions:

**Research Questions:**

**R.Q. 1-** Which features of Lebanese political system cause the rise of consociationalism?

**R.Q. 2-** What are the factors influencing the management of each particular crisis in Lebanon?

**R.Q. 3-** Why the peace in Lebanon is not lasting?

To fulfill the purpose of the present paper the study proposes the following hypothesis:

**Hypotheses:**

**H1** – Some Lebanese crises were affecting the foreign powers' interests, this is why each of the Lebanese peace agreements since 1860s were influenced by the third party involvement, which was presented as a peace guarantor to monitor the process of implementation of the current agreement.

**H2** - The power-sharing structure of the Lebanese Electoral Law is the reflection of the foreign influence on the country's internal affairs.

*Dear Sir/Md., if you are willing to help to explore this topic, please, feel free filling the questionnaire bellow by highlighting your answers (example: a) Deputy; b) Analyst).*

**You may chose more than 1 answer for some questions!**

**1/ What is your current position?**

- a) Deputy; b) Analyst

**2/ How fair do you find current Lebanese Electoral Law?**

- a) Fair enough; b) Somehow fair; c) Not fair

**3/ Which National Agreement do you personally find responsible for Lebanese crises?**

- a) 1943 National Pact; b) 1989 Ta'if Agreement; c) 2008 Doha Agreement

**4/ What do you think, what is causing to develop a political crisis in Lebanon?**

- a) Electoral Law; b) Foreign involvement; c) Confessionalism

**5/ Which country or nation do you find more responsible for the Lebanese crises?**



- a) Syria; b) U.S.; c) Iran; d) France; e) Israel; f) Russia; g) Palestinians

**6/ What are the factors influencing the management of Lebanese political crises?**

- a) National consensus; b) Elite consensus; c) Foreign involvement

**7/ What do you think, why the Lebanese peace is not lasting, because of what?**

- a) Consensus is not reached; b) The Lebanese Constitution is unfair; c) The Lebanese Electoral Law is unfair; d) Foreign powers are involved; e) Palestinian Question

**8/ How justifiable is the Syrian involvement in events of:**

1975-76 - a) Justified; b) Somehow justified; c) Unjustified;

1977-90 - a) Justified; b) Somehow justified; c) Unjustified;

1991-2003 - a) Justified; b) Somehow justified; c) Unjustified;

2004 - a) Justified; b) Somehow justified; c) Unjustified;

2006 - a) Justified; b) Somehow justified; c) Unjustified;

2013-14 - a) Justified; b) Somehow justified; c) Unjustified.

**9/ How Palestinian factor affects the Lebanese political stability?**

- a) Very strongly; b) Somehow affecting; c) Not affecting

**10/ How strong is your devotion to your confession (taeftak)?**

- a) Very strong; b) Somehow; c) I am neutral; d) I am against confessionalism

**11/ Would you prefer Lebanon to abolish confessionalism?**

- a) Yes; b) No

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!

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