

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA

**EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY POLICY  
IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS**

By

Anna Harutyunyan

May 2014

*Master's Essay in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Political Science and International Relations*

# SIGNATURE PAGE

---

Faculty Advisor

Date

---

Program Chair

Date

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA  
May 2014

## **Acknowledgments**

There are many people without whom the conduction of the research would have been impossible. First and foremost, I would like to express my appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Syuzanna Vasilyan, Jean Monnet Chair of European Studies and Assistant Professor. Her constant efforts were invaluable for me. She guided me how to progress and structure my thoughts, as well as to keep improving. Apart from all, I would like to thank her for her patience with me, I am grateful for everything.

I also want to thank our Program Chair Dr. Douglas Shumavon, for his willingness to help, and the program of Political Science and International Affairs (PSIA) in the American University of Armenia for giving me this opportunity for undertaking this research. It was a great honor to become a part of this family.

I thank the European Commission officials, both in Georgia and Armenia, for their readiness to share their knowledge and assist tremendously to my research. I would like to express my appreciation to Eva Pastrana, Attaché (Project Manager) Human Rights and Good Governance Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, to Dirk Lorenz, Counselor Head of Political, Economic, Press and Information Section Delegation of the European Union to Armenia, to Philip Shetler-Jones, Senior Analyst/ Head of Mission Analytical Capability, European Union Monitoring Mission, to Vano Chkhikvadze, Open Society Georgia Foundation Civil Society Program Coordinator and the Chairman of the Parliament's Committee on European Integration, as well as to Armen Baibourtian the Senior Adviser to the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the UNDP Resident Representative in Yerevan, who in the capacity of the Chief Negotiator with the European Union, led negotiations with the European Commission on the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan from 2005 until 2006.

I am very grateful to my family and friends, whose constant thoughts were always with me. I am tremendously grateful and happy to have such a supporting family that assisted me in every step that I took. One of my great assets is my friends that made my life in AUA happy, bright and motivating.

And finally I express my huge gratitude to Grisha Aghajanyan, in particular, for always supporting, motivating and just being with me. I am grateful to him for his care and attention and without him I would not be able to overcome this difficult time. Thank You for being beside me.

## Contents

Introduction.....	6
Literature Review .....	9
Methodology .....	14
Chapter One: EU Security Policy Objectives.....	16
<b>Armenia</b> .....	19
<b>Azerbaijan</b> .....	21
<b>Georgia</b> .....	24
<b>Progress of the South Caucasus from 2007 until 2013</b> .....	26
Chapter Two: The Impact of the European Union's Security Policy in the South Caucasus .....	35
Chapter Three: Security Policy in terms of IR theories.....	47
Conclusion .....	53
References: .....	56
Appendix 1.....	63
Appendix 2.....	64
Appendix 3.....	65
Appendix 4.....	66
Appendix 5.....	67
Appendix 6.....	68

## **Introduction**

### **Problem Statement/ Importance of the Research**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the South Caucasus became an area of concern. The European Union has become engaged in this area since the independence of the South Caucasian states in 1991. The armed conflicts which occurred in the South Caucasus in 1991-94, and the national security interests in the region prohibited major EU engagement on the political level. EU's role in the region consists of political, economic, social and environmental aspects.

The South Caucasus as a region is marked by deficit of security that is a potential threat for both the states of the region and its neighborhood, mainly the European Union. Regional destabilization might have a considerable impact on the wider security of the EU. The approach of the European Union towards the security considerations in the South Caucasus was first manifested in the European Security Strategy penned by Javier Solana in December 2003 under the title "A Secure Europe in a Better World". Though the EU borders the South Caucasus through the Black Sea, lacking direct a land border, the region is still perceived as a potential threat for the European security. It is stipulated by existence of unresolved regional conflicts and likelihood of a new war in the European neighborhood. The South Ossetia driven Russian-Georgian military conflict of August 2008 demonstrated this possibility.

In addition, international crime and trafficking originated in the South Caucasus or just transiting through it constitute a continuous threat for the EU. Another prevailing factor is the need for diversification of energy resources for the EU and the role of the South Caucasus for production and transportation of hydrocarbons. Along with energy security, the role of trade, transport, and communications corridor should be highlighted on the background of the region's

strategic location between Europe and Asia. The EU's security priorities trigger shaping and implementation of relevant policy measures aimed at addressing mentioned factors.

The EU through its numerous programs, mostly anchored on the Eastern Partnership, attempts to address security issues through some of the root causes of the region's problems which include protracted conflicts, poor governance, organized crime and trafficking, and economic under-development enabling Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to integrate though at different speed and different depth into European political and economic processes.

## **Content**

This research paper aims to interpret how the EU contributes to the security in the South Caucasian countries. The specific issues that the security policies of the EU and South Caucasian countries underline must be explained in the following chapters in order to understand the conceptual frameworks, the differences of approaches, importance of the region for the Union and eventually to analyze the EU's security policy through an International Relations theory.

The first chapter explains the European Union's security policy through its numerous instruments and agreements with the region, taking into consideration the National Security Strategies of the EU and South Caucasian countries, later on the Progress Reports illustrate the efforts of the countries in order to meet the EU standards. In the end the analysis of the failed state index concludes the chapter.

The second chapter is devoted to the allocations of the European Union to the numerous projects, related to the security policy in the region. Content analysis of the security strategies, documents, agreements and existing data, demonstrates the main security priorities defined for the European Union. Further the chapter ends with the word count analysis, showing the differences between the EU institutions towards the security issues in the South Caucasus.

And finally, the third chapter is based on the official statements and speeches of the EU representatives, tackling specifically the regional concerns. The conducted interviews with the officials and representatives of the EU institutions help to analyze and eventually come up with a theory. Two of the most influential contemporary approaches to international relations theory are liberalism and neo-liberalism. These two International Relations theories will help to understand the conducted security policy of the European Union in the South Caucasus. We will discuss the security policy in line with the IR theories more detailed in the third chapter, by linking it to all the domains of the EU's interests in the region. Having in regard the interviews, as well as taking into consideration the content analysis of all the related documents, projects and official statements the linkage of the theories with EU policy will be provided in the third chapter.

The overall findings will be presented in the conclusion, drawing on all the analyzed data that has been used in order to conduct this research. The security policy of the European Union will be explained by the International Relations theory in the last chapter.



## Literature Review

The EU has its security driven priorities in the region namely "energy security", "terrorism", "territorial issues", "regional arms race", "organized crime" and "border control". More attention was paid to the region, starting from the active examination of the progresses in the countries. According to the European Commission one of the key policy implications of the European Security Strategy is the need for the EU to "promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom the Union can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (European Union, 2014), (European Commission, 2007), (Nuriyev, 2007).

As stated in the European Security Strategy the European Union's security begins abroad and needs an advanced strategy. Lynch states that the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is a vital part of this forward security strategy (Lynch, 2005). Both Lynch (2003) and Simao and Freire(2008) in their articles state that within the framework of the ENP, the EU tries to stabilize the South Caucasus countries by the help of economic integration, institutional cooperation and by guaranteeing security in the region (Lynch, 2003), (Simao and Freire, 2008).

Bagcı(2012) refers to the Action Plans as political agreements which are not binding. Each country decides on its own the level of cooperation with the EU. There are many points in action plans like "political dialogue", "economic and social cooperation and development", "trade related issues", "market and regulatory reform", "Justice and Home Affairs", "transport", "energy", "information society", "environment", "research and development". He then refers to the "European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument" (ENPI), presented by the Commission as an outcome of a new policy instrument called in order to sponsor the costs of implementation of Action Plans (Bagcı, 2012).

But according to Gogolashvili(2009) in 2003, after the launch of the European Neighborhood Policy, the South Caucasian countries were initially not even included. The countries were integrated in the ENP soon after its commencement. Gogolashvili views the inclusion of the South Caucasian states in the ENP as a new stage in the EU's engagement in the region (Gogolashvili, 2009). And German (2007) noted, the EU's former external relations commissioner "Benita Ferrero Waldner has described the ENP aimed at using the peaceful intentions of the EU to leverage reforms that will facilitate the expansion of the zone of prosperity, stability and security" (German, 2007, p. 360).

Freire(2013) states that the EU mainly emphasizes the stabilization principle in line with the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the principles that underline EU action. She further compares the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs) signed separately with the three republics back in 1999, and highlights the existing difficulties regarding the harmonization of economic, financial and legal procedures (the EU *acquis*) particularly as a consequence of weak local institutional structures, and the fact that the EU had no capacity or mandate to deal with the conflicts. Considering the negotiation process of the Association Agreements with the three states as well as the development of bilateral and multilateral programs through the Eastern Partnership the author highlights that more than 14 years later, EU relations with the region have strengthened the bases set up by the PCAs (Freire, 2013).

Dekanozishvili (2004) separates the energy aspect as one of the EU priorities, stating the importance of the diversification and transportation of energy resources, as well as highlights the conflicts in the region, which may cause a threat and spread instability throughout the Union. From her point of view, however the EU has not yet defined its interest in the region. She supports the idea that the EU's interest in the South Caucasus are just economic and diplomatic. In her article Dekanozishvili argues that even that the European Union is implementing its policy

in the South Caucasus through several projects, starting from the humanitarian and technical assistance to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the intensity of the EU's engagement in the region still is very doubtful (Dekanozishvili, 2004). Meanwhile, Niruyev (2007) states that all the South Caucasian states seek security and stability, but the EU security policies towards each country, as well as countries' security concerns differ. Armenia seeks to expand its ties with the Russian Federation, for having a hostile relationship with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia also has good bilateral relations with the US and Iran. Azerbaijan's main foreign policy objectives are the territorial integrity of the country and the resolution of the conflict. Georgia sees its future connected with the European Union (Nuriyev, 2007).

The establishment of closer ties with the South Caucasian states is also driven by the energy supply, mainly gas, which exist in this region. The EU is interested in the South Caucasus, and tries to strengthen trade relations, military and communication because this region is a transportation corridor for the natural resources which connects East and the West (European Commission, 2004, a). Several external and internal aspects influence the EU's policy towards the South Caucasus, augmenting or in contrast limiting the EU's activity. Galstyan (2010) separates three problems in the context of energy security: the significance of the Caspian basin within the frames of European energy security, the importance of Europe within the frames of energy security of the Caspian basin, the physical safety of energy networks (Lynch, 2003). Along with risk factors the region also gives many opportunities for transit trade, production and transit of energy carriers. In this context, the importance of the South Caucasus for the EU must be considered in the context of EU energy security (Galstyan, 2010).

According to Galstyan (2010) the European Union considers security in the South Caucasus connected to all spheres of public life. The EU security promotion in the South Caucasus is not only driven by the settlement of the existing conflicts and issues, it implies

provision of security by spreading common values and norms (Galstyan, 2010). In reality, the South Caucasian security policy of the EU has wide regional coverage. Especially in terms of energy and transit projects the South Caucasus should be considered in the context of wider Black Sea-Caspian Sea region connecting with Central Asia. This is the status of South Caucasus in the context of energy security policy of the EU. Though the EU shows common attitude towards all the three states, energy policy has its differences. In case of Georgia, the issues of transport and infrastructure are permanent. Interest towards Azerbaijan is based on energy reserves and the transit route of Central Asian energy reserves. In case of Armenia, the major interest topic is the nuclear power plant (Aydin, 2004), (Galstyan, 2010).

As opposed to Galstyan and Aydin, despite the fact that Efe (2012) and Alieva (2006) state that the relations between the EU and the South Caucasus are strategically important for the energy, transport and security areas he puts the main emphasizes on the regional conflicts. Efe refers to the conflicts in his article, stating that ‘‘Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts are key impediments to further regional cooperation peace and stability in the South Caucasus’’ (p. 191). They consider these conflicts as threats both for the Caucasus region and the EU as well, being a hurdle for the regional cooperation, economic development and a concern for the destabilization of the area, creating security vacuums. Unresolved conflicts and unstable security issues influence the developing relations between these two parties hampering liberalization of politics, social – economic development, reforms in the security and defense area, as well as regional cooperation (Alieva, 2006), (Efe, 2012). In fact according to Stritecky some experts refer to the South Caucasus as an essential region for the EU primary security motives, and other reasons like energy diversification or economic profits are the reasons mentioned by the international experts (Stritecky, 2009).

Demirag(2005) and Gogberashvili (2010) also point out that existing territorial disputes and conflicts are hardening the economic development as the stability in the region is essential for the development of oil and gas resources, but the opposite is also essential no political stability can be achieved without political development, as the Union has its strategic and economic interest in the region, pointing out that the South Caucasus is an important transit corridor for the EU's energy interests. Considering the existing conflicts Demirag sees the region as a natural channel for trafficking, smuggling and organized crime having a bad impact on the European Union's security (Demirag, 2005). When referring to positive aspects of the policy in the South Caucasus, Gogberashvili(2010) touches upon the diversification of energy resources and the role of the region for the transportation of hydrocarbons. She mentions that the absence of land border between the region and the Union may eventually become a threat for the European security. The reason for the direct threat to the Union's security are not only the "unresolved conflicts " and likelihood of the new wars in European neighborhood, but additionally the "international crime" and "trafficking" (Gogberashvili, 2010).

There are different approaches in the academic literature towards the European Union's security policy in the South Caucasus. Mainly, the arguments split into two dimensions. First, explains the EU's engagement in the region as a consequence of the regional conflicts, as the Union strives to avoid the spreading unrests, thus trying to guarantee its own security. The second one emphasizes the EU's economic engagement in the region, highlighting that the security aspects are driven from the economic interests.

## **Methodology**

Whilst studying European Union's security policy in the South Caucasus it is important to look at the past and current major differences in the strategy, taking into consideration the National Security Strategies of the South Caucasian countries and the EU respectively. The policy research project tries to uncover 1) how the EU promotes security 2) why it does so and 3) what has been the impact of the EU's policy in the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Georgia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. The goal of this study is to identify to what extent the European Union has achieved its expected goals in the region in the security field. The research will focus on the specific issues that the security policy underlines.

Qualitative inductive research method with an explanatory design was used in order to conduct this research. Qualitative research method involves three basic components which are:

- the Collection of data (the principal methods to collect data include personal interviews and observation)
- analysis and interpretation of data
- communicating findings

The aim of the explanatory design, which is conducted to build a theory, is to provide description as well as explanation. In order to conduct the literature review secondary data analysis was conducted followed by the meta-analysis of existing data. Core theoretical concepts were identified following the gathering of data; tentative linkages were developed between the theoretical core concepts and the data.

The related articles in journals, books, prior researches, official statements, were analyzed in an in depth manner for the research. Content analysis and comparison was conducted by analyzing documents, indicators or speeches to find similarities and differences. Moreover,

discourse analysis starting from the SC National Security Strategies and EU's Security Strategy was conducted.

The research identifies and selects a set of relevant categories or classes into which the data is sorted. The data was compared across categories when testing hypotheses. In depth expert interviews with the EU and South Caucasian countries diplomats and representatives have been conducted.

Due to political and practical reasons as an Armenian citizen, it was impossible to visit the Republic of Azerbaijan, consequently no interviews were conducted, and thus the official statements and the online interviews have been used as a primary data.

Research Questions:

1. Why is the European Union fostering security in the South Caucasus?
2. How does the European Union promote security in the South Caucasus?
3. What are the major issues that the European Union security policy underlines?

Hypotheses:

H1: European Union's security policy in the South Caucasus has peaceful intention.

H2: European Union's security policy in the South Caucasus is best explained by the energy interests of the EU.

## **Chapter One: EU Security Policy Objectives**

The South Caucasian states, after the collapse of the Soviet Union cooperate with their European partners in the programs on fight with terrorism, organized crime, trafficking, peacekeeping, border management, energy security, terrorism and others. In this regard the relations of the European Union and the South Caucasian countries include many aspects and objectives defined in the European Neighborhood Policy strategic documents as broadening “the stability, security and well-being of all concerned” (European Commission, 2004, a).

The European Union values global stability and security. The Conclusion of 2008 calls on the EU to effectively use the instruments and improvement of capabilities of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy in order to play a growing part in building a safer world. Dealing with security challenges, like terrorism, organized crime and fragile States, will lead to a success from the continued and principled promotion of rule of law by the EU. All together, the EU pursues a common internal program for freedom, security and justice (European Council, 2008).

The EU is in front of grave security challenges that are increasing in size and convolution. Most of the security threats are cross-border and cross sectoral. The EU Security Strategy, which was adopted in early 2003, defines the challenges, main principles and strategies for dealing with these problems within the EU and calls on the Commission to suggest measures for implementing the strategy. There are five strategic objectives for internal security set by the European Commission: organized crime, terrorism, cybercrime, border security, disasters (European Commission, 2010, b).



Along with the internal security of the European Union there are many external issues causing threats to the Union, which in its turn is implementing internal and external security strategies for the creation of a secure environment. According to the European Commission “security is a precondition of development” (European Commission, 2003, c). The EU’s security strategy identifies the following issues:

- Terrorism
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Regional Conflicts
- State Failure
- Organized Crime (Ibid.).

The aim of the European Neighborhood Policy launched in 2004 is sharing the EU’s stability, security and prosperity among other countries, including the South Caucasian countries. Specific objectives for strengthening bilateral relations and security objectives under the ENP have been established in the ENP Action Plans for these three countries. The Country Strategy Papers (CSP) for the South Caucasian countries, which cover the EU main objectives in these countries and encircle all the instruments and programs, for the period 2007-2013 and the assistance will be presented under the new European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (European Commission, 2007, e). The main purpose of the CSP’s is to sustain close relationship between the South Caucasian countries and the EU in the context of the ENP and based on the objectives defined in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) and the EU-South Caucasian countries ENP Action Plans. Based on the CSP, a National Indicative Program (NIP) for the ENPI was adopted for the period 2007-2010 and 2010-2013 and is being implemented. In the three countries of the South Caucasus the PCA’s with the European Union are remaining in force until a successor documents are agreed (EU Commission, 2011, e, f, g).

In 2001 the European Union presented the Strategy on development of energy and transport networks in the South and East Europe. According to the strategy the main priorities are the guaranteeing security of oil and gas supplies and their diversification, the price of projects as well as the expected profit (European Commission, 2011, g).

Achieving full territorial integrity through the settlement of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as engagement in support for a peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh are the key objectives of the EU. This involves in the first place supporting the efforts of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia has a goal in preventing and contributing to the settlement of conflicts in the South Caucasus, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, but also to encourage people to people contacts, to actively involve civil society in peaceful conflict solution efforts and to support humanitarian and de-mining initiatives (Marlingen, Ostraukait, 2009), (European Commission, 2007, h).

Along with the European Union Security Strategy, the National Security Strategy of Armenia and the National Security Concepts of Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively, also highlight the main priorities which are in line with those under the EUSS.

NSS/ NSC	Main Directions	Threats to National Securities
<b>Armenia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Fight against terrorism</li> <li>-Arms control</li> <li>- Active engaging in major international organizations</li> <li>- Developing relations with global centers of power and countries with interests in the region</li> <li>- Participating in European and post-Soviet integration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-The key issue of the National Security of the Republic of Armenia is the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict</li> <li>- Use of force</li> <li>-Terrorism</li> <li>-Transnational Crime</li> <li>-Energy dependence</li> </ul>
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4.1.2. Integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures</li> <li>4.1.3. Contribution to international security</li> <li>4.3.6 Reinforcing border security</li> <li>4.3.8. Energy security policy</li> <li>4.3.9. Transportation security policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3.1. Attempts against the independence, sovereignty, territorial</li> <li>3.4. Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction</li> <li>3.5. Regional conflicts and transnational organized crime</li> <li>3.6. Actions against energy infrastructure of the Republic of Azerbaijan</li> </ul>
<b>Georgia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5.2. Integration into the European Union</li> <li>7.5.3. Council of Europe</li> <li>8. Fight against international terrorism and transnational organized crime</li> <li>10. Energy security policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. International terrorism and transnational organized crime</li> <li>7. Energy challenges:</li> </ul>

## Armenia

As stated in the Armenian National Security Strategy the development and progress of the relations between the European Union is a priority direction for the Armenian foreign policy. The intensified cooperation with the Union provides and promotes favorable stability in the region. It is also stated in the NSS that the close relations are considered to be a long-term priority and interest for Armenia (Ministry of Defense of RA, 2007). Armenia's political, economic and security development is hindered by the fact that Armenia doesn't have natural

resources and that it is geographically locked country by Turkey from the West and Azerbaijan from the East, this fact hinders safe and secure energy supply. For Armenia the future progress mostly depends on improved relations with neighbors, the solved issue of closed borders and successful and peaceful conflict settlement. With regard to the developments and the peaceful settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Union will give particular assistance related to the peaceful settlement of the conflict (European Commission, 2007, h).

The Armenian National Security Strategy refers to relations with the European Union, as well as other European structures, stating that the priority goal of the country is the consolidation and the progress of bilateral relations (Ministry of Defense of RA, 2007). European assistance to Armenia since 1991 represents more than 380 million EUR, while the ENPI funding is estimated at € 98, 4 million for the period 2007-2013. Armenia benefits from a number of allocations under the ENPI regional program particularly in the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), energy, development policy and Justice, Liberty and Security (JLS), and from allocations under CBC (Black Sea Program), thematic and nuclear programs. The ENP Action Plan refers to assistance in the area of migration issues including readmission and asylum, fight against terrorism and organized crime, including trafficking in human beings and drugs, the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons, weapons of mass destruction. Effective border management together with document security biometrics, support for fighting organized crime and effective management of migratory flows are other concerns for support under this headline. The Food Security Program (FSP) represents around 100 million EUR each (Ibid, European Commission 2006, i).

The NIP covering the period 2011-2013 was drafted on the bases of the mid-term review of the 2007-2013 CSP, which in its turn got valid power on strategic priorities and was prolonged until 2013. As stated in the NIP, according to the Mid-Term Review carried out by the

Commission in late 2008, the relations between Armenia and the EU have significantly deepened since 2007, but the main priority areas that were defined in the in the CSP have remained the same. The implementation of the key objectives, such as deeper political cooperation and trade and economic relations between Armenia and the EU, social and economic development between the regions in Armenia, and increased mobility and security to facilitate the movement of goods and persons, set out by the PCA and ENP Action Plan and the priorities of the Eastern Partnership bilateral track, are supported by the National Indicative program. The indicative amount for the 2011-13 NIP is € 157.3 million (EU Commission, 2011, f, h).

Security of energy and the energy sector is an issue of major concern for Armenia, as the country lacks natural resources, thus it seeks alternatives of guaranteeing the security of energy supply by developing optional energy sources such as thermo, hydro and wind sources of energy, and in the Action Plan the Progress related to energy networks (mainly electricity, natural gas) and co-operation on nuclear safety and radioactive source security is highlighted. It is reported that the EU has assisted Armenia with around € 29 million from 2011 to 2013 of TACIS funds on improving safety of the Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant (Ibid).

## **Azerbaijan**

As stated in the National Security Strategy of Azerbaijan the cooperation between the European Union and Azerbaijan is built on a bilateral and multilateral basis. The NSS emphasizes the importance of the development of economic and political cooperation, particularly with the Baltic, East and South-East European States. According to the National Security Strategy of Azerbaijan the ENP as well as the implementation of the Action Plan (2006), fosters strengthening of the cooperation in the fields of economy, politics as well as institutional reforms (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, 2007). In Azerbaijan's case the

political and security situation is heavily influenced by its geographic location as the country is pressed between the Russian Federation and Iran, the availability of sizeable energy resources and the protracted conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The peaceful resolution of the existing Karabakh conflict will be beneficial for the country's future development. The EU also provides support for confidence-building initiatives in the South Caucasus region, as well as continues the support for civil society and the endorsement of democratic values and respect for human rights throughout Azerbaijan. The EU will provide further specific assistance to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of conflict areas, the return to conflict areas of Azerbaijani IDPs and refugees and the elimination of the excessive accumulation of conventional weapons such as SALW (small arms and light weapons) and ERW (explosive remnants of war, including landmines)/(European Commission, 2007, e).

The assistance provided to Azerbaijan reached to €400 million since 1991. This includes assistance under the TACIS program, TACIS Exceptional Assistance Program (EXAP), food security program (FSP), post-war rehabilitation activities. The broad areas of cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security (JLS) are defined by the ENP Action Plan with Azerbaijan. Concerning the security policy the main emphasis will be put on the issues relating to WMD non-proliferation and disarmament, including conventional disarmament and landmines, migration and asylum, border management, including document security/biometrics and visas, organized crime and terrorism, the fight against the widespread corruption and money laundering and conflict. In transport, assistance will focus on improving the efficiency, security and safety of transport operations. This concerns road, aviation and maritime navigation safety plus maritime and aviation security, where training measures should also be envisaged (Ibid, European Commission, 2005).

The Mid-term Review of the CSP 2007-2010 of Azerbaijan undertaken by the Commission in late 2008, showed that the developments in the country referring to the areas of politics, economy and social development have changed in scope but not the core meaning of the main priorities as stated in the CSP. Furthermore, as mentioned in the CSP, the relations between Azerbaijan and the EU have intensified. The implementation of the key objectives under the PCA and ENP Action Plan and the priorities of the Eastern Partnership are supported by the NIP, and unlike the Armenian NIP also include the strengthening of energy security (European Commission, 2011, i).

As stated in the NIP Priority area 3, the energy security, mobility and security are PCA and Action Plan priorities, which are directly linked to the priority areas 8 and 9, and to chapters 4.3 and 4.6 in relation to strengthening of EU-Azerbaijani energy bilateral cooperation and improvement of cooperation in the field of Justice, Freedom and Security. One of the main priorities of the EU is ensuring the supply and transit of energy. The actions connected to energy security are linked to the EU-Azerbaijani Memorandum of Understanding on the Strategic Cooperation in Energy, signed in 2006(Ibid).

The Memorandum of Understanding on "Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy" signed in 2006 between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the European Union has an impact in ensuring the diversification of the energy supply and transportation routes, improvement and innovation of the energy infrastructure, resourceful use of energy supply and development of the renewable energy sources in the Republic of Azerbaijan ((Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, 2007).

The European oil companies are implementing oil projects in the Caspian region and in this context Azerbaijan has a double role both as a supplier of energy reserves and as a transit country. All these make the European strategy towards the Black Sea-Caspian region essential

(Galtsyan, 2010). The major objective is to ensure the secure transportation of energy supply the challenges for the EU to closer inter-state cooperation on transport and energy, principally through the developed two big programs TRASECA (the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia) for development of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia corridor and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transit to Europe) for guaranteeing the energy transit security Programs. The Action Plan covers Structural reforms in the energy sector and gradual convergence towards the principles of the EU internal electricity and gas markets, progress regarding energy network, progress on energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources technical cooperation and exchange of expertise co-operation on radioactive source safety and security, regional energy cooperation (Ibid).

## **Georgia**

After the 2004 enlargement, the European Union had an unprecedented development in terms of political, geographic and economic spheres, which gave an impetus for the Union to strengthen its cooperation with Georgia. The European Union and Georgia are enhancing their relations, promoting stability, security and welfare. The European Neighborhood Policy offers new perspectives in terms of strong commitment to support the resolution of Georgia's internal conflicts, drawing on the instruments at the EU's disposal, and in close consultation with the UN and OSCE, enhancing cooperation in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security, notably in the field of border management and migration (European Commission, 2007, g). It is stated in the Georgian NSS that the main priority area for Georgia is the stage-by-stage integration into the European Union, which will foster the development of the country's economic, democratic institutions and security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2005, 2012).



The EU contribution to peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is implemented through Joint Actions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The December 2005 OSCE Ljubljana ministerial declaration on Georgia endorsed a Peace Plan initiated by Georgia. Yet, the existing peace mechanisms, particularly the Joint Control Commission for South Ossetia, which is considered biased for Georgia's interests, have not reached any considerable result in 2006. At the September 2006 UN General Assembly, President Saakashvili reiterated Georgia's request to replace the CIS (mostly Russian) peace-keeping forces in conflict areas and confirmed Georgia's intention to re-establish its territorial integrity through peaceful means (Ibid).

During 1992-2005 the EU provided Georgia with EUR 505 million in grants through instruments, the most important being TACIS, the Food Security Program (FSP). In the field of enhanced cooperation on foreign and security policy in line with the priorities of the EU-Georgia Action Plan, like in cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan, particular attention would be paid to issues related to fight against organized crime, including trafficking in human beings, drugs, money laundering and corruption, WMD non-proliferation and disarmament, including conventional disarmament, and to conflict prevention and crisis management, continued reform of the social security system, notably social protection, child care, and health care. The European Commission's assistance in the field of transport is delivered through the TACIS regional program, the "Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia" (TRACECA). The program INOGATE "Interstate Oil and Gas Transit to Europe", funded under the TACIS Regional program, intends to increase the safety and security of energy transport to Europe. INOGATE fits in well with the goals of Georgian energy policy, which is geared to increasing Georgia's energy security and its transit potential (Ibid, European Commission 2006).

In case of Georgia as stated in the NIP 2011-2013, a wider range of priority areas must be covered. On the other hand, the Indicative Program provides certain elasticity concerning the completion of sub-priorities. The identification of the Annual Action Programs provides a chance to consider the opportunities of addressing the sub-priorities, in accordance with the EU policies and sector developments. For the development and the deepening of relations between the EU and Georgia in the context of Eastern Partnership the implementation of the sub-priorities must be ensured (EU Commission, 2011, k).

In terms of energy Georgia is an important transit country for the EU for oil and gas from the Caspian basins. The BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) oil pipeline and the BTE (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum) gas pipelines, connecting the Caspian basin with Turkey, as a result bypassing Russia and Iran, would gradually become a strategic alternative energy corridor. The EU would consequently intensify its energy cooperation with Georgia through the Country Strategy Paper, with the double objective of contributing to the EU's own security of supply and avoiding future disruption of energy supply to Georgia that could endanger the implementation of the ENP AP's objectives. Taking into consideration the transit potential of Georgia, as well as its interconnection with the transport and energy networks of the European Union, in order to ensure effective cooperation in the areas of energy and transport between the EU and the states in the Black Sea and Caspian regions in the framework of the "Baku Initiative" (Ibid).

### **Progress of the South Caucasus from 2007 until 2013**

The Progress Reports of the three South Caucasian countries represent the time framework from 2007-2013. The main objectives in the progress of the security issues are highlighted in the Cooperation on Justice, Freedom and Security which in its turn encompasses all the directives which has been so far aligned by the countries, as well as the main cooperation priorities such as

the border management, organized crime, trafficking, terrorism and fight against drugs. Energy security as well as the countries' achievements in this field comprises a biggest part in all the Progress Reports, showing that the European Union as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are interested in the cooperation in energy security. It is to note, that only Azerbaijan had some achievements in the fight against terrorism, while with regard to the fight against organized crime the progress was slow in Azerbaijan and Armenia, and in the case of Georgia it did not reach any success. The cooperation between the European Union and the South Caucasus in terms of border management as well as trafficking has showed a steady rise and energy security has been and remains a major field for the cooperation between the European Union and the South Caucasian countries. In 2012 Armenia and Georgia respectively aligned with 35 out of 62 EU CFSP declarations; meanwhile the progress of Azerbaijan toward aligning with the declarations from 2007 till 2012 was the slowest.

**For more details see the table below:**

<b>Armenia</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>Cooperation on Justice, Freedom and Security (CFSP)</b>	June, invited to align declarations on a case-by –case basis	No progress on the signature and ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.	Aligned with 108 out of 138 CFSP declarations.	aligned with 28 out of 44 CFSP declarations	aligned with 40 out of 82 CFSP declarations	Aligned with 35 out of 62 EU CFSP declarations
<b>Border Management/ Southern Caucasus Integrated Border Management (SCIBM)</b>	Preparation for the program is underway	Agreed in October, 2007	Delay of the implementation till March, 2010	Adoption of Border Security and Comprehensive Border Management Strategy in November	Implementation Action Plan approved, adopted a biometric passports legislation in November, visa facilitation and readmission agreements were adopted by the EU in December	EU-Armenia Mobility Partnership signed, visa Facilitation Agreement was signed on 17 December, EUR 3 provided to Armenia’s migration management capabilities support, app. EUR 61 million to Bagratashen, Bavra and Gogavan borders
<b>Trafficking</b>	Anti-trafficking commission received ministry status at the end of 2007	Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings which entered into force in August 2008	National budget allocated some EUR 100,000 to finance anti-trafficking actions	Armenia signed the 2007 Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse.	An Anti-Trafficking Board was established under the Ministry of Territorial Administration	Armenia’s first evaluation report on human trafficking,

**European Commission, Progress Reports 2007-2013**

<b>Organized Crime</b>	Armenia has yet to accede to the Third Protocol to the United National Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the illegal manufacture and trafficking of firearms	yet to accede to the Third Protocol to the United National Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on the illegal manufacture and trafficking of firearms	Armenia has yet to accede to the Third Protocol to the United National Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	Armenia has yet to accede to the Third Protocol to the United National Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	In December Armenia adopted a National Strategy to improve the effectiveness of the fight against organized crime	The national program for fighting against organized crime was approved in April and a timetable of actions for its realization was adopted.
<b>Drugs Control</b>		Armenian the criminal code gave legal definition to the quantity of trafficked narcotics which are matter to criminal sanctions.	SCAD V program closed	July a schedule for action was adopted under the National Program (2010-12), attended the ENP regional seminar on the EU drug monitoring system	The first EU-Armenia Drugs Dialogue took place on 7 September	In October, Armenia reiterated its willingness to establish close cooperation with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
<b>Energy</b>	Armenia adopted a new energy strategy document and an, the EU continued to demand the early closure of the Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant (MNPP), before 2016 action plan	EUR 7.2 million, was provided within the Action Plan 2007 under the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)	projects providing On-Site Assistance and the supply of equipment worth EUR 11 million to the NPP of Medzamor are being implemented under the INSC	Under the INSC Action Programs 2008, 2009 and 2010, another EUR 13.6 was given for the improvement of safety	ready to undertake a comprehensive risk and safety assessment of MNPP In October, became an observer under the Energy Community Treaty	EU continues to request the earliest possible closure of Medzamor

<b>Azerbaijan</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>Cooperation on Justice, Freedom and Security (CFSP)</b>	By the end of the year aligned with more than a half of declarations, no progress on the accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)	Aligned with less than half of the declarations, no steps towards accession to the Rome Statute of the ICC and to the Ottawa Convention	Aligned with 56 out of 138 CFSP declarations, no developments in the accession to the Rome Statute of the ICC	Aligned with 18 out of 44 CFSP declarations, no developments in the accession to the Rome Statute of the ICC	Aligned with 12 out of 82 CFSP declarations, high level of meetings	Aligned with 6 out of 62 EU CFSP declarations, has the lowest alignment rate, the security situation remained volatile
<b>Border Management/ Southern Caucasus Integrated Border Management (SCIBM)</b>	Education and training strategy on border management including improved understanding of Schengen rules and standards remains to be developed	Azerbaijan chooses to pursue cooperation in the SCIBM only under the bilateral component with Georgia	SCIBM was delayed to address issues raised by Azerbaijan	SCIBM implementation started in March 2010, new and reconstructed border crossing points were opened during the year	The issue of biometric passports was postponed, EU adopted directives for the negotiation of visa facilitation and readmission agreements	Negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements began in March, final drafts of the Migration Code and the Readmission Strategy
<b>Trafficking</b>	several regulations were adopted and special rehabilitation centres were opened	Azerbaijan has yet to sign and ratify the 2005 Council of Europe Convention	National Referral Mechanism adopted, shelter for children victims opened Inter-agency Commission formed, CoE Ratification pending	The CoE Convention entered into force in October	The Council of Europe Convention remained unratified	Azerbaijan continued to implement the National Action Plan

<b>Terrorism/ Organized Crime</b>	Cooperation with INTERPOL	Cooperation with INTERPOL	Presidential decree on the application of the law on the approval of the International Convention against Nuclear Terrorism was issued in January	In March the CoE Convention on Cybercrime which entered into force in July was ratified	No progress in acceding to the Hague conventions on child abduction and protection	Cooperation with INTERPOL, reported having broken up some terrorist groups
<b>Drugs Control</b>	Regulations and pieces of legislation were adopted to implement 1988 UN Convention, is engaged in SCAD V program	The five-year action program (2007-12) to combat drug addiction is being implemented in line with the national strategy	The South Caucasus Anti-Drugs Program (SCAD V) came to an end in	In October, participated in the ENP regional seminar on the EU drug monitoring system organized in Brussels.	The first EU-Azerbaijan Drugs Dialogue took place in September	Azerbaijan started work on formulating a National Strategy and an action plan for combating illegal trafficking in narcotics
<b>Energy</b>	Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (Turkey) was put into operation, , Regional dialogue continued through the “Baku initiative” for EU-Black Sea/Caspian energy cooperation	Increased the security of oil and gas pipelines, drafted an action plan in this area, consolidated oil and gas exports via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipelines	Continued to support development of the Southern gas corridor, developed plans for liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Romania from a Georgian Black Sea terminal	AGRI (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnection) project was endorsed, the State agency of alternative and renewable energy sources became operational	Joint Declaration on the establishment of the Southern Gas Corridor was signed	The Shah Deniz II became a sole pipeline option for the Italian leg of the European evacuation route. In June, Nabucco West became as the potential pipeline for Central and Eastern Europe

European Commission, Progress Reports 2007-2013

<b>Georgia</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>
<b>Cooperation on Justice, Freedom and Security (CFSP)</b>	June 2007, Georgia has been invited to align with CFSP declarations on a case-by-case basis	In 2008, Georgia aligned with 117 out of the 154 CFSP declarations	aligned with 97 out of 137 CFSP declarations	aligned with 28 out of 44 CFSP declarations	aligned with 42 out of 82 CFSP declarations, There was intense political dialogue with Georgia in 2011	aligned itself with 35 out of 62 EU CFSP declarations it was invited to support
<b>Border Management/ Southern Caucasus Integrated Border Management (SCIBM)</b>	The border management strategy of Georgia was approved after the in February, covering all the elements of the European Four-Tier Border Security System	The National Strategy 2008-2012 was endorsed by the President in February and its corresponding action plan was due for adoption in June	Action plan was adopted in December, The negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements were technically concluded in November and signature is expected in 2010	In October the ministry of internal affairs signed a two-year Operational Agreement with FRONTEX	Integrated Border Management (IBM) Strategy was submitted to the President for signature in December	visa facilitation and readmission agreements were satisfactorily implemented, the Visa Liberalization Action Plan (VLAP) was formally handed to Georgia
<b>Trafficking</b>	established programs for the support and reintegration of victims, a national strategy was adopted second national shelter was opened	National Action Plan for 2007-8 was fully implemented	Ministry of Internal Affairs continued implementation of the National Anti-Trafficking Action Plan	National Anti-Trafficking Action Plan 2009–10 was successfully implemented while drafting the successor plan in October	Georgia effectively addressed the fight against trafficking in human beings	-



<b>Organized Crime</b>	-	Georgia did not sign or ratify the Third Protocol to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime	Preparatory measures to sign and ratify the Third Protocol to the UN Convention, signed the Coe Convention	Preparatory measures to sign and ratify Third Protocol to the UN Convention, ratified the European Convention on Cybercrime, did not ratify the 2007 CoE	Has not ratified the Third Protocol to the UN Convention , the 2007 Council of Europe Convention and the European Convention on Cybercrime.	-
<b>Drugs Control</b>	Concept paper for a national drugs strategy was adopted in February, is fully engaged in the SCAD V program	participates in the SCAD V regional program, However, it has not yet designated a national focal point for the program	its participation in the SCAD V regional program, but failed to designate a national focal point for the program	not yet adopted a National Drugs Strategy incorporating both demand and supply reduction actions.	The first EU-Georgia Dialogue on drugs took place in September	-
<b>Energy</b>	key transit country of Caspian energy resources to EU participated in the “Baku initiative” for EU-Black Sea/Caspian energy cooperation	key transit country, European Commission study on feasibility of a Trans-Caspian/Black Sea energy corridor	enhancing the EU’s energy security, both the EU and Georgia have an interest to develop a regulatory framework, in line with the EU energy <i>acquis</i>	stepped up energy dialogue, inter alia, through the first ever energy subcommittee, held in Tbilisi	It reconfirmed its full support for developing the Southern Gas Corridor, the rehabilitation of gas networks continued	reliable energy partner for the EU, an active observer in the Energy Community, submitted an application to become a full member

European Commission, Progress Reports 2007-2013

<b>FSI</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
<b>Armenia</b>	-	89/146 4.5	112/177 4.5	109/177 4.5	101/177 5.3	101/177 5.1	102/177 5.2	102/177 5.2	105/178 5.3
<b>Georgia</b>	-	60/146 8.1	58/177 7.8	56/177 7.7	33/177 7.9	37/177 8.0	47/177 7.9	51/177 7.6	55/178 7.9
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	50/176 7.0	61/146 7.0	62/177 7.2	64/177 7.2	56/177 7.3	55/177 7.3	63/177 7.0	68/177 6.7	76/178 6.9

**The Fund for Peace, Failed State Index, 2014**

In order to observe the overall achievements of the South Caucasian countries in the security field, it is useful to compare the security scores mentioned in the Failed State Index. It is evident that all the countries during the whole period are in the warning zone. In case of Armenia there is a small but steady rise, despite the 2009 to 2010 fluctuation, and we may notice that the score grew by 0.8 points. Frequently observed fluctuations may be observed in the case of Georgia, and though the security score has decreased by 0.2 points from 2006 to 2013 it was stated that in 2011 the most improved country is Georgia. In terms of Azerbaijan's security score, the drastic decrease occurred from 2011 to 2012, where the index dropped by 0.3 and the overall index from 2005-2013 dropped by 0.1 (The Fund for Peace, 2014).

Taking into consideration the “state failure” security threat mentioned in the EU Security Strategy 2003, as well as referring to the progress reports of the three countries from 2007 till 2013 it is important to mention that even though some positive changes were observed in several fields such as “border management” and “energy security” issues, the overall situation concerning security in the South Caucasian countries did not achieve any positive dimensions, still remaining in the warning zone.

## **Chapter Two: The Impact of the European Union's Security Policy in the South Caucasus**

According to the CFSP Annual reports the EU is eager to progressively more invest in those partner countries which effectively realize their agreed reform objectives, its role in the South Caucasus remained strong. The work toward the upgrading of contractual relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, on the basis of the principles of “inclusiveness, differentiation and conditionality” was also continuing (European Council, 2012).

From the time when the Ceasefire Agreement of August 2008 was signed, the EU remained a major security actor in the region, through the deployment of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM in Georgia). Notwithstanding the fact that the EU strongly encouraged the prolongation of the OSCE Mission's presence in Georgia, including its previous monitoring role in South Ossetia, as well as the continuation of United Nations Monitoring Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in Abkhazia, the Russian vetoes led to the closure of both operations, eliminating elements of the international security efforts for Georgia. Consequently the EUMM remained the only international monitoring mission, making considerable contribution to security on the ground (European Council, 2010).

The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Georgia contributed successfully to stabilization, normalization and confidence-building efforts on the ground. While there was no possibility for the full access to the entire territory of Georgia, the EU continued to emphasize that this remains a pre-condition to fulfill the EUMM's country-wide mandate. The Mission is implementing its current mandate with at least 200 monitors, working on all its center tasks with a focus on the stabilization and confidence-building measures. Programs on the bilateral track of the Partnership aspire to support essential reforms and Confidence-Building Measures as pre-conditions for conflict resolution (European Council, 2011, 2012, 2013).

In the context of long-lasting conflicts, the EU Special Representative is actively engaged in expanding the EU's support to the conflict resolution process regarding Nagorno-

Karabakh. The EU worked in close coordination with the OSCE Minsk Group to sustain their efforts towards a solution for Nagorno-Karabakh. Numerous confidence-building measures in support of the peace process, including a study on the “Benefits of peace” were financed by the Union (2013).

<b>European Union Special Representative in the South Caucasus</b>	<b>European Union Monitoring mission in Georgia</b>
2009/133/CFSP EUSR South Caucasus 2.510.000,00	2009/294/CFSP EUMM Georgia 2.100.000,00
2009/131/CFSP EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia 445.000,00	2009/572/CFSP EUMM Georgia (prolongation until 14 September 2010, (€ 12.500.000) 9.000.000,00
2009/956/CFSP EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia 72.000,00	2009/572/CFSP EUMM Georgia (prolongation until 14 September 2010, € 12.500.000) 3.500.000
2010/109/CFSP EUSR for the South Caucasus (€ 1.855.000) 1.549.094	2010/424/CFSP EUMM Georgia (budget top up period until 14 September 2010) 2.500.000
2010/445/CFSP EUSR for the crisis in Georgia (12 month extension) 700.000	2010/452/CFSP EUMM Georgia (15 September 2010 - 14 September 2011) 26.600.000
2010/106/CFSP EUSR for the crisis in 419.753 Georgia (€ 502.000)	2011/452/CFSP EUMM Georgia 23,900,000.00 subtotal 23,900,000.00
2011/203/CFSP EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia 304,000.00	2012/503/CFSP EUMM Georgia 20,900,000 subtotal: 20,900,000
2011/518/CFSP EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia 1,758,000.00	
2012/326/CFSP EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia 2,000,000	

**European Commission, CFSP Budget - Commitments in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012**

The European Union Delegations to the South Caucasian countries refer separately to a number of projects, mainly emphasizing the energy issues as well as conflict prevention in terms of security policy. The EU Delegations projects refer to Eastern Partnership Integrated

Border Management program which aims at enhancing the border management capabilities between Armenia and Georgia. The projects of energy issues vary from the allocations under the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant to the distribution of funds transferred by the EU to Azerbaijan's state budget concerning the technical support for the energy issues, as well as the efficient use of the renewable energy resources in Georgia, including the allocations for the programs implemented by the ENP. The main objectives in terms of conflict prevention and resolution include independent analysis, dialogue between parties on the problems linked to conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. The European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK) succeeded in peace-building efforts which eventually led to the concrete confidence-building among the actors affected by the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh among the concrete major themes such as: broadening the base of participation in peace building initiatives, building confidence between all sides of the conflict through increased people-to-people contact, promoting peace-oriented fresh analysis and new ideas on the conflict, engaging civil society in dialogue with policy makers (European External Action Service, 2014).

According to Eva Pastrana the attaché (Project Manager) Human Rights and Good Governance from the Delegation of the European Union to Georgia, the only program of the EU target in Nagorno-Karabakh, until the situation is internationally agreed, cannot be handled in an impartial and unbiased and neutral way by any of the delegations of the two countries and the two main parties of the conflict. Her personal opinion was that it would be important to handle the question from Brussels. It may be posited that giving it to Georgia is important because Georgia is a neighbor country, but actually the three South Caucasian countries are different. She thinks it cannot be put either under Azerbaijan's or Armenia's delegation, because it would be difficult to ensure neutrality toward the question. The conflict resolution issue would not have any neutrality or safeguard if it was under the delegations of Armenia and Azerbaijan (Interview, 27.03.2014).

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Fields</b>	<b>Projects</b>	<b>Contribution</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Armenia</b>	Energy	Contribution to the ANPP operator for the implementation of the Stress Tests	EUR 989.559,47 100% of total	07/2012-07/2013	4.980.766
	Energy	Support to Nuclear Operator on Site Assistance to ANPP	EUR 2.178. 100 100% of total	02/2011-02-2014	
	Energy	Boron Convention and Neutron Monitoring Systems, ANPP	EUR 1.813. 107 100% of total	06/2009-06/2014	
<b>Georgia</b>	Energy	Black Sea Energy Transmission	EUR 8.000.000 100% of total	12/2008-12/2013	8.000.000
	Security System Management & Reform	EPIBM Enhancement of the BM Capabilities at the Ninotsminda-Bavra border crossing point between Armenia and Georgia	EUR 1.900.000 100% of total	10/2012-03/2014	1.900.000
	Conflict Prevention & Resolution	The EP for peaceful settlement of the NK conflict/EPNK-2	EUR 1.995.249 EUR5.847.616,51 100% of total	06/2010-12/2011 03/2012-02/2015	7.842.865
	Conflict Prevention & Resolution	SC Mediation & Dialogue Initiative for Reignited Peace Processes	EUR 1.490.000 80% of total	10/2009-04/2013	1.490.000
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	Energy	Technical Assistance to the Energy reform Support Program	EUR 752.000 100% of total	10/2010-20/2012	13.750.000
	Energy	Support Reform	EUR 13.000.000	01/2010-01/2012	

**European Commission Delegations to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia**

<b>Projects</b>	<b>Field</b>	<b>Timeframe</b>	<b>Budget</b>
<b>Land Transport Safety and Security (TRACECA)</b> Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey closely associated	Transport Safety and Security	2009-2011	€ 2.997.000
<b>Support to Integrated Border Management Systems in the South Caucasus (SCIBM)</b> Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia	Integrated Border Management	Timeframe: 2009 – 2012	Budget: € 6 million
<b>Eastern Partnership Integrated border management (IBM) – Training</b> Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia	Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management	Timeframe: 2011-2013	Budget: € 2 million
<b>Support for regional programs (Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy and Northern Dimension)</b> Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Turkey	Regional Programs	Timeframe: 2013-2014	Budget: € 10 million
<b>Enhancement of border management capabilities at the Ninotsminda-Bavra Border Crossing Point between Georgia and Armenia</b>	Border Management	Timeframe: 2012-2014	Budget: € 1.9 million
<b>Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management – Armenia/Georgia Bagratashen-Sadakhlo crossing point</b> Armenia, Georgia	Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management	2013-2017	€ 3,582,500 (EC contribution out of total of € 4.3 million)

European Neighborhood Policy Information Centre

[http://www.enpi-info.eu/list\\_projects\\_med.php?](http://www.enpi-info.eu/list_projects_med.php?)

Land Transport Safety and Security (TRACECA) project aims at improving the land transport safety and security regulations in line with EU standards, as well as works on improving and raising the awareness concerning the transport security and safety standards. The purpose of the project Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management on Armenia/Georgia Bagratashen-Sadakhlo crossing point is the maintenance of security through bilateral, multilateral and inter-agency cooperation in line with the facilitation of movement of goods and persons. The project seeks to increase the security by reducing smuggling and trafficking of people as well as goods, creating a secure environment for the mobility of people across the Bagratashen-Sadakhlo crossing. The funding for the Support for regional programs (Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy and Northern Dimension) contributes to the realization of goal of the Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy and Northern Dimension. The work for the EaP's thematic platforms (Democracy, good governance and stability; Economic integration and convergence with EU policies; Energy security; Contacts between people), is supported by the project. The Support to Integrated Border Management Systems in the South Caucasus (SCIBM) as well as the Eastern Partnership Integrated border management (IBM) – Training aim to upgrade border management of the EaP countries non-EU borders based on the experience of the European Union. This is an effective precondition for combating smuggling and human trafficking. Enhancement of border management capabilities at the Ninotsminda-Bavra Border Crossing Point between Georgia and Armenia has particular emphasize on the exchange of information and the integration of procedures through the Ninotsminda-Bavra Crossing Point (BCP). It also works on reducing the smuggling and trafficking of people and goods (EU Neighborhood Info Center, 2014).

Looking through the previous projects of the ENPI center, a conclusion that the main financial assistance and allocations goesto supporting the “border management” issues of the three countries, which include the fight against smuggling and “human trafficking” as well as



the secure transportation of energy and support for the “energy security” regulations in line with the EU standards, can be drawn.

<b>European Union Security Strategy(2003)</b>	<b>European Union Internal Security Strategy (2010)</b>
Terrorism-11	Serious and organized crime-3
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction-1	Terrorism-11
Regional conflicts-4	Cybercrime-16
State failure-4	Border Security-2
Organized crime-12	Disasters-9

**European Commission 2003, 2010**

<b>Descriptors</b>	<b>Armenia AP</b>	<b>Georgia AP</b>	<b>Azerbaijan AP</b>
Terrorism	6	9	7
Cybercrime	-	-	-
Trafficking	10	12	9
Energy security	-	1	3
Border control	11	31	21
Organized crime	4	3	3
Conflicts	13	14	13

**European Commission 2005, 2006 Action Plan Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia**

<b>Descriptors</b>	<b>Armenia CSP</b>	<b>Georgia CSP</b>	<b>Azerbaijan CSP</b>
Terrorism	1	1	3
Cybercrime	-	-	-
Trafficking	5	3	5
Energy security	1	2	4
Border control	9	20	17
Organized crime	4	4	5
Conflicts	31	18	26

**European Commission, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013**

<b>Descriptors</b>	<b>Armenia NIP</b>	<b>Georgia NIP</b>	<b>Azerbaijan NIP</b>
Terrorism	2	-	1
Cybercrime	-	-	-
Trafficking	2	1	1
Energy security	-	1	24
Border control	28	1	17
Organized crime	5	1	3
Conflicts	4	25	5

**European Commission National Indicative program Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia 2011-2013**

According to Action Plans with the three countries, the overall security threats for the European Union are highlighted, paying attention to all the spheres except for cyber security, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which have not been mentioned in any of the documents related to the South Caucasian countries. Having in regard the security priorities mentioned both in the EU security strategy 2003 and EU internal Security Strategy 2010, taking into consideration the projects of the European Council Delegations to the Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as concentrating on the ENPI projects and the NIP's of the countries, we may conclude that the main allocations are considered for the "support as well as enhancement of integrated border management", "assistance to energy concerning issues, safe and secure transportation" and to "conflict prevention and resolution ". The word count is done to demonstrate which specific issues are attributed more relative importance.

Although "trafficking and smuggling in human beings, as well as trafficking of weapons and drugs" does not represent a priority issue either the EU Security Strategy or the Security Strategy and Concepts for the South Caucasian countries, it has been addressed in all the documents, as well as in the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council and in the European parliament's resolutions. The European Council conclusions addressed the security priorities mainly in general, just emphasizing security priorities in the South Caucasus in some cases, although not paying too much attention and not delving into them. The general conclusion from the documents is that the European Union mainly emphasizes energy cooperation, and "secure transportation of energy resources" from the third countries, the EU also mentions the cooperation with the third countries in order to combat transnational "terrorism" and "organized crime", which are priorities both stated in the EU's and South Caucasian countries' internal security strategies.

The European Council reaffirms the paramount importance of the European Neighborhood Policy and supports the processor reform and modernization of partners in the

EU's neighborhood. The EC reaffirms its commitment to strengthen the ENP in order to consolidate a ring of prosperity, stability and security based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law in the Union's neighborhood. In this regard, the European Council welcomed the adoption of the ENP Action Plans for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (European Council, 2007). In 2012 conclusion on the South Caucasus the EU restated its commitment to promote prosperity, security, democracy and that it is ready to increase its efforts to support confidence building and peaceful settlements of the conflicts in the region (European Council, 2012).

Energy security is defined as a "key priority" in the 2008, 2009 and 2011 conclusion. This priority needs to be improved by enhancing energy efficiency, expanding energy suppliers, sources and supply means, as well as by promoting the Union's energy interests vis-à-vis third countries. For enhancing the top energy security priority, the Union collectively, as well as each Member State separately must be prepared to combine solidarity with responsibility (European Council, 2008, 2009, 2011). The European Union will strive to ensure lasting security of energy supply through the extension of its internal energy market principles to neighboring countries (European Council, 2007).

Simultaneously the European Council recalls the importance it gives to the European Neighborhood Policy, as a way to strengthen cooperation with its neighbors and expand prosperity, stability and security outside the borders of the European Union. The European Neighborhood Policy aims at supporting the political and economic reforms of neighboring countries on the basis of partnership and shared values. The Union seeks to reinforce and further develop its Neighborhood Policy, accordingly offering an increasingly close relationship and considerable support, as neighboring countries fulfill their commitments to reform (European Council, 2006).

The European Parliament's resolution "The Need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus" of 20 May 2010 concluded that a particular strategy would bring together EU projects in the South Caucasus and add a more active political role. The resolution focused on the South

Caucasus's security issues and conflicts: the Nagorno-Karabakh and the conflicts in Georgia. It also highlighted that keeping the status quo in the conflicts in the region tolerates the steady danger of growth of tensions and a recommencement of armed hostilities. It reaffirmed the EU's support towards the use of cross-border programs and dialogue among civil societies as means for conflict resolution and confidence-building measures (European parliament, 2010).

Compared to the EC Conclusions, the European Parliament 2004, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011 Resolutions address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Georgia's internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as being essential for stability in the EU neighborhood, as well as for the economic and social development of the South Caucasus region. Emphasizing the peaceful settlement of all the conflicts the resolutions underline that conflict zones are often used as "safe havens for organized crime, money laundering, drug trafficking and weapons smuggling". They underline the fact that the ENP was designed to surpass the dividing lines in Europe through steady extension of the area of democracy, prosperity and security. The resolutions reaffirm that the principal objectives of the EU in the South Caucasus are to encourage the progress of the countries into open, peaceful, secure and stable states. The EP also welcomed the fact that Georgia and Armenia align themselves with the most of the EU's CFSP declarations and supports the decision to involve Azerbaijan in the same way. Great importance was given to the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, as well as the importance of Trans-Caspian energy corridor projects, which would contribute to security and safety as well as diversification of energy supplies, was highlighted (European Parliament, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011).

### **Content Analysis/ Word Intensity Analysis**

<b>Descriptors</b>	<b>Council Conclusions</b>	<b>European Parliament Resolutions</b>
Terrorism	26	11
Cybercrime	4	1
Trafficking	6	7
Energy Security	41	78
Border Control	12	51
Organized Crime	13	8
Conflict	8	152

### **Discourse Analysis/ Word Intensity Analysis**

<b>Descriptors</b>	<b>The Council of Europe/Speeches/ Official Statements</b>	<b>Interviews</b>
Terrorism	1	-
Cybercrime	1	-
Trafficking	-	3
Energy Security	2	8
Border Control	5	9
Organized Crime	-	-
Conflict	7	6

Taking into consideration the word intensity analysis, it is evident that the main priority both for the European Council Conclusions and the European Parliament Resolutions, as well as the official statements and speeches and the conducted interviews is “energy security”. This is stated 41 times in the Council conclusions and 78 times in the Parliament resolutions. The Council conclusions pay more attention to the generally defined security priorities, which include “terrorism”, “organized crime” and “cybercrime” which are respectively stated 26, 13 and 4 times. This may be explained drawing on the member states’ approach as they consider “terrorism” and the “cybercrime” as a direct threat to their states. Meanwhile the “conflicts” are not as frequently addressed in the presidency conclusions.

In comparison, the Parliament’s resolutions which refer directly to the South Caucasian countries, mainly address and highlight the conflicts, being stated 152 times. And the second major priority for the EU’s policy in the South Caucasus is the “border control”, mentioned 51 times. Deducing from the analysis, when referring to security priorities the EU institutions have

different approach and focus on diverse issues, the European Council is mainly focusing on the general security priorities for the EU, not specifying on the South Caucasus countries, while the Parliament resolutions address specifically the countries of the South Caucasus tackling the existing security priorities in the region.

## **Chapter Three: Security Policy in terms of IR theories**

### **Liberalism and Neo-liberalism**

Classical liberals such as Bentham, Kant, and Mazzini highlighted the likelihood that international institutions (mainly arbitration courts and more complex international federations with their own parliamentary assemblies) would reduce uncertainty and move forward joint trust among states, thus attenuating the security dilemma and vigorously endorsing international cooperation and world peace (Schlosser and Morlino, 2011).

In this circumstance, the major tool of the 'liberal governmentality' is that State loses its power. The move from the 'territorial' pact to the 'pact of security' should also not to be misunderstood, thus the new mechanism that will continue maintaining the single most important notion of liberal societies is the one security. This does follow the traditional liberal rationale in which, as Foucault put it, the liberal powers allow to the 'population' to move within the 'Liberal Pacts of Security' as long this 'freedom' does not threaten the power of the regime (Lais, 2012).

Wendt (1992) stated that the liberals admit the neorealist's claims on powers of anarchic structure, but they gain rhetorically powerful argument that process can produce cooperative behavior, even in a self-help system. There are also claims that the liberals may consider that anarchy does in fact, comprise states with self-interested identities. According to Wendt states are still self-centered about their security but are worried first and foremost for their absolute gains more willingly than important and collective action is more possible (however still a matter of free riding because states continue to be "egoists") (Wendt, 1992).

Doyle states the traditional liberal claim that "governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in their foreign policy" (p.1). What tends to be called liberal resembles to principles and institutions, identifiable by certain characteristics-for example, "individual freedom", "political participation", "private property",

and "equality of opportunity"-that most liberal states share, although none has perfected them all (Doyle, 1986).

In his 1997 book *Ways of War and Peace*, Michael Doyle states that two centuries of separate peace among liberal democracies cannot be dismissed as an outcome, of tactical alliances; definitely, steady international alliance pattern among liberal democracies are generally considered to be an outcome of mutual liberal values and domestic institutions (Doyle, 1997). And Kant foresaw that liberal republics would gradually establish peace among each other by the help of the pacific union which is detailed in his Second Definitive Article of Perpetual Peace (Doyle, 1983).

It is affirmed that the interdependence of trade and the associated international ties of state authorities assist in creating crosscutting global contacts that serve as lobbies for shared adjustment. The variety of the associates amid liberal states across diverse subject spheres also guarantees that no conflict sours an entire connection by setting off a spiral of joint retaliation (Schlosser and Morlino, 2011).

Badie and Marlino (2011) refer to John Locke the founder of modern liberal individualism theory, who stated that states have themselves rights derived from individual rights to life and liberty (political independence) and property (territorial integrity), hence providing the liberal fundamentals of international law; they also mention Adam Smith, Baron de Montesquieu, and Joseph Schum who explain the commercial liberalism and what they saw as its natural result, "liberal pacifism"; and finally, Immanuel Kant and Giuseppe Mazzini who are liberal republicans that posit an internationalism that linked peace between liberal republics (Badie, Marlino, 2011).

As a preliminary understanding of liberalism Thorsen and Lie (2009) propose that it is best explained and approached as "*a political program or ideology whose goals include most prominently the diffusion, deepening and preservation of constitutional democracy, limited*



*government, individual liberty, and those basic human and civil rights which are instrumental to any decent human existence”* (Thorsen and Lie 2009, p. 7).

Analyzing the previous chapter the linkage between the EU’s security policy and the liberal theory can be drawn. The EU’s intentions in the region are peaceful, concluding from the bilateral cooperation with each of the countries it is evident that the EU strives to preserve democracy, avoid the conflicts and is making peace building efforts in the conflict zones.

The High Representative pointed out that the security challenges grow and change over time, becoming more diverse. She highlighted several security challenges which are “cyber security”, “terrorism”, “military aspects”, “climate change” and many other features that can be a direct threat to the EU citizens and to the whole world (Ashton, 2013). The discourse and content analyses showed that the main aspects of the EU’s security policy in the South Caucasus are the conflicts resolution and energy security.

The EU views security as being linked to all sectors of public life by portraying them as being intertwined. Neo-liberalism allocates many characteristics connected with “essentially contested” concepts such as democracy, whose multidimensional nature, tough normative nuances, and straightforwardness to modification over time is inclined to generate considerable debate over their meaning and correct application (Vasilyan, 2010), (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009).

According to neoliberals claim cooperation is more extensive, since the institutions are powerful. For many instances states are capable to work together to ease the effects of anarchy, create mutual profits, and stay away from shared harm. Neoliberal theory is concentrated on issues of international political economy (IPE) it’s that distributional conflicts are typically less important than the potential common gains. Neoliberals also have accepted a less extreme position on the absolute-relative gains debate. Neoliberalism believes that there is much more unrealized or potential cooperation (Jervis, 1999).

Jervis points out that neoliberals have concentrated on areas in which "the costs of erroneously believing that the other will cooperate are not excessive, and in which gains in efficiency are likely to be greater than conflicts over distribution, but it also seems that neoliberals see the restraints that actors can impose on others and themselves as stronger than defensive realists believe them to be" (p. 50). Neoliberals believe that changes in preferences over strategies usually are enough to produce mutual benefit. He argues that the changes in preferences over strategies would be sufficient to produce greater cooperation, this is often the case and, more particularly, that institutions are effective instruments for this purpose (Jervis, 1999).

The core concept of the neoliberal claim is the economy—the issue of the manufacture, exchange and the expenditure of resources. Neoliberal theory consequently rests on economic analysis above all other understandings (Scholte, 2005) So the security issues and priorities of the European Union in the South Caucasus are generally seen and normally approached as functions of, and subordinate to, economics.. Indeed, neo-liberalism tends to treat economics in separation from additional dimensions of the security policy. In particular, this has been the case, since the EU institutions mainly refer to energy security, which can be seen as an economic policy of the European Union, and thus all other security issues tend to be solved in order to achieve economic stabilization in the region.

Moreover in one of his speeches Van Rompuy mentioned that the EU should work closely with the key producer, transit and consumer countries. Europe has to be the “fatherland of peace” (Rompuy, 2011). According to the conducted interviews, and taking into consideration the alternative energy supplies for Europe, South Caucasus is an important region for its energy resources. While the EU is significantly dependent on the import of hydrocarbons, the problem of transportation of energy supplies is considered to be a priority issue for Brussels. The South Caucasus appeared both as a region of oil and gas supply source and at the same time

as transit road connecting Caspian energy to Europe. “Southern Corridor” is among the EU’s highest energy security priorities. Energy security in terms of dependency, diversifying resources pipelines going through Georgia matters for the EU. First of all, the core importance represents the energy corridor that requires a stable environment to operate effectively. Strategic role and has tremendous significance for the energy security.

Neo-liberalism is connected with a completely free market and is frequently seen as relations with the Third World. It creates basis for market rationale in decision making process in all spheres. Neo-liberalism is associated with the liberalism’s economic modification, which is improving some pre-Keynesian arguments about the creation of capital and its circulation, more willingly than to liberalism as a political doctrine, seen as a set of political institutions, or as political practices. Moreover, neo-liberalism is not only a collection of economic policies; the theory does not only reflect the concepts of easing free trade and maximizing shared profits. Political dialogue on all matters is approached in commercial terms. According to neo-liberalism the state must not only associate itself with the market but must also consider itself and act like a market actor across all of its spheres and functions, including law. Thus, it expresses the goal of the state’s authorities and the basis for state action, starting from legitimate adjudication and campaign finance reform to wellbeing and education policy to foreign policy, including conflicts and the organization of “homeland security.” Brown then refers to Marx’s statement that capital refers to every aspect of life; transforms each feature of it, making it suitable for its goals and decreasing every cost and action to its cold motivation (Brown, 2003).

Thorsen and Lie (2009) characterize modern liberalism as an active involvement of the state in the economy. Modern liberalism is therefore, for all intents and rationale, a deep modification of liberalism, particularly of the economic policies typically connected with it. While „classical“ or „economic“ liberals support “*laissez-faire*” economic policies as it ultimately leads to more freedom and real democracy, modern liberals are tended that this

analysis is inadequate and misleading, and that the state must have a key role in the economy, if the main liberal objectives and ideas are to become real (Thorsen, Lie, 2009).

William Beveridge (1944), and John Rawls (1993) have expressed their ideas concerning modern liberalism, which is normally considered as being related politically with the left of classical liberalism, because of its inclination to use the state as a tool for redistribution of wealth and power, by eventually creating a society estimated to be more “decent” or “equitable” (Beveridge 1944; 1945, Rawls 1993).

Neo-liberalism in its term is a heavily separated sphere of political beliefs which most notably and significantly comprise the assurance that the only authentic purpose of the state is the preservation of individual, especially commercial, liberty with strong private property rights (Mises 1962, Nozick 1974, Hayek 1979).

For Thorsen and Lie (2009) neo-liberalism is an entirely new version for economic theory and policy-making .It is apolitical theory which is connected to classical liberalism and resulted in the period straight before and during World War II. Their main point is that the neo-liberals have redefined liberalism by putting aside the “*laissez-faire*” attitude on economic policy matters, in contrast to the modern, egalitarian liberalism which emphasizes the economic aspects (Thorsen and Lie 2009).

During their visits and speeches the EU representatives mentioned specific areas, which are seen as security priorities for the EU. Integrated Border Management (IBM) is the only directly security related EU Eastern Partnership “flagship” initiative. It is a “soft” security project carried out in partnership with UNDP. In general the objective of the South Caucasus Integrated Border Management Program (SCIBM) is to increase inter-agency and international co-operation between the South Caucasus countries, EU Member States and other international stakeholders and to ease the movement of persons and goods across borders at the same time preserving the security of borders (European Commission, 2013).

The High Representative met with the Georgian President on 25 March 2010 and the Armenian President on 27 May 2010. In July 2012, President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, visited all three South Caucasus countries. Following his meeting with the representatives of the Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Commissioner Füle welcomed the development in the EU-Armenia relations, mainly the progress in Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreement and the signature of the Visa Facilitation Agreement, hoping that this will lead the two parties to the next level. In case of Azerbaijan, negotiations considering the aviation, Visa Facilitation and Readmission agreements have seen progress. In the regard of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict he repeated the EU's support for the OSCE Minsk group, and the issue of possible flights to the airport in Nagorno-Karabakh was discussed, highlighting the need of the diplomatic solution of the question. And finally with the Foreign Minister of Georgia, Füle discussed the latest developments, including the adoption by the Georgian Parliament of a foreign policy resolution (Füle, 2013).

The EU security priorities are driven from the security interests of EU member states, but that doesn't imply they're incompatible with the national security priorities of the South Caucasian countries. While liberalism highlights the "self-help" policy of the European Union, it emphasizes that the implemented policy is directed to mainly please the needs of the Union, rather than the aims of the South Caucasian countries. While the theory of liberalism highlighted the cooperation and peaceful intentions between the European Union and the South Caucasus, the neo-liberal theory emphasized mainly the economic cooperation and the energy policy of the EU. Drawing on the data analysis, several security priorities for the EU in the South Caucasus have been identified such as "border management", "conflict resolution" and "energy security". Thus the two theories are better illustrating the intentions of the Union, and its goals in the South Caucasus. The EU promotes peace and in order to stabilize the region for the safe transportation of energy resources.

## **Conclusion**

In order to achieve a long-term stability the European Union needs to find new routes of deploying security policy beyond its borders. Unstable regions, like in this case the South Caucasus may be a direct threat to the Union as a whole and its citizens, because of the instability which could eventually lead to spill over into security of the EU.

The South Caucasus remains strategically important for the European Union for the reason that region is in the geographic location of the major transportation as well as pipeline routes connecting the East with the West, and the main oil and gas provider for the European Union. The aim of the EU is to diminish its dependence on the oil and gas resources transferred from Middle East and Russia constructing optional pipeline routes in order to transport these natural resources.

The EU successfully increases its collaboration with the three countries of the South Caucasus by augmenting its cooperation on the bilateral and multilateral basis. Both the priorities mentioned in the security strategies of the EU and the ones of the South Caucasian countries which coincide are outdated. The European Union addresses the issues stated in the Security Strategies rather on half-half basis, as something is done for the sake of the EU, like visa liberalization, trafficking, fight against organized crime, but when it comes to border management is pretty much linked to what is different from the EU's side. Overall, the European Union has peaceful intentions in the region, striving to stabilize and to promote security.

When referring to conflict resolution and energy security issues, it is evident from the previous chapters that main allocations and EU funds go to these security priorities. If taking into consideration that the official statements and speeches, as well as the conducted interviews both in Armenia and Georgia, and the online versions of the interviews conducted in Azerbaijan show that the main priority and interest for the European Union in the South Caucasus was, and remains the security of energy transportation and diversification. So we may freely conclude that

the EU's security policy in the South Caucasus is mainly driven by its economic interest, emphasizing the energy security and thus the EU needs to support the conflict resolution and to promote peace-building efforts, by funding and allocating in this spheres. Cooperation of the European Union with the South Caucasian countries in the security field is extensive, taking into consideration that the EU institutions are too powerful and they are the main policy makers. In order to secure the pipelines transporting natural resources, first and foremost the European Union needs a stable and secure region.

So from the analyzed above one can conclude that peace and stability in the region routinely means consistent access to gas and oil resources for the European Union, while instability can hamper the delivery of hydrocarbons not only to the EU but international market.

#### **Recommendations/ Limitations for Future Research**

Having in regard the fact that being a citizen of the Republic of Armenia created hurdles for the implementation of the interviews in the Republic of Azerbaijan, for future it would be beneficial to conduct the interviews with the EU representatives in Azerbaijan as well. Taking into consideration the time limitation, the security priorities of each EU member states have not been analyzed separately, rather the security priorities of the European Union were taken as a whole for the implementation of the research. Finally, the progress of the each South Caucasian country must be further taken into consideration, in order to better understand the cooperation between the European Union and the South Caucasus in the security field.

## References:

Alieva Leila, EU and the South Caucasus, Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research, C.A.P. Discussion Paper, December, 2006

Alexander Wendt Source: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425

Aydin M., Europe's next shore: The Black Sea Region after the EU enlargement, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 53, 2004, p.15.

Bagcı, Hüseyin "The Neighborhood Policy: Putting Old Wine in a New Bottle? A Turkish Perspective Uluslararası Stratejive Güvenlik Çalışmaları Sempozyum Bildirileri, Beykent Üniversitesi Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, s. 30.

Beveridge, William, Full Employment in a Free Society. London: Allen & Unwin. Beveridge, 1944 Beveridge, William, Why I am a Liberal. London: Jenkins, 1945

Brown Wendy, Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, Theory & Event 7:12003

Council of the European Union 14605/1/12 REV 1 PESC 1195 FIN 724, Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP 2011, Brussels 2012

Council of the European Union 12562/11 PESC 912 FIN 503 PE 316, Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP 2010, Brussels 2011

Council of the European Union, Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP 2009, Brussels 2010

Council of the European Union 14924/13 PESC 1238 COPS 439 FIN 648 PE 460, Annual report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP 2012, Brussels 2013

Council of the European Union, Speech by Herman Van Rompuy "The great challenges for the European Union", 17 January 2011 PCE 007/11

Council of the European Union, Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Nagorno-Karabakh, Brussels, 18 July 2012 A333/12

Council of the European Union, EUROPEA1 U11O1 Brussels, 2 February 2013 A56/13 Address by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the panel: What future for the Euro-Atlantic security community? Munich Security Conference, Munich, 2nd February 2013

Council of the European Union, Remarks by HRVP Ashton at the joint press point with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov MEMO/11/791 Brussels, 15 Nov. 2011

Council of the European Union, Remarks by HRVP Catherine Ashton at the press point with President Saakashvili, Georgia, Tbilisi MEMO/11/796 Brussels, 16 November 2011



Council of the European Union, Statement by the spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton following her meeting with President of Armenia Brussels, 27 June 2012 A295/12

Council of the European Union, Press statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle following his meeting with Hovik Abrahamyan, President of the Armenian National Assembly Brussels, 9 January 2013

Council of the European Union, Statement by Commissioner Štefan Füle following the meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Mahmoud Mammad-Guliyev Brussels, 8 April 2013

Council of the European Union, Statement by Commissioner Stefan Füle following his meeting with Foreign Minister of Georgia, Maia Panjikidze Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Brussels, 24 April 2013

Council of the European Union, President of the European Commission Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan Press point/Brussels 21 June 2013

Deknozishvili Mariam, The EU in the South Caucasus: By What Means to What Ends? EuroJournal.org, Journal of Foreign Policy of Moldova, 2004

DemiragYelda, EU Policy towards South Caucasus and Turkey, Perceptions, vol. 9, no. 4, 2004-2005

Doyle, M., Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs: Part II. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12(4), 323-353, 1983

Doyle, M., Ways of war and peace, New York: W. W. Norton, 1997

EfeHaydar, Foreign Policy of the European Union towards the South Caucasus International Journal of Business and Social Science Vol. 3 No. 17; September 2012

European Commission, European Neighborhood Policy, Strategy paper, Brussels, 2004, (a)

European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, Brussels, 2010, (b)

European Commission, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2003, (c)

European Commission, Transport and Energy Infrastructure in SEE, Brussels, October 15, 2011, (d)

European Commission, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Azerbaijan National Indicative program 2011-2013 (e)

European Commission, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Armenia National Indicative program 2011-2013 (f)

European Commission, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Georgia National Indicative program 2011-2013 (g)

European Commission, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Armenia Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013 (h)

European Commission, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Azerbaijan Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 (i)

European Commission, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Georgia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 (l)

European Commission, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument Armenia Country Strategy Paper, 2007-2013 (k)

European Commission, EU-Armenia Action Plan, 2006

European Commission, EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan, 2005

European Commission, EU-Georgia Action Plan, 2006

European Commission, Panorama of EU Regional Programs and Projects, Eastern Partnership and Russia, Brussels, 2013

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007 Progress Report Armenia, Brussels, 2008

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2008 Progress Report Armenia, Brussels, 2009

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2009 Progress Report Armenia, Brussels, 2010

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2010 Progress Report Armenia, Brussels, 2011

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in Armenia Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action, Brussels 2012

European Commission, Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in Armenia Progress in 2012 and recommendations for action, Brussels 2013

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007 Progress Report Azerbaijan, Brussels, 2008

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2008 Progress Report Azerbaijan, Brussels, 2009

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2009

Progress Report Azerbaijan, Brussels, 2010

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2010  
Progress Report Azerbaijan, Brussels, 2011

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in  
Azerbaijan Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action, Brussels 2012

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in  
Azerbaijan Progress in 2012 and recommendations for action, Brussels 2013

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007  
Progress Report Georgia, Brussels, 2008

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2008  
Progress Report Georgia, Brussels, 2009

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2009  
Progress Report Georgia, Brussels, 2010

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2010  
Progress Report Georgia, Brussels, 2011

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in  
Georgia  
Progress in 2011 and recommendations for action, Brussels 2012

European Commission Implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in  
Georgia  
Progress in 2012 and recommendations for action, Brussels 2013

European Commission, European Neighborhood Policy, Strategy paper, Brussels, 2004

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2006-10633/1/06, Brussels, 2006

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2006-7775/1/06, Brussels, 2006

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2007-16879/1/06, Brussels, 2007

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2007-11177/1/07, Brussels, 2007

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2008-16616/1/07, Brussels, 2008

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2008-11018/1/08, Brussels, 2008

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2008-143/68/08, Brussels, 2008

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2008-12594/2/08, Brussels, 2008

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2009-11225/2/09, Brussels, 2009

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2009-7880/1/09, Brussels, 2009

European Council Informal Meeting of EU Heads 2009, Brussels, 2009

European Council Presidency Conclusions 2009-17271/1/08, Brussels, 2009

European Council Conclusions 2011-EUCO 2/1/11, 2011

European Council Conclusions 2012 EUCO-139/1/11, Brussels, 2012

European Council Conclusions 2013-EUCO 75/1/13, 2013

European Council Conclusions 2013-EUCO-217/13, Brussels, 2013

European Parliament Resolution P6\_TA (2008)0016, Brussels, 2008

European Parliament Motion for a resolution B7-0484/2013\, Brussels, 2013

European Parliament Résolution P5\_TA(2004)0122, Brussels, 2004

European Parliament Report A7-0123/2010, Brussels, 2010

European Parliament Résolution A5-0052/2004, Brussels, 2004

European Parliament Report A6-0516/2007, Brussels, 2007

European Parliament Resolution P6\_TA-PROV(2008)0396, Brussels, 2008

European Parliament Resolution P6\_TA-PROV(2006)0456, Brussels, 2006

European Parliament Report A7-0374/2011, Brussels, 2011

European ParliamentR ésolution P7\_TA(2012)0127, Brussels, 2012

European Parliament Résolution P7\_TA(2012)0128, Brussels, 2012

European Parliament Motion for a Resolution B6-0074/2004, Brussels, 2004

EuropeanParliament Joint Motion for a Resolution, Brussels, 2004

European Union, Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Armenia, 2014:  
Retrieved from [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/index\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/index_en.htm) last accessed 26.03.2014

European Union, Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Georgia2014:  
Retrieved from  
[http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/index\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/index_en.htm) last accessed 26.03.2014

European Union, Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Azerbaijan2014:  
Retrieved from [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/azerbaijan/index\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/azerbaijan/index_en.htm) last accessed 26.03.2014

Freire Maria Raquel, Security in the South Caucasus: the EU, NATO and Russia in the South Caucasus, Norwegian Peace building Resource Center, February 2013

GalstyanNarek EU's Foreign and Security Policy in the South Caucasus, Yerevan State University, Yerevan, 2010

GogolashviliKakha, "The EU and Georgia: The Choice is in the Context", The European Union and the South Caucasus – Three Perspectives on the Future of the European Project from the Caucasus, TigranMkrtchyan, TabibHuseynov and KakhaGogolashvili, Europe in Dialogue 2009/01, BertelsmanStiftung, p.99.

German, Tracey C. "Visibly Invisible: EU Engagement in Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus", 03 December2007,  
<http://www.tandfonline/doi/abs/10.1080/09662830701751144>, (p.360).

Gogberashvili Salome, Why Does the South Caucasus Matter for the EU and Russia (Comparative analysis of the interests and policies used) Institute of European Studies at Tbilisi State University June 2010

Hayek, Friedrich A, et al. Collectivist Economic Planning, Critical Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism. London: Routledge, 1935

Jervis Robert Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate Author(s): International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (summer, 1999), pp. 42-63

Lais Dimitrios, "The Language of Art & Music: A Three Piece Puzzle: The Relationship between Culture, International Relations and Globalization" Shift of Culture: From Liberalism to Neoliberalism, MSc Global Politics (LSE), 2012

Lynch Dov, "The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU", Chaillot Papers, 65, December 2003, p. 160.

Lynch Dov The Security Dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy, The International Spectator 1/2005.

Merlingen Michael, Ostrauskait Rasa EU Peace building in Georgia: Limits and Achievements, Working Paper No. 35 - December 2009 Center for the Law of EU External Actions.

Nuriyev Elkhan, EU Policy in the South Caucasus A view from Azerbaijan, CEPS Working Document No. 272/July 2007

Michael W. Doyle Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 1151-1169, p. 1

Ministry of Defense, republic of Armenia, National Security Strategy Armenia, Yerevan, 2007

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Azerbaijan, National Security Concept Azerbaijan, Baku 2007

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Georgia, National Security Concept Georgia, Tbilisi, 2012

Mises, Ludwig von, The Free and Prosperous Commonwealth: An Exposition of the Ideas of Classical Liberalism. Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand 1962

Nozick Robert, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974

Rawls, John Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993

Simao Licinia and Freire Maria R., The EU's Neighborhood Policy and the South Caucasus: Unfolding New Patterns of Cooperation, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2 (4), 2008

Stritecky Vit, "The South Caucasus in the European Periphery" in Bezen Balamir-Coskun and Birgöl Demirtaş-Coşkun, "Neighborhood Challenge: The European Union and its Neighbors" Universal Publishers Boca Raton, Florida, USA 2009 at www.books.google.com p 213-214

ScholteJan Aart, the Sources of Neoliberal Globalization United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Overarching Concerns Program Paper Number 8 October 2005

Schlosser Dirk-Berg and Morlino Leonardo, International Encyclopedia of Political Science, Los Angeles: Sage, 2011

Thorsen Dag Einar and LieAmund, What is Neoliberalism? Department of Political Science University of Oslo, 2009

Fund for Peace, Failed State Index, Washington D.C., 2014: Retrieved from <http://ffp.statesindex.org/> Last accessed 26.03.2014

Joint Declaration on the Southern Gas Corridor,  
[http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/strategy/doc/2011\\_01\\_13\\_joint\\_declaration\\_southern\\_corridor.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/strategy/doc/2011_01_13_joint_declaration_southern_corridor.pdf)

MalenaMard, Interview, 30.01. 2014,  
[http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=712&id\\_type=6&lang\\_id=450](http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=712&id_type=6&lang_id=450)

## **Appendix1**

### **Interview Questionnaire:**

1. Why the European Union is interested in promoting security in the South Caucasus?
2. How is the security policy of the European Union enacted?
3. What are the European Union's security priorities in the South Caucasus? Are they national driven?
4. What is the role of the European Union in the regional conflicts?
5. What does the energy security in the South Caucasus mean for the European Union?
6. What is the role of the EU in border management, trafficking issues, organized crime, as well as drugs control? What are the success stories?
7. What is the overall achievement of the EU in implementing its security policy in the South Caucasus? What are the success stories?
8. According to CFSP annual reports more allocations are transferred for the conflict resolution in Georgia than Armenia and Azerbaijan? Why is it so?

## Appendix 2

<b>Descriptors</b>	EP Report A5-0028/2002	EP Résolution P5_TA(2004)0122	EP Report A5- 0052/2004	EP Report A6- 0516/2007	EP Resolution P6_TA(2008)0016	EP Report A7-0123/2010	EP Motion for a resolutionB7- 0484/2013
Terrorism	-	3	4	1	1	-	-
Cybercrime	-	-	-		1	-	-
Trafficking	1	1	1	2	2	-	-
Energy security	2	10	15	14	2	7	9
Border control	5	4	7	9	12	11	2
Organized crime	-	1	2	2	1	1	-
Conflicts	13	12	22	12	14	21	4

### **European Parliament Resolutions**



### Appendix 3

<b>Descriptors</b>	EP Motion for a resolution B6-0074/2004	EP Joint Motion for a Resolution 2004	EP Resolution P6_TA-PROV(2006)0456	EP Resolution P6_TA-PROV(2008)0396	EP Report A7-0374/2011	EP Resolution P7_TA(2012)0127	EP Resolution P7_TA(2012)0128
Terrorism	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Cybercrime	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trafficking	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Energy security	1	-	-	-	2	15	1
Border control	-	-	-	-		-	2
Organized crime	-	-	1	-	--	-	-
Conflicts	4	8	11	1	3	12	15

### European Parliament Resolutions

## Appendix 4

<b>Descriptors</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2008-11018/1/08</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2008-143/68/08</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2008-12594/2/08</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2009-11225/2/09</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2009-7880/1/09</b>	<b>Informal Meeting of EU Heads 2009</b>	<b>Conclusions 2011-EUCO 2/1/11</b>	<b>Conclusions 2013-EUCO 75/1/13</b>
Terrorism	8	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
Cybercrime	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trafficking	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Energy security	-	3	-	1	10	2	4	3
Border control	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Organized crime	4	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
Conflicts	-	-	4	3	-	-	-	-

**European Council, Conclusions**

## Appendix 5

<b>Descriptors</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2006-10633/1/06</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2006-7775/1/06</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2007-16879/1/06</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2007-11177/1/07</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2008-16616/1/07</b>	<b>Presidency Conclusions 2009-17271/1/08</b>	<b>Conclusions 2012 EUCO-139/1/11</b>	<b>Conclusions 2013-EUCO-217/13</b>
Terrorism	3	-	1	3	7	1	--	1
Cybercrime	-	-	-	1	1	--	-	2
Trafficking	2	-	1	1	-	-	-	1
Energy security	1	4	2	-	7	2	1	1
Border control	1	-	7	1	2	-	-	-
Organized crime	2	-	-	1	2	1	1	1
Conflicts	-	-	-	1	-	-		-

**European Council, Conclusions**

## Appendix 6

### Discourse Analysis/ Statements/ Speeches

<b>Descriptors</b>	<b>Ashton MEMO 11/791 2011</b>	<b>Ashton 2012 A295/12 2012</b>	<b>Ashton 2012 A333/12</b>	<b>Ashton 2013 A56/13</b>	<b>Stefan Fule 2013 (a)</b>	<b>Stefan Fule 2013 (b)</b>	<b>Stefan Fule 2013 (c)</b>	<b>Barosso 2013</b>	<b>Malena Mard 2014</b>
Terrorism	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Cybercrime	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Trafficking	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Energy Security	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Border Control	-	1	1	-	1	1	1	-	-
Organized Crime	-	-	-	-				-	-
Conflict	2	1	1	-	1	1	1	-	-

### Discourse Analysis/ Interviews

<b>Descriptors</b>	Interview 1	Interview 2	Interview 3	Interview 4	Interview 5	Interview 6
Terrorism	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cybercrime	-	-	-	-	-	-
Trafficking	1	-	1	-	-	1
Energy Security	1	1	2	1	2	1
Border Control	1	1	2	1	1	3
Organized Crime	-	-	-	-	-	-
Conflict	1	1	1	1	1	1