

American University of Armenia  
School of Political Science and International Affairs

# The Role of the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S.A.

## *The Challenge of Connection and Inclusion*

A MASTER ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF  
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FOR PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

By

Suren Avetisyan

Yerevan, 2013

# SIGNATURE PAGE

---

Faculty Advisor

Date

---

Program Chair

Date

American University of Armenia  
December 2013

## *Acknowledgments*

I wish to express my utmost gratitude to my master's essay supervisor Dr. Arpie Balian, whose encouragement, guidance and support helped me from the initial to the final stage of the research and writing of this essay, and whose sharp intellect and wisdom helped me to explore my topic as much as possible. Thank you!

I would also like to heartily acknowledge the entire faculty of the School of Political Science and International Affairs, particularly Program Chair Dr. Douglas Shumavon, professors Dr. Khatchik Derghougassian, Dr. VahramTer-Matevosyan, Dr. SyuzannaVasilyan and Dr. Yevgenia Paturyan, who have invested their time, knowledge and professional skills in the development of future graduate students in the field of Political Science and International Affairs. And last, but certainly not the least, I would like to thank my classmates and my family for their emotional and intellectual support, and who gave me strength to carry on.

## **Glossary**

AAA-Armenian Association of America

AUA-American University of Armenia

AGBU-Armenian General Benevolent Union

ANCA-Armenian National Committee of America

AIPAC-American-Israeli Political Action Committee

ARF-Armenian Revolutionary Federation

CRS-Congressional Research Service

GPO-Government Printing Office

FY-Fiscal Year

FMF-Foreign Military Financing

IMET-International Military Education and Training

MD-Ministry of Diaspora

MFA-Ministry of Foreign Affairs

USAID-United States Agency for International Development

## **Table of Contents**

Background of the Problem .....	6
Purpose of the Study .....	8
Research Hypotheses .....	8
Importance of the Study .....	9
Scope of the Study .....	9
Definition of Terms .....	10
Review of the Literature.....	20
Research Methods.....	28
Research Findings.....	30
Conclusions, Discussion, and Suggestions for Future Research.....	40
Bibliography.....	44
Annex 1.....	50

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

### **Background of the Problem**

Early definitions of “diaspora” are many and rather broad and do not adequately consider the changing political environments and globalization. Simply stated, most diaspora studies define the term as the political and cultural behavior of ethnic groups in their host or adopted new states. More recent literature distinguishes between different kinds of diaspora primarily on the basis of social unity within a diaspora community and its ties with the homeland. The *International Organization for Migration* provides a broader definition of diaspora as “members of ethnic and national communities, who have left but maintain links with their homelands.”<sup>1</sup> Safran (1991) places emphasis on the notion that diasporans believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their homeland and to its safety and prosperity.

In the case of the Jewish Diaspora, for example, although the term refers to the physical dispersal of Jews throughout the world, it clearly carries religious, philosophical, and political implications pertaining to Jewish perception of the special relationship between the land and the people of Israel. Interpretations of this relationship range from the messianic hope of traditional Judaism for the eventual “gathering of the exiles” to the view of Reform Judaism that the dispersal of the Jews was providential and fostered monotheism (Britannica Online Encyclopedia, at [www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/161756/Diaspora](http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/161756/Diaspora)). How different is the Armenian Diaspora from that of the Jewish people?

---

<sup>1</sup> Policymakers IOM Migration Research Series Paper No. 26, International Organization for Migration, 2006

Whether any or all of these definitions apply to the Armenian Diaspora needs to be investigated from different perspectives looking into distinct historical time periods: before the establishment of the Republic of Armenia in 1991 and after that, at the least, or even considering periods before and after the 1915 Genocide of Armenians by the Ottomans. This essay will look into the role of the Armenian Diaspora since 1991, but with some reflections on its changing role from earlier periods.

It is a known fact that throughout history Armenia has served as a stage of confrontation that dispersed Armenians away from their homeland. As early as in the 3rd and 4th centuries AD, the first recorded deportations of Armenians relocated them in Persia. The Byzantine policy of displacing the Armenian population forced their relocation to the Balkans. Emigration from the homeland increased dramatically in the 7th through 14th centuries when Armenians dispersed in many directions, including Syria, Mesopotamia, Crimea, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia, etc. The migration of Armenians to Cilicia was significant in the 10th and 11th centuries, when the Seljuk invasion displaced numerous princely families and military leaders. The dispersion of Armenians in the Middle Ages was greatly influenced by the East-West trade. Without delving much more into such causes of dispersions, it is important to note that the most organized Armenian Diaspora began to take shape after the Armenian Genocide.

Decades of continuous emigration of Armenians from their homeland has gradually established the various diasporan communities in the West, some more active than others. In the period preceding WWI, the Armenian communities of Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, India, Russia, France, Bulgaria, and USA were relatively sparse and engaged mostly in scanty cultural and educational activities. The Genocide and deportations organized by Ottoman Turkey marked

an era of new settlements by Armenians. Large numbers of deportees were forced to find refuge in other countries and rebuild their lives. With the most recent flux of Armenians leaving their homeland since 1991, the Armenian Diaspora has gradually assumed a more active role with different facets that include social, political, economic, and cultural attributes.

This essay will be limited to the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S. focusing on the patterns and achievements of its political lobby, including impact on U.S. foreign policy. Analysis of the results achieved by the Armenian lobby will be limited to development programs and other types of assistance realized by the U.S. government in and for Armenia, as well as corresponding budget appropriations to the Republic of Armenia.

### **Purpose of the Study**

This essay is essentially aimed at analyzing the activity of the Armenian lobby focusing on performance in the past two decades. Whereas the Armenian lobby comprises different groups and organizations working at both federal and state levels, the analysis will cover the activities of the Armenian lobby and the level of success in achieving its objectives relevant to work with the U.S. Federal government. Although most of this work is done through Armenian lobbyists centered in Washington, D.C., there is no doubt that state level contacts and political activism by individuals throughout the United States contributes to the end results and accomplishments.

### **Research Hypotheses**

H1: The Armenian lobby is successful in getting U.S. funding for Armenia.

Ho: The Armenian lobby is not successful in getting U.S. funding for Armenia.



H2: The Armenian lobby is successful in keeping the Armenian genocide resolution on the U.S. Congressional agenda

Ho: The Armenian lobby is not successful in keeping the Armenian genocide resolution on the U.S. Congressional agenda

### **Importance of the Study**

Since Armenia declared independence in 1991 and established the Armenia mission in the U.S. capital, the Armenian lobby has shifted attention from working mostly on the recognition of the Armenian Genocide to other issues directly related to the independent homeland. Thus, it is important to bring two decades of Armenian Diaspora's lobbying experience into a research study, exploring the merits of political action and, hopefully, to shed some light into differences with the Israeli lobby that could be beneficial for future action. This study will also serve as groundwork for future research, both from the perspective of the Armenian lobby and for gaining a better understanding of the merits of lobbying from the Armenian perspective.

### **Scope of the Study**

This essay will be limited to the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S. focusing on the patterns and achievements of its political lobby, including impact on U.S. foreign policy. Analysis of the results achieved by the Armenian lobby will be limited to development programs and other types of assistance realized by the U.S. government in and for Armenia, as well as corresponding budget appropriations to the Republic of Armenia.

It must be noted that the Armenian lobby in the U.S. spends considerable time, financial resources and effort on other issues on its political agenda. But the limitations of this essay do not allow expansion of the research into other areas and activities. Issues related to the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, for example, occupy a significant portion of the Armenian lobbyists' efforts throughout major states of the United States, but are not considered in this study.

### **Definition of Terms**

For the purposes of this study, the term *lobbying* shall be defined as "the process of influencing public and government policy at all levels: federal, state, and local. ... Lobbying involves the advocacy of an interest that is affected, actually or potentially, by the decisions of government leaders" (<http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Lobbying>). Considering that this essay discusses lobbying in the United States, it is necessary to examine specific aspects of lobbying.

The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution refers to lobbying as protecting the rights of the people. In that regard, it states that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances" (<http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Lobbying>). Despite the fact that lobbying activities are protected by the Constitution, there are two laws that regulate lobbying in the U.S. In 1946 the Congress passed the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (2 U.S.C.A. §§ 261, 261 note, 262–270 [1946]) and in 1995, it passed the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (Pub. L.No.104-65, 109 Stat. 691, retrieved from <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Lobbying>).

## **CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE**

The phenomenon of Armenia is that for centuries it has had an influential and powerful Diaspora. In various time periods, its Diaspora was strong in India, China, and Europe. Nowadays, the Armenian Diaspora has strongest positions in the U.S., the French Republic and the Russian Federation. In the case of the American-Armenian community, the Armenian Diaspora has managed to gain some influence in domestic politics other than Armenia-related or other national-ethnic issues. The Armenian lobby influences domestic as well as foreign policies — since domestic policies are deeply intertwined with foreign policy — at least, over a range of issues.

The Armenian lobby in the U.S. does actually represent a phenomenon: For U.S. foreign policy, Armenia does not represent a great strategic interest, and yet, it has received (for more than a decade since independence) the second largest per capita foreign aid after Israel, which gets the largest amount of U.S. foreign aid. Multiple op-ed and news articles have commented on the similarities between Armenian and Israeli lobbies, also noting their differences. Just recently, a TV commentator stated that the Jewish lobby “intimidates” politicians and others, but the Armenian lobby does not (<http://www.hbo.com/real-time-with-bill-maher/episodes#/real-time-with-bill-maher/episodes/0/270-episode/video/clip-chuck-hagels-hearing.html/eNrjcmBOYM5nLITPz0lxzEvMqSzJTA5ITE-1S8xN1SzLTEnNh4k65+eVpFaUcDIyskknlpbkF+QkVtqWFJWmsjGyMQIAUKwXOA==>). But since the Israeli lobby is normally considered to be the strongest in the U.S., it would be useful to look at these two lobbies, at least conceptually (the literature review shall be dedicated to that).

The literature review, therefore, will be an attempt to conceptualize the phenomena of ethnic lobbies in the U.S. in general and the Jewish and the Armenian lobbies, in particular. Norman Berdichevsky (2007) argues that viewing Zionism (even though analyzing this specific term is by no means an objective in this study) as a merely biblical term does not portray the true picture. Zionism has a wider historical and cultural connotation, especially in Middle East politics. This lends itself to viewing Zionism as a phenomenon, somewhat similar to Christianity for Armenians, but not easily comparable to other nations (Berdichevsky, 2007, p.119). This will be discussed in greater detail in the section on the Armenian lobby.

Whether or not ethnic lobbies influence U.S. foreign policy and whether or not the U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the “motherland” is affected or is altered as a result of ethnic lobbyists is an issue worth exploring. The volume of reviews and debates on the extent of influence by ethnic lobbies on U.S. foreign policy has increased considerably over the last two decades (Shain, 2003). This is not to say that ethnic lobbies were inactive in the U.S. prior to 1990s; in fact, Thomas Ambrosio speaks of five periods when ethnic lobbying has been intense in the U.S., mainly before and during World War I; during and after the Cold War; and after 9/11 (Ambrosio, 2003). In an earlier article on the influence of ethnic lobbyists on U.S. foreign policy, rather on 'Multicultural Foreign Policy', Yossi Shain (1995), a renowned scholar on the role of Diasporas in international affairs, notes:

"Scholars, journalists, and political practitioners increasingly recognize the ability of American ethnic groups to influence U.S. foreign policy, ...yet very little has been said about how such influence bears on America's national interests abroad, on ethnic relations inside the United States, and on American civic culture in general" (Shain, 1995, p.69).

Most importantly, the author argues that essentially, if in the past some ethnic groups were inclined to be viewed as aliens who try to 'penetrate' the foreign policy of the U.S., they are now

considered 'insiders' who promulgate American values and ideas. Further, Shain argues that influence, exerted by ethnic groups may modify U.S. foreign policy. This is in line with Wilsonianism, considering, as he would propose, the rising trends of neo-isolationism(Ibid., p.70).

With respect to the phenomenon of ethnic lobbies influencing the U.S. foreign policy, Shain makes several important points. First, he links the influence of ethnic lobbies either with elections or to minor relevance of a certain issue to the administration (Shain, 2003). He notes, however, that when an issue supported by an ethnic lobby is a matter of priority for U.S. foreign policy, and in line with the position of the U.S. administration, ethnic lobbies have had the greatest influence in the policy-making process (Shain, 2002). Technically, ethnic lobbying is only a fraction of a broader notion of diaspora activities. Shain and Barth (2003), for instance, argue that

“even though diasporas may play the role of ethnic lobbies and champion multicultural foreign policy, more generally, diasporas are increasingly able to promote transnational ties, to act as bridges or as mediators between their home and host societies, and to transmit the values of pluralism and democracy. ... Given their international location, diasporas are aptly suited to manipulate international images and thus to focus attention on the issue of identity. Once triggered, this dynamic can be used to influence foreign policy decision making. This is done, inter alia, by engaging in the domestic politics of the homeland” (Shain and Barth, 2003, p.450-1).

It is important to understand that, in essence, ethnic lobbies were always present in both domestic and foreign policies of the U.S. John Newhouse (2009) posits that “The United States is a nation of immigrants — a strength that has also created vulnerabilities” (Newhouse, 2009, p.1). He succinctly describes the entire case with ethnic lobbying in the U.S. in the following passage:

“Although ethnic population groups have at times offset isolationist tendencies in the United States, they also can find themselves conflicted on issues that could divide the motherland from the adopted country, the United States. In other cases, these so-called hyphenated groups unhesitatingly side with the United States and, in effect, become more royalist than the king” (Ibid, p.1).

Despite the referenced bold recognition of the fact that ethnic lobbying is somewhat inherent to U.S. politics, Newhouse nevertheless raises concern regarding this issue. His critique is targeted to the lack of analysis and understanding of “the effects of the relentless increase in the privatization of U.S. foreign policy in recent years” (Newhouse, 2009, p.13).

There is, nevertheless, essentially a different argument on the role of ethnic groups. Yossi Shain (1995) discusses the uniqueness of the American polity, its preference of the political criteria instead of the ethnic in as far as inclusion and loyalty are concerned. In fact, he argues, “ethnic pluralism in the United States is by now part of the American creed of ‘Celebrated Diversity,’ to use Lawrence Fuchs' phrase” (Shain, 1995, p. 811). Still, he recognizes the complexity of the matter, especially because the collapse of the Soviet Union has basically complicated the distinguishing allies and enemies in the world. Thus, the role of ethnic lobbies also has become more complicated (ibid, p.812). If this argument by Newhouse would lead into thinking that ethnic lobbies might exert considerable influence upon the U.S. foreign policy, the converse would also be valid, Shain argues. Diasporas are inclined to assist their homelands in any manner, if only their actions would fit into the American understanding of political pluralism, since otherwise they would have to pick a side, which might not be how they would want to position themselves (Shain, 1995, p.814).

Another issue tackled by scholars and analysts is that policy-making in the U.S. Congress is getting more and more corrupt. This means that legislators are pushing or even formulating

policy based on personal interests paying less and less attention to the priorities of the country. This is especially true when congressmen cut deals with lobbyists, some of which invest large amounts of money in such arrangements.

Finally, the issue of national security comes to the front line; lobbying can become a driving force behind fueling instability regionally, states Newhouse (2009), particularly referring to issues related to South Asia and the Middle East. He continues with a somewhat pessimistic assessment, arguing that "the activities of lobbies representing foreign interests have contributed to the gradual erosion of the United States' credibility and influence in the world" (Newhouse, 2009, p.13).

As stated earlier, analysts have argued that the Israeli lobby is the most powerful among the ethnic lobbies in the U.S., some going as far as calling the Jewish lobby "the model lobby" (Newhouse, 2009, p.4). Newhouse describes the structure of the Israeli lobby as the "Conference of Presidents" — an organization that has an umbrella role and overarching presence in the structure of the Jewish lobby. He states that the main organization within this structure is the AIPAC (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee), which has grown its network within the various branches of government to an extent that the author considers its ability to influence events and policies in Washington unprecedented (Newhouse, 2009). Subsequently, he brings more specific examples to support his argument. For instance, he discusses how AIPAC achieved its goals when, in 1995, the U.S. Congress passed a bill that moved its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem "despite private objections from the government of then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Clinton administration" (Newhouse, 2009, p.5). It is interesting to note — and Newhouse explicitly states this — that "AIPAC characterizes its role

as promoting financial assistance to Israel from the U.S. government, most of this appropriation has become routine and is rarely challenged” (Newhouse,2009 p.5). The author argues that AIPAC instead heavily focuses on justifying Israel's hard power policy towards Palestine — same as its policy on Hezbollah and Iran.

Nevertheless, Newhouse makes an interesting point by saying that despite the current solid position of AIPAC, its future strength is not unequivocal. He supports this by the increase in the number of Jewish Americans who consider the lobby “as a group of largely ethnocentric extremists and oppose its tactics” (Newhouse, 2009, p.5). Moreover, he posits that there is a persistent trend within academia nationwide to consider lobby as “*negative* or *extremely negative*” to U.S. interests (as quoted by Newhouse, 2009, p.5). To explain the strength of the AIPAC, Newhouse makes the following argument:

1. Hard-liners in the Jewish American community are much more persistent in their cause.
2. "A deep fear of Arab intentions still leads many Jews in the United States to be more comfortable with AIPAC's politics" (Newhouse, 2009, p.6).
3. AIPAC is manned by professionals who are considered to have mastered the D.C. way of doing politics.

Newhouse continues the argument by bringing yet another example of how powerful the Jewish lobby is. In March, 2009, the Jewish lobby and its supporters in the U.S. Congress successfully opposed appointing Charles Freeman to the post of chair of the National Intelligence Council. Newhouse praises Freeman as one of “the most widely respected foreign policy analysts who has often taken exception to pro-Israeli policies” (Newhouse, 2009, p.6).

Thus, Freeman states:



“There is a powerful lobby determined to prevent any view other than its own from being aired. ... It is not permitted for anyone in the United States to say so. This is not just a tragedy for Israelis and their neighbors in the Middle East; it is doing widening damage to the national security of the United States” (Newhouse, 2009, p.5).

In the article *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, John Mearshimer and Kenneth Waltz (2007) further explore the issue of the omnipresent Jewish lobby in the U.S. Firstly, they argue that instead of being driven by national interests, the U.S. foreign policy — at least when it comes to the Middle East — is driven by U.S.-Israeli relations. This, the authors claim, has become even more so following the 1967 war (Mearshimer, Waltz, 2007, p.1). The authors agree with Newhouse in thinking that this special relationship “has no equal in American political history” (Mearshimer, Waltz, 2007, p.1). They too recognize that there are various ethnic or other interest groups in the U.S. domestic politics but “no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American national interests would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical” (Ibid, p.1).

Among various benefits that Israel gets because of this ‘special relationship’ (as indicated by scholars of international relations), Israel is referenced as the largest recipient of direct U.S. military and economic assistance on an annual basis. Several authors also mention other benefits that Israel relishes, such as (a) getting its entire foreign aid appropriation at the beginning of each fiscal year as opposed to other recipients that receive aid in quarterly apportionments; (b) the right to spend 25% of its FMF in investing into its own domestic defense industry; (c) complete absence of accountability of spending; (d) U.S. giving \$3 billion to Israel to develop its own armaments, including aircraft, missile systems, etc.; and (e) allowing Israel access to the U.S. military intelligence, something that US NATO allies do not. Clearly, this supports the position

by many that ethnic lobby can directly oppose U.S. national interests. It is appropriate to mention that many analysts raise the question on how the U.S. appears to be completely neutral or not concerned with the Israeli nuclear arsenal (Mearshimer and Waltz, pp.2-3).

Further, other authors present and discuss several points upon which the Jewish lobby has traditionally used in pressing U.S. lawmakers:

1. The notion of Israel being a small state that is surrounded by enemies;
2. Considering that Israel is a democracy, cooperation from the U.S. cannot be denied;
3. Playing the role of a moral victim; and
4. “Virtuous Israelis” versus “Evil Arabs” (Mearshimer and Waltz, 2007, p.11).

With respect to the first notion, authors argue that starting with the establishment of the independent state, Israel has been militarily strong; they claim that it is the military superpower of the Middle East, with an unmatched superiority over its neighbors (Ibid, p.8). Secondly, authors have failed to recognize the association between being a democratic state and getting guarantees through U.S. assistance. Others have argued that the U.S. is a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded as a Jewish state and its citizenship is based on the principle of blood kinship (ibid. p.9). Thirdly, although some authors recognize the fact that the moral crimes committed against the Jews have given them legitimate ground for acquiring their own state, the United States does not have to sustain any special treatment of Israel based on that fact (Ibid, p.11). And lastly, the notion of ‘Virtuous Israelis’ versus ‘Evil Arabs’ (Mearshimer and Waltz, 2007, p.11) is reviewed and the authors conclude that “this ... is yet another myth” (Ibid, p.11).

In line with Newhouse, Mearshimer and Waltz, James McCormick argue that basically the Jewish lobby is by any measure the most powerful and influential lobby nowadays (McCormick, 2008, p.320). Nevertheless, unlike the previous authors, McCormick raises the question as to how the American-Jewish community of 6.2 million has become so powerful. He gives several explanations to this phenomenon.

Firstly, he notes that the Jewish population is heavily represented in such key states (from the electoral perspective) as New York, New Jersey, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, California, Illinois and Ohio. Not only are the Jewish communities large in these areas, they are also politically active, which makes them count during elections (Ibid, p.322).

Secondly, the author notes that “the Jewish community and pro-Israel lobbying groups provide a large amount of campaign funding for congressional and presidential elections” (Ibid, p.322). He goes on arguing that sometimes their support has been crucial for candidates and illustrates this argument by bringing the case of Senators Roger Jepsen (R-IA) and Charles Percy (R-IL) who lost the support of the Israeli lobby and, as a result, were not re-elected, because they had challenged American policy towards Israel.

Thirdly, McCormick elaborates on that point in support of Newhouse, arguing that the AIPAC:

“has an effective and efficient organizational structure operating within Washington, D.C. ... with its large contingent of activists nationwide, AIPAC is well positioned to elicit a grassroots response to the Congress and the executive branch at any time ... has effectively tied itself into the political decision-making network in Washington” (Ibid, p.322).

## **The Armenian Lobby**

Despite the fact that by 1972, the Armenian National Committee of America was the only formal lobbying organization that existed in the U.S. (Gregg, 2002, p.10) and despite the fact that the Armenian lobbying effort in the United States intensified only in 1980s, by then the Armenian-American community had almost 80 years of experience in advancing the Armenian cause. Mark Malkasian (1984) essentially discusses the initial struggle of the Armenian-American Community for the Armenian Cause. He refrains from mentioning any specific moment in time when the Armenian-American political advocacy emerged as such, even though he initially mentions the tremendous importance of the 1915 Armenian Genocide as a point of departure (Malkasian, 1984, p. 349). Instead, he brings a different argument that explains the roots of the Armenian lobbying effort(s) in the United States and the reason why the Armenian cause, to some extent, has enjoyed sympathy in the United States, both by the government and by the public at large. Malkasian begins his assessment with the American missionaries' reviews of the atrocities by the Ottoman empire (Representatives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions reached the Ottoman Empire in 1820), as sympathetic to Christian Armenians while depicting the perpetrators as the "terrible Turk" (Malkasian, 1984, p. 349). He also claims that Armenians have benefited from the American educational programs in the Ottoman Empire (ibid., p. 350).

The Armenian massacres of 1894-1896 in the Ottoman Empire, when up to 200,000 Armenians were slaughtered, were "The American public's first significant occasion to evidence its generosity on behalf of the Armenians. ... A total of \$1.5 million in American charity was distributed by the National Armenian Relief Committee, in cooperation with the American Red Cross"(Grabill, 1971, 19, in Malkasian, 1984, 350).Malkasian argues that it was the 1915 Genocide, though, that gave

true impetus to the Armenian-American community political activities, even though first "The Armenian Relief Committee soon came into existence, and in November 1915 merged with the Persian War Relief Fund and the Syria-Palestine Committee to form the American committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR)"(Malkasian, p.350).

Armenia's coming to existence as an independent, albeit small state in 1918 fuelled the activism of the Armenian-American Community, and Vahan Cardashian, a Yale graduate and a New York lawyer, who was working in the Turkish diplomatic mission in the U.S. resigned as soon as the information about the Genocide was received in America. He then established an organization that would employ the classic techniques of lobbying—the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA) (Malkasian, p. 351). Cardashian essentially employed several important lobbying techniques: he kept correspondence with the State Department, Congress, White House, and individuals. The popularity of the Armenian cause, as argued by Malkasian, started to fade away, as soon as the allies started to realize that the Kemalist armies will take over the Empire and the Sevres Treaty will probably not be sustained; this position essentially prevailed after the Lausanne Treaty of 1923; and even though the organization led by Cardashian failed, it set the stage for the emerging Armenian lobby in the United States. Similarly, Shain and Barth argue that the split among the Diaspora accelerated after Armenia surrendered to the Red Army in 1920:

"Following the genocide and the collapse of the first Armenian Republic in 1920, and throughout the Soviet era (three-fourths of the world's surviving Armenians lived in the former Soviet Union), Armenian diasporic leadership was generally split between the conservative bourgeoisie (whose wealth and political ambition were left intact) and militant intellectuals, urban workers, and former peasant soldiers represented by the Dashnak Party" (Shain, Barth, 2003, p.467).

John Newhouse, for instance, argues that in the 1980s, the lobbyists started “intense lobbying for a Congressional Resolution condemning Turkey” (Newhouse, 2009, p.10). But, even though the recognition of Genocide has been the primary goal of Armenian-Americans since 1915, the end of the eighties brought other issues to take importance. As the Soviet Union entered in its period of stagnation in 1989, this marked economic and political crisis threatening the prospect of an independent Armenia. However, because of the cautious attitude of the U.S. Administration with respect to establishing ties with Soviet republics, Armenian-Americans found themselves in a situation of conflicting loyalties. As Shain puts it:

"Armenian-Americans' initial support of Washington's admonition has resulted in their leaders' loss of their anticipated political role as the navigators of Armenian national life in the former Soviet Armenia. ... This leadership role inside Armenia was expected because of the laborious involvement of leading Armenian organizations in the United State. ... In 1989, when the diaspora's leaders called on the home nation to reach an agreement with Gorbachev without cessation, they were perceived at home as reinforcing the communists' line" (Shain, 1995, p.821).

As a result, the overwhelming defeat of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) in the Armenian presidential elections of October 1991 did not come as a surprise. This was especially humiliating, since the ARF was the ruling party in the first independent republic, 1918-1920 (Ibid, p.821). Afterwards, the leaders fled to Persia, then to France and, during the entire course of their émigré status, they considered themselves "to be the sole legitimate representative of the Armenian nation and retained an independent exile government that occasionally resorted to acts of violence and terrorism" (Shain, Barth, 2003, p.467).

As was noted above, there is an argument for comparison with the Zionist leaders and the Jewish lobby. Norman Berdichevsky (2007) argues that "A historical parallel must have been evident to the Zionist leaders in 1948 when they proclaimed the State of Israel despite warnings

and advice by the U.S. State Department to postpone the action" (Berdichevsky, 2007, p.122). He specifically emphasizes that at the Versailles conference, when the United States proposed to establish a mandate over independent Armenia, the Armenian church globally supported the idea, being perfectly aware of the fact that the new state will eventually be surrounded by predominantly Muslim countries; it would not, at the same time, have any reliable allies in its neighborhood; and thus, establishing a mandate over Armenia would first of all give it some sort of assurance that there would not be a massacre again — something that indeed did not happen in Armenia but took place in Israel (Berdichevsky, 2007, p.122).

Heather Gregg (2002) discusses the creation of the second Armenian lobby organization in the United States, the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA). One of the points she brings out is that its key activists and fundraisers were working with the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) “the largest other anti-ARF organization” (Gregg, 2002, p.10). Gregg henceforth poses the question of an inner-diaspora competition, so to speak, but she concludes that although this competition might have hindered the success of the Armenian lobby, it has resulted in even greater mobilization (explained by the fact that both organizations have almost identical objectives).

Gregg specifically mentions that since the Armenian lobby in the United States is bipartisan, the Congressional Armenian Caucus (in the House of Representatives), established in 1995, “encourages initiatives for Armenia and Armenian issues” (Gregg, 2002, p.18). There is yet another important aspect to this, which is that the Government of Armenia has not ever allocated any sums for the purpose of lobbying on her behalf in Washington, DC. An argument might be made that the reason why the Armenian Diaspora advocates its cause through fund-

raising within the community, Newhouse (2009) argues that “the Armenian community in the United States — concentrated in California, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York ... is surpassed in strength and influence only by the Israel lobby ...” (Newhouse, 2009, p.10).

By contrast, the Government of Turkey relies on investing more and more money into lobbying and so any failure in anti-Turkey action or attempt to adopt a resolution that would recognize the Armenian Genocide would be considered “success” for Turkey. To achieve this objective, the Turkish lobby recruits heavyweight lobby firms, often retired government officials (such as Douglas Feith, a former undersecretary for defense policy, and Richard Perle, former chair of the Defense Policy Board) to increase impact (Newhouse, 2009, p.10).

For the sake of cohesiveness, six primary areas where the Armenian lobby is vocal are reviewed. First, it is the 'crusade' or the concerted action for U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide (1915-1922). As far as this issue is concerned, Gregg argues that both ANCA and AAA have adopted the issue of recognition as a priority agenda item. But, unlike ANCA, the AAA does not raise issues related to claiming territories and/or financial reparations (Gregg, 2002, p.19). This quest for recognition has started since the 1980s and both aforementioned organizations have been working on crafting appropriate legislation (that would condemn and recognize the Armenian Genocide) and getting it adopted. From a technical point of view, although ANCA and AAA have used different tactics for achieving this goal, their combined efforts in the recent past have been impressive. While ANCA practices grassroots mobilization (lobbying on Capitol Hill, as well as in several states at respective state/county levels), AAA



focuses more on lobbying the Congress and “concentrates its efforts on increasing documentation surrounding the Armenian Genocide” (Ibid, p.19).

The second topic of importance is the Nagorno Karabakh issue. ANCA, as well as AAA, actively pursue the issue of recognition and financial assistance for NKR (Gregg, 2002, p.21). Despite the fact that both organizations advocate on behalf of NKR, Gregg argues that ANCA is much more vocal on this issue. ANCA is constantly lobbying the right of the people of Karabakh independence and self-determination. She also links the intense activity of ANCA to the prevailing ARF pursuit for Karabakh arising from the manifestation of the party in Karabakh in 1990s (Gregg, 2002, p.21). Unlike ANCA, the position of AAA on the Karabakh issue is more based on collaboration, including relationship building between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Gregg concludes by stating that “the Assembly’s approach to the Karabakh conflict, therefore, is far less direct than ANCA’s, adopting a cooperative and conciliatory tone towards the issue” (Gregg, 2002, p.21).

The third agenda item of the Armenian lobby is the Freedom Support Act (Section 907). Originally, the Freedom Support Act was passed in 1992 allowing former Soviet states to receive financial and technical assistance from the U.S. Essentially, the Armenian lobby has worked hard to pass Section 907 that prevents Azerbaijan from receiving any assistance from the United States as long as “Azeri hostilities towards Armenians continue and the Azeri blockade against Armenia persists” (Gregg, 2002, p.22). The specifically strong effort was explained earlier, albeit theoretically, by Shain: "By and large, matters concerning the integrity and sovereignty of the ancestral homeland or the safety of the scattered nation are likely to galvanize a more intense diaspora involvement than matters concerning the homeland's domestic political struggles"

(Shain, 1995, p.821). Shain also argues that the Armenian lobby played a major role in Congress's passing of Section 907 (Ibid, p.821). Gregg argues that maintaining Section 907 “is the strongest evidence of the success of the Armenian lobby” (Ibid, p.22). It is further argued that Section 907 has not been lifted — even under heavy campaigning by 14 oil companies, the Turkish Caucus, and pro-Israel lobbies (Gregg, Ibid, p.12). The main aim of these groups is to get Section 907 eliminated for the full implementation of the Silk Road Strategy Act, under which Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states are expected to get support for developing their economy. The rationale behind this is described by Gregg as “balance against Iran, China, and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism” (Gregg, 2002, p.22). However, after the September 11 events, the Congress passed the Foreign Aid Bill (FY 2003) that allowed the president to waive Section 907. Nevertheless, both ANCA and AAA continue to advocate for it. As long as Section 907 impacts Azerbaijan-U.S. relations, Tabib Huseynov notes the following:

“Conflict with Armenia has had a deep impact on the U.S.-Azerbaijan relations and it would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole history of the bilateral relations between the two countries has been obfuscated by the activity of the ethnic Armenian lobby in the USA, which became an influential force in U.S. domestic politics by 1990s” (Huseynov, 2003).

When it comes to reasons why the U.S. Congress passed Section 907, his main argument is built around three points: (1) the ill-defined (overall) policy of the United States towards Azerbaijan; (2) the lack of awareness about Azerbaijan which could have prevented the legislators from passing Section 907; and (3) there were no lobbies/interest groups that could have advocated on behalf of Azerbaijan (and against Armenia) (Huseynov, 2003).Huseynov continues that:

"Adoption of the Section 907 was undoubtedly one of the most significant victories of the Armenian interest groups in the U.S. The Azerbaijanian government, which could get 50-

60 million of aid annually, was deprived from this assistance and Azerbaijan was the only former Soviet Union country to be sanctioned in such a way" (Huseynov, 2003).

It is quite interesting to see that the moral aspect of this blow to Azerbaijan has been a matter of concern to Huseynov. In other words, the exact wording and meaning of the document was much more important than the immediate financial consequences. The basic argument of the author on that matter is that the document turned everything upside down—presenting the Azerbaijanis as aggressors, while the Azerbaijanis kept on saying that it was Azerbaijan that suffered from aggression. Huseynov stresses the fact that the effect of Section 907 has broader implications, since it has created a negative image of Azerbaijan by presenting it as the aggressor (Huseynov, 2003). This matters the most. Section 907 presents the Nagorno Karabakh as an independent polity — while at the same time it was a recognized territory of Azerbaijan — and Huseynov, not without irony, mentions the fact that the United States, too, has recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (Huseynov, 2003). The author discusses yet another trend in US-Azerbaijani relations. The increasing awareness of Azerbaijan in the United States (and, possibly the growing influence of the oil lobby), “the role of the Armenian lobby has been gradually decreasing” (Huseynov, 2003, available at [http://www.stradigma.com/english/june2003/articles\\_04.html](http://www.stradigma.com/english/june2003/articles_04.html)).

The fourth agenda item of the Armenian lobby is safeguarding financial and technical assistance to Armenia. As Gregg puts it, this has been a top priority for both ANCA and AAA (Gregg, 2002, p.23). According to the author, “both ANCA and the Assembly claim credit for securing a minimum of \$90 million to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh annually, earning Armenia the nickname of ‘Israel of the Caucasus’” (Gregg, 2002, p.23).

In line with Gregg's argument, King and Pomper argue that the Armenian lobby has managed to bring Armenia on the list of top U.S. aid recipients (the data are as of 1999). In 1999, the U.S. allocated \$74.3 million to Armenia in foreign assistance, which, as the authors argue, “was more than the combined total of all U.S. foreign assistance given to 43 other nations that also received American dollars in 1999” (King, Pomper, 2004, p.8). The authors note that Armenia's per capita assistance “also ranked in the top ten of all nations, according to the 2001 USAID Loans and Grants “green book”(King, Pomper, 2004,p.9). The top ten per capita recipient nations in 1999 were Israel, Jordan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, West Bank/Gaza, Macedonia, Armenia, Cyprus, Georgia, and Honduras.

## **Chapter 3: Research Methods**

### **3.1 Research Design/methodology**

The research design is qualitative, despite segments of the research that utilize numerical data mostly available through U.S. government websites. Since this research does not utilize a quantitative data collection instrument, the analysis relies mainly on the use of secondary data available through congressional records and other sources, as well as expert interviews, analyzed for content using specific descriptors. Thus the research methodology used primarily comprises content analysis of documents and expert interviews and quantitative analysis of budgetary data covering the past decade, 1993 through 2013.

### **3.2 Data collection instruments**

As stated above, data collection consisted of Internet mining and expert interviews, conducted with various experts, both in the Republic of Armenia and in the United States of America. Various U.S. governmental websites (Government Printing Office, Department of State, Library of Congress, [foreignassistance.gov](http://foreignassistance.gov)) as well as Armenian American community websites (Armenian National Committee of America, Armenian Assembly of America) were mined for information pertaining to the topic.

Experts were selected based on their role or level of awareness of the interrelationships among the different players, including the U.S. Congress, U.S. Congressional Armenian Caucus, RA Government, and the Armenian lobby, including political action committees and cultural and church organizations.

### **3.3 Data Analysis**

As stated earlier, the primary tool used for analyzing the data was content analysis, and the SPSS statistical software. Descriptive statistics, frequencies, and correlations (Pearson's  $r$ ) were used for processing data (including quantitative data derived from content analysis of notes from expert interviews) and interpreting the results in relation to the hypotheses of this research.

### **3.4 Assumptions of the Study**

There were several assumptions at the start of this study. First of all, it was assumed that the Armenian lobby has some sort of influence, as far as the U.S. financial assistance to Armenia is concerned. Secondly, that issues concerning political, economic or any other U.S. assistance to the Nagorno Karabakh (NK) and keeping the Genocide issue on the Congressional agenda are separate and are not a part of a single effort. Thirdly, it was assumed that, by and large, the Government of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian lobbying groups in Washington, D.C., consistently coordinate their actions regarding contacts with the U.S. government on those issues. Fourthly, it was assumed that the Armenian lobby works with the Congressional Armenian Caucus; but there was no assumption that the Caucus also cooperates with the Government of Armenia. It was also assumed that the Armenian lobby would not be able to have much impact on the U.S. Government, absent the influence of the Congressional Armenian Caucus. And lastly, it was assumed that the Armenian lobby probably has more influence on the Legislative branch of the U.S. Government, rather than the Executive branch.

Some of these assumptions were confirmed and others were reworded as a result of the findings from this research. Those will be presented later in Chapter 4.


### **3.5 Limitations of the Study**

There were several limitations to the study, as follows: First, reliance on secondary data on U.S. budget allocations limited the researcher's ability to get more information on the specifics of numbers that would have allowed a better understanding of the differences of budget numbers between the President's budget and the congressional appropriation in any given year. Secondly, there were no records of the petitions and action calls filed by the two major Armenian-American organizations—the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA)—as submitted to Congress. These would have made possible measuring the performance of the Armenian lobby in actual terms. Thus, the research and analysis relied mostly on data collected from expert interviews.

## Chapter 4: Research Findings

The graph below represents the financial assistance to the Republic of Armenia, as far as budget requests and budget appropriations are concerned. It is to be noted that data on the President's budget request to Congress for FY 1993-2000 were not available. Thus, the blue line for those years was reflected at zero. Therefore, the jump between FY 2000 and 2001 is not real.

**Graph 1: Amount budgeted for Armenia in the President's Budget versus the amount appropriated.**




As stated earlier, the data is collected from printed material available at the Government Printing Office, Library of Congress materials, as well as from the Internet [foreignassistance.gov](http://foreignassistance.gov) website (these sources are appropriately listed in the bibliography). Visually, the graph shows that the President's budget request has been lower than the congressional appropriation throughout. In some years, the increase between these two numbers has been significant.



The next graph represents the per capita assistance to Armenia FY 1993-FY 2014 (numbers for FY 2013 and FY 2014 are estimates) the Armenian Statistical Service (ArmStat) population censuses have been used to calculate the graph (the links can be accessed in the bibliography section).

**Graph 2: Per Capita Amount Appropriated for Armenia**



As is shown in the above graph, the U.S. financial assistance to Armenia has declined over the years. Absent details about line item content of budgets, voting patterns at the Committee level, competing budget requests, roll calls, etc., it is not possible to understand the underlying reasons for the decline. Presumably, the change in the country level of development and democratization could have served as reasons for the decrease in the U.S. appropriations to Armenia.

A comparison of the voting patterns of Democrats v. Republicans on each fiscal year's budget appropriation to Armenia could have been revealing from the perspective of respective

preferences along party lines. But, considering that the votes at the Budget Sub-Committee level are unavailable, it is impossible to get data on votes cast in favor or against the appropriation for Armenia given that Budget Committee level votes on the total and not on the Armenia line item, specifically.

However, it is safe to assume that the changes in the budget, rather increases from the President's budget request to the congressional appropriation, are as a result of Sub-Committee level work. Given the U.S. Federal budget process, line item changes are usually made at the Sub-Committee level where budget discussions are more specific and deal with detail. Along those lines, over fifty percent of experts interviewed in this research(both experts from Armenia and the U.S.) indicated that the Armenian lobby has greater influence on the Congressional Budget Sub-Committee. Of the experts who spoke on this particular phenomenon, most underlined the work of the Armenian lobby (without further specification) with Congressional staffers and their relatively higher impact on the Congressional Sub-Committee. Indeed, because at the level of the Sub-Committee staffers conduct detailed analysis of each line item in detail and there is more leeway to make an impact.

Along those lines, experts interviewed also revealed that the Armenian lobby had no influence on the Executive office of the President. This is supported by the fact that almost all the experts interviewed ranked the influence of the Armenian lobby in the Legislative branch as more influential, ranging from high to normal. This is especially meaningful when one considers the relationship between the Congressional Armenian Caucus and the Armenian lobby, as well as the work of U.S. Armenian organizations in general.

Further analysis using SPSS showed a strong positive correlation (Pearson  $r = 0.862$ ) between the effectiveness of the Armenian lobby working through the Armenian Caucus and the overall impact of Armenian Organizations in the Diaspora (including church and cultural organizations). Using a five-point Likert scale, where 5 indicated total agreement and 1 indicated total disagreement, the researched measured the role and effectiveness of the Armenian Caucus in the U.S. Congress.

**Impact of the Armenian Caucus in the U.S. Congress**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Totally disagree or disagree	3	18.8	18.8
	Neither agree nor disagree	4	25.0	43.8
	Agree and totally agree	9	56.3	100.0
	Total	16	100.0	100.0

In comparison, the effectiveness and role of the Armenian diaspora organizations in the U.S. produces the following:

**Impact of Diaspora Organizations**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Totally disagree or disagree	6	37.6	37.6
	Neither agree nor disagree	2	12.5	50.1
	Agree or totally agree	8	49.9	100.0
	Total	16	100.0	100.0

As shown in the tables above, the majority of experts interviewed agreed or totally agreed with the statement that “In effect, the Armenian lobby would not be able to have much impact on the U.S. Government without the Armenian Caucus.” Similarly, the majority of experts either agreed or totally agreed with the statement that "The Armenian Organizations in the Diaspora (including

church and cultural organizations) work through the Armenian Caucus to have any influence on the U.S. Government." Both the correlation coefficient of  $r = 0.862$  (strong correlation) and simply the raw data themselves indicate that Armenians influence the U.S. Congress primarily working through Congressional Armenian Caucus.

Moreover, a strong positive correlation coefficient of 0.921 was found between the following two statements: " The Armenian Caucus has direct contact with the RA government" and " The Armenian Caucus works very closely with the Armenian lobby in D.C."

**The Armenian Lobby Works Closely with the U.S. Congressional Armenian Caucus**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Totally disagree or disagree	1	6.3	6.3	6.3
	Neither agree nor disagree	3	18.8	18.8	25.1
	Agree or totally agree	12	74.9	74.9	100.0
	Total	16	100.0	100.0	

Comparing the above with the table that follows, we find a weaker agreement expressed by respondents on the relationship between the government of the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Caucus. And thus, it is more likely that the RA government works with the Armenian lobby rather than directly with the U.S. Congressional Armenian Caucus. It is quite possible to attribute these responses to a possible lack of awareness or, more likely, that such cooperation exists but is not overt or formal. Further, one of the respondents clearly stated, there are lobbying stipulations under U.S. law that govern or regulate the work of lobbyists and foreign governments, which places the Armenian lobby in Washington, D.C. in a more acceptable position than other official entities.

**The RA Government Works Closely with the U.S. Congressional Armenian Caucus**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Totally disagree or disagree	7	43.8	43.8	43.8
Neither agree nor disagree	8	50.0	50.0	93.8
Agree	1	6.3	6.3	100.0
Total	8	100.0	100.0	

This research also investigates the degree to which the Armenian political action committees (PACs) in the U.S., specifically in Washington D.C. are closely coordinating their actions internally and the extent to which the RA Government works with the Armenian lobby in D.C. to get the attention of the U.S. Congress on issues of significance (including matters other than financial assistance). With respect to the first question, the majority of experts interviewed thought that there is no coordination among the different PACs in Washington, D.C. More specifically, a top expert explicitly mentioned that the inter-party rivalry (among the Dashnaks and the non-Dashnaks) is the biggest barrier to Armenians' potential power and ability to maximize impact. This expert stated that "the rivalry goes as far as dividing the Armenian Revolutionary Party (Dashnak party) itself."

However, all the experts interviewed agreed that when it comes to 'strategic' decisions, the lobby is more or less united. Along those lines, a former Armenian Ambassador to the U.S. expressed that "Armenian advocacy groups speak in one voice only on issues of strategic importance. Sometimes this happens at the request and support of the Armenian government."

With respect to the latter question (whether or not the Armenian Government works with the Armenian lobby in D.C. to get the attention of the U.S. government on certain issues not only

limited to financial assistance), the overwhelming majority of experts interviewed were in agreement, although some had minor reservations. A top expert stated that the level of cooperation is not satisfactory and much more can be done, explaining that the level of cooperation largely depends on the specific issue. Moreover, as it was mentioned above, one of the respondents explicitly mentioned that there are strict lobbying regulations that deal with the level of cooperation between the U.S. Congress and foreign governments and the lobbying groups inside the United States.

Further analysis of these two questions was necessary, and revealed a strong negative correlation of  $r = -0.645$  between the question of cooperation of the Armenian lobby and the RA government as it relates to the question whether or not the Armenian lobby is represented in a single voice. Below is the table showing the attitude of respondents to the matter of the Armenian lobby being unified in principle. This type of strong negative correlation coefficient is explained by the fact that the respondents were unanimous on the lack of the Armenian lobbyists maintaining a single front and speaking in one voice, and also being unanimous on the question measuring the extent to which the Armenian government works closely with the U.S. Congressional Armenian Caucus.

**The Armenian lobby being represented in a single voice**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid yes	4	25.0	28.6	28.6
Valid no	10	62.5	71.4	100.0
Total	14	87.5	100.0	
Missing System	2	12.5		
Total	16	100.0		

Nevertheless, the positions of the experts suggest that even though the Armenian lobby is generally quite influential in the U.S. Legislative branch, and more specifically, at the level of the Congressional Budget Sub-Committee; and considering that the Armenian lobby is more or less united on Armenian issues of greater national importance and the Government of Armenia coordinates its actions with the Armenian lobby, the U.S. financial assistance to Armenia has decreased over the years. In the view of top experts, although the outcome of the Armenian lobby's performance on financial assistance to Armenia has not been impressive in recent years, it is to be noted that the decrease in the U.S. Budget Appropriation to Armenia is linked to issues unrelated to Armenia or U.S.-Armenia relations.


However, the issue of financial assistance is not the only or the most important target of the Armenian lobby in the U.S. Two issues of utmost importance for Armenians everywhere are also on the agenda of the Armenian lobby in Washington. First and foremost is the issue of recognition of the Armenian Genocide of 1915; second, is the issue of financial assistance to the Nagorno Karabakh Republic together with preserving parity in security funding for Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On the issue of the Armenian Genocide, only one of the experts interviewed disagreed with the statement that "The Armenian lobby in D.C. has been effective in keeping the Armenian Genocide issue on the Congressional agenda." Furthermore, almost all of the interviewed experts and officials agreed that the Armenian lobby works with other ethnic lobbying groups to increase its negotiating power on the Genocide issue.

A former Armenian Ambassador to the U.S. underlined that the Armenian PACs work closely with the Greek lobby and cooperate with the Hellenic Caucus in the U.S. Congress,

although this cooperation may have changed in more recent years with cooperation also with the Jewish World Watch, the American Hellenic Institute, and Kurdish PAC.

### Funds budgeted to the NKR, 1998-2012



Source: Jim Nichol, *Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interest*, Congressional Research Service, 2013, retrieved from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf>, May 18th, 2013

With respect to the latter, it must be noted that the analysis of appropriation acts and budget fact sheets<sup>2</sup> show that since 2003 (the year Azerbaijan became eligible for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET), the parity has been preserved and it can be safely stated that the Armenian lobby has by far managed to secure adequate military financing.

<sup>2</sup> These include all the appropriation acts and bills, that are listed in the bibliography, and the Department of State fact sheets, as listed in the bibliography.



## **Chapter 5: Conclusions, Discussion, and Suggestions for Future Research**

### **5.1 Summary**

Summarizing the main findings, it must be mentioned that

The study reveals that there is a strong negative correlation existing between the FREEDOM Support Act Section 907 waiver and allocations of financial assistance to Nagorno Karabakh. From 1993 to 2001, Section 901 has not been waived. After 9/11, when the U.S. began the global war against terrorism, the first waiver was introduced and has become a continuing resolution since. One of the primary goals of the Armenian-American Community for the past 22 years has been to preserve military parity between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The analysis showed that the Armenian lobby has by far managed to secure adequate military financing along those lines.

### **5.2: Conclusion**

In line with the discussion above, 87.5 percent of the experts interviewed were strong in their statement that the Armenian lobby was instrumental in securing U.S. funding for Armenia. This further strengthens the impact of the Armenian lobby vis-à-vis its work with the U.S. Congress on issues of significance to Armenia and Armenians. On the basis, of the analysis completed,

H1: The Armenian lobby is successful in getting U.S. funding for Armenia — is accepted;

Ho: The Armenian lobby is not successful in getting U.S. funding for Armenia — is rejected.

H2: The Armenian lobby is successful in keeping the Armenian genocide resolution on the U.S. Congress' agenda—is accepted;

Ho: The Armenian lobby is not successful in keeping the Armenian genocide resolution on the U.S. Congress' agenda— is rejected.

This essay was limited to the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S. focusing on the patterns and achievements of its political lobby, including impact on U.S. foreign policy specifically concerning budget appropriations, keeping the Genocide issue on the Congressional Agenda, security and funding issues related to Nagorno Karabakh. Despite the fact that the Armenian lobby in the U.S. spends considerable time and financial resources on other issues on its political agenda, those are of primary importance to the Armenian people. But the limitations of this essay did not allow expansion of the research into other areas and activities. What this essay revealed, though, was that the Armenian lobby is doing its best (a) to secure financial assistance for Armenia in U.S. Budget Appropriations; (b) to keep the Genocide issue on the Congressional agenda; and (c) to secure military parity with Azerbaijan or financially assisting Nagorno Karabakh.

### **5.3: Suggestions for Future Research**

As it has already been mentioned, because of the limitations of this essay, many more issues in the topic were not explored. More specifically, the issues of the Genocide Recognition are not only limited to its presence on the Congressional Agenda and the Armenian lobby's activities to keep it there. The counter-measures of the Turkish lobby and other interest/lobbying

groups, opposing the recognition for different reasons, could be researched. One question to pose could certainly be whether or not the Genocide Recognition would be a blow to the U.S. National Security, as far as Turkey, a NATO ally of the U.S., is concerned. The reluctance of the U.S. arms and munitions manufacturers and exporters is another issue worth looking into.

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

Ambrosio, T., & Shain, Y. *Diaspora Communities: Influencing U.S. Foreign Policy*, drafted by Channa Threat, June 23, 2003.

Berdichevsky, N. Parallel Zionisms: Chinese, Greek, Armenian, and Hungarian Parallels of Nationhood, Diaspora, Genocide, Exile, Partition, and Aliya *World Affairs*, Vol. 169, No. 3 (Winter 2007), pp. 119-123, World Affairs Institute, retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672763> November 9th, 2013

Bill Maher, (02 01 2013), HBO: Real Time With Bill Maher, Episode 270, accessed at <http://www.hbo.com/real-time-with-bill-maher/episodes#/real-time-with-bill-maher/episodes/0/270-episode/video/clip-chuck-hagels-hearing.html/eNrjcmBOYM5nLITPz0lxzEvMqSzJTA5ITE-1S8xN1SzLTEnNh4k65+eVpFaUcDIyskknlpbkF+QkVtqWFJWmsjGyMQIAUKwXOA==>, April 25th, 2013

Britannica Online Encyclopedia, *Diaspora*, at [www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/161756/Diaspora](http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/161756/Diaspora)

Conference Report 106-339, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-106hrpt339/pdf/CRPT-106hrpt339.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1999, Government Printing Service, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ113/pdf/PLAW-106publ113.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ7/pdf/PLAW-108publ7.pdf>, April 20th, 2013

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ199/pdf/PLAW-108publ199.pdf>, April 20th, 2013

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ447/pdf/PLAW-108publ447.pdf>, April 20th, 2013

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995, Government Printing Service , retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hr4426enr/pdf/BILLS-103hr4426enr.pdf>, April 20th, 2013

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Government Printing Service, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ107/pdf/PLAW-104publ107.pdf>, April 20th, 2013

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Government Printing Service, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ118/pdf/PLAW-105publ118.pdf>, April 20th, 2013

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations, 2001, Government Printing Service, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ429/pdf/PLAW-106publ429.pdf>, April 20th, 2013

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002, Government Printing Service, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ115/pdf/PLAW-107publ115.pdf>, April 20th, 2013

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill 2006, Government Printing Office, retrieved at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109hrpt152/pdf/CRPT-109hrpt152.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill 2007, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109hrpt486/pdf/CRPT-109hrpt486.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ102/pdf/PLAW-109publ102.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2007, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109hrpt486/pdf/CRPT-109hrpt486.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2006, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109hrpt152/pdf/CRPT-109hrpt152.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2005, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt599/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt599.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2004, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt222/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt222.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2003, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-107hrpt663/pdf/CRPT-107hrpt663.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2002, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-107hrpt142/pdf/CRPT-107hrpt142.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2000, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-106hrpt720/pdf/CRPT-106hrpt720.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1999, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt719/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt719.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1998, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt176/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt176.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1997, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt600/pdf/CRPT-104hrpt600.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 1996, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt143/pdf/CRPT-104hrpt143.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Grabill, J.L., *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 19, as quoted in Mark Malkasian, *The Disintegration of the Armenian Cause in the United States, 1918-1927*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), pp. 349-365. Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/163045> .Accessed: November 9th, 2013

Gregg, H.S., *Divided They Conquer: The Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the United States*, *Rosemarie Rogers Working Papers*, Working Paper #13, MIT, August 2002, retrieved from

Green G. (2012 10 26), *On Waiving Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act*, Project Vote Smart, retrieved from <http://votesmart.org/public-statement/754717/#.UrHvKfQW2zl>, April 20th, 2013

Huseynov, Tabib, *Influencing American Foreign Policy: A Case on Ethnic versus National Interests*, *stradigma.com*, Issue 5, June 2003

JSTOR International Journal, Vol 63, No 1 (Winter, 2007-2008), pp. 3-20. Policymakers IOM Migration Research Series Paper No. 26, International Organization for Migration, 2006.

King, D. & Pomper, M., The U.S. Congress and the Contingent Influence of Diaspora Lobbies: Lessons from U.S. Policy Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan, *Journal of Armenian Studies* (VIII, 1), Summer 2004.

Malkasian, M., The Disintegration of the Armenian Cause in the United States, 1918-1927, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), pp. 349-365. Published by: Cambridge University Press, retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/163045> , November 9th, 2013

McCormick, J.M., *Ethnic Interest Groups and American Foreign Policy: A Growing Influence?*, Interest Group Politics, Eight Edition, by Allan Cigler, Burdett Loomis, University of Kansas. Sage UK, 2012.

Mearsheimer, J.J. & Walt, (2007), *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*. London: Penguin

National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia (2001) Changes in the Numbers of De Facto and De Jure Population (Urban, Rural) of Armenia by Sex, according to the Data of 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989, 2001 Censuses, retrieved from <http://docs.armstat.am/census/pdfs/13.pdf>, April 20th, 2013

National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia (2011), The Preliminary Results Of 2011 Census Of The RA, retrieved from <http://www.armstat.am/en/?nid=451>, April 20th, 2013

Newhouse, J. Diplomacy, Inc. The influence of lobbies on U.S. Foreign Policy, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2009

Nichol, J. (2013), *Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interest*, Congressional Research Service, retrieved from <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf>, May 18th, 2013

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 482 , retrieved from, <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1995/roll482.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 208, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1994/roll208.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 240, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1993/roll240.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 250, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2006/roll250.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 228 , retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1996/roll228.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 362, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1999/roll362.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 449, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/roll449.xml>, April 20th 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 400, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2000/roll400.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 266, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2001/roll266.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 429, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/roll429.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 335, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/roll335.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 335, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/roll335.xml>, April 20th, 2013

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 032, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/roll032.xml>, April 20th, 2013 (2003 )

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 564, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll564.xml>, April 20th, 2013

Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll Call 364, retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1997/roll364.xml>, April 20th, 2013.

Public Law 105–277—Oct. 21, 1998, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ277/pdf/PLAW-105publ277.pdf>, April 20th, 2013.

Public Law 104–208, 1996, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ208/pdf/PLAW-104publ208.pdf>, April 20th, 2013



Requests and Appropriations for FY 2008-2014 were accessed at ForeignAssistance.gov, <http://foreignassistance.gov>, March 9th, 2013.

Safran W. (1991) *Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return* *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*.

Shain, Y. Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 109, No. 5 (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 811-841, retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152533>, November 9th, 2013

Shain, Y., & Barth, A., Diasporas and International Relations Theory, *International Organization*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Summer, 2003), pp. 449-479 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Organization Foundation, retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3594834> November 9th, 2013.

Shain, Y., Multicultural Foreign Policy, *Foreign Policy*, No. 100, 25th Anniversary Issue (Autumn, 1995), pp. 69-87. Published by: Washington Post. Newsweek Interactive, LLC, retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149304> November 9th, 2013

State, Foreign Operation, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2010, Government Printing Office, retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt187/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt187.pdf>, May 18th, 2013

State, Foreign Operation, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2013, Government Printing Office, retrieved from, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt494/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt494.pdf>, May 18th, 2013.

The Free Dictionary, Lobbying, accessed at <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Lobbying>, April 20th, 2013

United States Department of State, Foreign Military Financing Account Summary, retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm>, May 18th, 2013

## Annex 1

### The Interview Questionnaire

1. To the best of your knowledge, what (kind) of lobbying approaches does the Armenian lobby utilize? (In responding to this question, rank-order all of the items that follow from the perspective of impact/effectiveness.)

- Letter-writing
- Leaflets
- Postcards
- Posters
- Petitions
- Other (please, specify) \_\_\_\_\_

2. At what level of the U.S. government do you think the Armenian lobby has had greater success and higher impact?

- The Executive Office of the President
- Congressional Budget Committee
- Budget Sub-Committee
- Congressional staffers
- Other \_\_\_\_\_ (Please specify)

3. In your opinion, are the Armenian political advocacy groups in Washington DC represented in a single voice by way of closely coordinating their actions?

- Yes
- No
- If other, please, specify

4. On scale where 1 is very influential and 9 is not influential at all, is the Armenian lobby more influential in the Legislative or Executive branch of the U.S. government?

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

1      2      3      4      5      6      7      8      9

6. On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is totally disagree; 2 is disagree; 3 neither agree nor disagree; 4 is agree; and 5 is totally agree, please rate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements defining the relationship between the Armenian lobby, other Armenian organizations, the RA government, and the Congressional Armenian Caucus:

The Armenian Caucus works very closely with the Armenian lobby in D.C.

The Armenian Caucus has direct contact with the RA government

The Armenian Caucus relies heavily on documents/resources (other than monetary) that could originate from either the RA government or the Armenian lobby groups

Effectively, the Armenian lobby would not be able to have much impact on the U.S. government without the Armenian Caucus

The Armenian organizations in the Diaspora (including church and cultural organizations) work through the Armenian Caucus to have any influence on the U.S. government

7.1. Does the Armenian lobby work with other ethnic lobbying groups to increase its negotiating power on the Genocide issue?

Yes

No

If other, please, specify \_\_\_\_\_

7.2. If yes, with which lobbying groups does the Armenian lobby specifically cooperate?

---



---



---



---



---

8. Does the RA Government work with the Armenian lobby in Washington D.C. to get the attention of the U.S. Government on an issue?

Yes

No

If other, please, specify \_\_\_\_\_

9. Does the Armenian Embassy in the U.S. work more closely with the Armenian lobby groups than any U.S. government entirely?

Yes

No

If other, please, specify \_\_\_\_\_

10. The following statements pertain to the degree of effectiveness of the Armenian lobby with respect to various issues. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement, where 1 to 5, where 1 is totally disagree; 2 is disagree; 3 neither agree nor disagree; 4 is agree; and 5 is totally agree

The Armenian lobby in D.C. has been instrumental in securing U.S. financial assistance to the Republic of Armenia on a consistent/continuous basis

The Armenian lobby in D.C. has been effective in keeping the Armenian Genocide issue on the Congressional Agenda

The Armenian lobby in D.C. has been effecting in securing parity in security funding of Armenia and Azerbaijan

The Armenian lobby in D.C. has had a crucial role in supporting, financially or otherwise, the Nagorno Karabakh