

Turkey's EU Integration Perspectives: Implications for the South Caucasus

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Abstract

This study is trying to analyze the issues associated with the Republic of Turkey's integration in the European Union (EU) and how those issues influence the process of the integration. Turkey's accession would be analyzed from the beginning of negotiations between Turkey and the European Union. One of the main parts of this study will analyze the Copenhagen Criteria, before, during and after Turkey's accession in the European Union and how its accession will influence the South Caucasian region. However, before the accession, Turkey as a country needs to overcome challenges that are facing now.

First, this study will briefly analyze negotiations with the two actors, Turkey and EU; what challenges Turkey was facing in the beginning of the negotiations and what challenges are being faced now. The other part would be devoted to find out the external and internal factors that Turkey is trying to solve and its "zero-problems with neighbors" policy.

The fact that Turkey's accession into the European Union lasted this long and the fact that it has closed borders with Armenia makes this topic interesting to do research on it. The European Union and South Caucasus region are interested in this process because it will change the dynamic of the region. It is worth to mention that the United States of America and Russian Federation have a huge impact on this process. For understanding this topic, document analysis would be needed to analyze official documents. Document analysis is considered as a objective, systematic and quantitative description, which will aid in explaining concepts that will be needed for this study.

Introduction

In 1959 Turkey applied to the European Economic Community (EEC), half century has passed since then its opinions and views about this integration are varying and opposing. In 1959 the EEC had only six members, while now it has 27 members, besides the structure was changed significantly. After the 1963 Ankara Agreement between the EEC and Turkey, it was clear that Turkey sees its future with the European Community, which will help them to benefit both economically and politically.

Though, Turkey's aspiration to be granted a full membership from the European Union, the latter is discussing how beneficial would be to integrate Turkey into their community. Turkey has domestic and external problems and is faced by challenges, which are linked to its issues. One of the internal problems that Turkey is facing now, are: human rights, minority issues, mainly the Kurdish issue, judicial and political sphere are corrupted and military intervention in Turkey are visible. In spite of its determination to become a full member of the EU, Turkey still occupies 37% of Cyprus's territory. Turkey also has problems with its neighbor, mainly Armenia. First, it does not recognize the Armenian Genocide, which was committed by the Ottoman Empire. Also, both countries do not have any diplomatic relations, and in 1993, Turkey sealed its borders with Armenia, because of the Nagorno Karabakh war, which was between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is considered Turkey's brother-state and during the war Turkey wanted to intimidate Armenia by blockade. Even now, the Armenian-Turkish border is closed.

Since 1990s and 2000s, with the enlargement of the EU and due to structure changes, disagreement in the EU to Turkey's full membership enlarged significantly, mainly because of the lack of human rights and democracy in Turkey. Economic problems that Turkey is facing now are a concern for the EU countries, as well as the non-European mentality,

culturally and religiously. The EU's center-left think that if Turkey meets with all criteria that is set by the European Community, there should not be any problem with its accession, even if Turkey's mentality is different from the European. The center-left European groups are more skeptical towards Turkey with the thinking that Turkey will never meet all the criteria. The Turkish government will bring with its membership, its problems and those problems will become involuntarily Europe's problems too. Without solving the Cyprus issue, who is part of the European Union, Turkey will have difficulties to have normal discussions within the EU. Many intellectuals in Turkey think that the EU is not coherent towards Turkey and subjective in the case of the Cyprus issue, as well as in the PKK terror in Turkey, lastly in the case of the 1915 Armenian problem. Hence, the willingness to join the EU decreased in Turkey. This was the longest process of the integration of one country, fifty years have passed since the 1963 Ankara Agreement and it seems Turkey's full membership into the EU looks more complex than ever.

For centuries, the South Caucasus has been transition region for the transportation and energy routes between North-South and East-West Eurasia. This role continues progressively. Hence, the South Caucasus has a growing importance for the EU. Turkey would be the direct way to connect with the South Caucasian region. Security, stability, democracy, human rights, security of energy supply, prevent illegal migration from the South Caucasian region to the EU are the main priorities for the EU's foreign policy towards this region. Through Turkey, oil and gas from the Caspian region, could be imported in the shortest way to EU countries, which will help to diversify energy sector of the EU.

Thy hypotheses of this study are:

H₁: The Armenian –Turkish relations influence the process of Turkey's integration in the European Union.

H₂: The Cyprus issue between Greece and Turkey is one of the main issues acting as a

barrier for the accession of Turkey in the EU.

H₃: The South Caucasian region will benefit from Turkey's full membership of Europe.

Research questions are:

RQ₁: How does the Armenian-Turkish relations influence the process of Turkey's integration in the European Union?

RQ₂: Is the Cyprus issue acting as one of the main barriers for Turkey's EU accession?

RQ₃: Will the South Caucasian region benefit from Turkey's full EU membership?

Although this research was carefully prepared, there were some limitations. First of all time, given short time to do research on this study and second, space, due to the closed Armenian-Turkish border, since field research in Turkey would give a better understanding of attitudes regarding the issue.

Literature Review

This paper will try to explore the issues regarding Turkish accession into the European Union. Turkey's gaining full membership from the European Union (EU) will bring both advantages and disadvantages for the EU. There are some holdups for Turkey becoming a member; such as it has issues with its neighbors and Turkey's human rights issues. If Turkey becomes a member, it will be the first Muslim country becoming part of the European community. As was mentioned by Cidom Ustun, Turkey as a country was facing difficulties because it was a Muslim country, and with an aspiration of becoming part of the European Union. Turkey tried to find allies in the region and be part of some community that will help its country to progress.¹

In 1959 the Turkish membership process to the European Union has started, however only in recently Turkey is considered for full membership. During those years Democratic Party, which was a center-right party, was in power and Adnen Menderes was Prime Minister. However in 1960 the military intervention occurred in Turkey and after that negotiations with the EEC were delayed. After two years, in 1962, EU gave Turkey associate membership status and there was a possibility of full membership.² From the beginning of the process, there have been many talks, reports and information that were discussing Turkey's membership and its advantages and disadvantages. Katinka Barysh and Subidev Togan think that the EU granting Turkey a full membership would be beneficial, while Lucy Jones and Arthur Bonner lean towards being against.

Ufuk Ulutas is stating that from the beginning of the early 2000s the Turkish foreign policy tries to have "zero-problem-with-neighbors" policy, which mainly aims to minimize

¹ Cigdem Ustun, "Europeanization of foreign policy: the case of Turkish Foreign policy towards the Black Sea region," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 10, no. 02 (2010): 225-242,

² Gencer Hic Aysen. "The Evolution of Turkish-EU relations and an Evaluation of its Future ." no. 3 (2010).

any problems that Turkey has with its neighbors. Some analysts, who are doing research about Turkey, consider that it achieved noteworthy progress in pursuing this policy during 2009.³ Katinka Barysh adds that Ankara has also taken the initiative to mediate long-standing conflicts in the region as much as possible, naturally in a diplomatic way. Business with its neighbors has been flourishing starting from the last decade. Turkey's policy is trying to spread stability in the region, which starts with their zero-problem with neighbors' policy.⁴

While Katinka Barysh, Subidev Togan and Ufuk Ulutas stated and views Turkey's accession into the EU beneficial, Lucy Jones of the European Press Review specified, "Turkey could become a bottomless pit into which billions will be poured without the economy getting on its feet."⁵ Moreover, she added that Turkey will never achieve the criteria set for Turkey and indeed it will be a waster of EU's funds. A more favorable view is of Katinka Barysch of the Centre for European Reform stated "Turkish integration has more economic benefits for the EU, than costs. Turkey is one of the fastest growing economies...If the EU fails to solve its problems, the Union in 2010 will be gridlocked, slow-growing, an inward looking and unwelcoming there is no reason why Turkey should want to join such a club."⁶ Moreover, she added that Turkey has already fulfills with the EU's criteria on democracy, minority rights and the rule of law. As one might know Turkey needs to comply with the three accession criteria, where one is political, one is related to economy and the last one *acquis communautaire*.⁷

Even though the European Commission is an important actor of making the decision whether or not Turkey could be part of the EU, there is the other fact; the other European

³ Ufuk Ulutas. "Turkish Foreign Policy in 2009: A year of Pro-activity," *Insight Turkey*, 12, no. 1 (2010): 1-12,

⁴ Katinka Barysch. "Can Turkey combine EU accession and regional leadership?." *Centre for European Reform*. (2010).

⁵ Lucy Jones. "Washington Report on Middle East Affairs | Telling the truth for more than 30 years - European Press Review." *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs | Telling the truth for more than 30 years - April 2013 Issue*. Accessed May 15, 2013. <http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/272-washington-report-archives-2000-2005/march-2005/8591-european-press-review.html>.

⁶ Katinka Barysch. "The Economics of Turkish accession." *Center for European Reform* 27 (2005), p.8

⁷ *ibid*

countries need to approve Turkey's integration. Even though from the first sight it may seem that the accession of Turkey and the enlargement will be beneficial for the EU overall, but it is not that simple. Europeans and many politicians think that by the enlargement of the EU, EU will face such problems as "the loss of jobs, the threat of terrorism and the weakening of the national culture". All of these may weaken EU.⁸

Turkey's and EU relations had a different perspective during the 90s. During the Helsinki European Council meeting, which was held in December 1999, specified that:

"Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European Strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms."⁹

During those years it was clearly stated that EU saw Turkey part of the EU, and after that meeting, Turkey should have reported its progress and after reviewing that progress, the EU will finalize their decision.¹⁰ After making that decision EU's Commission closely reported Turkey's progress starting from 1998. To discuss future relations with Turkey, negotiations were held in December 2004, between the European Council and Turkey. During those talks the Council affirmed that Turkey is progressing towards the European standards and is meeting with the Copenhagen criteria.¹¹ The Copenhagen criteria are considered one of the ways to become EU state. Candidates are anticipated to show "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities"; also the candidate countries must have a stable economy, which can face future problems and be economically at the same level as the other EU countries. This process is done step-by step, when the aspirant country meets with the first condition, it

⁸ Katinka Barysch, "Can Turkey combine EU accession and regional leadership?," *Centre for European Reform* (2010),

⁹ European Union Report, "Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession" (2003), p 4

¹⁰ European Union Report. "Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession." (2003).

¹¹ Commission Staff, "European Neighborhood Policy " (2005),

proceeds to the next level.¹² However, the Copenhagen criterion suggests of limiting the military force, but as one might know Turkey has one of the biggest military forces in the NATO and the region. And many years the military was the head of the Turkish government, thus making it one of the important actors. While concentrating on bettering the military, other spheres, such as political and legal institutions suffer.¹³ Elisabeth Johansson-Nogues and Ann-Kristin Jonasson stated that the EU is acting as a ‘catalyst’ and that “we contend that the internal dimension of the Turkish democratization efforts is much more important than it is usually given credit for in academic analysis.”¹⁴

Though some analysts and researchers state that granting Turkey full membership would be beneficial, the Commission has acknowledged several issues that Turkey will bring with its accession, such as:

- Combined impact of Turkey’s population, size, economic, security and military potential, religious and cultural characteristics
- Turkey’s on-going radical change
- A lower middle income country¹⁵

Turkey’s full membership into the EU would influence the South Caucasian region too. Dr. Haydar states that the integration of Turkey might help the South Caucasian region and after EU granting Turkey a full membership, through Turkey EU may deepen its relations with the South Caucasian countries. After the independence of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, EU developed economic and trade relations with those countries and supports their efforts to resolve all of the issues that exist in the region. EU is interested in

¹² Baken Saatcioglu. "How Closely the European Union’s Membership Conditionally Reflect the Copenhagen Criteria? Insights from Turkey." *Turkish Studies*. no. 4 (2009): 559-576.

¹³ Ersin Kusdil, and Sefa Simsek, "The Importance of Values in predicting Turkish youth’s opinions about the European Union in light of the Copenhagen Political Criteria ," *International Journal of Psychology*, 43, no. 6 (2008): 98-996,

¹⁴ Johansson-Nogues Elisabeth, and Ann-Kristin Jonasson. "Turkey, Its Changing National Identity and EU Accession: Explaining the Ups and Downs in the Turkish Democratization Reforms." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 19, no. 1 (2011): 113-132.

¹⁵ Commission Staff. "Issues arising from Turkey’s Membership Perspective." (2004):

resolving all of those issues. Through the cooperation with the EU and the South Caucasian countries, stability may follow. Noticeably, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are part of the EU's European Neighborhood policy from 2004.¹⁶

From the beginning of the early 2000s the Turkish foreign policy tries to have “zero-problem-with-neighbors” policy, which aims to minimize any problems that Turkey has with its neighbors. Ufuk Ulutas in his research states that Turkey achieved remarkable progress in pursuing this policy during 2009.¹⁷ Ankara has also taken the initiative to mediate long-standing conflicts in the region as much as possible, in a diplomatic way. Business with its neighbors has been flourishing starting from the last decade. Katinka Barysch adds that Turkey's policy is trying to spread stability in the region, which starts with their zero-problem with neighbors' policy.¹⁸ From the beginning of its existence as a state in 1923, Turkey is facing with external and internal difficulties. Those issues are because of the fact that Turkey as a Muslim country tries to be part of the European union. The active question of Turkish identity has already been upraised, most intensely through the legislative attempt to adjust Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which forbids statements determined to insult Turkish identity, the Turkish state or its institutions.¹⁹ The Turkish Penal Code (TPC), also known as Article 301, had widely discussed both on national and international levels. One of the highlights of the Article is that a person who degrades Turkey or “the Government of the republic of Turkey, or the grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be sentenced a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and two year”.²⁰ Another concern was a freedom of speech, by this article it is clearly stated that whoever does not agree with the Turkish

¹⁶ Haydar Efe. "Foreign Policy of the European Union towards the South Caucasus." *International Journal of Business and Social Science*. no. 17 (2012).

¹⁷ Ufuk Ulutas, "Turkish Foreign Policy in 2009: A year of Pro-activity," *Insight Turkey*, 12, no. 1 (2010): 1-12,

¹⁸ Katinka Barysch. "Can Turkey combine EU accession and regional leadership?." *Centre for European Reform*. (2010).

¹⁹ Richard Giragosian, "Redefining Turkey's Strategic Orientation," 6, no. 4 (2008): 33-40,

²⁰ Bulgen Algan. "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression in Turkey." *German Law Journal*. no. 12 (2008).

Government or any decision that is made by the Government will face imprisonment. Dr. Algan in his research enhances that the Turkish Penal code may influence the process of negotiations between Turkey and the European Union. It might not have a direct connection, but that code certainly prohibits freedom of speech, which is an important factor for the European Union.²¹ If Turkey wants to be part of the EU they need to be more democratic than they are now.

On 1 May 2004, after the enlargement of the European Union, EU tried to find new ways to deepen its relations with neighbor's countries to the South and to the East. The Union seeks ways to promote peaceful resolution, promoting security, prosperity and, of course, stability. With the free trade the EU will stabilize economy of its neighbors. However, both the EU and countries that are seeking EU's funding, partnership and help should aspire to have the same-shared values as EU. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) sets aspiring objectives for partnership with neighboring countries based on commitments key foreign policy objectives and political, institutional and economic reforms. Partner countries are highly supported by the EU to have closer political, economic and cultural relations with the EU, improving cooperation and to share responsibility in conflict prevention and peaceful resolution.²²

Turkey wants to have a peaceful region; of course it could be achieved only through not having problems with its neighbors. It could be a hard task, since Turkey has a lot of issues in the region, particularly with Armenia, Cyprus, the Kurdish issue and issues that are more internal.²³

Those problems started in different centuries, for example in April 1993 Turkey closed its borders with Armenia and refused to have any diplomatic relations with Armenia,

²¹ Bulgen Algan. "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression in Turkey." *German Law Journal*. no. 12 (2008).

²² Commission Staff, "European Neighborhood Policy." (2005).

²³ Ufuk Ulutas . "Turkish Foreign Policy in 2009: A year of Pro-activity." *Insight Turkey*. no. 1 (2010): 1-12.

one of the problems of closing the border was the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even though Armenians and Turkish people had problems long ago, starting from 1915, when Turks killed 1.5mln Armenians in Western Armenia. As it comes Nagorno Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan was/is considered as a “brother” state for Turkey. The Armenian-Turkish closed borders worsened the Armenian economy more than the Turkish economy. Dr. Nathalie Tocci complements the fact that both countries’ economy was influenced by this action, since both Turkey and Armenian could have become regional partners and will have many beneficial effects on the wider region, covering the Black sea, Iran, Russia and Central Asia. Moreover, the opening would greatly contribute healthier environment for the region, step by step the tension in the region will fade away, and for the long-term stability and peace in the broader region.²⁴

Though Armenia does not set forth any preconditions for Turkey, Turkey has three preconditions, which Armenia recognizing the borders of Turkey, to end the occupation of Azerbaijani territories and to stop situating the events of 1915. According to Sedat Laçiner “these requests are both quite easy to fulfill and based on the basic principles of the UN, NATO and the EU, namely, respect for borders and the unchangeableness of borders through violence”.²⁵ Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan in his statement emphasizes “the Genocide is important, we do not waive our claim for its recognition...we agree to open the borders without preconditions.”²⁶ Ufuk Ulutas argues that the zero-problems with neighbors’ policy gave Turkey a different perspective to try to solve the existing problems. After implementing that policy Turkey signed a protocol with Armenia, which was signed “by Foreign Minister Davutoglu and his Armenian counterpart Eduard Nalbandian in Zurich on October 10,

²⁴ Nathalie Tocci, Burcu Gultekin-Punsmann, Simao Licinia, and Nicolas Tavitian, "The Closed Armenia-Turkey Border: Economic and Social Effects, Including those on People: and the Implications for the Overall Situation in the Region" (2007),

²⁵ Laçiner Sedat, Mehmet Özcan, and İhsan Bal. *European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey's Membership on the European Union*. Ankara, Turkey: International Strategic Research Organization, 2005, p 69.

²⁶ Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan. "Armenia and the Caucasus: Crossroads or Dead End?" (2008), p. 46

2009".²⁷ This was considered as a step forward to better the relations and have a stable atmosphere in the region.²⁸

Not only Turkey wants to have zero-problems with its neighbors, but also to secure energy sector in the region, which has an important role not only for Turkey but also for Europe. Energy security is important for consumers and producers. Producers need to be sure that consumer countries will get their oil and gas without interruption. Through South Caucasus consumers will get their oil that is why stability in the region should be one of the interest of Turkey, according to Efe Haydar. He also adds that Turkey has a potential to become one of the main energy producers in Europe and through that the influence of Russian energy sector will minimize. Through that not only Turkey and Europe will benefit, but also the whole South Caucasian region.²⁹ Only in Azerbaijan the expected revenues are 160-180 billion dollars. The oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan that was constructed in 2005, became the major deliver for the "big oil" from Azeri-Chirag-Cuneshli, from the Caspian region to the European countries. Turkey becoming EU state will benefit to this process and EU will have more impact in the region. Thus, as said by Leila Aliyev the region is expected to be more stabile than it was during the previous centuries.³⁰

There is a regional cooperation between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, where the cooperation between these three countries became stronger than during the past decades. These three countries are inclined more to the West than to be under the influence of Russia, unlike Armenia, which favors Russian cooperation more than Western cooperation. Even though there is some cooperation but it is not satisfactory yet. Though there are some good prospects. Georgia, like Turkey, wants to become EU member, while Azerbaijan nowadays

²⁷ Mehmet Dikkaya and Deniz Ozyakisir. "Developing Regional Cooperation Among Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan: Importance of Regional Projects ." (2008).

²⁸ Ufuk Ulutas . "Turkish Foreign Policy in 2009: A year of Pro-activity." *Insight Turkey*. no. 1 (2010): 1-12.

²⁹ Efe Haydar, "Turkish Policy Towards South Caucasian Region and Stability in the South Caucasus," 03, no. 04 (2011): 432-440

³⁰ Leila Aliyev. "EU and South Caucasus." (2006).

does not show a major interest in it. Through Turkey, becoming EU state, may help Georgia to become one too. Those three countries have different economic and political advantages and are quite diverse. While Turkey had its market economy independently for years, Azerbaijan and Georgia are former Soviet Union states and they face other difficulties than Turkey and their economies are yet to be transformed to the market economies, which will take some time. But overcoming that diversity, they have a chance to become important alliances for each other.³¹

Katinka Barysch in her research states that while Turkey's relations with South Caucasus, United States, Middle East and Central Asia are flourishing, the relations with the EU are heading for deadlock. Even though Turkey made some improvements, as was mentioned above, Turkey has amended Turkey's 301 Penal code, cut back military forces, non-Muslim citizens have a wider opportunities and made their life easier, reformed the judiciary system and so on, still there are problems that EU is taking into consideration, mostly the Cyprus issue.³² However, William Chislett argues that Turkey needs to remove existing obstacles to the free movements of goods, which includes any restrictions on transport, which are part of its requirements under the Association Agreement. One of the obligations is to open airports and ports to the republic of Cyprus.³³

After the Brussels Summit, which was held in December 2004, where negotiations started for discussing Turkey's accession in the EU, after almost 40 years, Turkey faced other difficulties. On October 3, 2005, the EU publicly initiated the accession negotiations. However, Germany and France were questioning whether a Muslim country, which has different culture can ever become fully European. Nevertheless, Turkey becoming a EU state could be influenced by the European states and through that Cyprus issue might be resolved

³¹ Mehmet Dikkaya and Deniz Ozyakisir. "Developing Regional Cooperation Among Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan: Importance of Regional Projects ." (2008).

³² KatinkavBarysch. "Can Turkey combine EU accession and regional leadership?." *Centre for European Reform*. (2010)

³³ William Chislett, "Turkey's EU accession Negotiations: On the Rocks," *Real Instituto Elcano* (2006),

with negotiations between Greece and Turkey³⁴.

³⁴ Maria Do Ceu Pinto, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union in terms of impact on the EU's security and defense policies-potential and drawbacks." No 53(1) (2010): 89-110

Chapter 1

Turkey's Integration in the EU: Background and Issues

Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman jointly drafted a plan, which will help Europe to stabilize their economy after the World War II. They created the European Economic Community and a plan for a European common market principally in coal and steel, those were staples of the arms industry. The European Economic Community (EEC) was created for preventing any repetition of the World War I and II. The European Coal and Steel Community was founded in 1952, with Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands joining France and Germany. During the 1950s the cooperation expanded and more countries were interested in that cooperation, because it brought many advantages to those countries that were part of that cooperation. In March 1957, the Treaties of Rome founded the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The EEC set up a common market on the basis of a customs union³⁵.

Since EEC was expanding, Turkey wanted to be part of the international communities, which will help in future economically and united it will not face the challenges alone. After the World War II, it was affected by war, even though it declared war on Germany and Japan on March 1st, 1945. Though it joined war when it was almost over, the Turkish society and economy suffered from it. And because of that it wanted to be part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in 1952 it became part of the NATO and started to have a major role in it and in 1949 joined the Council of Europe. Through those partnerships Turkey would secure itself from the diplomatic isolation and will boost its economy. After one year of the establishment of the EC, in 1959 Turkey submitted an official

³⁵ Pilar Bilgin, and Ali Bilgic, "Turkey and EU/rope: Discourses of Inspiration/Anxiety in Turkey's Foreign Policy," 04, no. 03 (2012): 111-125,

application for membership to EEC after knowing that Greece applied too. Their Prime Minister asked the Ministers of the Turkish government, if there is anything that Greece can do and they can't. So applying to EEC, Turkey wanted to prove to Greece that it can't isolate Turkey and if needed Turkey will become member of that community by their wish. Also, they clearly understood if Greece joins the EEC, it would cause them problems in future and that it was not only an economic but also political affair. Those who were part of the EEC will get also financial aid for their developments, which would help Turkey to boost its economy quicker than it planned. Menderes publicly announced that by joining EEC, it would be the answer for their developments and politically they would not be isolated³⁶.

During the 1960 coup d'état in Turkey, negotiations with EEC stopped about 17 months. After that on November 1961, Ismet Inonu became Prime Minister of the Republic. During his presidency, he was clear that he saw Turkey's future in Europe, since as was mentioned it would help them economically and it would not be isolated from the international society. The fact that the Military had a major role in Turkey was not satisfactory for the EEC, since democracy and less use of arms were the main aspects of the EEC. Feridun Cemal Erkin, which was that time the Foreign Minister of Turkey and previously was an ambassador in Washington, SC (1948-1955) said: "our main objective is to avoid being left out of the process of European economic integration and ensuing political integration. It is not difficult to understand what remaining outside such a process would mean"³⁷. Even though during those 17 months that Turkey could not negotiate and deepen their relations with the EEC, they still wanted to be part of it. There was another factor, that Greece was part of that Community, and year-by-year its influence and importance was growing. It was a risk for Turkey, since Greece was allying with the European countries,

³⁶ Pilar Bilgin, and Ali Bilgic, "Turkey and EU/rope: Discourses of Inspiration/Anxiety in Turkey's Foreign Policy," 04, no. 03 (2012): 111-125,

³⁷ Ibid, p. 114

which were starting to have a major role in the international community and became an example of how states can have the same interests and through that cooperation grow their economies.

On 12 September 1963 the Ankara Agreement was signed between Turkey and the EEC. Even though Greece was becoming a major ally for the European countries, its economy was not on the same level as the other European countries' economies and could not compete with the others. The same with Turkey, its economy was not industrialized. EEC offered both Turkey and Greece, gradually become a full member, until the time when their economies would be on the same level as the others. Foreign Minister Erkin pointed that EEC is approaching to problems in a 'unique' way. Through signing the Ankara Agreement, Turkey one more time proved that its wish to become a member was still in their minds and through this, they were reaffirming it. In his address to the Senate, Prime Minister Inönü reiterated his Foreign Minister's words: "With this agreement, we think that we have made serious progress in the way towards Turkey's Westernization, which was decided by Atatürk as a national policy". On December 1st, 1964 the Ankara Agreement came into a force.³⁸

The Ankara Agreement was split in transitions and each transition lasted 5 years. The first 5-year transition was ended in 1968 and the same year the second transition began. And after the Ankara Agreement, first time they had a meeting on 5 April 1968. During that time the Prime Minister of Turkey was Süleyman Demirel (from 1965-1969, 1969-1971), Head of Justice Party. Those five years they considered as a model how countries could make a transition towards industrialization. After those negotiations with the EEC, they signed the Additional Protocol on 23 November 1970. 400 million USD was given to Turkey, as a loan, for boosting its economy and for lowering its own customs duties in 12 and 22 year-periods.

³⁸ Pilar Bilgin, and Ali Bilgic, "Turkey and EU/rope: Discourses of Inspiration/Anxiety in Turkey's Foreign Policy," 04, no. 03 (2012): 111-125,

The Turkish opposition was not as interested in EEC than the government of Turkey, they considered EEC as an interference against Turkey's economic development and that Turkey could be better without the EEC. Nevertheless, on November 23rd, 1970, the second financial protocol was signed in Brussels and on January 1st, 1973 the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved it, in July 1971 the Additional protocol entered into force.

After signing and approving the Supplementary Protocol (Additional Protocol), relations between the EC and Turkey languished throughout the 1970s and 80s, because of the Cyprus issue, which was emerged during those years and became a serious obstacle. Second issue that arose between Turkey and EC was the negative consequences of two oil crises (1973 and 1979). During those years Turkey's economy faced challenges and the EC realized that if they accept Turkey during those years, the EC's economy would suffer from that. Third issue was linked with the second issue, which was unemployment. The EC became more "protectionist", and none of the countries, which were part of the EEC were more restrictive in opening their labor markets for foreign workers, especially for Turkey, since their labor was cheaper than any other European labor. Both, Turkey and the EEC realized that negotiations could not be transferred to the next level, since those issues needed to be solved, only then to proceed. In 1980, there were negotiations over a potential reconsideration of the Treaty of Ankara, but those negotiations came to nothing.³⁹

Again, the 12 September 1980 coup brought Turkey-EEC relations to a termination. While the EEC did not take an obvious position, the Council of Europe rejected the credentials of delegations from Turkey, which prevented them from taking their seats in the Assembly. The EC had two major issues. First, Greece, Portugal and Spain became part of the Common Market, however their economies were not on a satisfactory level. Second, during that time they started to create a single market, where all barriers against freedom of

³⁹ Richard T Griffiths and Durmus Özdemir. *Turkey and the EU Enlargement: Processes of Incorporation*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2004.

movement of capital, people, goods and so on were abolished. And through that the roadmap of the economic union in Europe was being created. It was a problem in a way, that first they needed to help less-developed markets to achieve the same level as the others, meantime abolishing barriers would take time and procedures, that needed to be seriously discussed. The Single European Act was signed in 1986 and came into force in July 1987. The same year Turkey applied for full membership, right before the General elections, with Prime Minister Turgut Ozal. However, the European Parliament passed various problems that Turkey had, both domestic and international. Domestic problems were human rights and the Kurdish issue. International problems were the Cyprus issue, and the Armenian Problem. Therefore, those problems should have been solved as soon as possible. For 'the Decision in relation to the Political Solution for the Armenian issue', which should have been solved, the time was set till 1987, 'the Situation in Cyprus' in 1988 and 'the Situation of Kurds in Turkey' in 1992.⁴⁰ But during the discussion in the National Assembly of Turkey, the Turkish politicians were clear that they would not let the international community influence their decisions and they would never bow under foreign pressures. Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu said, "Turkey's application to be a member of the EC will not be affected by such partial, bigoted and unbalanced decisions".⁴¹ And that decision that was made by the European Parliament was considered as a scheme against 'Turkey's territorial unity'. It is interesting that while it came to Turkey, the European Parliament passed different decisions and it was not solely based on the economy. Even though, Greece, Spain and Portugal had economic issues they were still integrated into the European Community, while Turkey should have solved problems that were existing many years and it was obvious that those issues needed a lot more time than the EP was expecting to be solved. This could be the

⁴⁰ Pilar Bilgin, and Ali Bilgic, "Turkey and EU/rope: Discourses of Inspiration/Anxiety in Turkey's Foreign Policy," 04, no. 03 (2012): 111-125,

⁴¹ *ibid*

indicator the EP was not wanting Turkey to be part of them. Since the others who applied for the full membership was accepted, still Turkish application was revised and added. That time they wanted more political reforms than economic. Turkey could achieve the economic standards within a few years, since its geography is in crossroads and the most trade was done through Turkey from Europe to Asia. ⁴²

Turkey must fulfill few criteria set by the European parliament in order to become a member. This fact in turn changed Turkey's approach towards the EEC. Turkey wanted to be part of EEC because of the fear of international isolation. Now, Turkey wanted Europe acceptance of their national and cultural identity and through that Turkey would enrich the Europe's political and cultural life. The European Parliament transformed a lot since 1959. It was clear that they approached countries differently, and to say that they set the same criteria for each candidate, it was wrong. Turkey broadened the list of unities in its program: pluralist democracy, free elections and market economy. This shift in discourse was significant, since Turkey's new government understood that they could not change the whole identity of the Turkish nation, and firstly they were a Muslim country with different culture and viewpoint. They were seeing Turkey part of Europe, with their identity, just with the better political and economic conditions. That commonality would help both actors to be combined and cooperate without interfering in each other's policies.

With the fall of Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and the end of the Cold War many Central and Eastern European countries had to reorient themselves. Hence, because of that fact the Community received applications for membership. During the Copenhagen meeting, the European Council came up with the Copenhagen criteria and three conditions needed to be fulfilled for the full membership, which were:

1. Political criterion- of institutions, which consists of democracy, rule of law, human

⁴² Ibid

rights and respect and protection of minorities.

2. Economic criterion- capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces with the European Community and functioning market economy.
3. *Acquis* criterion, which is the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*.⁴³

As the other candidate countries, Turkey should have met with all of those criteria for becoming a member. After the fulfillment of those criteria, candidate countries could become part of the EU. However, from the beginning of the EEC, criteria were fewer and easier to accomplish, and Turkey was one of the first countries who applied for full membership and as the other new candidate Turkey must fulfilled those requirements.

After the Motherland Party losing the 1991 elections, center-right True Path Party (TPP) and center-left Social Democratic People Party (SDPP) formed a coalition, where Suleyman Demirel was the head of that coalition and the head of TPP (1991-1993) and after him led by Tansu Ciller (1993-1995). Ciller signed the Customs Union Agreement in 1995. During those years economy of Turkey was doing poorly, with 150% inflation and suffering from trade deficit. The government pointed out during their meetings with the EU representatives that Turkey's need to have 'free trade', it would help them to export and import goods to Europe and from Europe easily. Since the government was doing bad at economy, as was mentioned previously, during the 1970s the opposition was stating that EEC would be a barrier for Turkey and Turkey could do better without their interference. That was why during the talks with the European countries, Turkey was only mentioning about the 'free trade' but no other dimension of the Customs Union and no other help was expected from them.⁴⁴

During 1995, Turkey reformed its Constitution. The original text of the Constitution

⁴³ Tanja Marktler. "'The Power of the Copenhagen Criteria'." In *Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy*. 2, 343-363. 2006.

⁴⁴ Pilar Bilgin, and Ali Bilgic, "Turkey and EU/rope: Discourses of Inspiration/Anxiety in Turkey's Foreign Policy," 04, no. 03 (2012): 111-125,

prohibited any cooperation between political parties and civil society organizations. After reforming the Constitution these prohibitions were eliminated. Also, the voting age was lowered from 20 to 18 and organizations that were established by the youth and women were allowed in Turkey. Besides those changes in the Constitution; Turkey adopted in 1987 the European Commission of Human Rights and recognized the obligatory outcomes of decisions of the European Court of Human rights in 1990.⁴⁵

After that the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council meeting resulted one of the most significant and serious crises in Turkey's relations with Europe. The Council criticized foreign and domestic affairs of Turkey and after that Prime Minister did not attend the Conference of Europe, which was prearranged to bring together the Member States and the candidates. Subsequently, Turkey made a decision to suspend political dialogue with the EU. Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, during his interview mentioned that Europe was only accepting countries that were Westernized and Europe is rejecting the Turkish identity and culture and though that they were isolating Turkey. Starting from 1959, Turkey wanted to be part of the EU for not being isolated and during that time they were stating that the EU is the one who is isolating them. Turkey gained confidence because of the fact that it was the biggest ally for the United States and had the second largest army in NATO, while Europe was trying to solve everything in a peaceful way and they were not satisfied with the fact that Turkey's Military had a major role in their foreign and domestic affairs. Yilmaz that mentioned that even if they meet with all the conditions, the biggest thing that could never be changed is their culture and identity and compared that with the Berlin wall, the cultural Berlin wall. Reporters wanted to clarify what he was trying to say by the Berlin Wall analogy, PM Yilmaz replied: 'Religious discrimination, of course'. The conclusion that was done by Yilmaz was right, even though the European Community never claimed themselves as a "Christian"

⁴⁵ Richard T. Griffiths, and Durmus Özdemir. *Turkey and the EU Enlargement: Processes of Incorporation*. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2004.

Community, all of the countries were Christian and Turkey was the only Muslim country that wanted to be part of it.⁴⁶

Foreign Minister Ismail Cem highlighted that Turkey has elements both from 'Western' and 'Eastern' culture, and that is what makes Turkey a unique country, which could be part of Europe, but at the same time keep its identity and culture. By not accepting Turkey, as how it was, Europe was going to be the entity when it isolates country, in this case Turkey. Foreign Minister Cem was seeing Turkey part of the European Community, but with a common ground in political values only. Turkey would have had the same political values, respecting human rights, democracy, they would separate judiciary and so on, but Europe did not have the right to point to Turkey what need to be solved and how it needed to be solved, in this case the Armenian, Cyprus and Kurdish issue. This was interfering with their foreign and domestic affairs, which was not acceptable for Turkey.⁴⁷

From 1997 till 1999, there were not any talks between Turkey and Europe, and only at the 1999 Helsinki European Council, when Turkey was confirmed as a candidate State to join to the Union. Foreign Minister Cem, mentioned that through the Helsinki decision, not only it was beneficial for Turkey but also for Europe. Through the Turkish accession in the EU, Europe would have direct links to the Eastern culture and they were integrating a country that historically was always part of the West and East. The choice that the EU made would either provide the EU with a crucial bridge of conciliation with the country with other characteristics, or in case of not integrating they would discriminate Turkey and it would eventually had negative effects on Europe. Also Cem mentioned Greece in his speech: 'If the borders of Europe end with Greece, this can create problems for Turkish-Greek relations'. Still, Turkey was considering Greece as a threat, if they were not part of the EU; they knew that the European countries would only support the Greek community, but not them.

⁴⁶ Pilar Bilgin, and Ali Bilgic, "Turkey and EU/rope: Discourses of Inspiration/Anxiety in Turkey's Foreign Policy," 04, no. 03 (2012): 111-125,

⁴⁷ Ibid

In 2001, Turkey reformed the Constitution, where it considerably strengthened constitutional safeguards of fundamental liberties and rights. To some extent Turkey enlarged the scope of the freedom of expression and other rights, which are related to that field, such as the freedom of the press and association. Nevertheless, the Amendment of Article 118 decreased the National Security Council's (NSC) influence on civilian governments.⁴⁸ The latter was important, since the EU was not favoring the fact that in Turkey military had a huge part in their politics.

During the 2004 Brussels European Council, Member States agreed that 'on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations without delay'.⁴⁹ On May 28 2004, in Oxford Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan during his speech, stated:

“When the EU completes its enlargement, it will become the world's biggest trading bloc; stretching from the Atlantic to the Russian-Ukrainian border in the east; with a population of around 500 million; integrated in a number of areas from customs union to monetary and political union. Our responsibility as Europeans is to sustain and enhance the dynamism and innovative power of this giant bloc... Despite the difficulties, the Turkish economy grew by 8 percent in 2002, and 6 percent in 2003. In the next couple of decades, per capita income is expected to exceed 10 thousand Dollars... In the early 1980s, when Greece became an EU member, this time Turkey was experiencing difficult times. After and even before its EU membership, Greece had been welcomed as part of the European system, and never had any reason to doubt the European support. Turkey, on the other hand, always found itself in a position of having to prove why it was European, and the contributions it could make

⁴⁸ Richard T. Griffiths, and Durmus Özdemir. *Turkey and the EU Enlargement: Processes of Incorporation*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2004.

⁴⁹Tayyip E. Erdogan. "Why the EU needs Turkey. Last modified May 28, 2004.

to the EU.”⁵⁰

As could be understood from PM Erdogan’s speech, he clearly stated that Turkey is already European and they consider themselves as Europeans. During his speech, he compared Turkey with Greece, pointing out that Turkey in many ways was ahead of them, especially economically. He mentioned during his speech that Greece was favored from the beginning while Turkey was struggling to meet all the criteria. In spite of anything, Erdogan mentioned that Turkey sees its future within the European Community.

In Lithuania, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül highlighted the benefits both sides will have from a favorable decision:

“We are confident that by the time of EU membership, Turkey’s economy will grow strong enough to be a source of dynamism and stability, not a burden to the EU. Political and economic stability in my country has already begun to encourage the Turkish immigrant workers in Europe to come back home. Beginning of accession negotiations is expected to give further impetus to this trend. Furthermore, I believe that EU will get an additional strength from Turkey in its struggle with challenges like terrorism, narco-traffics, organized crime, illegal immigration and ecological disasters.”⁵¹

Turkish politicians and ministers were always affirming that not only would Turkey benefit from Turkey’s accession into the EU, but also EU. Abdullah Gul once mentioned “Turkey is not after all taking a share from the European ‘cake’. Turkey herself will make this cake bigger”.⁵² Also, PM Erdogan addressed JDP's Parliamentary group meeting and made the point that it is Europe interest too to integrate Turkey, it would prove that Europe is accepting the other cultures too and economically Turkey would only benefit them. During

⁵⁰ ibid

⁵¹ Abdullah Gul. "The Turkish Point of View Regarding Turkey-EU Relations." T.C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı . Last modified 2004. http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/konusma_aciklama_mesajlar/kitap/36.pdf.

⁵² ibid

the past years, Turkey was only mentioning that it needed Europe more, but during that time their policies changed, Europe was the one who needed Turkey and would benefit if Turkey became one of them. Foreign Minister Gül concurred:

“Turkey's EU membership will mean that Europe has achieved such maturity that it can incorporate a major Muslim country into its fold. And that EU stands for common values and institutions rather than common religion. For Turkey, EU membership will mean anchoring more than a century old western vocation into the highest standards of democratization, good governance and integration. For the world, this would evidence that civilizations line up in terms of their democratic vocation, and not on the basis of religion”.⁵³

Through those speeches, they were provoking the European countries and how unfair they were towards Turkey and through that they were anticipating that Europe would give in and make the accession for Turkey easier. And in case of not integrating Turkey would state that Europe is not respecting human rights and their culture.

During the 2004 the Turkish government reformed the Constitution, where many provisions were added, such as Article 10, which stated, “women and men have equal rights. The State is obliged to put this equality into effect”.⁵⁴ Many reforms were made for the equality of men and women, since in the EU's Constitution all men and women are equal. Therefore, reforming the Turkish Constitution, especially Article 10, was an important factor in the country's progress, in line with the EU norms and values.

From the beginning of the 1998, Europe started to report Turkey's internal problems, so that they would have a clear idea, they would face what kind of challenges if Turkey became one of them. The first phase of the screening started in October 2005 and ended in

⁵³ ibid

⁵⁴ Richard T Griffiths and Durmus Özdemir. *Turkey and the EU Enlargement: Processes of Incorporation*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2004, p. 97

October 2006. During 2005-2006, Turkey started political dialogue with the United Kingdom, Austrian and Finnish presidencies. The European Union announced that the Association Agreement is still work in progress and is in a satisfactory manner. In the context of the customs union, trade between the EU and Turkey reached 75billion euros only in 2005.⁵⁵

In all instances, the EU advised Turkey to “remove all restrictions on the free movement of goods”, incorporating “restrictions on means of transport regarding to Cyprus”.⁵⁶ Turkey was not committed to fulfill all of the technical barriers to trade, state aids, enforcement of intellectual property rights, import licenses, and other discriminatory provisions. Though trade negotiations were completed in September on processed agricultural products, however no growth can be reported regarding Turkey's long-standing ban on imports of live bovine animals, beef and other animal products.⁵⁷

In January 2006, the Accession Partnership was revised and adopted the same year; through that short and long term goals were set for Turkey to fulfill for accession. The EC granted 500million euro to Turkey for improving its economy.⁵⁸

Negotiations began “on eleven chapters (*Science and Research Enterprise and industry, Statistics, Financial Control, Trans-European Networks, Consumer and health protection, Intellectual property law, Company law, Information society and media, free movement of capital and taxation, Science and Research*), where Science and Research was temporarily closed”.⁵⁹

The enhanced political dialogue between the EU and Turkey has continued from the beginning of 2006. During the month of March political dialogue meetings were held at

⁵⁵ Commission of the European Communities, "Turkey 2006 Progress Report" (2006),

⁵⁶ *ibid*

⁵⁷ *ibid*

⁵⁸ *ibid*

⁵⁹ Commission of the European Communities, "Turkey 2009 Progress Report. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010" (2009),

ministerial level and after that at political director level in February and July 2009.

During those ministerial and political director level meetings the main challenges, that Turkey was facing, was discussed. Those issues were discussed in terms of the Copenhagen political criteria and how Turkey was dealing with those issues throughout the years. Turkey needed to reform its judiciary and the law enforcement services. For changing its policies, Turkey was granted money, which will help her to overcome those challenges. Even if Turkey will not become part of the EU, it still benefits from their programs. Turkey from these negotiations will benefit either way.⁶⁰

During the talks, Europe was concerned with the fact of the issue of missing persons and the restrictions on the property rights of Greek Cypriots living permanently in the northern part of Cyprus remain pending. And Turkey did not compensate people who lived in northern Cyprus. And yet the Turkish government did not fulfill this.⁶¹

The Cyprus issue was not the only one that Turkey had/has in their foreign and domestic affairs. One issue that was facing them through the 20th century was the Armenian Genocide. Not only, Turkey as a country does not recognize it as a crime, but also, they do not let their citizens to voice their concerns about this crime. 200 Turkish intellectuals signed A petition to denounce ‘the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915 [...]’ and about 30,000 signatures were collected through the Internet where the Turkish people were apologizing to the Armenians.⁶² The Turkish Penal Code (Article 301) restricts freedom of expression and criminalizes statements determined to insult Turkish identity, the Turkish state or its institutions.⁶³ This Article had widely discussed both on national and international levels. Many diplomats on international level asked the Turkish government to explain the meaning of Article 301. In 1926 similar article was created and

⁶⁰ Commission of the European Communities, "Turkey 2009 Progress Report. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010" (2009),

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Richard Giragosian, "Redefining Turkey's Strategic Orientation," 6, no. 4 (2008): 33-40,

then was revised by the Turkish government. One of the highlights of the Article is that a person who degrades Turkey or the Government of the republic of Turkey, or the grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be sentenced a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months and two years. Another concern was a freedom of speech, by this article it is clearly stated that whoever does not agree with the Turkish Government or any decision that is made by the Government will face imprisonment.⁶⁴ The Turkish Penal code may influence the process of Turkey being a part of the European Union. It might not have a direct connection, but that code certainly prohibits freedom of speech, which is an important factor for the European Union.

Minority rights in Turkey, especially the Kurdish issue became a problem many years ago. Through Article 301, public does not have the right to state their opinion, if they do not obey they will be sent into a prison or pay taxes. Through those restrictions, the government does not let the people to state their opinion. If in Turkey there was a real democracy, the public might have accepted the Armenian Genocide. A documentary which was called '*Sarı Gelin –Blonde Bride: the Truth behind the Armenian Issue*' was distributed, which was written by Kemal Yalcin in 2005, was suspended by the Ministry of National Education following criticisms "by the Armenian community about what it considered discriminatory education offered to school children"⁶⁵. However, the documentary is still not withdrawn from any schools and if individual does not want to participate, he/she has the right to do. Through this, the government tries to teach to the younger generation their point of you.⁶⁶

Minorities in Turkey do not have the right to have their own schools, which are taught only in their language. Furthermore, during political campaigns, only Turkish language is allowed. The Armenian Patriarchate's proposed to open a university department for the

⁶⁴ Bulgen Algan. "The Brand New Version of Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code and the Future of Freedom of Expression in Turkey ." *German Law Journal*. no. 12 (2008).

⁶⁵ Commission of the European Communities, "Turkey 2009 Progress Report. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010" (2009),

⁶⁶ *ibid*

Armenian language and clergy has been pending for a number of years. Minorities can teach their language outside of any officially established schools. Only in January 2009, TRT-the public service broadcaster-started to broadcast in Kurdish 24 hours a day and in September the Turkish University established a “Living Languages Institute”, which was providing education in Kurdish and other languages which are spoken in Turkey. During the same year the national radio network was allowed to broadcast in Armenian. Those were the progress that was done during the year of 2009.⁶⁷

The political dialogue between the EU and Turkey was enhanced and on going during 2009. On 26 November 2009 political dialogue meetings were held at ministerial level and 13 July 2010 and one political dialogue meeting at political director level on 10 February 2010. These meetings mainly focused on the main challenges faced by Turkey in terms of the Copenhagen political criteria. During those meetings EU and Turkey discussed regional areas of common interest. Also during those meeting, they discussed the progress that was done by Turkey towards the fulfillment of Accession Partnership. The most part they paid attention to the economic dialogue. It was quite obvious, that for the EU Turkey’s integration would be beneficial only in economic sphere, because of their location and the fact that through Turkey, they can import oil and gas, which will help the European countries to have alternatives and Russia’s energy influence will no longer be a threat to them.⁶⁸

The government put limitations on people, such accessing YouTube. YouTube was inaccessible in Turkey for about two years, from May 2008 to November 2010, because of the fact that there were videos that was showing Turkey’s history in a bad light. Not only YouTube, but also other websites are being controlled and some are still banned. Though some progress was seen. Such as, letting *Newroz* (the Kurdish New Year) and 1 May demonstrations, which was not interrupted by the Turkish police and on 24 April to mark

⁶⁷ Ibid

⁶⁸ European Commission, “Turkey 2010 Progress Report. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011”, 2010,

‘Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day’, they let Armenians to have a protest and even in some places the police were protecting.⁶⁹

There are European countries, such as Austria, Germany and France, who are against of the accession of Turkey. During survey that are done in Europe, it found out that Europeans are not concerned with the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country, rather than it has such a different culture than Europe. At the end of 2006 survey that was conducted in Austria, almost 60percent of respondents were also concerned about the Cyprus issue, furthermore about the Kurdish issue.⁷⁰ Furthermore, in 2006 Nicholas Sarkozy stated, “Turkey is in Asia Minor. I will not explain to little French school children that the frontiers of Europe are Iraq and Syria”.⁷¹ He then also added that after giving Turkey a full membership it would be the end of the European Union. Nicholas Sarkozy’s opinion was different from the former President of France, Jacques Chirac. Chirac in 2004 emphasized the fact that while rejecting Turkey, it might become a major instability issue for Europe. Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, agreed with the fact that granting a full membership would increase prosperity and the security of Europe.⁷²

If one thing is certain, the EU is clearly a different institution from then the European Economic Community. First, the EU increased from six to twenty-five member-states, secondly, the European ideology has changed those fifty-five years. Hence, because of the changes both in the EU and Turkey, both actors have been forced to readjust their positions on the question of Turkish EU membership. As was mentioned, the progress was made but how acceptable it is for the European Union. Still, Turkey has problems, such as Cyprus

⁶⁹ European Commission, “Turkey 2010 Progress Report. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011”, 2010,

⁷⁰ Katinka Barysch. "What Europeans think about Turkey and why?" (2007): www.cer.org.uk.

⁷¹ "Turkey As election fever rises, Sarkozy consolidates his Turkey position." Accessed May 16, 2013. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/as-election-fever-rises-sarkozy-consolidates-his-turkey-position.aspx?pageID=438&n=as-election-fever-rises-sarkozy-consolidates-his-turkey-position-2006-10-07>.

⁷² Frederikke Rosendal Egede Saabye. "When Speaking about Turkey...!" Accessed May 16, 2013.

<http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=1320985&fileId=1320986>.

Issue, the Kurdish issue and the Armenian issue. However, the problem does not that country has problems, but the fact that they do not accept that those issues need to be solved. Those issues were the main ones, however still Turkey is struggling with the other issues that are more domestic. All of these taking into consideration, Turkey could become a part of the EU, if it tried to solve the issues and start negotiations with the other perspective. They approach the same issue from the same perspective during all of the existence of their government.

Chapter 2

Integration of the Turkish government in the EU and how will this influence the relations with the South Caucasian states?

From the Turkish viewpoint, the practical result of the Soviet Union's demise was the replacement of one large and powerful neighbor with three smaller states- Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In December 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkish policy toward the Caucasus has changed dramatically with the implementation of a new policy orientation. Turkey became the first country to recognize the independence of the new republics, recognizing Azerbaijan on December 9, and the rest on December 16.⁷³ With their independence new conflicts came into the light. And Turkey was worried that because of those conflicts, Turkey's security would be threatened. During that time Turkey's main perspective was to be the new dominant country and replace Russia. Those conflicts definitely had a negative impact in the Transcaucasia region, and since Turkey was ahead of South Caucasian countries in many ways, such as being part of the NATO and trying to access the EU, Turkey understood that it could benefit from the collapse of the Soviet Union.

This Chapter aims to find out how the integration of the Turkish government in the EU will influence its relations with its neighbor countries, mainly Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Thus through this, it will be clear costs and benefits for the region after the accession of the Turkish government in the EU. Turkey's relations with these three countries are different. Turkey has good relations with Azerbaijan, and even Azerbaijan is considered as a brother-state for Turkey. Georgia and Turkey relations are pleasing, still could be improved and cooperation between the two countries can deepen through trade and energy

⁷³ Mustafa Aydin. "Turkish Policy Toward the Caucasus." *The Quarterly Journal* 04 (2002):

sector. While, the Turkish-Armenian relations are non-existent and the Armenian-Turkish border is closed starting from 1993. Research question for this chapter is: will the South Caucasian region benefit from Turkey's full membership? Also, in this chapter 3rd hypothesis would be discussed, which is the south Caucasus region will benefit from Turkey's full membership of Europe.

Although the South Caucasus has various political difficulties, the region is far from isolation from the rest of the world. The region is an essential part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and part of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) organization. Thirdly, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed agreements with the EU on partnership and cooperation and agreed on their action plans with the EU. Moreover, they are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Yet, being a member of different organizations does not make the South Caucasian region appealing for investments for foreigners, due to the corruption in the region and conflicts that exist, foreigners are not confident to invest in the region. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia should pay attention to their governance and economic competitiveness. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and Action Plan that were designed by the EU for those countries would help the South Caucasian region to develop quicker.⁷⁴

The major conflicts that exist in the South Caucasian region are: Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, which are non-recognized states (NREs). They strive independence and international recognition. These conflicts are one of the major reasons that cooperation within the South Caucasian regions is weak. South Ossetia and Abkhazia strive independence from Georgia with a help of Russia, while Nagorno Karabakh region wants to be independent from Azerbaijan and with a help of Armenia, they liberated that region from

⁷⁴ Eldar Ismailov and Vladimer Papava. "A new concept for the Caucasus." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 8, no. 3 (2008): 283-298.

Azerbaijani troops.⁷⁵ Though Turkey does not have a direct connection with these conflicts, they are indirectly involved in these conflicts.

Despite the fact that Turkey and Georgia were establishing close diplomatic ties, there were some issues that both countries could not ignore. Abkhazia was one of the areas that was striving its independence and in mid-1992, Georgian paramilitary troops entered Abkhazia and war was occurred. In September 1993, the Abkhazian forces won and drove the Georgian army from Abkhazia. Ceasefire was signed and came into force, but the final settlement has not been reached. Abkhazians, where the majority were Muslims, were seeking support from Turkey; since in Turkey Abkhazians community exists. In August 1992, the Caucasian–Abkhazian Solidarity Committee (Kafkas– Abkhaz Dayanisma Komitesi) was originated by Turks of Abkhazian descent to coordinate the assistance given to Abkhazia and young Turks during the war were helping Abkhazians. Since, Turkey, as a country, did not interfere in the war, demonstrations occurred in Turkey for supporting Abkhazia for its independence. This was a clever move for Turkey, interfering would in some way destroy its relations with Georgia. Also, if it helped Abkhazians for their independence, Turkey would show its support for independence of minorities and in an indirect way will show support for Nagorno-Karabakh issue and threatened its relations with Azerbaijan. To make matters worse, Vladislav Ardzinda, President of Abkhazia, visited Turkey many times during 1992–1993 although any Turkish official never received him. This showed Georgia, that Turkey would not interfere with its domestic affairs. Also, Turkey had minority issues too; the Kurdish issue was the main one.⁷⁶

In 2001, for example, the Turkish company Kara-Elmas signed an agreement with the Abkhazian government to exploit a coalmine in the breakaway republic with estimated

⁷⁵ Anja Wittich, and Maas Achim. "Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus." *Journal of International Alert* (2009):

⁷⁶ Karagiannis Emmanuel. "The Turkish–Georgian partnership and the pipeline factor." *Southern Europe and the Balkans* 06, no. 01 (2004),

reserves of 3.8 million tons of high-quality coal, which will help Abkhazia to have money and power to seek its independence from Georgia. Visiting Tbilisi in April 2002, Turkish State Minister Mehmed Kececiler guaranteed the Georgian government that Ankara will not let such illegal trade.⁷⁷

The fact that in 2008 during the South Ossetia-Georgian and Georgian-Abkhazian war the Russian Federation got involved, showed that the Russian influence still exists in the region, which is not beneficial for Turkey, since it wants to become the dominant power in the region with a support of US and NATO. Turkey immediately took action to support Georgia by sending 100,000 tons of food aid and started a project to build 100 houses for refugees in Gori, which is close to South Ossetia. In the wake of the Georgia-Russia crisis, Turkey has conceived of a multilateral diplomatic initiative, which would help to solve all the South Caucasian problems with Turkey's support. The Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform, which will involve of Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, aims to develop a shared regional perspective and policy instruments to deal with issues, mainly regional peace and security, economic cooperation and so on. This platform was created by the standards and norms of the OSCE, but since OSCE failed to impose stability in the region many years, the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform will do better, according to the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan.⁷⁸

It is worth to mention, that the Turkish policy was greatly influenced by the commitment to be part of the EU. In a way that during talks with the other countries it always mentioned about stability, peace and to resolve all the conflicts peacefully, through negotiations.

For Georgia, Turkey was the best option to cooperate with, because of Turkey's

⁷⁷ Emmanuel, Karagiannis. "The Turkish-Georgian partnership and the pipeline factor." *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 06, no. 01 (2004),

⁷⁸ Bulent Aras, and Hakan Fidan. "*Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a new geographic imagination.*" 40 (2009): 195-217.

ambitions to become EU as Georgia. Tbilisi could maintain its role in the region, as a counterbalance to Russia in the Transcaucasia and Ankara would be an alternative source of trade and investment. And if Turkey becomes EU state, Georgia could start trade through Turkey to EU. Moreover, Turkey is the second country in the list of investing in Georgia, after the USA and the second trade partners' -after Russia.

For Turkey, Georgia could be a strategic partner and in addition, Turkish companies are keen to cultivate commercial ties with Georgia though reluctant to invest substantial sums in the country because of "poor infrastructure, inadequate banking, and lack of technical expertise"⁷⁹. Georgia is also very important to Ankara because it is the only state that Turkey can import and export goods via Georgia to Azerbaijan, because the Armenian-Turkish border is closed. Because of the closed border with Armenia, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project provided Turkey to reach Azerbaijani oil and for Georgia the chance to promote its independence from Russia by enhancing its strategic significance.⁸⁰

It is relevant to give some historic background of the Turkish-Armenian relations, then to proceed to the 2009 Protocol. The communication between Armenia and Turkey commenced after the independence of the RoA. In 1992, Armenian officials were invited to join to a ministerial meeting of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council (BSEC), which was held in Antalya. Arman Kirakossian, which was Acting Foreign Minister from 1991-92, had a friendly discussions and meetings with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hekmit Cetin. This meeting, which was held in Antalya, showed that even though Turkey did not recognize the Armenian genocide, they could cooperate without preconditions. Yet, Nagorno-Karabakh issue was brought up between the two countries, Azerbaijan was/is considered as a brother state for Turkey, and in April 1993, Turkey sealed its border with Armenia, the relations and trade between Turkey and Armenia also were interrupted.

⁷⁹ *ibid*, 15

⁸⁰ Bulent Aras, and Hakan Fidan. "Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a new geographic imagination." 40 (2009): 195-217.

The other factor is the Armenian Diaspora, who has attempted to impose their views in the middle of the already complicated relationship that exists between the two countries. Even though the Armenian Diaspora has the best intentions, it does have an impact on the real political situation in the Republic of Armenia, in some way a negative impact.⁸¹ The talks between Armenia and Turkey should be two-sided, without any other actors.

In 1996 the first talks started between the European Commission and Armenia, after the talks between these two actors was signed a Partnership and Cooperation agreement. The Action Plan was created in 2006 for achieving a high level of integration for Armenia and makes a possible for Armenia to participate in key aspects of ENP (European Neighborhood Policy). In economic terms, investment, growth shall be aroused. The ENP covers eight main priority areas, which will help Armenia to integrate into the EU, which are “strengthening democratic structures, strengthening human rights, encouraging further economic development, improving investment climate”, developing an energy strategy, converging economic legislation and administrative practices, “contributing to a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and enhancing efforts in regional cooperation”.⁸² While Turkey has far been able to stay clear of any direct military involvement in the conflict, but in future it may face dilemmas concerning the regional conflicts. Since Turkish policy is concerned about its border security, during this regional conflict Turkish officials were sure that this does not escalate to a level that seriously threatens Turkish security, and thus their military interferences was not necessary. However, the conflict has also stopped both sides, especially Turkey, to put an end to historic animosities.⁸³

⁸¹ Richard Goshgarian, "Breaking the Stalemate: Turkish-Armenian relations in the 21st Century." (2005).

⁸² Aybatr Gorgulu, Jonahan Levack, and Gokce Percinoglu. "Turkey's Trade Policy Towards Europe, the South Caucasus and Armenia." (2011).

⁸³ Mustafa Aydin. "Turkish Policy Toward the Caucasus." *The Quarterly Journal* 04 (2002):

As could be seen there is no implication about the Armenian-Turkish border, however this does not imply that the closed border between these two countries is not important, especially for economy the opened borders would be beneficial for the European Union.⁸⁴

The ENP plan covers a broad range of European Integration issues. And it is pointed out “Armenia is ought to commit it to common values rooted in European principles. Second, legislation, norms and standards of Armenia shall be advanced by achieving a high level of approximation regarding the EU framework”.⁸⁵ Definitely, many reforms are undertaken and Armenia’s economy is flourishing every single year, but not in the way as it should have been. For a trade between the EU and Armenia, both actors should have had a short way to communicate, which could be achieved only if the Armenian and Turkish border is opened. The short way between EU and Armenia will foster the Armenian trade. In a wide range, the European Commission considers Armenia’s performance and tries by financial and by exchanging professionals to maintain the Armenian economy. Turkey in its way tries to become a EU member. So having good relations, at least normal relations will only benefit the Armenian economy. Surely Armenia is not ready to become a EU member. But Turkey in its was can’t become a EU member too, since many regulations should be implemented.

After the sealing of the border, until 1997, Armenia and Turkey were not negotiating in any way, but that soon changed on May 3rd of the same year, when the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) was established. This Council’s program was trying to find a solution where Turkey and Armenia would have person-to-person and commercial talks; also making sure that there is cooperation between the two nations’ civil

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ Aybars Gorgulu, Jonahan Levack, and Gokce Percinoglu. *"Turkey's Trade Policy Towards Europe, the South Caucasus and Armenia."* (2011), p. 3

societies.⁸⁶This program was trying to develop ideas and finding solutions to problems that Turkey and Armenia have. TABDC was developing ideas, addressing shared problems and the overall goal was transferring insight to decision-makers, since they are the ones who will try to communicate the other party and come up with the an agreement.

After some contacts, which were organized by TABDC, there was a chance for some talks. In June 2000, the Armenian and Turkish representatives, including leading Armenian Diaspora representatives, such as Van Krikorian and Andranik Migranyan, and former diplomats from both nations held exploratory meetings at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. Even though TABDC's activities had a positive influence, there were no direct talks between Armenia and Turkey. Still, both countries representatives gave their unspoken approval for some talks, hereafter the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) was launched in 2001. Both countries media welcomed the initiative as a "historical breakthrough." TARC focused on confidence building, including trade and travel between Armenia and Turkey, which was via Georgia. Even the government of Turkey made easier for the Armenian citizens to enter Turkey, by paying \$15, this was considered as a "goodwill gesture."⁸⁷

During TARC talks the Armenian genocide was brought up and then TARC requested the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) "to facilitate the provision of an independent legal analysis on the applicability of the United Nations Genocide Convention to events which occurred during the early twentieth century".⁸⁸On February 4, 2003, the legal analysis was presented to TARC that stated that: "International law generally prohibits the retroactive application of treaties. The Genocide Convention contains no provision mandating its retroactive application. To the contrary, the text strongly suggests it was intended to

⁸⁶ David L. Philips. "Diplomatic History: the 2009 Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey and the 2009 Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia." (2012):

⁸⁷ *ibid*

⁸⁸ *ibid*,17

impose prospective obligations only on the states party to it. Therefore, no legal, financial, or territorial claim arising out of the events could successfully be made against any individual or state under the Convention.”⁸⁹

The analysis also accomplished with the term of genocide, the International Criminal Court gave four elements, where if those four elements could be applied to the Armenian genocide, it should be considered as genocide. Those four elements are: “(1) one or more persons were killed; (2) such persons belonged to a particular national, ethnic, racial, or religious group; (3) The conduct took place as part of a manifest pattern of similar conduct against the group; and (4) the conduct was perpetrated with the intent to destroy in whole, or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such. At least some of the perpetrators knew that the consequence of their actions would be the destruction of, in whole or in part, the Armenians of eastern Anatolia, as such, or acted purposefully towards this goal, and therefore, possessed the requisite genocidal intent. The Events, viewed collectively, can thus be said to include all the elements of the crime of genocide as defined by the Convention, and legal scholars as well as historians, politicians, journalists and other people would be justified in continuing to so describe them.”⁹⁰

Official and non-official talks were held until 2009, when the Armenian diplomats proposed a simple text on recognition and normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations. Erdogan proposed for a joint history commission, which would discuss the events of 1915-1921, and UNESCO later on would have published those findings. Armenia announced that they are willing to do that, however many documents needed for this task are in Turkey, so Turkey should provide access to all those archives.⁹¹

For Turkey the fact that Armenians have carried the genocide allegations to

⁸⁹ *ibid*

⁹⁰ *ibid*, p 17

⁹¹ David L. Philips. *Diplomatic History: The 2009 Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey and the 2009 Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia.* (2012)

international platforms, in their opinions worsened the problem. Also Turkey fears that if they recognize the Armenian genocide, the RoA will demand some territories from Turkey as alleged 'historical rights' and some compensation, because many Armenians during 1915 lost their homes, money, lands and so on.⁹²In Armenia the discussion of relations between the two countries is somehow limited by the anticipation that Turkey will discuss and acknowledge as genocide the killing of Armenians in Ottoman Turkey in 1915 as genocide.⁹³

The other factor that influences the relations of Armenian and Turkey is the Turkic Penal Code (TPC) or Article 301, law no 5237. The TPC code is a violation of freedom of speech. This law was changed nearly seven times since 1936. It basically states that: "A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years. A person who publicly denigrates Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security organizations shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years. In cases where a Turkish citizen in another country commits denigration of Turkishness the punishment shall be increased by one third. Expression of thought intended to criticize shall not constitute crime".⁹⁴ So here what kind of sentence can cause for a punishment: "All the Turkish people are thieves and half of them are stupid." This is one example where one can be put into a jail or pay a huge amount of money. It is worth to bring an example regarding the Armenian genocide. Novelist Orhan Pamuk in February 2005 said during one of his interviews "30000 Kurds and one million Ottoman Armenians were killed in Turkey". After this sentence he was prosecuted⁹⁵. There are many other cases, where novelist, Turks, journalists stated their opinion and were

⁹² Aybars Gorgulu. *Turkey-Armenia Relations: An Eternal Deadlock?* (2008): 124-145.

⁹³ Kentel Ferhat, & Gevorg Poghosyan, Gevorg. (2005). *Armenian and Turkish Citizens' Mutual Perceptions and Dialogue Project*. (V. Aytar, Ed.)

⁹⁴ World Law Direct. "Article 301 of Turkish Penal Code - WORLD Law Direct Forums." Accessed May 13, 2013. <http://www.worldlawdirect.com/forum/law-wiki/13828-article-301-turkish-penal-code.html>.

⁹⁵ *ibid*

charged a huge amount of money. This TPC law violates the basic human rights and shows that the word genocide is not welcomed in Turkey. This makes everything harder since people basically are afraid of stating their opinion regarding Armenia and the Armenian genocide.

Nevertheless, even though the Article 301 and the Armenian genocide were discussed all the time, in 2009 the agreement was signed between Turkey and Armenia. After nearly a decade of tense relations, a lack of diplomatic relations and closed borders Armenia and Turkey step-by-step are trying to improve their relations, even some analysts state that those talks are moving quickly, considering the fact that they have many problems. Especially after the invitation by Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian the Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited Armenia and became the first Turkish President who visited Armenia. After the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, Armenia understood that it needed to a new incentive for opening the Armenian-Turkish border.

Turkey's promise to open the border with Armenia, nevertheless, has rigorously damaged its traditionally close relationship with Azerbaijan. The two countries were describing each other as 'one nation, two countries'. After the 'Football diplomacy' in 2008 and signing the 2009 Protocol Azerbaijan turned away from Turkey in anger and endangered to limit future gas sales, which in its turn would threaten Turkey's ambition to become an energy hub. Azerbaijan was worried that Turkey will normalize its relations with Armenia without waiting for Nagorno Karabakh issue. Turkish officials, mainly, the prime minister, reassured Azerbaijan that the Armenian-Turkish border would not be opened until Armenia started withdrawing its troops from some parts of some of the areas surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.⁹⁶

What regards Armenia, Armenia believes that Nagorno Karabakh officials need to be

⁹⁶ Katinka Barysch. "Can Turkey combine EU accession and regional leadership?." *Centre for European Reform*. (2010).

part of the negotiations, since the war was between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. Also, Armenia attributes importance to the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group, and seeks a settlement exclusively through peaceful means, and settlement should be based on

- “Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement must be based on recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh people's right to self-determination;
- Nagorno-Karabakh should have uninterrupted land communication with Armenia, under jurisdiction of the Armenian side;
- The security of Nagorno-Karabakh should be internationally guaranteed”.⁹⁷

After discussions, which were not available for a public, the Protocol was signed in Zurich on October 10, 2009. Both countries decided to open the border within two months after the ratification. In the protocol there was written that they agree to “implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations”.⁹⁸ The genocide term was not used, since as could be seen historical records need to be examined. The government of Turkey has not ratified this protocol, and they did not announce publicly why they did not ratify and one cannot draw a conclusion from it that it is due to the Armenian Genocide.

The Armenian government is more inclined to open the border, since it will benefit Armenia in many ways. Armenia is in blockade, which puts barriers for Armenian development. The Armenian Genocide as could be seen is influencing the process of the opening of the border and it did influence the process of the 2009

⁹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. "Nagorno-Karabakh issue." Accessed May 11, 2013. <http://www.mfa.am/en/>

⁹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia. Accessed May 11, 2013. http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/20091013_protocol1.pdf.

protocol, even though the term genocide was not written in that protocol, in case of ratifying it the genocide will be brought up into discussions.

Though there are conflicts in the region, cooperation between South Caucasian countries exist. The main ones are: the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus-Asia (“), the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport To Europe (INOGATE), Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BKE) Natural Gas Pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway Project”⁹⁹. These projects involve only Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey; Armenia does not participate in any of those, because of the conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Armenia and Turkey.¹⁰⁰

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are oriented towards West, while Armenia has traditionally been Russia’s ally. Other than geopolitical location, Azerbaijan has the greatest relative advantage, since it is rich with the hydro carbonic deposits, but the transportation depends upon the other countries, mainly Armenia and Georgia. The shortest way to Turkey is through Armenia, this is the best transportation route, where Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia would benefit. The fact that Armenia and Azerbaijan do not have any diplomatic relations and currently borders are closed, Georgia benefits from this.¹⁰¹ Closed borders are not beneficial for any of these actors, other than Georgia. The stabilization of Turkish-Armenian relations and the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, will lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Stability in the region would benefit them economically. Thus after Turkey’s accession in the EU, South Caucasian region would highly benefit from this and

⁹⁹ Guney Ayhan, and Selim Ozdemir. "Is the Regional Economic Cooperation in South Caucasus Myth or reality?" *The Journal of Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences* 16, no. 1 133-145. Accessed , 2011.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid*

¹⁰¹ Eldar Ismailov, and Vladimer Papava. "A new concept for the Caucasus." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 8, no. 3 (2008): 293-298. Accessed May, 2013.)

this leads to approve the third hypothesis: “the South Caucasian region will benefit from Turkey’s full membership of EU”.

Conclusion

The Turkish membership is indeed the most complicated one in the history of accession into the European Union. Many researchers, politicians, reports analyzed the Turkish membership and information about this topic is everywhere. The discussion how beneficial would be for the EU grant Turkey a full membership was discussed many times. However, this Master's essay was not paying attention to pros and cons rather what issues are holding for the EU to accept Turkey to their community. As was mentioned there were several issues that exists many years and the fact that Turkey did not solve or overcome those issues. The domestic issues that exist in Turkey are prolonged and democracy in Turkey is doubtful, as was stated in this Master's essay many times.

As one can tell from this Master's essay first chapter, relations between Turkey and the EU had ups and downs; these relations came to the verge of not negotiating, then normalizing the relations. Both the EU and Turkey changed their structure, the fact that a half-century passed from the first agreement, changed the whole dynamic of the integration. The slow progress of the talks advocates that there is much to achieve by Turkey and the willingness of the European Community to accept Turkey is in uncertainty.

Though from the first chapter, it could be seen that the main problems that Turkey need to solve is the Cyprus issue mainly. It does influence the European Union and Europeans. The Armenian-Turkish relations are important to be solved, however from the research it was shown that the EU in generally does not pay a huge amount of attention to that conflict and mainly the recognition of the Armenian genocide. The EU suggested Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide, but they cannot force Turkey to recognize, since

Turkey, as was stated many times by their public officials, claims that nothing like that happened.

The general opinion of Europe is an important fact. The cultural differences are the main worries for the EU citizens and public officials. The other factor is the Cyprus issue, as was mentioned, it is indeed one of the issues that Turkey needs to solve. Hypothesis 2nd is partially accepted, because of the fact that the Copenhagen Criteria does not cover the external issues but nevertheless it influences the public opinion about Turkey.

As it comes to Turkey, few conclusions could be entailed. The main reason that Turkey wants to become the EU states is economic and not being internationally isolated. Now from granting full membership to Turkey, the EU will benefit greatly, rather than Turkey.

As it comes to the South Caucasian region, the Hypothesis 3rd is accepted: the South Caucasian region will benefit from Turkey's full membership of Europe. The region would benefit from Turkey's full membership in the EU. It would certainly mean that Turkey met with the Copenhagen criteria's political, economic and *acquis communautaire*. As it comes to the first Hypothesis, which is: the Armenian-Turkish relations influence the process of Turkey's integration in the European Union, it is refuted. Though the Armenian Diaspora tries to make this as a part of the accession, during the talks the EU suggests Turkey to come up with the resolution of this issue, but it is not part of the criteria. However, as European country in future, Turkey should not have closed borders with its neighbors.

One cannot fully articulate what disadvantages and advantages Europe will have after granting a full membership to Turkey, the facts that exist about pros and cons are based on assumption. And after only granting a full membership to Turkey the challenges and compensations would be seen. The same could be told about the benefits the South Caucasus

will have from Turkey's membership. Nonetheless, this topic could be understood differently since it incorporates many different actors and coming up with the single conclusion is challenging.

Though from the first chapter, it could be seen that the main problems that Turkey need to solve is the Cyprus issue mainly. It does influence the European Union and Europeans.

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