AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA

PROSPECTS OF REVIEWING ARMENIA'S

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

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BY

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

The aim of the Master's Essay is to examine (i) the methodology and elaboration process of the creation of National Security Strategy of Armenia, (hereafter referred to as Strategy) (ii) the strength and weaknesses of the Strategy and (iii) why Armenia needs to review its Strategy. Consequently the Master's Essay is divided into 3 Parts. Part 1 discusses the evolution of Armenia's National Security Strategy since 1991 independence. It focuses on the process of adoption, how the document was drawn up by the interagency commission, with the secretary of Armenian Defense Ministry in collaboration with local and foreign experts. The consultations with NATO Partners on the development of a National Security Strategy and a Military Doctrine are presented. Parallels between the draft of the Strategy and the final approved version are being done.

Part 2 examines the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy. The utmost focus is put on analyzing the Strategy with the combination of ends, ways and means. Finally, the Master's Essay brings forward prospects of reviewing the Strategy, discussed in Part 3 and at the end will come up with conclusion.

INTRODUCTION

Five years have passed since the adoption of the National Security Strategy of Armenia. During the half of decade the changing external and domestic policy environment and the contextual shortcomings of the document call for the reviewing of RA Strategy. In 2007, the political document was approved to present the interests and priorities of RA, the external and internal threats to its security, cooperation frameworks as well as future visions. This political document is a combination of permanently changing political views, hence it requires periodical reviews in accordance with the evaluation and redefinition of political perspectives.

The problem was raised since the adoption of the document, as it raised controversial opinions on methodological ground. First of all, the problem of reviewing this public document was because of its contextual shortcomings and around methodological, theoretical and applicable aspects. Hence the history of the problem is divided into four subcategories: legal, political, economic and social.

Legal aspect of the problem is the fact that some experts claim that this political document is as important for a country as its Constitution, but in Armenia the document was not made into law. While the political aspect of the problem is the research of the Strategy in international centers. Some believe that the research of the RA Strategy in Washington, Moscow and Brussels gives the document an extra weight and see it as a balanced document. Others find the research of Strategy in the aforementioned centers as a methodological shortcoming

The economic dimension is the list of desired ends with only cursory, if any, discussions of ways and means. The Document avoids recognizing the limited resources,

moreover, wrestling with consequences of those limits. One of the shortcomings also is the unwillingness to face the necessity of tradeoffs inherent in strategic choice.

The current extent of the problem is the changing external and domestic policy environment. The external aspect in its turn is divided into global and regional aspects such as changing regional/global security and political environments, emergence of new challenges and evolving transregional integration tendencies. Among them are the events between Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia in August 2008 as well as the regular violations of the ceasefire in the contact line between the Armenian-Azerbaijani forces and the latest developments concerning Iran.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Different methodologies are applied when reviewing National Security Strategies/Concepts. The cases of US and UK are chosen. Some authors follow the traditional way of reviewing National Security Strategies. The strategy is a combination of ends, ways and means. Hemmer (2011) and Gow (2009) examine the National Security Strategies of US and UK respectively from this perspective first of all. Hemmer (2011) analyses the Obama administration's National Security Strategy in the framework of these three variables: ends, ways and means. The findings are that the Strategy lists the desired ends with only cursory, if any, discussions of ways and means. He claims that the Strategy is silent about concessions, tradeoffs and hard choices.[1] Gow also believes that UK should review its National Security Strategy by putting emphasis on the relationship of means and ends. The strategy should be more specific, instead of being general, because the challenges are defined in such a general term, that it is difficult to practice a scheme for the effective achievement of those goals. The article is worthy for providing suggestions to strengthen national security structure.[2]

These both articles are of highest importance when comparing with Armenia's case, because what the Armenia's National Security Strategy misses is the discussion of these three variables. Another problem is the prioritization of the threats, so that to put the limited resources against. It is difficult to implement a strategy when there is a wide array of diverse threats. The acknowledgement of the limited resources is important but at the same time there is a need to wrestle with the consequences of those limits and the unwillingness to face the necessity of tradeoffs. Hemmer concludes that the Strategy offers a snapshot of what the administration thinks about overall direction of American foreign policy and it is much more a National Security Aspiration rather than National Security Strategy. The same problem also

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[1] Hemmer Christopher, 2011, *Continuity and Change in the Obama Administration's National Security Strategy,* Comparative Strategy, vol. 30, is. 3, pp. 268-277

[2] James Gow, 2009, *The United Kingdom National Security Strategy: the need for new bearings in security policy*, The Political Quarterly, vol. 80, is. 1, pp. 126-133

exists in Armenia's NSS, because the Strategy is structured in a very broad way and avoids being specific, especially when the issue comes close to the major problems and threats that the country faces, be it external or internal.

Ter-Matevosyan (2010) provides review perspectives for National Security Strategy/Concept with Armenia's case. The emphasis is put on criteria for reviewing NSS. The criteria are as follows: change of priorities (when new administration comes), annual reporting, realization of one of the attributes, ecological disasters.[3] Because the RA Strategy was approved in 2007, the abovementioned criteria are actual for Armenia. On the other hand, the Nagorno-Karabagh problem is the key priority of Armenia's National Security Strategy, which implies that the militarization has a strategic meaning in the document. But problems connected with economy, rule of law that Armenia faces nowadays are of vital importance for the National Security. Giragosian (2007) argues that gravest threat to Armenian national security is not an external one, but is rooted in the internal challenge of corruption. He highlights the three specific trends of Armenian insecurity, manifested in the military, political, and economic spheres. The author concludes that only by admitting that the core challenges to national security come from within can true security and stability in Armenia be achieved.[4] The strength of article is the shift of security orientation to internal issues and threats.

Sorensen (1990) shares the similar view. He argues that the two goals, economic independence and democratic enhancement, continue to be of fundamental importance while reviewing National Security.[5] For this purpose it is important to have a thorough look at the factors in question. Moreover, these two factors are of vital importance for the national security of Armenia.

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[3] Վահրամ Տեր-Մաթևոսյան, 2010, *ՀՀ ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարության վերանայման հեռանկարներըՀայկական Բանակ*, 3(65) pp. 73-82

[4] Richard Giragosian, 2006, *Redefining Armenia's National Security Strategy*, Demokratizatsiya, vol. 14, is. 2, pp 223-234

[5] Theodore C. Sorensen, 1990, *Rethinking National Security*, Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, No. 3, pp. 1-18,

Kotanjian (2008) sees the development of the Armenia's National Security Strategy in the context of regional security in the South Caucasus. He stresses the importance of the Armenian factor in creating comprehensive security architecture in the South Caucasus, as well as promoting economic progress and democracy in the region.

However Cyr (2001) and Locher (2008) find that the formulation and implementation of the National Security Strategy first of all comes from the National Security structure. Cyr views the National Security structure from Administrative approach as a best way for the National Security Policy implementation, coordination and administration. He finds that the coordination of agencies' work was the primary objective for the creation of National Security Council. The strength of article is the strong argument that the author uses to support his hypothesis.[6]

Locher also believes that the review of NS Strategy should begin with the legislative reform of National Security system. This is an actual theme for Armenia's National Security system as well, because National Security challenges demand more effective communications and collaboration between agencies. The organizational cultures of the different components of national security system do not reward collaboration and information sharing. The author stresses the point that there is no common interagency planning process, methodology or lexicon. Thus, it is highly difficult to link strategy to resource allocation decisions. Moreover, there is no established process to monitor and assess the execution of national security policies and plans.[7]

Most importantly, during the past decades authors view the redefinition of National Security Strategy away from traditional military perspectives. The aforementioned authors and Brown (1986), Berkowitz (2007), Downes (2010) as well followed the same path. Brown

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[6] Arthur Cyr, 2001, *How important is National Security structure to National Security policy?*, World affairs, vol. 146, is. 2, pp. 127-147
[7] James R. Locher III, 2000, *The most important thing: Legislative Reform of the National Security System*, Military Review, vol. 88, is. 2, pp. 4-12

believes that the key to peace is demilitarization, because considerations of military threats have become so dominant that new threats to the security of nations are being ignored. Among the new threats he mentions oil depletion, soil erosion, land degradation, shrinking forests, climate alteration. The same problem also exists in Armenia. Armenia now faces problems connected with urbanization, sustainable development, budgetary deficit, state debt and migration. The article is relevant in terms of redefining National security from environmental perspective, however from time dimension it is not relevant as much because it is concentrated on bipolar world and on the conflict between United States and Soviet Union.[8]

Berkowitz (2007) provides another interesting approach for the redefinition of National Security Strategy. He argues for the concept of sustainability. The challenges and threats are not of the same character as they used to be. Today's U.S. adversaries are remarkably strong. With this strategy of sustainability, the U.S. will achieve its goals of ensuring peace, creating wealth, and promoting human rights and rule of law. At the end the author provides the general rules that are important for pursuing strategy based on sustainability.[9]

The same is for Kittrie (2011). He also sees the redefinition of National Security away from traditional military perspectives. In addition to abovementioned authors he speaks about law as an increasingly powerful alternative to traditional military means to achieve operational objectives. The article suggests how the United States could more effectively deploy some types of "lawfare" as a tool for promoting its national security objectives. It takes as a case study the uses and potential uses of "lawfare" against Iran.[10]

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[8] Lester R. Brown, , 1986, *Redefining National Security*, Challenge, vol. 29 is. 3, pp. 25-32
[9] Bruce Berkowitz, 2007, *Strategy for A Long Struggle,* Policy Review, is. 141, pp. 33-46
[10] Kittrie, Or., 2011, *Lawfare and US National Security*, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law; 2011, vol. 43 is. 1/2, pp. 393-421,

Ritchie (2011) is unique in his arguments for reviewing National Security Strategy. The key step towards new definition of National Security Strategy should be based on "human-centric' foundation. The key is to "put people first" namely the UK taxpayers who pay for the armed forces. This involves refocusing conceptions of 'security' away from the state, military threats, towards the needs of individual people and communities. The article provides unique ideas that a state-centric security framework rooted in military power, prestige and influence, simply does not work for billions of people or the planetary ecosystem.[11]

However review perspectives would be incomplete without prior assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the document. The paper sets out to examine:

RQ 1 What are the strengths and weaknesses of Armenia's National Security Strategy?

RQ 2 Does Armenia need to review its National Security Strategy?

RQ 3 Which institution should lead reviewing process of the Strategy?

Hypothesis: The reviewing of the Strategy should be done by a nonpartisan staff of National Security Council

METHODOLOGY

The methodology of the study is as follows: (i) primary data, (ii) secondary data, interviews. For the questionnaire and the persons participated in the interviews see Appendixes 1 and 2.

The limitation of the study mainly includes few number of persons participated in the interviews. To have the opinions of persons especially from the National Security Council would to some extent favor the study.

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[11] Nick Ritchie, 2011, *Rethinking security: a critical analyses of the Strategic Defense and Security Review,* International Affairs**,** vol. 87, is. 2, pp. 355-376

Part 1

Evolution of Armenia's National Security Strategy

The Armenian perception of National Security has changed significantly throughout history. After the fall of Bagratuni's kingdom the only priority of national security was to ensure the physical survival of the Armenian nation on its historical land. This fundamental focus on physical survival kept its way during Ottoman Empire. 1915 Armenian genocide put an utmost emphasis on the very essence of Armenia's national security: survival.[12] However new elements of national security came with the first Republic of Armenia in 1918. The independence did not last long because of the Sovietization of Armenian statehood. Giragosian argues that Sovietization of the Armenian state met the primary need for survival, but it also damaged the development of a sophisticated Armenian national security concept as the later was mostly dominated by the parameters of Soviet identity and policy. Soviet strategy resulted in the institutionalization of "regime security" over "national security."[13] After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the third Armenian Republic emerged with no experience to face the new challenges of complex reality.

South Caucasus has always been the center of the clash of interests of both the regional actors and for major powers as well. Russia, Turkey and Iran continue their historical influence in the region. After the end of the Cold War USA immediately has engaged in the activities of the region. For the main actors of the region, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the independence brought with itself new threats and challenges. The three states of the region each faced difficult course of system transition, nation-building and

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[12] Richard Giragosian, 2005.,*Toward a New Concept of Armenian National Security:* World Bank, Washington DC:
[13] Ibid

political, economic reforms. The region committed itself in overcoming the legacy and constraints of seven decades Soviet rule.

At the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vision of national security in South Caucasus was mainly dominated with the maintenance of independence and the wars on Nagorno-Karabagh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[14] Being geographically landlocked, Armenia, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union faced the blockade of borders by Turkey and Azerbaijan. The unpredictable situation in the region, yet the conflict of Nagorno-Karabagh defined the external dimension of threats to the national security of the newly independent state. On the other hand because of the system transition the internal situation within the country was unfavorable. The external threats and the internal chaotic situation within the country called for an elaborated and organized system of National Security Strategy.

Generally, National Security documents are categorized as "National Security Strategy", "National Defense/Military Strategy" and/or "Military Strategy/Military Doctrine". National Security Strategy is a strategic-political document, which conceptualizes security interests, priorities, risks and threats as well as future visions. This document prioritizes country's security needs, identifies the state's enduring strategic interests, and outlines the methods necessary to ensure those interests.

National Defense/Military Strategy, which Armenia actually does not possess, is a combination of military and political perspectives. While the third one, "Military Strategy/Military Doctrine" is purely military in its characteristics.

On February 7, 2007, the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia (hereinafter referred to as «Strategy») was approved by the President's decree. The document defines the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia as "a system of state policy aimed to guarantee state, public and individual security, sustainable development and

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[14] Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, 2012, *Territorial reintegration as a National Security Objective: The cases of Azerbaijan and Georgia,* Journal of East European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 12, is 2, pp. 1- 19*

the maintenance of the Armenian identity. It is implemented through the development and execution of a unified state policy based on an all-inclusive system of democratic values for all spheres of life"[15]

In December, 2007, Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia (hereinafter referred to as «Doctrine») was approved by the President Decree. "The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia is a set of official views embracing the political-military, military-strategic, military-economic and military-technical basis for ensuring the military security of the Republic of Armenia."[16] The Military Doctrine specifies some important details of the Strategy that are related to the military field.

The first steps toward the elaboration of the Strategy after the independence goes back to 1992. The elaboration process can be divided into three main categories: integration process, drafting and the final approval. The document was drawn up by a special interagency commission in collaboration with local and foreign experts. The research of the Strategy was conducted in Washington, Moscow and Brussels. The head of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, MoD, RA, Academic Supervisor of the Draft elaboration, Doctor of Political Sciences, Major General Haik Kotanjian in the interview with Press Attache of the Defense Ministry of Armenia Seyran Shahsuvarjan mentioned that Armenia received great assistance from Russian colleagues from the Center for the Methodology of International Relations Studies of the Russian FM Diplomatic Academy and the Russian Academy of Public Administration, who in their turn closely cooperated with experts on transitional processes from Harvard and Yale. Also efficient contacts with the experts of the Russian National and International Security Fund and the Russian Academy of Military Sciences were conducted. The updating of the "Basic Principles of the Military Policy of the Republic of

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[15] *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia*, 2007, (http://www.mfa.am/en/security/)
[16] *Military Doctrine of the Republic of Armenia*, (http://www.mil.am/eng/index.php?page=49)

Armenia: The Military-Political Aspect of National Security" started in 2000 when Serzh Sargsyan became Defense Minister.[17]

Serzh Sargsyan was aware of the Russian methods of National Security Concept development, hence he decided to enlarge the ministry's scope of theoretical-methodological national security knowledge due to the leading research centers of the US and Europe.[18] Through fellowship programs Defense Ministry's specialists studied the programs of the US National Defense University, the RAND and the Marshall Center. In order to meet the needs of the constantly changing external security environment, the specialists also studied the NATO strategy of transformation in the international security system.

It is important to mention the role of NATO in drafting the Strategy. Armenia-NATO relations date back to 1992, when Armenia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, EAPC, in 1997). Cooperation deepened and broadened after Armenia joined the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994. Armenia has consulted with NATO partners on the development of a National Security Strategy and a Military Doctrine and also conducted a Strategic Defense Review.[19]

Both documents, Strategy and Doctrine were developed as a result of Armenia's decision to deepen its defense and security links with NATO and other Western security structures. The Armenian government has since upgraded its participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program by negotiating an "Individual Partnership Action Plan," or IPAP. Further in late 2005, NATO and Armenia agreed on the country's first Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP).

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[17] Seyran Shahsuvaryan , 2006. Armenian National Security Strategy: Methods of Formulation: *An Interview with Major General Gaik Kotanjian* http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?69976-Armenian-National-Security-Strategy-Methods-Of-Formulation#.T1SggPEgcTY)

[18] Ibid

[19] International organizations, North Atlantic treaty organization (http://www.mfa.am/en/international-organisations/NATO/)

In 2004-2005 the Ministry of Defense drafted "The NSS landmarks" for the commanders of the Armed Forces. In 2005 December 15, the Interagency commission was composed of 28 members, among them members from Parliament and Central bank and the National Security Adviser. 615 amendments are being done to the preliminary draft. After 615 amendments, cross-advisory process takes place for commission members. Then Armenia's NSS glossary is crafted. Cooperation with NATO ISAG (international security advisory group) is conducted. In November 2006, Parliamentary hearings took place and after 4 months RA National Security Strategy is approved by the president in 2007 February.

However the Strategy raised controversial opinions about its methodological ground. Vigen Sargsyan, at that time assistant to the President, believes that the research of the Strategy in Washington, Moscow and Brussels gives the document an extra weight and sees it as a balanced document. According to Vigen Sargsyan, the Strategy is a result of interagency consensus, which is unprecedented in Armenia's history. Others find the research of the Strategy in the aforementioned centers as a methodological shortcoming. Here is how the external demands come into conflict with internal constraints. Ayvazyan believes that the document was researched by foreign countries' experts, countries with controversial interests and that the document is manly classified for the foreign audience rather than for internal.[20]

On the other hand, Kotanjyan finds that the Commission chose the only right way, that is to work out the national security concept on its own, based on the most advanced methodological achievements and the advice of the leading professional schools of Russia and the West. [21] According to Kotanjyan, the military-political leadership of Armenia knew well what problems could raise when just making a copy of the American document as one Central European country did. In some post-Soviet countries national security strategies were

[20] Հակոբ Չաքրյան, 2007, *ՀՀ ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարության փաստաթուղթը վերանայման կարիք ունի,* , (http://www.armtown.com/news/am/azg/20070518/2007051808/)
[21] Seyran Shahsuvaryan , 2006. Armenian National Security Strategy: Methods of Formulation: *An Interview with Major General Gaik Kotanjian* http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?69976-Armenian-National-Security-Strategy-Methods-Of-Formulation#.T1SggPEgcTY)

written by foreign experts. The documents were later translated into national languages. He argues that the chairman of the Inter-Department Commission was indisputably right when he said that each country has a unique security environment, national interests and goals and peculiar ways and priorities of their use for ensuring national security. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Russian Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov and NATO officials readily responded to Serzh Sargsyan's official request for organizing external approval of the document.[22]

In short, Kotanjyan presents the following diagnosis: the Academic Committee of the US National Defense University – "The inter-department process for developing the Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Armenia and its product comply with the modern methodological standards"; the Modern Expert Group of the national security and international relations departments of the Russian Academy of Public Administration – "The draft Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Armenia is the mature product of systematized efforts of the Inter-Department Commission"; the International Advisor Group for Security of the NATO European members – "The draft is comprehensive and scientifically substantiated". The recommendations of professional schools are especially valuable. It should be noted that the experts just recommended as they clearly understood that it is for the Armenian authorities to develop a document of national importance.

On the whole to take into account the fact that after the Soviet Union collapse there was a lack of experience in developing National Security Strategy in Armenia, the international centers' assistance toward the issue is an achievement. Richard Giragosian, Director of the Regional Studies Centre in Yerevan, believes that the Strategy was significant, especially because the process was as important as the product result. There was an interagency commission involving experts from Europe, Russia and United States. In this

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[22] Ibid

way it was good for learning experience and policy formulation. Richarg Giragosian believes that it sent a good message outside of Armenia, being professional in terms of process.[23]

It was mentioned earlier that before the final approval 615 amendments were done to the preliminary draft. Among the amendments is the issue of Armenian community of Georgia, especially Javakhq. The issue of Javakhq gives a strategic nature to Armenian-Georgian relations. The draft puts an emphasis on "the importance of targeted cooperation with Georgia regarding the sustainable and safe development of the social, spiritual and cultural sectors for the Armenian population of Javakhq, and in fact, the entire Georgian-Armenian population".[24] While the Strategy covers Javakhq only once in the following context: "The two governments (Armenia and Georgia) have engaged in fostering cooperation aimed at improving the social and economic situation of the Armenian population of Georgia, including the Armenian community of the southern Georgian region of Javakhk." The Strategy puts an emphasis on "improving social and economic situation" while the draft is much more specific. It says: "…voluntarily took upon themselves an obligation to protect the democratic freedoms of national and regional minorities and maintain political, civic, social, economic, educational and cultural rights…"[25]

In case of Nagorno-Karabagh problem, the draft again is more specific and gives more precise points acceptable for the solution:

1. Exclusion of Nagorno-Karabagh's subordination to Azerbaijan. Exclusion of Nagorno-Karabagh's existence as an enclave. Existence of Nagorno-Karabagh's land border.

2. International guarantees for creating necessary conditions for Nagorno-Karabagh's participation in progressive world integration processes; and

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[23] Interview with Richard Giragosian, Director of the Regional Studies Centre in Yerevan, 13.06.2012, Yerevan
[24] Hayk Kotanjian, 2008, *Guidlines on developuing Armenian national security strategy in the context of regional security architecture,* Yerevan, Drastamat Kanayan institute for national strategic studies, MOD, RA,
[25] Ibid

3.   The necessity for clear international guarantees for the non-resumption of war and ensuring the security of Nagorno-Karabagh problem.

After the amendments the Strategy says "The Republic of Armenia advocates a peaceful and compromise – based solution to the conflict".[26] "Nagorno-Karabagh should have a geographic link to Armenia and its security should be guaranteed" If the draft mentions in what circumstances the existence of Nagorno-Karabagh will be acceptable, the Strategy mentions: "Armenia is ready to accept only a resolution which would affirm the irreversible reality of the existence of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabagh".[27]

As for institutional reforms, the draft says that in order to establish democratic mechanism for effective public control, for strengthening anti-corruption measures, especially those against bribery, "the Republic of Armenia is implementing appropriate long-term state programs, including the Poverty Reduction Program, the Millennium Challenge Program and the Anti-Corruption Strategy Program". What the Strategy says is: "Institutional reforms are aimed at the strengthening of a democratic state… an intensification of the fight against corruption, especially bribery. In this respect, Armenia has initiated a number of long-term state programs, most notably an anti-corruption strategy".[28] In the Strategy, Poverty Reduction Program, the Millennium Challenge Program and the Anti-Corruption Strategy Program are missing and instead of programs the document says only anti-corruption strategy generally, it does not say how, by what means, and who is in charge for that vision.

The draft of the Strategy includes objectives, ways and means. To some extent, it is more specific in describing external and domestic security strategy. The draft sets out its objectives in domestic security, then the ways, and means, how to achieve these objectives. Put differently, the draft describes the main goals of the domestic security in the following arenas: defense, political-legal, institutional, socio-economic, information-communications.

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[26] *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia*, 2007(http://www.mfa.am/en/security/)
[27] Ibid
[28] Ibid

In order to achieve these objectives, the draft anticipates legislative, institutional, economic, social, informational reforms. The reforms are the ways to achieve the objectives. The draft then continues mentioning the means for achieving the objectives, which the Strategy actually lacks. According to the draft, "the Republic of Armenia implements legislative reforms... on the basis of harmonizing it with the standards of democratic legitimacy, humanism, openness as set forth by international law. The process of constitutional reforms has fundamental and crucial significance".[29]

To sum up, the collapse of the Soviet Union left South Caucasus states in a new strategic environment and without any experience in conceptualizing their National Security priorities. Although disoriented security preferences came to dominate the foreign policy agenda of the newly independent states in the region, Armenia, in contrast to Georgia and Azerbaijan, was quick in its security preferences with an immediate take of Russia's side. Meanwhile, NATO was quick in its engagement in the region which is illustrated in the political and reform oriented agendas, namely "Partnership for Peace" and "Individual Partnership Action Plan". Due to this process of integration the concept of security made shift from state-centric nature to nation-centric.[30] Georgia was the first to present its IPAP to NATO in 2004. According to IPAP project, each partner would be given advice on political and security related issues. While elaborating on National Security documents, each country in the region pursued its own security agenda based on some compulsory methodological recommendations from the West.[31] The NSDs of South Caucasus countries (Georgia in 2005, Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2007) raised much interest among politicians, scholars and the international relations community both within and outside the countries. However controversial opinions concerning the methodological structure also found ground in

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[29] Hayk Kotanjian, 2008, *Guidlines on developuing Armenian national security strategy in the context of regional security architecture,* Yerevan, Drastamat Kanayan institute for national strategic studies, MOD, RA,
[30] Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, 2012, *Territorial reintegration as a National Security Objective: The cases of Azerbaijan and Georgia,* Journal of East European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 12, is. 2, pp. 1-19
[31] Ibid

Armenia. Some see it as a balanced document based on the most advanced methodological achievements and the advice of the leading professional schools of Russia and the West while others find that the document is manly directed for the foreign audience rather than for internal. On this point, while the Chapter One of the current thesis was designed in a way to present the methodology of the evolution and elaboration process of RA National Security Strategy, Chapter Two will discuss the structural strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy.

Part 2

Strengths and weaknesses of the RA National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy of Armenia "is a system of state policy aimed to guarantee state, public, and individual security, sustainable development and the maintenance of the Armenian identity. It is implemented through the development and execution of a unified state policy based on an all-inclusive system of democratic values for all spheres of life."[32] This important document is a state-wide political document that presents the core state policy principles which guarantee the security of the individual, state, and society as well as the identity of all Armenians. The National Security Strategy of Armenia begins with fundamental values of the National Security of the Republic of Armenia such as independence, protection of state and its population, peace and international cooperation, preservation of national identity and prosperity. It then moves on to factors and policies guaranteeing aforementioned fundamental values of national security (for example, efficient and transparent state institutions, safeguarding human rights, maintaining law-enforcement structure, protecting vulnerable segments, developing innovative technologies). Then the Strategy turns to describing threats to the national security, separated as external and internal threats. Consequently, the Strategy describes the ways for ensuring domestic and external security.

The Strategy has its strengths and weaknesses. A key strength is that the RA Strategy is not limited only to traditional military and security issues, but also covers the full set of wider issues. Baldwin argues that most often policy-makers are concerned with redefining the Strategic Concept of Security with the traditional concern from military perspective, rather

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[32] *Republic of Armenia, National Security Strategy*, 2007

than with internal threats.[33] During the past decades most authors view the redefinition of National Security Strategy away from traditional military perspectives. For example Brown, Berkowitz, Downes followed the same path. Brown believes that the key to peace is demilitarization, because considerations of military threats have become so dominant that new threats to the security of nations are being ignored. Among the new threats he mentions oil depletion, soil erosion, land degradation, shrinking forests, climate alteration.[34] The same problem also exists in Armenia. The strategy says that it is aimed to guarantee sustainable development along with state, public and individual security.[35] Berkowitz in his work "Strategy for a long struggle" argues for the concept of sustainability. The challenges and threats are not of the same character as they used to be. In case of USA, he says that with this strategy of sustainability, the U.S. will achieve its goals of ensuring peace, creating wealth, and promoting human rights and rule of law.[36]

The Strategy is strong in a sense that it puts an emphasis on the maintenance of the Armenian identity. Part One of the current thesis described the evolution of Armenia's National Security concept with the main emphasis on "survival" and protection of national identity. Wolfers defines security as the absence of threat to acquired values.[37] Not only safety, defense, autonomy are the only values to be protected but other values also exist. Identity security comes first while defining the security level of a community. Security is the protection of core values and promotion of core values.

The Strategy is strong as much as it gives high priority for democratic values. Most important, the Strategy views democratic values as means for achieving it ends. Mainly, the Strategy says that "The National Security Strategy of Armenia … is implemented through the

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[33] David Baldwin, 1997, *The concept of security*, Review of International Studies, v.23, pp. 1-12

[34] Lester R. Brown, 1986, *Redefining National Security*, Challenge, vol. 29 is. 3, pp. 25-32

[35] *Republic of Armenia, National Security Strategy*, 2007

[36] Bruce Berkowitz, 2007 *Strategy for A Long Struggle,* Policy Review, is. 141, pp. 33-46

[37] Arnold Wolfers, 1952 *"National security" as an ambiguous symbol,* Political Science Quarterly, vol. 67, no 4, pp. 481-502

development and execution of a unified state policy based on an all-inclusive system of democratic values for all spheres of life." [38]

According to Richard Giragosian what is most interesting is that National Security Strategy identifies internal threats to its security just as much as external, in terms of corruption, lack of democracy and etc… The strength is that the document correctly recognizes and balances external threats with internal threats.[39]

The Strategy is strong for providing a precise definition of its ends, fundamental values and consequently providing ways for achieving those ends. However, the 3 greatest shortcomings of the document is that (i) it is very general, it lacks specific definition of problems and consequently (ii) lacks the definition of means for the solution of the problem and (iii) it fails to identify seriously the key challenges, hence it can not offer anything in terms of the way in which the challenges can be faced.

What the Strategy misses is the discussion of means for achieving the ends. The document is not precise in defining what resources should be used. Along the way, it does not offer much analysis of whether these goals are feasibly achievable and whether their policies will be strong and agile enough to get the job fully done. "Strategy" is at once concept and process, relationship of ends and means.[40]

The document is silent about such issues as in what territory Armenia wants to exist. The document does not speak about the attributes of Armenian question, among them the international recognition of Armenian genocide. It is silent about territorial problems. Moreover, the document is not precise about Javakhk, Nakhijevan and Western Armenia. The

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[38] *Republic of Armenia, National Security Strategy*, 2007
[39] Interview with Richard Giragosian, Director of the Regional Studies Centre in Yerevan, 13.06.2012, Yerevan
[40] James Gow, 2009, *The United Kingdom National Security Strategy: the need for new bearings in security policy,* The Political Quarterly, vol. 80, is. 1, pp. 126-133,

document talks only about Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict resolution, leaving apart the issue of Nakhijevan, Shahumyan, Getashen.[41]

The word Javakhk is mentioned in the Strategy in the following way: "The two governments (Armenia and Georgia) have engaged in fostering cooperation aimed at improving the social and economic situation of the Armenian population of Georgia, including the Armenian community of the southern Georgian region of Javakhk."[42] Social and economic situation is not exhaustive. The fact is that the social-political life of the Armenians of Javakhk is under the continuous, direct and total control of the Georgian force structures. Attempts to uproot any expression of protest by the Armenians of Javakhk are immediately uprooted by the police through repression, threats, bribes, criminal cases etc.; The Georgian authorities go on forcing the Georgian language in territories where Armenians live; in Samtskhe-Javakhk region, Armenians are the 55% of the population, but they are almost not represented in the government of the region; the Georgian government creates illegal obstacles for the passage of Armenian-language books in Georgia, etc.[43]

Even less is there a conceptualization of such major internal problems as emigration, budget deficit, state debt. It fails to be explicit in challenges. The identification of threats and challenges is weak in the NSS. The Strategy shows its weakness when the issue comes close to the means for the solution of these problems. It does not show the means, the resources the government, the country will mobilize to implement the ways. Moreover, it lacks analyses of obstacles and challenges that stand in the way of execution. The Strategy is silent to explain how the government intends to overcome the aforementioned challenges and obstacles.

The strategy does not say anything about the major problem that Armenia faces nowadays, the problem of emigration. A state is first and foremost rich by its human

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[41] Հակոբ Չաքրյան, 2007, *ՀՀ ազգային անվտանգության ռազմավարության փաստաթուղթը վերանայման կարիք ունի*, , (http://www.armtown.com/news/am/azg/20070518/2007051808/)
[42] *Republic of Armenia, National Security Strategy*, 2007
[43] *The issues of Armenians in Javakhk*, 2011, http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/politics21418.html

resources. The human capital is of highest priority for a nation's survival and well-being. According to AGBU statistics the number of emigrants from Armenia between 1990 and 2010 is estimated to be 1,000,000. Two-thirds went to Russia, 9% to other former Soviet republics, 15% to Europe, and 10% to the United States. Two-thirds of the emigrants cite economic reasons. According to a UN report released in May 2010, the number is between 700,000 and 1,300,000.   According to UN statistics, 6,226 native Armenians sought refuge in 44 other countries in 2009, representing a 43 percent increase and 2.5 times the number of Azeris having sought similar refuge. 95,000 individuals left Armenia in the first quarter of 2010 – a 7.1% increase over the same period last year.[44] Emigration is an internal threat and it should be addressed in the Strategy in a way that it will provide the ways and means for dealing with the issue so that to bring it to the minimum level possible.

Another major problem is budget deficit and state debt. The fact that the Strategy was approved in 2007, before 2008 world crisis, shows the highest necessity for reviewing the Strategy. Armenia is the only country in Eastern Europe and Central Asia that runs a larger current account deficit than it did before the crisis: its current account deficit is estimated to have crossed the 12 percent mark of GDP in 2011, a far away from the average of 3.3 percent for the five years preceding 2008. (Policy Forum Armenia, 2012) Armenia reacted to the crisis through external borrowing which doubled Armenia's public debt in 2009-10 and almost completely exhausted its borrowing capacity for years to come. Having reached 40 percent of GDP, Armenia's debt has come dangerously close to the default threshold for developing countries. According to PFA Report, in the next three years (2012-14), the country needs to repay its external creditors over $1 billion in principal and interest, of which $600 million is owed to the International Monetary Fund. (2012)[45]. This is likely to further

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[44] *Factoids about Armenia and Karabagh*, 2010 http://araratmagazine.org/2010/07/factoids-armenia/
[45] *Armenia: Averting an economic catastrophe*, 2012, Policy Forum Armenia, special report

aggravate the internal social and economic conditions and to undermine Armenia's position in the region.

The Strategy defines urbanization threat in a following way: "The continuation of this trend of urbanization constitutes a threat to the national security, as it results in a pattern of overly compact inhabitation and settlement in the areas prone to seismic activity, a deterioration of the demographic balance in rural areas, and a depopulation of border villages". [46] Again we have a problem, although addressed in the document as a threat to national security, however without any discussion of means and ways for dealing with the issue. According to CIA World Factbook urban population is 64 % of the total population of the country (2010) and rate of urbanization is 0.5% annually.[47] Because of urbanization rural areas in Armenia become depopulated. According to Soghoyan "in many rural areas of the former Soviet Union, poverty and unemployment are forcing people to leave, but in Armenia it is men who are going, leaving whole villages almost entirely populated by women".*[48]* Actually youth is also leaving villages for the purpose of education, employment and other reasons. The damage here is twice, because in case of high level of urbanization, both Yerevan and villages suffer. Yerevan becomes overpopulated, which brings to environmental problems, water and air pollution, housing problems, unemployment, increased crime and poverty, traffic jams, and the like. From environmental perspective, the high level of urbanization makes the cars and burning waste emit dangerous gases that change the air quality in the city and pose threats to people's health. Dangerous gases like carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxides cause respiratory diseases, like asthma, bronchitis, etc.[49] Studies show that disease rate rises when the air pollution level increases. With the increased population it

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[46] *Republic of Armenia, National Security Strategy, 2007*
[47] Central intelligence agency, *The world factbook*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html
[48] Yeranuhy Soghoyan, *"Armenian Migration: Does the BBC Know Something our Officials Do Not?"* Yerevan, 2012

[49] United Nations environment programme www.unep.org

becomes difficult to manage the waste. Most of the waste is dumped into rivers or the streets. The waste pollutes the water and it consequently becomes difficult to get clean water.[50] On the other hand, as a result, villages become gradually depopulated, which causes serious problems, especially the risk is much higher for bordering villages. Also problems connected with food provision for those living in the city are unavoidable. People move to the city, population grows in the city, which means that more pressure is put on the rural people (who are few, therefore, in amount and mostly women) to produce food for the growing amount of urban people.

Giragosyan in his article "Redefining Armenian National Security" argues that the greatest threat to National Security of Armenia is not an external one, but rather internal connected with corruption. Corruption has its negative impact on democratic development of a state, because transparency, rule of law, accountability, good governance are prerequisites for dealing with the issue.

The Strategy is silent about Secure Cyberspace. Cybersecurity threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety and economic challenges. The very technologies that empower the state to lead and to create also empower those who would disrupt and destroy. The US National Security Strategy sees threats from individual criminal hackers to organized criminal groups, and terrorist networks.[51] The strategy requires networks that are secure, trustworthy and resilient and at the same time protecting and safeguarding privacy and civil liberties as a national security priority. Protection of privacy and civil liberties is the respect for human dignity, a fundamental approach to human rights, which is in its turn actually not a priority in Armenia's National Security Strategy.

To conclude, the essential difference between Concept and Strategy is that the former one is concentrated on the question "What?" while the later one on the question "How?" In

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[50] Ibid
[51] US National Security Strategy, 2010

order to answer the question "How?" strategy sets up its ends, ways, and means. Hence the ways and means are the core features of the strategy to pursue its ends. Examining the RA Strategy exactly from this point led to a conclusion that the Strategy actually lacks describing the ways and means for achieving its ends. In some cases the Strategy even fails to identify seriously the key challenges, hence it can not offer anything in terms of the way and means in which the challenges can be faced. On this point, after describing the methodological and structural shortcomings of the Strategy, the Third Chapter of the thesis will be devoted to examining why Armenia needs to review its National Security Strategy.

Part 3

Why Armenia needs to review its National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy of Armenia was adopted in 2007 and since then there have been changes in circumstances which by all means require a review or at least partial elaboration of the Strategy. The importance of this factor leads to the formation of the research question and hypothesis which will be discussed in the third Part of the current Master's Essay. The two research questions and the hypothesis stand as follows:

RQ 2: Does Armenia need to review it National Security Strategy?

RQ 3: Which institution should lead the reviewing process of the Strategy?

Hypothesis: The reviewing of the Strategy should be done by the nonpartisan staff of National Security Council.

The circumstances have changed since 2007, when the Strategy was adopted. The main factors that call for the reviewing of the Strategy are

1. Changing external environment (global and regional)

2. Changing domestic policy environment

3. Change of priorities

The current extent of the problem is the changing external and domestic policy environment. The external aspect in its turn is divided into global and regional dimensions such as changing global/regional security and political environments, emergence of new challenges and evolving transregional integration tendencies. The changing global external dimension is characterized by the financial crisis of 2008, which hit most countries worldwide, be it developed or developing country. During the economic crisis of 2008-2009, Armenia experienced the consequences of crisis. The fact that the villagers are the most

vulnerable part of our nation is a well-known concern and hence the villagers suffered most from the global economic crisis.

Among external changes are the latest developments concerning Iran. Up to recently Iran has been subject to rounds of sanctions. Armenia, with its closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, has friendly relations only with two out of four neighboring countries, with Islamic Republic of Iran and Georgia. In order to recognize the essence of Armenia's position toward UN sanctions against Islamic Republic of Iran several factors are needed to be taken into the center of the agenda. The set of factors include the geographic location, being neighboring countries, history and commitment to friendly relations, cooperation in economic, energy and financial sectors, the factor of Iran as being an ally in the region and undoubtedly the factor of Armenian Diaspora in Iran.

During this period the region faced the events between Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia in August 2008 as well as the regular violations of the ceasefire in the contact line between the Armenian-Azerbaijani forces. Emergence of new challenges and evolving transregional integration tendencies, activities of certain countries aimed at the economic isolation and exclusion of the RA from major economic projects in the region is one of the major threats to RA. Azerbaijan's constant war rhetoric is a serious threat to Armenian National Security. At the UN Security Council meeting under the chairman of Ilham Aliev, Azerbaijan repeated the "overused thesis of anti-Armenian propaganda of Azerbaijan".[52] Azerbaijan's activities toward isolation of Armenia, is the greatest challenge. During the protest outside the Iranian Embassy the demonstrators also blamed Iran for supporting Armenia. They used such anti-Armenian slogans as "Drop Armenia from your chest", "Without Iran, Armenia's last breath would exhaust", "Iran, don't support

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[52] Armenpress, 2012 *"Overused thesis of anti-Armenian propaganda of Azerbaijan".*

Armenians".[53] Instead of trying to reach the peaceful settlement of Nagorno Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan all the time puts emphasis on its military capacity, claiming that Azerbaijan's military budget ten times exceeds Armenian. On the other hand, Georgia, northern neighbor to Armenia, sees Azerbaijan as a strategic partner, while referring to relations with Armenia based on balance.

In the domestic dimension are the risks generated by disproportionate urbanization and migration. Chapter Two of the current Master's Essay covered the contextual shortcomings of the Strategy, among them the problems connected with the urbanization and migration. The problem is especially under the concern for bordering villages, which become empty as a result of urbanization and migration. The highest rates of urbanization and migration represent a major threat to the national security of Armenia.

The internal dimension of the changes includes man-made crises and ecological disasters. The issue to be addressed is also the crisis connected with the Mach 1st event in 2008. After the February 2008 presidential elections, the opposition led by former RA president Levon Ter-Petrosyan challenged the official results and organized mass demonstrations. However the demonstrations did not lead to a peaceful revolution but a bloody repression, with eight dead and dozens of wounded as a result of all-night clashes between the opposition and police forces.[54] Man-made and ecological disasters can have a greatest influence on national security. The unexpected outcome of the disasters can be brought to the minimum level possible if the National Security Council elaborates an effective crises-management policy. Not to go so far but the latest event associated with the landslide as a result of the rains in the northwestern region of Tavush in Armenia which buried several cars on the main road close to Lchkadzor village near the border with Georgia. The landslide was 200 m long and 60 m in height. A number of trucks and cars rolled into

[53] News.az, 2012, *Protests held outside Iranian Embassy in Azerbaijan*
[54] Vicken Cheterian, 2010 , *From reform and transition to "Colored revolutions"* Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, pp. 1-22

Debed river as a result. Electricity was cut off in the neighboring communities because of damaged powerlines and water pipeline supplying water to five communities was damaged and out of order depriving these communities of water. As a result of the landslide five people were declared missing; nine people were hospitalized; 35 machines were completely buried and most of them damaged. Although the search and rescue teams worked tirelessly throughout day and night, the continuing rains, the threat of the landslide hazard complicated the search and rescue work since heavy equipment could not be used.[55]

The third factor that calls for reviewing the Strategy is the change of priorities. It is accepted that the newly elected president running for the office brings with him a new National Security Strategy/Concept with his own preferences and priorities. However in 2008 presidential elections, when Serzh Sargsyan became the president, there was a little expectation that a new version of Strategy will be adopted as Serzh Sargyan was actively engaged in the elaboration and adoption process of the Strategy.

Beniamin Poghosyan, Deputy Director of the Institute of National Strategic Studies, Yerevan, finds that because the Strategy was adopted in 2007 January and President Serzh Sargsyan took the office in 2008 February, in this one year period to speak about new Strategy is not realistic. Also to take into account the fact that Serzh Sargsyan beginning from 2000s was directly engaged in the elaboration procedures, hence it is not logical to review the Strategy after one year period from the adoption of the Strategy.[56] *

However during the interview with Richard Giragosian, he mentioned that the Strategy should be reviewed at least every two yeas. Because the threats change, such as the emergence of economic crisis, while the document was adopted before the crisis. As Serzh Sargsyan is a former Minister of Defense, in a good way he understands the National

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[55] *Landslide in Armenia*, www.trust.org
[56] Interview with Beniamin Poghosyan, Deputy Director of the Institute of National Strategic Studies, Yerevan, 10.06.2012, Yerevan
* The views are those of Beniamin Poghosyan personally, and do not represent the point of view of the Institute per se

Security, so expectations are higher, requiring him to do more, take more actions toward National Security.[57]

Up to now among the policies taken is the Strategic Defense Review 2011-2015. The main result of the work done in addition to the existing short- term planning, is a full cycle of mid-term defense planning, providing the basis for setting up serious preconditions for the main processes of long-term defense planning. Moreover, a solid institutional background has been established to institutionalize the defense planning system and link the defense budgeting system, military education, military industry, equipment acquisition, development of the military infrastructures, management system (particularly via regulations of civilian-military relations within the MOD of the RA), and the public awareness mechanisms with the governmental and budgeting systems more effectively.

Currently the review of the RA Strategy is supposed to be done by the RA National Security Council. In the USA National Security Council first of all is called to provide foreign policy coordination in a manner that is seen to be impossible through reliance on the State Department alone.[58] Another important feature of National Security Council structure is the policy implementation. Administrative approach of National Security Council structure puts an emphasis on coordination and insurance that presidential directives and NSC decisions are carried out. The key approach is the translation from concept to implementation, from declaration to operation. In the USA the Strategy is periodically prepared by the executive branch of the government of the United States. According to the USA NS Act of 1947, the 3 intrinsic responsibilities of NSC Staff are as follows: (i) to assure that the President has full information to make the key decisions, (ii) monitor the implementation, (iii) coordinate political, economic, military and intelligence aspects for

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[57] Interview with Richard Giragosian, Director of the Regional Studies Centre in Yerevan, 13.06.2012, Yerevan
[58] Arthur Cyr, 2001, *How important is National Security structure to National Security policy?*, World affairs, vol. 146, is. 2, pp. 127-147

President to deal with threats and opportunities.[59] In a broad definition, the NS Council (i) provides information and policy advice to the president, (ii) manages the policy coordination process, (iii) monitors implementation of presidential policy decisions, (iv) manages the interdepartmental dimensions of crises, (v) articulates the president's policies, (vi) undertakes long-term strategic planning, (vii) conducts liaison with Congress and foreign government (viii) coordinates summit meetings and NS related trips.[60]

This shows the main mission of National Security Council toward the implementation of the Strategy, rather than the creation or review of the strategy. In 2007, the creation process of the RA Strategy was led by the Defense Ministry. However since 2008 the Council could have gained enough experience to lead the reviewing process. But the main shortcoming that really weakens the efficient activity of the Council is its political party orientation. That the Secretary is the head of a political party speaks about the fact that the staff of the Council becomes full of Secretary's political party members, hence it weakens the efficiency of the Council's activities. According to Beniamin Poghosyan, because the Secretary has a Party affiliation, therefore the staff of the Council is filled with the Party members, which means that after each political change, not only Secretary but also the staff changes. In this case the issue of the quality of experts and specialists rises. So the fact that the Secretary's position was ranked among politicized positions was not right. On the whole the position of Secretary should not be left to political party issues, that X party gained that much votes for the Y party and he finds that the Secretary's politicized position is wrong and it can at least be a discretionary position, left to the President's appointment.[61]

[59] Constantine Menges, *Improving national security decision-making*, Organizing for National security, ed. Douglas T.Stuart, 2000, pp 203-205
[60] Gabriel Marcella, *National security and the Interagency process: Forward into the 21st century*, Organizing for national security, ed. Douglas T. Stuart, 2000, pp172
[61] Interview with Beniamin Poghosyan, Deputy Director of Institute of National Strategic Studies, Yerevan, 10.06.2012

On the other hand Beniamin Poghosyan finds that the review of the strategy can also be led by the Presidential Administration along with National Security Council and with interagency collaboration. As the National Security Council is adjunct to the Presidential Administration, consequently it will be logical if activities are coordinated by Presidential Administration and National Security Council including such institutions as the Institute of National Strategic Studies, as one of the main elaborators of the Strategy.[62] On the whole, it is more logical that review procedures will be coordinated by the Presidential Administration.

Richard Giragosian during the interview mentioned that theoretically the National Security Council together with the Ministry of Defense and the National Security Service is in charge for the reviewing. As for Presidential Administration, it has the dominant, strongest role, but also is the smallest in terms of resources and it is not really their job, because President should have outside recommendations, form other ministries, not from his office. At least the Presidential Administration can lead with the representatives of other ministries, NSC, MoD and etc.

Although much emphasis is put on the question, whether the Strategy should be reviewed or not, the policy option for reviewing the Strategy can be annual reporting as it is in the USA. Snider says that annual report was not to be a neutral planning document, rather it serves 5 primary purposes: (i) to communicate strategy vision to Congress and thus legitimize a rationale for reasons. It is considered the beginning point for dialogue. (ii) to communicate the same vision to constituencies . (iii) to communicate to selected domestic audiences, often political supporters of the President. (iv) for internal constituency of those in the executive branch, the document creates internal consensus on foreign and defense policies. (v) how it contributes to the overall agenda of the President. [63]

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[62] Interview with Beniamin Poghosyan, Deputy Director of Institute of National Strategic Studies, Yerevan, 10.06.2012
[63] Don M. Snider, 1995, *The national security strategy: documenting strategic vision*, 2ed, pp. 106-135

Particularly, the practice of an annual reporting can enhance the system and make the strategy increasingly better. In the United States this annual reporting practice was instituted during the Nixon Administration. It became a part of law in 1986 by Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act and became binding for every Administration to submit to Congress an annual report on national security strategy[64].

Matthew Baldwin argues that initially the amendment was to enhance the effectiveness of the strategic planning. By requiring a Strategy report, which was focused on identifying goals in accordance with relating ends with means, resource allocation and also set within the context of time horizon, the Congress helped to eliminate strategic inefficiency and error. According to Baldwin, GNA (Goldwater-Nichols act) laid the cornerstone for the rebirth of an effective national security strategy. After some series of critical failures, the aim of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to provide a legislative safeguard against future failures in U.S. national security strategy. By passing the Act, Congress anticipated corrections in significant deficiencies in general strategic planning and insurance that strategy was complemented by available resources and vice-versa fiscal efficiency in national defense spending.[65]

To sum up, Part three was designed in a way to examine the two research questions: (i) why Armenia needs to review its National Security Strategy and (ii) which institution should lead the reviewing process. During these five years the changes of circumstances call for reviewing the document. Changes in the external and internal environment and change of priorities take the main focus under the agenda. Part 2 covered the strengths and weaknesses

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[64] Richard Giragosian, 2005.,*Toward a New Concept of Armenian National Security:* World Bank, Washington DC:

[65] Baldwin, *In search of US Grand Strategy: National Security Strategy since Goldwater-Nichols,* Duke University

of the document. It emphasized the point that the Strategy should be reviewed in accordance with ends, ways and means.

While the second question rises: Which institution should lead the reviewing processes. This Part presented various views expressed during the interviews. While Presidential Administration is strong and dominant enough to lead these procedures, it does not possess sufficient resources for this vision. Hence during these recent years National Security Council may have generated enough experience. If the process to be left for the Council then efficient reviewing calls for nonpartisan orientation in the Council. Each political change may have its consequence on the overall activity of the Council. The hypothesis stressed the need for the efficient reviewing of the Strategy with nonpartisan oriented Council staff, because after each changes, the issues of the quality of experts and specialists rise.

Conclusion

In the broad sense the purpose of the study was to examine (i) the methodology and elaboration process of the creation of National Security Strategy of Armenia, (ii) the strength and weaknesses of the Strategy and (iii) why Armenia needs to review its Strategy. In the narrow sense the Master's Essay set out to examine particularly (i) the factors that call for reviewing, (ii) which institution should lead the reviewing processes and (iii) to test the hypothesis, that stands as following: The reviewing of the Strategy should be done by the nonpartisan staff of National Security Council.

Part 1 of the current Master's Essay reached the conclusion that after the collapse of Soviet Union, there was a lack of experience in developing National Security Strategy. However NATO was quick in its engagement in the region. The countries of the region, including Armenia pursued their own security agenda based on some methodological recommendations from the West. This in its turn raised controversial opinions on the methodological ground. However, taking into account the fact, that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Armenia found itself without any experience to develop National Security Strategy, the assistance from international centers was an achievement.

Part 2 was constructed to discuss the first research question about the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy. The main findings included the following points. Among the strengths of the document are the facts that the Strategy (i) is not limited to traditional military perspectives, (ii) gives high priority for democratic values, (iii) balances external threat with internal threats.

As for the weaknesses, the facts are that the Strategy (i) is not precise on some threats, (ii) lacks the definition of means, (iii) fails to identify some key challenges. Part 2 concluded with the remarks that there is no conceptualization of some major internal problems, the

Strategy does not show the means and the resources the government needs to achieve its ends and finally is not explicit to explain how the government intends to overcome some of the challenges and obstacles. On this very point Part 3 set out to test two research questions: (i) why Armenia needs to review its National Security Strategy, (ii) which institution should lead the reviewing process and the hypothesis: The reviewing of the Strategy should be done by the nonpartisan staff of National Security Council.

Part 3 argued that change of circumstances (global, regional and domestic) and change of priorities call for reviewing of the document. Moreover, the review should be done in accordance with ends, ways and means, along with the contextual shortcomings discussed in Part 2.

While testing which institution should lead the reviewing process, the Master's Essay reached the conclusion that during these recent years National Security Council may have generated enough experience. However if the process to be left for the Council, then efficient reviewing calls for nonpartisan orientation in the Council. Each political change may have its consequence on the overall activity of the Council. The hypothesis stressed the need for the efficient reviewing of the Strategy with nonpartisan oriented Council staff, because after each changes, the issues of the quality of experts and specialists rise.

In the concluding remarks, the Part 3 presented the essence of annual reporting as a policy option. The foremost essence of annual reporting is its focus on identifying goals in accordance with relating ends with means, resource allocation and also settlement within the context of time horizon. The practice of an annual reporting can enhance the system and make the Strategy increasingly better.

The final and main conclusion is that Armenia should review its National Security Strategy and the reviewing should be monitored by the nonpartisan staff of National Security Council.

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Appendix A

Interview questionnaire

1. How do you evaluate RA National Security Strategy, especially the fact that the research was conducted in Washington, Moscow, Brussels.

2. What do you think what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Strategy

3. What do you think, is the Strategy enough precise in defining ways and means for achieving its ends?

4. What do you think, does Armenia need to review its Strategy? If yes, why? And especially which parts?

5. It is accepted that the newly elected Authorities bring new Strategy? What do you think, why President Sargsyan did not do that? And do you find it likely that if reelected in 2013 he will do that?

6. At the NS Administration there is a newly created department to lead the reviewing. Does it have the sufficient experience to effectively lead these procedures?

7. What do you think, which institution should lead the reviewing of the Strategy?

8. What is your attitude toward the fact that NC Secretary's position is politicized?

9. What do you think should amendments be done in the RA Law concerning the depoliticized nature of the NS Secretary?

10. And the last question: In many countries, also in the USA, there is law on annual reporting. Is there a possibility to integrate such a system?

Appendix B

The interviews were conducted with

- Beniamin Poghosyan – Deputy Director at the Institute of National Strategic Studies

- Richard Giragosian – Director of the Regional Studies Centre in Yerevan.