

**AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA**

**INTEGRATING TURKEY INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
PROS AND CONS**

**A MASTER'S ESSAY SUBMITTED TO  
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF  
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
FOR PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF ARTS**

**BY  
NELLI CHOLAKHYAN**

**YEREVAN, ARMENIA**

**DECEMBER 2005**

SIGNATURE PAGE

---

Faculty Advisor

Date

---

Dean

Date

American University of Armenia

December 2005

## **Acknowledgments**

I am very grateful to my Faculty Advisor, Dr. Armen Aivazyan, for substantial support that he provided me during the whole process of writing this Master's Essay. I am thankful to my Faculty Advisor for his advice and for willingness to provide me any kind of information referring to the topic, since these factors were the main reasons encouraging me to write this paper.

Dr. Aivazyan's significant experience in the field of international relations both in practical settings and in theory were informative and helpful for me to obtain, analyze and deepen my knowledge about Turkey in general and its processes of development on the way of integration into the European Union in particular.

In general, I am pleased to express my sincere gratitude to all instructors, lecturers and doctors of the Graduate School of Political Science and International Affairs.

## Table of Contents

Introduction.....	5
Literature review and methodology .....	10
Chapter 1 .....	14
Historical Background: Turkey-EU Relationships.....	14
Chapter 2 .....	21
The Major Obstacles For Turkey’s Integration Into Europe .....	21
European Democratic Standards And Turkey’s Compliance With Them .....	25
Turkey And Its Significant “European” Geographic Location .....	31
Chapter 3 .....	34
Kurdish PKK Guerrilla Activities Cause A Problem For Turkey’s Integration Into The EU.....	34
Chapter 4 .....	38
The Relationship Between Turkey’s Historical Background, Religious-Cultural Heritage, Human Rights Record And The Unwillingness Of Some European Countries To Add Turkey To The EU	38
Chapter 5 .....	42
Armenian Genocide’s Denial As An Additional Obstacle For Turkey’s Integration Into EU.....	42
Armenian-Turkish Relations Vis-A-Vis Turkey’s EU Integration Process .....	48
Conclusions.....	52
REFERENCES: .....	55
<i>Appendix A: A Timeline of EU-Turkey relationships</i> .....	58

## **List of abbreviations**

EC	- European Council
EIONET	- European Information and Observation Network
EU	- European Union
KDP	- Kurdistan Democratic Party
NATO	- North-Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKK	- Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan)
UMP	- Union for a Popular Movement
UN	- United Nations

## **Abstract**

The major objective of this essay is to assess the feasibility of Turkish membership in the European community. For a better understanding, the paper firstly will stress on a brief background of Turkey-EU relationship. A special emphasis will be put on the main obstacles, such as religious-cultural heritage and Kurdish problem that still keep Turkey beyond the European family. The study is also going to determine whether the issue of Armenian genocide denial may become an additional obstacle to the desired membership in the EU for Turkey. Finally such issues as Turkish qualifications for membership, its geographic location and the nature of its government, which will have particular importance for the EU membership, are to be studied as well.

## Introduction

The main criteria for integration into the EU of a particular candidate-state are its economic and political conditions. In case of Turkey, the situation is different. In order to understand the desire of the oldest “associate member” of the European Union – Turkey to become a full member, one needs to necessarily deal with an additional set of challenges, such as: the Greco-Turkish traditional rivalry, the Cyprus issue, the question of geographical location of Turkey, Turkey’s religious-cultural heritage, its human rights record, including the Armenian genocide, Kurdish problem and the possibility of a "fundamentalist" take-over. Obviously the total impact of these factors seems to have kept Turkey out of the Union, at least for the foreseeable future.

Throughout Europe, the arguments that surround Turkey’s projected accession revolve around a series of issues, ranging from demographic through geographic to political. One commonly raised point is that, if and when it was to join the EU, Turkey would become the EU’s most populated member state. Turkey's current population is 71 million, and demographers project it to increase to 80-85 million in the next 20 years. This compares with the largest current EU member state Germany, which has 83 million people today, but whose population is projected to decrease to around 80 million by 2020.<sup>1</sup>

Another argument is rooted in the age-old debate on whether it is possible to establish geographic borders for Europe, and whether Turkey ‘fits’ within these borders. This is seen by many as a dispute that rests on philosophical and intellectual prejudgments, especially since the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, is widely accepted to aim for the construction of a union of European states based on shared common values.

---

<sup>1</sup> Source: “A Look at Turkish Candidacy for EU” by Associated Press

Perhaps the most sensitive of all arguments is based on the cultural and religious differences. Since the EU identifies itself as a cultural and religious mosaic that recognizes and respects diversity, the supporters of Turkey's EU bid believe that, as long as both Turkey and the EU member states maintain this common vision, cultural and religious differences should be irrelevant.

The EU member states' concerns over Turkey's human rights record as well as global and regional security-related issues have also been key factors behind Turkey's prolonged application process. The future of the divided island of Cyprus has also been a major sticking point. The Council's December 2004 decision demanded a compromise formula on the Cyprus issue, under which the affected sides would have to work towards a solution to the conflict before the scheduled 3 October 2005 launch of membership talks with Ankara.

The results of the referenda on the EU Constitution during the first half of 2005 - especially the No votes in France and the Netherlands - have been detrimental to Turkey's EU bid. The French president Jacques Chirac said Turkey needed to improve its human rights record and reform its justice system before being considered for EU membership. "Is Turkey's entry possible today? I say 'No,'" he said (Georges-Picot, 2004).

Although subsequent research and surveys have failed to prove that enlargement in general, and Turkey's candidacy in particular, were key factors behind the public's rejection of the Constitution, the summer of 2005 still witnessed an increase Europe-wide of skepticism towards Turkey's European prospects. Here are some 'predictions' made by the Independent Commission on Turkey; Friends of Europe, Brussels on Turkey's EU admission in A Look at Turkish Candidacy for EU: "It will generate a westward migration projected to total 2.9 million Turks by 2025..." and "It will likely be Europe's poorest member. Its current economic output is 27 percent of the EU average, below Romania (28.9) and Greece (77 percent)" (October 6, 2004).



On the other hands Turkey's leaders imply in their manner the delay with starting the negotiations process and as it was sent by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in an interview with CNN-Turk TV "I find this decision still disputable"... "To display such double standards against a country with such an interest, affection and determination (toward the EU) brings questions to our minds" (Keaten, 2004). Apparently the main argument for Turkey's leaders is that the EU is reluctant to accept a mainly Muslim country.

In order to understand whether the above-mentioned factors, as well as the Armenian genocide recognition issue can keep Turkey behind the EU membership this study has employed the following research questions:

1. What are the major obstacles for Turkey's integration into Europe?
2. Can the guerrilla activities by the Kurdish PKK cause a problem for Turkey's integration into the European Union?
3. When or whether can Turkey fully comply with the European democratic standards?
4. Is there any relationship between Turkey's historical background, religious-cultural heritage, human rights record and the unwillingness of some European countries to add Turkey to the EU?
5. What is the significance of Turkey's geographic location for the EU membership?
6. Will the Armenian genocide's denial become an additional obstacle for Turkey's integration into EU?
7. How can Armenian-Turkish relations be solved by the Turkey's EU-directed application process?

The employed questions had provided to some extent complete picture of the topic discussed, but during the study the time was not enough for in-depth analysis of the economic aspect of Turkey's integration into the EU and the general impact of EU-Turkey relationships on the economic developments of Turkey.

## Literature review and methodology

While reviewing the literature related to the topic, the conclusion has been made that the opinions of scholars examined this field are very controversial and can be classified as “for”, “against” Turkey’s membership and those who suggest the third way of “privileged partnership”.

Jon Gorvett (2005) in his article As EU Decision on Turkey’s Application Nears, Both Sides Get the Jitters stresses that “...December’s European Union summit talks on Turkey s EU accession were certainly full of sound and fury. Yet for all that, the actual process under which Muslim Turkey will join the EU looks likely to be far more sedate - if still prone to moments of political theatrics.” (p. 32)

Alexander Rose (2005) in his article Before You Join . . . considers all the pro arguments brought by Turkey and points out that “Turkey, and the rest of us, should rethink its accession to the EU” (p. 24).

The Emerging Markets Monitor Journal points out that there are obstacles ahead of October talks for Turkey’s EU membership and discusses all the issues putting Turkey at the political risk, including the issues of Armenian genocide recognition “Complicating relations further, Turkey refuses to acknowledge claims that 1.5 ml Armenians suffered genocide at the hands of Ottoman Turks during the World War I - another source of disagreement with the EU” (May 2005).

Very interesting political and economic outlook for Turkey is presented in Country Report, where the main obstacles put Turkey ahead from the European club are discussed and the analyses is done whether there is a progress on meeting the criteria for EU membership “On May 25 2005 the Turkish Parliament enacted the new Criminal Code, the passage of which is one of the EU’s conditions to start of accession negotiations”, on the other hand the

report indicates that “Talks over Cyprus show no sign of progress” and “Turmoil has continued in the opposition parties” (May 2005).

Elaine Sciolino (2004) in the article European Public Uneasy Over Turkey's Bid to Join Union points out that “Polls throughout Europe suggest that many share the fear first expressed by former President of France Valery Giscard that Turkey is not a European country and that Turkish membership would mean ‘the end of Europe’” (<http://topics.nytimes.com>).

The article Vatican stirs debate on Turkish EU membership addressed to the view point of the Vatican on the issue of integrating Turkey into the EU, in particular in an interview with Le Figaro magazine, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger said that “Turkey is ‘in permanent contrast to Europe’ and that linking it to Europe would be a mistake” (2004).

Franck Biancheri, in his article EU-Turkey 2004: the year of living dangerously is bringing the pro and con arguments on Turkish membership, claiming that on one hand “saying ‘yes’ to Turkish membership and opening related negotiations will immediately act as a very powerful political booster for all xenophobic and rightist extremists parties throughout the EU (already on the rise).” (<http://www.newropeans-magazine.org>). On the other hand, Biancheri is emphasizing the disadvantages that may cause by the further enlargement of the EU membership “Let's keep in mind that the European Union as such is going to be almost completely paralyzed until at least 2010 because of the current enlargement and its lack of institutional and methodological preparation.” (<http://www.newropeans-magazine.org>).

David L. Phillips addresses the issue by recommending to the U.S. administration to “use its influence to encourage EU members to set a date for starting accession negotiations with Ankara” (Foreign Affairs 2004, 97) In his article Turkey's Dreams of Accession Phillips pointed that “EU membership would anchor Turkey in the West, fortify it as a firewall

against terrorism, and help make it a model of democracy for the Muslim world. Rejection, on the other hand, would set back domestic reforms and radicalize religious extremists” (Foreign Affairs 2004, 87).

In his turn, Wolfgang Schauble in his Talking Turkey responded that “The process of integration is ongoing... Such a high degree of integration cannot continue...” (Foreign Affairs 2004, 134) Schauble is also addressing the issues of further development of Turkey with NATO after the Eurointegration, as well as the geographical location of Turkey claiming that “countries such as Turkey and Russia only partly share Europe’s heritage and geography; in other parts they definitely do not.” (Foreign Affairs 2004, 136)

The Armenian Online Weekly addressing the March 24-25 meeting in Brussels stressed on the issue of the blockade against Armenia, which has to be considered as an obstacle for Turkey’s integration into the European Union: “the EU-Armenia Parliamentarian Cooperation Committee reaffirmed the 1987 resolution regarding the Armenian Genocide, reported the European Armenian Federation for Justice and Democracy. The committee also reiterated its position on Turkey's lifting of the blockade against Armenia as a pre-condition of Turkey's accession to the EU. Since Turkey was granted candidate-country status at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, the European Parliament adopts a report each year on Turkey’s progress towards accession. In 2000, this report called upon Turkey to publicly recognize the Genocide. In 2001, the Lamassoure report replaced the mention of the Genocide with a reference to the so-called Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission. “In last year’s report on the ‘European Union’s relations with the South Caucasus’ the European Parliament reaffirmed its June 1987 position on the Genocide.” (<http://www.hairenik.com/armenianweekly>)

In his joint press conference with the Azeri President, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, addresses the issue of Turkey’s viewpoint related to the Nagorno-Karabakh

conflict resolution “Our policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the same as before. Turkey will never leave Azerbaijan alone as to its conflict with Armenia. In particular, our approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is fully in line with that of Azerbaijan. We have responded to all the proposals and demands we have had before in the same way.” (<http://www.ilham-aliyev.org>). As well as Erdogan in response to the question that opening of frontiers with Armenia and recognition of Armenian genocide are among the terms determined for entrance of Turkey in European Union claimed that “Adoption of such thing is impossible for us. It is decision of Turkey. Turkey knows very well how to act in this field.” (<http://www.ilham-aliyev.org>).

The study utilizes historical-comparative methodology of analysis. The main resources for observation and analysis are books, articles in specialized journals and Internet sites, as well as historical literature. Firstly, the relevant literature about the topic in general has been collected. Secondly, the thorough analysis has been done in order to select the information relevant to the research questions. Finally, the research has been arranged into the present MA Essay.

## Chapter 1

### Historical Background: Turkey-EU Relationships

Relations between the EU and Turkey are based on the Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey, the so-called **Ankara Agreement**<sup>2</sup>, which was signed on 12 September 1963 and came into force on 1 December 1964. The cornerstone of this agreement is the establishment of a customs union in three stages. A **Financial Protocol** accompanied this agreement. A second and third Financial Protocol was signed in 1970 and 1977 respectively. The Ankara Agreement also set up an **Association Council** that meets regularly and discusses the work of the association. This institutional framework was expanded with the implementation of the final phase of customs union.

The Association Agreement was supplemented by an **Additional Protocol**<sup>3</sup>, which was signed on 23 November 1970 and came into force on 1 January 1973, establishing a schedule for technical measures to be taken to attain the objective of the customs union within a period of 22 years. On 14 April 1987 Turkey presented its application for membership of the Community. The Commission adopted its opinion on the application on 18 December 1989. It concluded “that it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away”. The Commission gave both economic and political reasons. The Commission also noted “the negative effects” of the dispute between Greece and Turkey and “the situation in Cyprus”. The opinion states that the Commission “does believe, however, that the Community should pursue its cooperation with Turkey, given that country's general opening towards Europe”. The Commission also considered that “the Community has a fundamental interest in intensifying its relations with Turkey and helping it to complete as soon as possible the process of political and economic modernization” ([www.deltur.cec.eu.int](http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int)).

---

<sup>2</sup> See Timeline in Appendix A

<sup>3</sup> See Timeline in Appendix A

On 5 February 1990 the Council adopted the general content of the Commission opinion and asked it to make detailed proposals developing the ideas expressed in the opinion on the need to strengthen EC-Turkey relations.

On 7 June 1990 the Commission adopted a set of proposals including completion of the customs union, the resumption and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation and the strengthening of political and cultural ties. This package was not approved by the Council.

On 6 March 1995 the EC-Turkey Association Council decided to move onto the final stage of the customs union and resume financial cooperation. The Council also decided to step up cooperation in several sectors, to strengthen institutional cooperation and to intensify political dialogue. On 13 December 1995 Parliament gave its assent to the customs union. The Decision on the final phase of customs union came into force on 31 December 1995; on the institutional front, it set up a consultation body, the Customs Union Joint Committee. On 15 July 1996 the General Affairs Council adopted the Regulation on the MEDA Programme for 12 Mediterranean countries, including Turkey (<http://www.euractiv.com>).

Following a meeting of the Conference of Presidents on 28 November 1996, a specific procedure was adopted by which Parliament gives its opinion on the projects the Commission wished to finance under the MEDA programme (of which ECU 375 million for Turkey over the period 1996-99). Despite this procedure, by the end of 1997 commitments came to ECU 103 million. ECU 272 million was programmed for the period 1998-99.

In the wake of the informal Foreign Affairs Council in Apeldoorn (16 March 1997), the European Union, speaking at the meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council on 29 April 1997, reaffirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership of the European Union. At the same time, the EU also said that Turkey's application would be judged on the same criteria as the other applicant countries, and the Commission was called on to draw up a communication

on the future development of relations between the European Union and Turkey, in the context of the customs union.

Agenda 2000 considered that “the European Union should continue to support Turkey’s efforts to resolve its problems and to forge closer links with the EU” and it refers on this point to the communication on the further development of relations with Turkey adopted by the Commission on 15 July 1997.

This communication proposed a series of measures designed to consolidate the customs union and to extend it to new fields (services and agriculture) and to step up cooperation in several sectors (environment, energy, telecommunications etc), some of which come under the second and third pillars. The Commission also proposes helping Turkey in its efforts to improve the human rights situation. In this connection the Commission prepared a preliminary draft programme proposing cooperation with the Turkish authorities and NGOs to support the Turkish authorities’ efforts to increase respect for human rights and the rule of law. The Turkish authorities have not yet followed up this proposal.

The Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 confirmed at the highest level “Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the European Union”. The Heads of State and Government also decided to draw up a strategy “to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field. This strategy should consist in development of the possibilities afforded by the Ankara Agreement, intensification of the Customs Union, implementation of financial cooperation, approximation of laws and adoption of the Union acquis; participation, to be decided case by case, in certain programmes and certain agencies...” In addition, the European Council has listed a number of principles which will allow strengthening ties with Turkey. The European Council also indicated that Turkey would be invited to participate in the European Conference on the same basis as the other applicant countries. As requested by the Luxembourg European Council, the Commission



adopted on 4 March 1998 the initial operational proposals of the “European Strategy for Turkey.” (<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey>).

### **Developments in the Enlargement process**

The European Council in Helsinki (10-11 December 1999) welcomed “recent positive developments in Turkey, as well as its intention to continue its reform towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a **candidate State** destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States” (<http://europa.eu.int/council>).

The decisions taken at Helsinki were an important watershed in EU-Turkey relations. Turkey, like other candidate countries will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.

The Association Council met in April 2000 for the first time in three years and was chaired by Turkey. It adopted two important political decisions, one on the establishment of eight sub-committees of the Association Committee and the other on the opening of negotiation for an agreement aiming at liberalization of services and the mutual opening of procurement markets between the EC and Turkey. A first round of negotiations was held.

The **Accession Partnership** was formally adopted by the EU Council on 8 March 2001, is a roadmap of the priorities for Turkey in making progress towards meeting all the criteria for accession to the EU (<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en>).

The purpose of the Accession Partnership is to set out in a single framework the priority areas for further work identified in the Commission’s 2000 regular report on the progress made by Turkey towards membership of the European Union, the financial means available to help Turkey implement these priorities and the conditions which will apply to that assistance.

On the basis of this Accession Partnership Turkish Government has adopted on 19 March 2001 its National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis. (NPAA) The programme provides a wide-ranging agenda of political and economic reform. At the same time, a government decree was adopted on the implementation, co-ordination and monitoring of the NPAA. The Gothenburg European Council of 15 and 16 June 2001 regarded the National Programme as a “welcome development” and “urged Turkey at the same time to take concrete measures to implement the priorities of the Accession Partnership, which is the cornerstone of the pre-accession strategy” (<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey>).

On 26 February 2001, the Council adopted a regulation, which provides for the coordination of EC pre-accession financial assistance to Turkey.

The Council decided on 5 June 2001 to authorize the Commission to negotiate with Turkey a framework agreement, which will simplify the legal procedures to permit Turkey's participation in individual Community programmes.

Negotiations for Turkey's participation in the European Environment Agency and in the European Information and Observation Network (EIONET) have been concluded.

The Council adopted in December 2001 a regulation on pre-accession financial assistance to Turkey. This new regulatory framework ensures an accession driven approach of EC's financial co-operation with Turkey. As for all candidate countries, financial assistance has to focus on the priorities identified in the Accession Partnership.

In its 17 December 2004 decision, the European Council recognized Turkey's “significant legislative progress in many areas” but added that “these need to be further consolidated and broadened”. Furthermore, the report also took note of the improvements in the country's economic stability and predictability and the strengthened independence and efficiency of the judiciary. Regarding the respect for human rights and the exercise of

fundamental freedoms, “Turkey has acceded to most relevant international and European conventions”.

Most importantly for Ankara, Turkey got a fixed date (3 October 2005) for starting membership negotiations. The Turkish side had originally hoped for an earlier date, in view of the Copenhagen summit commitment that the EU would open talks “without delay” once Turkey is deemed to have made sufficient progress in its reforms. ([http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2004](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004))

Under the Council’s decision, a framework for Turkey’s EU membership negotiations was established by the Commission. This document was released on 29 June. The negotiating framework, which has been described by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn as “rigorous”, rests on the following elements:

- The underlying and shared objective of the talks will be Turkey’s accession. However, the negotiations will be “open-ended”, which means that their outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand.
- At the end of the talks, should Turkey fail to qualify in full for all obligations of EU membership as specified in the Copenhagen criteria, EU member states would still ensure that Ankara is “fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond”.
- The accession negotiations will be conducted in the framework of an Intergovernmental Conference with the participation of Turkey and all EU member states. The policy issues will be broken down into 35 policy areas (chapters) - more than ever before - and the decisions will require unanimity.
- The EU may consider the inclusion of long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses in its proposals for each framework.

- Membership talks with candidates “whose accession could have substantial financial consequences” (such as Turkey) can only be concluded after 2014, the scheduled date for the establishment of the EU’s new financial framework.
- Accession negotiations can be suspended in case of a “serious and persistent breach [...] of the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded”. Suspension would require a Commission initiative or a request to that effect by one third of the member states. The final decision would be made by the Council by qualified majority, and the European Parliament would be informed.
- Under a compromise formula agreed at the December 2004 EU Council, before 3 October 2005 Turkey would have to sign a protocol that will adapt the 1963 Ankara Treaty to the ten new member states of the EU, including the Greek Cypriot government. For practical purposes this would amount to an implicit recognition of this government for the first time since the island’s division in 1974. “The adoption of this protocol is in no way recognition, and I’ve put this on the record,” Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has said. The deal did not include a commitment from Ankara that the protocol would be ratified by the Turkish parliament before October 2005. As for the other key condition: Turkey on 1 June 2005 enacted the country’s revised penal code.

Finally the dream of entering into the European club seems to some extent “feasible” for Turkey - on 3 October the negotiations process officially started. But the matter is how long it will last and what is the outcome? Would it be mutually satisfying for Europe and Turkey? What are the expectancies of common people living in Europe and Turkey, since they are the rulers in democratic system which is pursued by their countries?

## **Chapter 2**

### **The Major Obstacles for Turkey's Integration Into Europe**

Indication of a start date for accession talks - 3 October 2005 - was a historical one for Turkey. Living for some 41 years after first applied to join Turkey finally started to feel the feasibility of the dream to become a member of the European club.

Yet for all, expectations remain low with regards to a number of outstanding issues/obstacles that still will make certain EU countries to find ways to keep Turkey out of EU entrance.

Indicative of this was the statement from the country's powerful National Security Council (MGK), issued a few days after the 17 December EU summit agreement on Turkey's accession. "The council notes the importance of carrying out (membership) negotiations without any discrimination or conditions against Turkey," the statement read. This was a reference to two important conditions attached to the agreement on Turkey's EU entry. The first concerned the perennial Cyprus issue, the second questions the free movement of labor within a future enlarged EU including Turkey (<http://europa.eu.int>).

The Cyprus issue is something of a taboo in Ankara, which sees the Greek Cypriot dominated republic as illegitimate, a situation that dates back to the 1960s, when the original, bi-communal Cypriot state was divided by ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Successive Turkish governments have argued that these conflicts were the responsibility of the Greek Cypriots, who deliberately subverted the original, founding constitution of the republic in order to assert their dominance over the whole island. Recognizing the Republic of Cyprus therefore becomes for Ankara a way of recognizing the Greek Cypriots' right to rule the whole of Cyprus - and its Turkish Cypriot population. Others may not interpret the situation quite like that, but for Ankara there is no other way of viewing it, particularly as the Turkish Cypriots have been identified as a major 'national

cause' since Turkish troops invaded the island back in 1974, seizing the northern third in an operation justified as being in defense of Cyprus' ethnic Turks.

Since the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU last May, it has been pushing for recognition of Turkey. Now though, with the Republic of Cyprus an EU member, any negotiations over Turkish membership will require the Turks to sit down with representatives of a government they do not recognize. This proved to be the major sticking point at December's summit, as EU negotiators worked on finding a formula for a final agreement that would effectively mean Turkish recognition without actually saying so.

The final agreement stated that Turkey must extend its existing customs union agreement with the EU to cover the 10 new members that joined in May 2004 - including Cyprus - by the time it opens membership talks on 3 October. This partial recognition will be hard enough for many in Turkey to swallow "Erdogan balked at the requirement, which EU diplomats said amounted to tacit recognition of the Greek Cypriot government. After hours of intensive negotiations, the EU agreed to accept a statement from Erdogan that he would sign the customs agreement before the talks start and that the move would not constitute recognition of Cyprus" (Hacaoglu 2004).

The other major issue of dispute was the attachment of conditions on future movement of labour - and indeed, on the whole question of permanent conditions on Turkish membership. With a population of nearly 70 million and a relatively low level of average income, a concern in several European states - and Germany in particular - is that Turkish membership will mean large numbers of Turks leaving for Europe in search of work, once visa restrictions are lifted. EU leaders agreed that "long transition periods, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses ... may be considered" (Hacaoglu 2004).

To address this, there had been discussion of some sort of restriction on Turkish movement within the EU once it becomes a member. These restrictions reflect the fears

among several member states that there could be a flood of cheap Turkish labor to other EU countries and that the Union's expensive subsidizing policies will be bankrupted by such a large and extremely poor country joining the EU.

This, however, would mean Turkey's membership being of a second-class nature, somehow kept out of clauses in the EU constitution and other agreements guaranteeing the free movement of labour. Ankara, while having few objections to some kind of phased withdrawal of travel restrictions, was strongly opposed to any kind of permanent block, seeing this as discriminatory.

“In the EU the main opponent countries voted against Turkey's integration shared the most common opinion that ‘...it is too big, too populous, too poor and too culturally different to integrate into the EU...’” (Pineau and Chambers 2004).

David Philips also argues that the Europe is reluctant towards the Turkey's admission due to the Muslim nature (2004, 95). The main arguments he also puts for the Turkey's deserve of joining the EU are that “EU membership would anchor Turkey in the West, fortify it as a firewall against terrorism, and help make it a model of democracy for the Muslim world. Rejection, on the other hand, would set back domestic reforms and radicalize the religious extremists” (Philips 2004, 87). Wolfgang Schauble in his Talking Turkey opposed to this argument:

A far more likely explanation for Europe's hesitation to admit Turkey is an awareness of the potential problems that could arise from the integration of a country that shares hundreds of miles of borders with Syria and Iran into a union that among other things, all but guarantees freedom of movement for all individuals (2004, 135).

At the same time, Turkey's EU accession process requires the country to normalize its relations with all its neighbors. This may have important political implications, particularly for a country which has traditionally had “none-too-good links” across its borders. One place in particular where this is likely to have an effect is in relations with neighboring Armenia. The main cause of denial of diplomatic relations is Turkey's refusal to recognize the 1915

massacres of Ottoman Armenians as a case of genocide and went from bad to worse when Turkey sided with Azerbaijan in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then Turkey has preserved its land borders with Armenia.

The Caucasian countries have a special relationship with the EU (Armenia now is covered by the EU's Neighborhood Policy) - the pressure for a reopening of the frontier and the normalization of relations is set to escalate. Yet this will not be easy for Turkey, which will be reluctant to do anything that alienates its traditional regional ally, Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, the foreign relations implications to the south are likely to result in continued improvement in ties with Syria. These have thawed greatly since the late 1990s - when Turkey threatened to invade over allegations of Syrian support for Kurdish separatists. With Syria itself improving its EU links through an Association Agreement, this process looks likely to go still further.

The question now for many in Turkey and elsewhere is: what next? Following four decades of preparations and a few days of heated disputes, the EU formally opened accession talks with Turkey on 3 October in Luxembourg and the scrutiny over Turkey is even more than it was before: "Turkey will be under ever closer scrutiny by the EU, by European public opinion and by member states", Olli Rehn, EU Enlargement Commissioner, said. (<http://www.euractiv.com>). This process may itself take longer than 10 months; after that, the length of the accession talks themselves is fairly indeterminate, but estimates range from anywhere between 10 and 20 years: it is perhaps not surprising that few in Turkey are holding their breath over the arrival of EU membership. Expectations are therefore generally low, both amongst ordinary Turks and the countries political and financial communities.



## **European Democratic Standards and Turkey's Compliance with Them**

In the EU Copenhagen Summit of June 1993 the EU leaders agreed on a set of conditions and rules that define whether a nation is eligible to join the EU. The criteria require that a state have the institutions to preserve democratic governance and human rights, a functioning market economy, and that the state accept the obligations and intent of the EU. "Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union." Candidate states should also have created the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its administrative structures, so that European Community legislation transported into national legislations implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures (<http://europa.eu.int>).

The democratic standards that need to be met by the Copenhagen criteria imply that all citizens of the country should be able to participate on an equal basis to the political decision making for every single governing level, from local municipalities up to the highest, national level. This also implies free and fair elections, the right to establish political parties without any hindrance from the state; fair and equal access to a free press; free trade union organizations; executive powers restricted by laws, and with free access to independent judges ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen\\_criteria](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_criteria))

The rule of law implies that government authority may only be exercised in accordance with written laws, which were adopted through an established procedure. The principle is intended to be a safeguard against arbitrary rulings in individual cases.

In order to satisfy this set of requirements, several of the Central European states that recently joined the EU had to drastically improve their judicial procedures, make them more transparent, introduce accessible procedures for appeal and take measures against certain communist-party nominees in judicial ranks.

Rights which every person holds because of his quality as a human being; human rights are “inalienable” and belonging to all humans. If a right is inalienable, that means it cannot be bestowed, granted, limited, bartered away, or sold away (e.g., one cannot sell oneself into slavery). These include the right to life, the right to be prosecuted only according to the laws that are in existence at the time of the offence, the right to be free from slavery, and the right to be free from torture.

UN created the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is the most authoritative formulation of Human Rights (more stringent than the very similar European Convention on Human Rights). This requirement forced several of the recent EU-members to implement major improvements in their legislation, public services and judiciary. Many of the changes involved the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities. It also demanded radical abolishment of the privileges previously enjoyed by communist party members and leaders.

According to the Convention for the Protection of National Minorities members of such national minorities should be able to maintain their distinctive culture and practices, including their language (as far as not contrary to the human rights of other people, nor to democratic procedures and rule of law), without suffering any discrimination.

The convention from the Council of Europe on this was a major breakthrough in this field. However the area was so sensitive that the convention did not yet include a clear definition of such minorities. As a result, many of the signatory states added official clarifications to their signature on which minorities in their country were involved. Some examples follow. Declarations made with respect to treaty No. 157 Framework Convention

for the Protection of National. A certain consensus was reached (among other legal experts, the so-called groups of Venice) that this convention refers to any ethnic, linguistic or religious people that defines itself as a distinctive group, that forms the historic population or a significant historic and current minority in a well-defined area, and that maintains stable and friendly relations with the state in which it lives. Some experts and countries wanted to go further. Nevertheless, recent minorities, such as immigrant populations, have nowhere been listed by signatory countries as minorities concerned by this convention.

In order to understand whether Turkey will ever comply with the above-stated standards it is necessary to look into the problems existing in Turkey. First of all Turkey needs to improve the domestic and foreign policies, since it had already an experienced drawbacks in relations with the Europe. Because the European body prides itself on being an association of democracies, the 1980 military coup - in a country enjoying associate status - was a severe shock. The harshness of repression under the military regime further disturbed the EC - many EC leaders knew personally the former Turkish leaders whom the military put on trial for treason. The EC responded by freezing relations with Turkey and by suspending economic aid. A related body, the Council of Europe, also expelled Turkey from its parliamentary assembly. The restoration of civilian rule gradually helped to improve Turkey's image. In 1985 Germany's prime minister signaled the EC's readiness to resume dialogue with Turkey by accepting an invitation to visit Ankara. The following year, the EC restored economic aid and permitted Turkey to reoccupy its seats in European deliberative councils. Nevertheless, frequent veiled threats by Turkey's senior military officers of future interventions if politicians "misbehaved" did not inspire confidence in Europe that democracy had taken permanent root in Turkey. As late as 1995, some Europeans remained apprehensive about the possibility of another military coup, a concern that was shared by various Turkish politicians.

In terms of foreign policy, the main obstacle to EU membership remains the unresolved issues between Turkey and EU member Greece. The most serious issue between the two countries is their dispute over the island of Cyprus, which dates back to 1974. At that time, Turkish troops occupied the northeastern part of the island to protect the Turkish minority (20 percent of the population), which felt threatened by the Greek majority's proposals for unification with Greece. Years of negotiations have failed to resolve a stalemate based on the de facto partition of Cyprus into a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south, a division that continues to be enforced by a Turkish force estimated at 25,000 troops in early 1995 (<http://www.country-data.com>).

Following the November 1983 declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus - a government recognized only by Turkey in early 1995 - Greece persuaded fellow EU members that progress on settling the dispute over Cyprus should be a prerequisite to accepting Turkey as a full member. Despite Ankara's position that such an obvious political condition was not appropriate for an economic association, once the EC agreed in 1990 to consider an application for membership from Cyprus, diplomatic efforts aimed at convincing individual EC members to veto the condition became futile. Since 1990 Turkey has supported UN-mediated talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders that are aimed at devising procedures for the island's reunification. As of January 1995, these intermittent discussions had made little progress, and the prospects for a resolution of the Cyprus problem appeared dim.

The next condition needs to be fulfilled is the human rights record. EU members have also expressed reservations about Turkey's human rights record. Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, two human rights monitoring organizations supported by the EU, have reported the persistence of practices such as arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture in prisons, and censorship (<http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Helsinki>). The

Turkish Human Rights Association, itself subject to harassment and intimidation tactics, has prepared detailed chronologies and lists of human rights abuses, including the destruction of entire villages without due process, and has circulated these reports widely in Europe. The documented reports of human rights abuses, like the coup rumors, sustained questions about Turkey's qualifications to join a collective body of countries that have striven to achieve uniform standards for protecting citizen rights.

Alexander Rose (2005) is urging to rethink of Turkey's accession and is speaking of economic and democratic values of Turkey by bringing an interesting data: "According to the July 2004 report on public opinion in the older members, the new member states (NMS), and candidate countries by the EU's official pollster, Eurobarometer, the Turks listed their top three concerns as unemployment, the economic situation, and inflation, and named the army, the police, and the legal system as their three most trusted institutions. They were the most likely of anyone to believe the EU to be effective in reducing taxation - heaven knows where they picked up that bizarre idea - and least likely to say that the EU could fight. Kemalist instincts blazing, nearly three-quarters of Turks said they trusted their national parliament, compared with an NMS average of just 16 percent. What we have here, in other words, is a nation of patriots who think the EU will cut their taxes and leave it at that." (National Review, January 22).

Finally, one of the main taboos for Turkey dating it back from being democratic is its history, which led to the hostile relations with its neighbors. What are the democratic standards for the country that massacred 1.5 millions innocent lives and does not recognize the matter as genocide? This is the feature of the country that is waiting for its turn to be called "European." Moreover, Turkey continues its policy by assisting Azerbaijan, which took the same path of genocidal policies towards the Armenians. By joining the European club Turkey has to normalize its relations with the neighbors and one of them is Armenia.

But today Turkish policy is making the opening of borders conditional on settling the Karabakh conflict on Azerbaijan's terms that is on pulling out from the liberated land in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Democracy is a system that provides liberty, equality and justice to people, people are the rules. As per today Turkey does not comply with any of the democratic standards, so how can it think of being on the one road with European countries? Therefore, Turkey should not accuse Europe in considering only the matter of Muslim nature - it should improve first of all its policies.

## **Turkey and Its Significant “European” Geographic Location**

One of the arguments that Turkey brings for the entry into the EU is its advantaged geographical location.

Turkey is bounded by eight countries and six bodies of water. Surrounded by water on three sides and protected by high mountains along its eastern border, the country generally has well-defined natural borders. Its demarcated land frontiers were settled by treaty early in the twentieth century and have since remained stable. The boundary with Greece - 206 kilometers - was confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which resolved persistent boundary and territorial claims involving areas in Thrace and provided for a population exchange (<http://www.lib.byu.edu/>). Under the agreement, most members of the sizable Greek-speaking community of western Turkey were forced to resettle in Greece, and the majority of the Turkish-speaking residents of Greek Thrace were removed to Turkey. The 1923 treaty also confirmed Turkey's 240-kilometer boundary with Bulgaria.

Since 1991 the more than 500-kilometer boundary with the former Soviet Union, which was defined in the 1921 treaties of Moscow and Kars, has formed Turkey's borders with Armenia (268 kilometers), Azerbaijan (nine kilometers), and Georgia (252 kilometers). The 499-kilometer boundary with Iran was confirmed by treaty in 1937 ([http://www.aaainc.org/info/Turkish\\_Blockade.pdf](http://www.aaainc.org/info/Turkish_Blockade.pdf)). Turkey's two southern neighbors, Iraq and Syria, had been part of the Ottoman Empire up to 1918. According to the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey ceded all its claims to these two countries, which had been organized as League of Nations mandates under the governing responsibility of Britain and France, respectively. Turkey and Britain agreed on the 331-kilometer boundary between Turkish and Iraqi territory in the 1926 Treaty of Angora (Ankara). Turkey's boundary with Syria - 822 kilometers long - has not been accepted by Syria. As a result of the Treaty of Lausanne, the former Ottoman Sanjak (province) of Alexandretta (present-day Hatay

Province) was ceded to Syria. However, France agreed in June 1939 to transfer Hatay Province to Turkish sovereignty, despite the strong objections of Syria's political leaders. Since achieving independence in 1946, Syria has harbored a lingering resentment over the loss of the province and its principal towns of Antakya and Iskenderun (formerly Antioch and Alexandretta). This issue has continued to be an irritant in Syrian-Turkish relations.

Only 3% of Turkey's territory lies in geographical Europe. Furthermore, the Turkish capital is not in Europe, but in Asia and Turkey's membership would mean that the European Union's external borders would now reach Middle Eastern nations such as Syria, Iraq and Iran.

The proponent's of Turkey's EU membership are considering the matter from the political perspective: "The boundaries of Europe can not be clearly defined," said Oliver Roy (2004), Middle East expert at Paris' Political Science Institute. Roy continues that "Since the geographic definitions of Europe don't really work, there is the definition of political choice. Europe becomes a concept rather than a civilization or a culture. And in that case, Turkey is clearly European" (Roy cited in Wielaard 2004).

In response, a panel of former EU leaders and executives, led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, issued a 52-page report explaining exactly why Turkey should be in Europe, and stressed that the continent's south-eastern borders "remain ... open to interpretation." According to the report only 3 percent of the country lies geographically in Europe, 11 percent of the country's population lives there, and the area also holds much of Istanbul. Besides, the report argued, the Ottoman Empire from which Turkey was born inherited the Byzantine and Eastern Roman realms and much "Greco-Latin and Judeo-Christian culture." (Wielaard 2004).



Geographically speaking, Turkey does indeed sit at a crossroads of the Europe. But does it really matter and since when did geography act as the sole determinant of history? Consider, too, that Russia also sits at a geographical crossroads that between Europe and Asia, yet no one is suggesting that she join the EU: "... Countries such as Turkey and Russia only partly share Europe's heritage and geography; in other parts they definitely do not" (Schauble 2004, 136).

Turkey stresses its involvement in European history for about 500 years, mostly through the Ottoman Empire. It considers itself a European state. A prevalent point of view in Turkey, echoed by its prime minister Erdogan, is that the EU seems to be a "Christian club", that the EU has no right to consider itself that way, and that this causes reluctance to accept a Muslim state into the Union. Many opponents of Turkish membership point out that about 90 percent of the country is geographically in Asia, not Europe, and assert that the European Union as an institution should not be sacrificed to solve the geopolitical problems of the world.

Even the Vatican has entered the debate: "Turkey has always represented another continent in the course of history, in permanent contrast to Europe," the Catholic Church's top theologian, former Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, said in an interview with Le Figaro Magazine in August, in opposing Turkey's membership (Mahony 2004).

The undisputable fact is that Europe - in the sense of European values - is not a geographic location, but an "ideal" composed of philosophical, political, social and economic dimensions. These include democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, freedom, the equality of the sexes, the abolition of the death penalty and torture. Therefore, the geographical location of Turkey with only 3% in Europe does not make a sense, as the political perspective does. Therefore, it is necessary to put away the geography and again speak of democratic standards that Turkey need to meet in order to enter as a full member into the European family.

## Chapter 3

### **Kurdish Problem as an Obstacle for Turkey's Integration Into The EU**

In Turkey territorially the difference is significant; while moving from the West to the East inside Turkey: Turkish cities like Istanbul and Izmir are unquestionably European and the standard-bearers for Turkey's EU membership bid. The vision in the southeast, on the other hand, has gone a bit "cross-eyed". "As Turkey looks west, its future will likely be decided in its strife-torn southeast" (Khan 2005, 34).

The southeast is a war zone, with military checkpoints, armed camps, lines of soldiers patrolling the mountain passes. These poor zones may decide the future of 70 million Turks, since this territory is tucked away in the deep valleys and gorges of the snow-capped Zagros mountains, the natural boundary dividing Iran and Iraq from their westward-looking neighbor. The oppressed area is the place of the conflict that pit Turkish forces against the Kurdistan Workers Party (in Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or PKK), also known as KADEK and Kontra-Gel, which is an armed organization dedicated to creating an independent Kurdish state in a territory (sometimes referenced as Kurdistan) that consists of parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern Syria and northwestern Iran (<http://en.wikipedia.org>).

After 30 years, Turkey at the threshold of its entry into Europe is at a point where it has to objectively compare the results of claims and actions of PKK through regional, national and international comparisons.

During the long years of its activities as a revolutionary left-wing organization PKK claimed there was a "mass violence by Turkish state on the Kurd identity". In its activities main goal was to alienate the people from the state through pushing security forces into more and more overt and repressive countermeasures. So that PKK can claim itself as defenders of

the people against the overwhelming power (“mass violence”) of state. But the Western countries have added the PKK to its list of terrorist organizations (Economist 2005, 12).

With the turn of the century, there is a tendency to associate PKK with the word “Kurdish problem”, with its positive and negative contentions. All the sides agree on the need to improve the living standards at the region. No one knows how to achieve this goal on a region where terror is on the rise.

The groups who classify PKK as terrorist, see the problem as the ability in free expression, aligned with the 1970s view point. They claim PKK represent the culture of violence and is a barrier against the democratic paths. Their solution is aligned with implementation of the freedom, without PKK and/or war economy controlling.

The groups who classify PKK as a freedom movement, perceive the problem as breaking the state into federations, as a step toward the building of greater Kurdistan.

The ideology and methods of PKK are putting under the question the democratic processes and justice system in Turkey. In a democratic system, an ideology that questions the state’s legitimacy will of its population and its security apparatus was hard to be accepted political view in such a country as Turkey.

Last spring, the PKK’s political wing, now calling itself Kongra-Gel, did cancel the ceasefire, citing the Turkish military’s intransigence. But although fighting resumed, it is at a significantly lower level than in previous years (Khan 2005, 36).

The PKK is not the military’s only concern. Just over the mountains, in Kurdish-controlled Iraq, the Kurds are rallying with a renewed sense of opportunity. The Iraq war has been a boon for them and their calls for independence. A December 2004 petition signed by 1.7 million Iraqi Kurds and delivered to UN headquarters in New York City demanded a referendum on the issue. Turkish authorities have repeatedly said they will oppose any such

move, fearing the emergence of a Kurdish nation could further incite their own Kurdish population to rebellion.

Those concerns may be justified. Kurds, often called the largest stateless ethnic group in the world, have all suffered oppression, whether in Iran, Syria, Turkey or Iraq. This common experience binds them more securely than national affiliation. In the area of Iraq controlled by Masoud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) - which, united with another Kurd party, won 75 of 275 assembly seats in the recent Iraqi election - there is sympathy for the PKK (Economist 2005, 14).

A close affiliation between the two groups still exists, which is worrying for Turkish authorities. The U.S. has promised it will eventually root out PKK guerrillas hiding in Iraq. But with the current situation still out of control, U.S. commanders say they are stretched too thin to do anything for the time being. In a meeting with Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul, former U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage proposed three-way talks between the U.S., Turkey and Iraq to work out a plan to deal with the more than 5,000 fighters ensconced in mountain camps on both sides of the border. But will Iraqi Kurds support a U.S. offensive against fellow Kurds?

Turkey itself has little room to maneuver, in part because of its EU membership bid. For human rights groups, those negotiations provide added leverage to their demands for fundamental reforms, and the conflict with the PKK tops their agenda. "If recent indications are any sign, it may not come to that. The Turkish government seems to be listening - it has no choice" (Khan 2005, 37).

The EU has long made it clear that these issues had to be resolved before Turkey could become a member. For almost just as long, its warnings had little effect. But over the past two and a half years, there has been a dramatic shift. The first "EU laws" were passed several months before Erdogan's Islamist Justice and Development Party came into power -

in a single session, the National Assembly removed the death penalty, paved the way for teaching and broadcasting in Kurdish, and lifted restrictions on freedom of assembly. Since Erdogan took over, control of the National Security Council has been switched from generals to civilians. The penal code has been reformed and a “zero tolerance” stance adopted on human rights abuses (Country Report on Turkey 2005, 17). But all of these still need to be materialized into the political life of the country.

With the end of its unilateral cease-fire in August 2004 (the cease-fire had lasted for five years), on the claims that Ankara’s reforms are “cosmetic”, PKK leaders seem to favor a return to armed guerilla warfare. The increase in PKK attacks on Turkish military, police and governmental targets seem to further prove this fact. The PKK claims it is only acting in self-defense and for the protection of the Kurds. Does Turkey really need such a problem at this moment, when it finally achieved the start point of negotiations for bidding the EU membership? Obviously it does not. So, it has no other choice, but listen its minorities and protect their rights.

However, this option could bring some uncomfortable developments to the very essence of Turkish state, which was built on repression and genocide. Turkey has all the rights to believe in its ultimate demise, if the Kurds and other minorities enjoy full freedom of expression and political activities.

## **Chapter 4**

### **The Relationship Between Turkey's Historical Background, Religious-Cultural Heritage, Human Rights Record And The Unwillingness Of Some European Countries To Add Turkey To The EU**

According to initial reactions coming in from the member states, Turkey can count on the support of the most EU-member countries in the process of negotiations on full membership to the EU. The recent poll data show that in those countries 40-50% of populations are in favor of Turkish EU membership.

At the same time, doubts - albeit at different levels - have been voiced by Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany and Greece. Data shows that only 10% of Austrian, 15% of Cypriot and 25% of Greek population are considering Turkey within the European family (<http://news.bbc.co.uk>).

According to the opinion poll data 56 % of the French oppose Turkey's membership. President Jacques Chirac said that he would require a national referendum on any future expansion. While Chancellor Gerhard Schrader of Germany has reacted favorably, a poll data showed that 57 % of his country's population opposed and that 62 % of Germans wanted the matter to be decided in a referendum (Sciolino 2004).

Meanwhile, the opponents are for a "third way", under which the EU would offer a 'privileged partnership' status to Turkey.

Ankara has completely rejected such alternatives. "For us, negotiations mean negotiations for full membership. No other alternative is possible for us," Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul told Zaman newspaper (<http://www.zaman.com>).

Denmark's Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen has to date taken a relatively cautious course. He said that while there is no reason Turkey should not join the EU if it fulfills all the necessary political criteria, "the start of the talks does not automatically mean

EU membership. If Turkey fulfills what is expected of it, it will be a different Turkey”, he said. On other occasions Rasmussen stressed the long transition period to membership (<http://www.euoparl.eu.int>).

Austrian President Heinz Fischer, clearly heeding the message from an Austrian public that is mostly against Turkey joining the EU, said that “I believe that negotiations with Turkey should start, but under the condition that a date for its possible full-fledged membership in the bloc be clearly indicated”. Stressing that Turkey’s EU accession was an “extremely emotional issue” for Austrians, Fischer said in October 2004 that “it is too early to talk about Turkey’s maturity for the EU”. The Netherlands remains strongly divided over the issue. The country with the second largest Muslim population in Europe in terms of percentage (6%, compared with 7% in France and 3% in Britain) is struggling hard to cope with the potentially explosive issues of religion, immigration and terrorism, especially in the wake of the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh (<http://www.euoparl.eu.int>).

Cyprus may turn out to be another wildcard in the EU pack. “In principle we are in favor of Turkey’s candidacy [...] because we are convinced that a truly European Turkey will be a factor of stability in our region and a secure link between Europe and the Middle East,” said Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos. However, he said that Cyprus’s support was conditional on Turkey recognizing the government of Cyprus. “Turkey must show that it understands and accepts that the setting of a date for the commencement of accession negotiations entails obligations towards the European Union and each member of the European family and consequently Cyprus too,” said Papadopoulos (<http://www.euractiv.com>).

However, Turkey immediately responded by declaring that it has no intention to recognize EU member Cyprus.

In mid-November 2004, French President Jacques Chirac openly raised the possibility of a “third option” for Turkey. “There is a third hypothesis that in three to four years, things have progressed but there are still obstacles that we will not surmount. We will therefore need to find another solution, to create a sufficiently strong link for our ambitions for peace and co-operation but without integration into the EU,” said Chirac. “Chirac’s reference to a “third option” was notable: the French president - himself a supporter of Turkey’s cause - has been known to be at odds even with his “original” party, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) over Turkey. Nicolas Sarkozy, the next UMP leader, remains an advocate of granting Turkey a “privileged partnership” status instead. He said that he was opposed to Turkey’s entry “not because it is a Muslim country but because Europe must concentrate on the enlargement which has already taken place” (<http://www.euractiv.com>).

The United States “strongly but discretely” supports Turkey’s EU bid, said the US Ambassador to the EU, Rockwell Schnabel. “Membership is an interior issue of the EU. They will make the decision. So we have to be silent. Our stance is well known. The support for Turkey given by our many presidents and administrations has never changed. It isn't reflected much in public opinion; however, our support continues,” said Schnabel (Keaten, 2004).

EU members agreed in December 2004 to open accession talks with Turkey in October 2005.

The doubts were continued till the date of the negotiations start. On Wednesday, 28 September 2005 the European Parliament voted to impose stringent new conditions on Turkey’s entry into the EU - including an admission that it perpetrated genocide against the Armenians and recognition of the legitimacy of Cyprus’s Greek government. Meanwhile, Austria continues its refusal to accept the EU Commission’s guidelines for the latest round of negotiations. Vienna is demanding that the guidelines include the option of a “privileged partnership” for Ankara if membership talks fail. The discussions were continued next days,



Austria was insisting on holding off Turkey from full membership. UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said failure to agree could harm relations between Christian and Muslim nations (<http://news.bbc.co.uk>).

Erdogan said his country will refuse to begin negotiations if it is to be offered anything other than full membership. Thus Turkey is threatening to walk away from the talks. Europe is dealing with the dilemma: many countries argued that keeping Turkey out of the EU would widen the “theological-political divide” between Christian and Muslim nations, and finally will lead to the raise of secular extremism.

By rejecting the fact of being Muslim European countries do not express the real implications of their refusal. Indeed, the point is that the poor country with the tremendously huge number of total population with Muslim religion, cruel and dirty history will enter the civilized, rich and Christian family. Even the blackmails to withdraw the application presented by the Minister of foreign affairs and the prime minister do not speak in favor of this country. Europe is afraid of the flow of migrants and the arguments proving this version are that France and Germany with the big number of Turkish minority have already problems with this minority over the years. The most important fact is that If started, the Turkish negotiations are expected to take about 10 years. After 10 years the statistics envisaged that the population of Turkey will reach the number 80 million the same as in Germany and therefore Turkey will have the majority representation in the Parliament and will act as a main decision-maker. Does Europe really need Turkey to take the crucial decisions in the future, or depend on the vote of Turkey? These are the issues troubling the Europe. In case of having other country with more pure historical and cultural background, definitely Europe will open its doors without delays through bringing new conditions for full membership.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Armenian Genocide's Denial As An Additional Obstacle For Turkey's Integration Into EU**

At the December 2004 Summit it was supposed that the negotiations could have been interrupted once Turkey refused to meet the requirements on the EU accession.

Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan balked at the requirement, which EU diplomats said amounted to tacit recognition of the Greek Cypriot government. After hours of intensive negotiations, the EU agreed to accept a statement from Erdogan that he would sign the customs agreement before the talks start and that the move would not constitute recognition of Cyprus (Brand 2004).

"It is out of question to recognize Cyprus, such a thing would only be a part of a lasting solution (on the island)," Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul told Turkish state television before leaving Brussels (Hacaoglu 2004).

It is worth noting that Erdogan before the summit on 17 December, 2004, expressed his annoyance saying that "We were expecting the other outcome, i.e. to start the negotiations in spring 2005 with the guaranteed positive outcome that considers the full membership of our country into the European family" (<http://www.regnum.ru>).

It is known that the main obstacle for the delay with the accession is the Cyprus issue: the Cypriot part of this island being the full member of the EU is not officially recognized by Ankara as a united and independent state. The matter is that in case of recognition Ankara will have to pull out its troops from the island. Related to this EU Commissioner, Netherlands Prime Minister Yan Peter Balkende told that Cyprus and Austria have their own position on the matter of advisability of negotiations with Turkey "...the negotiations will be extremely complicated..." (<http://www.regnum.ru>).

The view point of the Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was more optimistic - referring to his Turkish colleague, he told that the Turkish government is ready to recognize Cyprus formally, but the relevant decision ratification will take time. By saying that Berlusconi made clear for Cyprus that at least 15 years are required for EU leaders to take the final decision on the dates of Turkey's admission into the EU. Reasoning from this logic the Cyprus issue will be resolved. However, Cypriots do not want to postpone their claims towards Ankara especially since their voice can make a sense today (Brand 2004).

Meanwhile, as it was reported via the Belgian mass media, Yan Peter Balkende never received consent on the recognition of Cyprus by Turkey. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulla Gul strongly objected the fulfillment of such a precondition for EU admission. He had excluded any form of the issue of Cyprus recognition. The concern is that in the document on the requirements for Turkey's EU integration can also include the other not less sharp problems for Ankara, such as related to the Armenian point. In particular, European Parliament urged Turkey to acknowledge "the genocide perpetrated against the Armenians" nearly a century ago. Turkey has been accused of killing as many as 1.5 million Armenians during a 1915-23 campaign to force them from western Turkey. Ankara vehemently denies this (<http://www.regnum.ru>).

In response to these initiatives Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdulla Gul noted that in case of stipulating on such unreal for Ankara conditions Turkey will withdraw its demand for EU accession and will refuse negotiating. The Turkish side in compliance is conditioned with the realization of the whole list of factors that cannot be ignored by the European Establishment by taking into account the interests of the Europe as well.

Erdogan, also, reiterated that Turkey will not hesitate to say no to the EU if the bloc imposed unacceptable conditions on starting membership talks with Turkey.

The matter is that there are real, material benefits, rather than a dialogue between the civilizations, which according to Silvio Berlusconi will be regulated with accepting Muslim Turkey into the Christian Europe. Turkey has an advantaged geographic location and by being a bridge between the Europe and Asia this country can become the main route for the energy resources flow to the Europe. In particular, there is a perspective of delivering the Kazakhstan oil and Turkmenistan gas through the main exporting oil pipe line Baku (Azerbaijan) - Tbilisi (Georgia) - Ceyhan (Turkey), as well as through the pipe line Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum. The first one is planned to be used for exporting the oil from the Iraqi oilfield Kirkur. In the future it is considered to use the Turkish route as transit for transportation of Iranian gas to the Europe. All of these projects aim at reducing the dependence of the Europe from Russian exporters, who are almost the monopolists at the energy resources market currently. Therefore, the EU cannot just storm out Ankara, since in this case the matter will be complicated. The position of USA, by being actively engaged in lobbying of almost all the above-mentioned arrangements, is not the last one in this situation. Having Turkey integrated into the EU and taking into account the position of the Great Britain Washington will become the main scenario writer for Europe politics. It is also worth mentioning that Turkey - the main regional ally for Washington - is a member of NATO as well. With becoming the EU member Turkey will have a hand in hindering the plans of the some European countries to differentiate the EU military system. The EU initiative to create the European reaction forces does not fit in the perspectives of the NATO, as well as Washington and Ankara respectively. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during his visit to Transcaucasian countries has noted that "No one security system will be effective without involvement of the USA..." (<http://www.regnum.ru>).

The Armenian issue has been an emotional annex to the list of requirements, with Turkey - the inheritor to the Ottoman Empire - disputing the scale and nature of the killings, and railing against the term “genocide” used by surviving Armenians and their descendants.

France has an Armenian population of around 450,000 on its soil. The Prime Minister Barnier, responding to his Turkish colleague question about Turkey and its ambitions of joining the EU, said: “We will ask all the questions - notably that of the Armenian genocide, notably that of Cyprus - all through the negotiations” He said the bloody events “are a wound that does not heal,” and added: “This issue is at the very heart of the European project, which is based on reconciliation.” He admitted earlier that recognition of the Armenian tragedy could not legally be made a pre-condition for the membership talks, but he said it was “a question that we will raise in the course of negotiations, and we have around 10 years to raise it” (Brand, 2004).

Barnier’s decision to raise the Armenian issue was being interpreted as a bid to reassure a French public that remains by a clear majority hostile to Ankara's bid to join the European Union.

An interesting development was taking place before the October 3: on September 28, 2005 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the opening of negotiations with Turkey. Again two issues were put against Ankara: Cyprus issue and recognition of Armenian genocide. In particular the clause 5 states:

5. Calls on Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide; considers this recognition to be a prerequisite for accession to the European Union; and “considers this recognition to be a prerequisite for accession to the European Union” (<http://www.armenian-genocide.org>).

The process of urging Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide has been discussed at this level many years before: the European Parliament resolution of 1987, which set the recognition of the Armenian genocide as a precondition to the consideration of Turkish accession to the Union, the European Parliament has continuously restated this principled

position in successive resolutions. The clear consensus within European countries remains: “Turkey cannot join the Union without giving up its ultra-nationalist and aggressive policy towards Armenia. European Armenians urge the upcoming meeting of the European Council to reflect the will of the European public, to honor this vote of the European Parliament, and to respect the European values on which the European project is based,” concluded the chairperson of the European Armenian Federation (<http://www.anca.org>).

Nevertheless, in a political resolution voted afterwards, Parliament notes “the Commission and the Council take the view that Turkey has formally fulfilled the last conditions for starting the accession negotiations on 3 October 2005” ([http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.341/current\\_category.7/affirmation\\_detail.html](http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.341/current_category.7/affirmation_detail.html))

In particular, Douglas Alexander, President-in-Office of the Council noted that Turkey had met two conditions before accession negotiations could be launched: to bring into force six outstanding pieces of legislation which reinforce the rule of law and human rights; and to sign a Protocol extending the 1963 Ankara Agreement to the new Member States. (<http://www.europarl.eu.int/omk>). But addressing the question of human rights he pointed that Turkey has far gone in reforms and the situation is improved, “but significant efforts are still required.” First, let us look at the brighter side. Recently, there have been some encouraging signals. Alexander “landmarked” the acknowledgement made by Prime Minister Erdogan of the existence of a ‘Kurdish issue’. “Moreover, the academic conference on the Armenian issue was finally able to be held in Istanbul last weekend, with the support of the government and despite last-minute attempts to cancel it by an administrative court. These attempts were strongly condemned by Prime Minister Erdogan and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul. This is a major step forward in seeking the historical truth in Turkey on this very sensitive issue” (<http://www.europarl.eu.int>).

Has Turkey really met the requirement on human rights record by holding a conference? Some German and Cypriot EU Parliament deputies stressed that “Views are deeply divided as to whether matters are improving or deteriorating in terms of meeting Copenhagen criteria. The decision to press charges against Orhan Pamuk on grounds of having labeled the Turkish Republic because he had spoken critically of the Armenian genocide and the treatment of the Kurdish minority is deeply worrying. In a fully democratic state these cannot be grounds for criminal proceedings” and “The Council and the Commission want to brush this under the carpet, just as they have brushed under the carpet the treatment of religious minorities, Article 305 of the Penal Code, the question of the Armenian genocide, the repression of demonstrations by women and so many other issues, including that of Orhan Pamuk and freedom of expression within Turkey” (<http://www.europarl.eu.int>). The main argument brought for explaining such a critique by the EU member states is that Turkey’s history is worrying and in order not to let repeating the cruel past the Armenian genocide issue should not be ignored.

The European Parliament’s resolution was as usually responded by Turkish authorities and surely the non-binding character of resolutions has been placed at top importance by them.

Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan played down the moves, telling reporters: "The European Parliament’s decision will not affect the EU process. It has no power of sanction," according to NTV television (<http://uk.news.yahoo.com/28092005/325/eu-parliament-slaps-turkey-armenians.html>).

Surely, there is no sanction, no resolution is binding, but the member states are obliged to fulfill the requirements based on the moral principle. So, how can such a country even taking into account all the reasons behind do the step forward and be considered as a democratic state that meets the Copenhagen criteria and bids for the EU full membership?

## **Armenian-Turkish Relations Vis-A-Vis Turkey's EU Integration Process**

The European Union's decision to pursue membership talks with Turkey could have far-reaching political and economic ramifications for the Caucasus. According to the opinion of Western countries the accession process can stimulate democratization in the region.

One of the conditions of the democratization is the re-establishment of the relations with the neighbors. In this case the most troubling is the border with Armenia, which has been blockaded by Turkey. The reasons brought for was the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey has kept its frontier with Armenia closed since 1993. The closure is connected with a Turkish embargo designed to encourage Armenia's withdrawal from Azerbaijani territory liberated during the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Turkey urged Armenia to pull out from the "occupied" territories of Azerbaijan and only after that it would consider the re-opening of diplomatic relations with Armenia.

In this conflict Turkey has sided with the ethnically and religiously closer Azerbaijan over Armenia, with which Turkey has many other disputes stemming from the Armenian Genocide. EU reports state that Turkey should take active measures to resolve this situation before eventual accession.

But there were other more powerful reasons behind as well: first of all the history with Armenia especially the tabooing Armenian genocide issue is bothering Turkish government during the last century, which insists the killings were not genocide. Subsequently, the opening of borders and diplomatic relations may lead to the territorial demands by Armenians.

In 1993 Turkey has also unfairly accused Armenia "in supporting and even providing bases of allocation for PKK" (Aivazyanyan 2004, 120). Using this reason Turkey was even planning to invade into Armenia in 1993.



These were the reasons put forward the severance of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia. During the last years many attempts were made to reopen the border.

The European Parliament resolution, along with the demand on the recognition of the Armenian Genocide also urged Turkey to reopen its border Armenia “as soon as possible.”

Armenia’s Foreign Ministry welcomed the non-binding resolution and expressed hope that the EU leaders will heed its Armenian-related provisions. “The decision by the European Parliament demonstrates that the European community fully understands and shares Armenia’s concerns relating to the current unacceptable state of Turkish-Armenian relations,” read a ministry statement (Danielyan 2004).

The resolution was welcomed later by a Brussels-based lobbying group representing Armenian communities in France and other EU countries. “This is a brilliant victory for all those Europeans who want to preserve the European values in the face of an unrepentant state,” the president of the European Armenian Federation, Hilda Tchoboian, said in a statement (<http://www.armenialiberty.org>).

Some political observers in Turkey say the decisions of the EU immediately increased pressure on Ankara to normalize relations with neighboring Armenia. Turkish observers say the government will have a difficult time finessing the border issue, adding that despite the EU pressure, the status quo may not change in the near future.

Armenian President Robert Kocharian in late 2004 appealed to the EU to place the opening of the frontier among the pre-conditions for Turkey’s EU membership. “It is unacceptable for a country that is to have membership talks with the EU to keep its border closed with another country that is already in the neighborhood policy of Europe” (<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles>).

There has been a debate for some time now among Armenians on whether Turkey’s membership in the European Union would be in Armenia’s interest. Some Armenians believe

that after joining the EU, Turkey would be a more civilized and democratic nation that would recognize the Armenian Genocide, lift the blockade of Armenia and establish friendlier relations with its neighbors.

Those opposed to Turkish membership in the EU are certain that Turkey would never become a democratic state and that the paper reforms it has reluctantly enacted are meant solely to show that it can meet the requirements of being a democracy pursuing state. There are no guarantees that Turkey would ever recognize the Genocide and lift the blockade of Armenia after joining the EU. Furthermore, as potentially the most populous state in the EU, Turkey would have the largest number of representatives in various EU organs, enabling it to pass pro-Turkish and pro-Azeri initiatives and oppose those in Armenia's interest. The California Courier publisher Harut Sassounian (2005) brings the pro and con sides of the "Armenian benefit" from Turkey's joining to EU:

The pro-EU group feels that since Turkey is going to join the EU anyway, and Armenians would be unable to block it, by opposing the Turkish efforts Armenians would gain nothing, but risk further antagonizing an already hostile and powerful neighboring country.

The anti-EU group, on the other hand, believes that an attempt has to be made to hinder Turkey's membership, forcing the Turks to make some accommodating gestures to the Armenians. In view of recent anti-Turkish developments in Europe and the souring of U.S.-Turkish relations, Armenians in both groups need to reassess their positions on this issue.

At this juncture, Armenia's interests would best be served if the EU would neither accept nor reject Turkey in the short term. It would be preferable if Turkey just languished on Europe's doorsteps for several decades, while gradually reforming its society and making more and more concessions to Armenians, Greeks, Cypriots, Kurds, Assyrians, Alawites and others. The longer this process takes, the more likely it is for these parties to obtain concessions from Turkey. Because the membership will not give to Armenia the prosperous economic relations with Turkey, neither it will pretend to establish the diplomatic relations.

The great examples are Cyprus and Greece: these countries have already adopted such a long-term “milking” strategy. Even though both countries could have vetoed Turkey’s membership at the outset, they realized that by doing so they would have eliminated their sole leverage on Turkey. They are well aware that, unless Turkey satisfies all of their demands, they could slam the door on its membership at any moment during the prolonged accession process.

The best way to obtain concessions from Turkey is neither by waiting until it joins the European Union nor by hastily blocking its membership, but by making continued demands during its prolonged years of candidacy for the EU. “It is in everyone's interest that Turkey should always be a bridesmaid, but never a bride!” (Sassounian 2005).

## Conclusions

The paper has studied all the pro and con sides of Turkey's possible admission into EU. The final remarks have to reiterate all the feasible consequences of Turkey's acceptance and denial by the European family.

The history of EU-Turkey membership has a long path, which shows the consistent desire of Turkish government to pursue the Western direction put forward by the father of Turks - Ataturk. But the issue of full membership is still under the question even after the opening negotiations. The main reason keeping Turkey behind the EU is its incompliance with the democratic standards, in terms of poor economy, human rights record, cultural/religious heritage.

Western experts suggest for Turkey the third way 'Privileged Partnership' with the EU, which is a high-status agreement full of economic, security, and political goodies but containing only such parts of the achievements as Ankara wants. Europeans consider this way as a best one for solution of this issue. According to European skeptics across the Continent, there would finally be a working alternative for EU. These are solutions that will please most of the Europeans and Turks.

Advocating partnership over the membership does not imply any prejudice against Turkey and Turkish society. By saying that many scholars are bringing forward all the recent economic developments in Turkey as a guarantee for this country's compliance to become a full member.

In reality Turkey, as usual, is very clever in order to mislead the Europe. Indeed, if speaking of economic developments there are many arguments indicating that it will be the poorest country in Europe and the remote locations are proving this point of view. Human rights records improvements cannot be determined only by the adoption of laws - they should

be exercised as well. Many political leaders are applauding the courage of Turkish Prime Minister: but is this a determinant factor for letting in a country with such a dirty history?

Turkey is the biggest and the poorest country ever seeking to join the EU and its entry will influence the future course of European integration. If Turkey were to become a member, for instance, the borders of the European Union would stretch to Syria, Iraq and Iran. Turkey's membership bid is also controversial because only a small fraction of the country is geographically within Europe and, while officially secular, it is the first Muslim nation began entry negotiations with the European Union.

The future perspective according to the analysis done in this paper is the following: nevertheless, there is no shortage of legitimate worries about Turkey's eventual accession. Turkey is so poor and underdeveloped that there are serious questions as to how the country can be successfully integrated into the European Union. Under present policies, Turkey alone would 'swallow' all of the limited EU funds intended to help close the development gap between the Union's richer and poorer countries and regions. The consequences might be compared to those of trying to incorporate Mexico and the rest of Central America into the United States.

For the EU the "benefit" will be the issue of free movement of workers and this surplus labor force will undoubtedly result, at least in the short run, in high unemployment and exacerbated economic and social problems.

On the other hand many scholars consider the Turkish accession as a chance both for the country to fulfill its potential as a successful modern democracy in the Muslim World and for the West to strengthen a precious ally in the fight against terrorism. But they do not explain how country ignoring to be bound by the resolutions of EU Parliament and continuously abusing the human rights may become a 'model' for successful modern

democracy in the Muslim World? Therefore, it is understandable fact that for Europeans it is difficult to overcome their preconceived and stereotyped views on Turkey.

As per now, Europe cannot say 'yes' or 'no', so the only way out is to change the question. This option is not just a European one: many Turks do not see accession to the European Union as their country's best future. There is a widespread view that Europe will never accept Turks and therefore the conditions are going to be more enforced. But those Turks most of the time end up in jail because their opinions have not been 'politically correct' for the past 40 years. This happens in a country, which pursues democratic standards and is knocking the door to the Europe. The democratic standards include first of all the freedom of speech without any distinction to any human being. This is the real face of this country and Armenia saw it many times. Armenia's experience shows that Turkey pursuing its own goals is always at the side of Azerbaijan, which many years ago massacred Armenian population on its territory. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was simulated by Turkey for ceasing the land borders, but in reality, to close the eyes on the Armenian genocide issue.

Nonetheless, the future possibilities are still extraordinary. Claims that Muslim Turkey's membership of the predominantly Christian EU mean a fatal undermining of the 'clash of civilizations' are taken into account as well, leading to many preconceptions with regards not only of what it is to be a Turk - but also of what it is to be a European.

Armenia also will not benefit from Turkey's EU membership. There are no guarantees that Turkey would ever recognize the Genocide and lift the blockade of Armenia after joining the EU. Furthermore, as potentially the most populous state in the EU, Turkey would have the largest number of voices in decision-making institutions and those voices definitely are not going to be pro-Armenian. On the other hand, it would not be wise to publicly oppose Turkey's integration into the EU, since after all the Armenian voice would mean very little for European nations to decide about the faith of Turkey - this issue should be left for the EU.

## REFERENCES:

- “Armenian National Committee of America Welcomes European Parliament Vote Pressing Turkey To Recognize The Armenian Genocide.” (2005). October 7. (Webpage: <http://www.anca.org>).
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2004) “A Look at Turkish Candidacy for EU.” Associated Press. October 6.
- Aivazyan, Armen. (2004) Essential Elements for Armenia’s National Security Doctrine. Part I. Lusakn: Yerevan.
- Biancheri, Franck. (2004) EU-Turkey 2004: the year of living dangerously. Parts I&II. July 15. (Webpage: <http://www.newropeans-magazine.org>).
- Brand, Constant. (2004) “EU Parliament Calls for Talks With Turkey.” Associated Press. December 15.
- Brand, Constant. (2004) “EU Talks With Turkey Could Alter Landscape” Associated Press. December 18.
- “Conclusions Of The European Council On Turkey Since Luxembourg of December 1997.” September 10. (Webpage: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey>).
- Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005) Country Report on Turkey: The Economist Intelligence Unit Unlimited 2005: 13-19. EBSCO Publishing. (Webpage: <http://search.epnet.com>).
- Danielyan, Emil. (2004) “EU Chief Urges ‘Frank Discussion’ Of Armenian Genocide.” (Webpage: <http://www.armenialiberty.org>).
- Danielyan, Emil. (2004) “EU Assembly Backs Calls For Armenian Genocide Recognition” (Webpage: <http://www.armenialiberty.org>).
- “EU Deadlocked Over Turkish Entry.” (2005) Official web site of BBC news. October 3. (Webpage: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4301532.stm>).
- “European Parliament Reaffirms Resolutions on Armenian Genocide, Takes Firm Approach Toward Blockade by Turkey” Armenia Weekly Online. June 23. (Webpage: <http://www.hairenik.com/armenianweekly>)
- “EU parliament slaps Turkey over Armenians” (2005) (Webpage: <http://uk.news.yahoo.com/28092005/325/eu-parliament-slaps-turkey-armenians.html>).
- “EU - Turkey: Historical Review.” September 10. (Webpage: <http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int>).
- “European Union, European Commission, EU Enlargement: A Historic Opportunity” August 20 (Webpage: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm>).
- Georges-Picot, Emmanuel. (2004) Chirac: “Turkey Not Fit for Entry Into EU.” Associated Press. April 29.

- Gorvett, John. (2005) "As EU Decision on Turkey's Application Nears, Both Sides Get the Jitters." Washington Report on Middle East Affairs Volume 23 Issue 10 (December): 32-66. EBSCO Publishing. (Webpage: <http://search.epnet.com>).
- Gorvett, John. (2005) "Turkey Gets The Go-Ahead..." The Middle East (February): 26-29
- Hacaoglu, Selcan. (2004) Turkish PM Returns Home to Hero's Welcome. Associated Press. December 14.
- Honor Mahony. (2004) "Vatican stirs debate on Turkish EU membership." EU Observer. (August).
- Human Rights Watch World Report: Turkey: Human Rights development. July 17. (Webpage: <http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Helsinki>)
- "Interview with Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul by Zaman Newspaper" (<http://www.zaman.com>).
- "Joint Press Conference of Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan." June 30. (Webpage:<http://www.ilham-aliyev.org>).
- Keaten, Jamey. (2004) "Germany, France Propose Date on EU Talks" Associated Press. December 5.
- Khan, Adnan R. (2005) "Dirty Little Secret." Maclean's. Volume 118 Issue 14 (March): 34-37. EBSCO Publishing. (Webpage: <http://search.epnet.com>).
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005) "Obstacles ahead of October talks... Turkey: Political Risks On The Horizon" Emerging Markets Monitor Journal Volume 11 No. 06 (May): 1-2. EBSCO Publishing. (Webpage: <http://search.epnet.com>).
- "Official Journal of the European Communities." September 15. (Webpage: <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en>)
- "Opening of negotiations with Turkey - Additional Protocol to the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement: Debates." (2005) September 28. (Webpage: <http://www.europarl.eu.int>).
- Palmer, John. (2004) "The Prospect of Turkish Entry Will Hasten a Multi-Speed Europe." (Webpage: <http://www.europeanaffairs.org>)
- Phillips, David L. (2004) "Turkey's Dreams of Accession." Foreign Affairs Volume 83 No. 5 (September/October): 86-97.
- Rose, Alexander. (2005) "Before You Join . . . Turkey, and the rest of us, should rethink its accession to the EU." National Review January. January 31: 22-24. EBSCO Publishing. (Webpage: <http://search.epnet.com>).
- Pineau, Elizabeth and Chambers, Madeline. (2004) EU Clinches Deal on Launching Turkey Entry Talks. Associated Press. December 14.
- "Presidency Conclusions of Helsinki European Council of April 2000." September 10. (Webpage: [http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm)).



- “2004 Progress Report on Turkey.” September 2 (Webpage: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2004](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004)).
- “Recommendations on Turkey’s entrance.” September 2. (Webpage: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report\\_2004/pdf/tr\\_recommandation](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdf/tr_recommandation)).
- Sassounian, Harut. (2005) “Always a Bridesmaid, Never a Bride” The California Courier Publisher. July 6.
- Schauble, Wolfgang. (2004) “Talking Turkey: Is Europe Ready for a Muslim Member?” Foreign Affairs Volume 83 No. 5 (November/December): 134-136.
- Sciolino, Elaine (2004) European Public Uneasy Over Turkey’s Bid to Join Union. October 2. (Webpage: <http://topics.nytimes.com>).
- “The December 2002 European Council Presidency conclusions.” September 2. (Webpage: [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf)).
- “The Provisional edition of the European Parliament resolution.” (2005) September 28. (Webpage: <http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation>).
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005) “Too big to handle?” Economist Volume 375 Issue 8432 (June): 12-16.
- “Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923” “The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Volume II, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1924.” August 5 (Webpage: <http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1918p/lausanne.html>).
- “Turkey’s Blockade Of Armenia” (2003) Armenian Assembly of America: Issue Brief: Research and Information Office. July 20. ([http://www.aaainc.org/info/Turkish\\_Blockade.pdf](http://www.aaainc.org/info/Turkish_Blockade.pdf))
- “Turkey: Conflict and Diplomacy: Cyprus and Beyond.” August 20. (Webpage: <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13924.html>)
- “Turkey’s EU bid: a ‘third way’ looming?” (2004) September 15. (Webpage: <http://www.euractiv.com>)
- UN Declaration on Human Rights.
- UN Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2004) USA trumps in the Turkish sleeves: a hydrocarbon smell of EU decision. Regnum Information Agency: TransCaucasian Branch. (Webpage: <http://www.regnum.ru>) (in Russian).
- Wielgaard, Robert (2004) “Outgoing EU Leaders' Tongues Are Loose” Associated Press. September 10.
- Wielgaard, Robert (2004) “EU Sees Turkey in Newly-Defined Europe.” Associated Press. October 7.

### *Appendix A: A Timeline of EU-Turkey relationships*

**February 1952:** Turkey becomes a full member of NATO.

**September 1959:** Ankara applies for associate membership of the European Economic Community.

**September 1963:** The Ankara Agreement (an association agreement) is signed to take Turkey to Customs Union and finally to full EEC membership. The first financial protocol is also signed.

**November 1970:** The Additional Protocol and the second financial protocol signed in Brussels.

**January 1973:** The Additional Protocol enters into force. It sets out comprehensively how the Customs Union would be established.

**July 1974:** Turkey invades Cyprus.

During the **first half of the 1980s**, relations between Turkey and the Community come to a virtual freeze following the military coup d'état on 12 September 1980.

**June 1980:** The Association Council decides to decrease customs duties on almost all agricultural products to "zero" by 1987.

**September 1986:** The Turkey-EEC Association Council meeting revives the association process.

**14 April 1987:** Turkey applies for full EEC membership.

**December 1989:** The Commission endorses Turkey's eligibility for membership but defers the assessment of its application.

**March 1995:** Turkey-EU Association Council finalizes the agreement on the Customs Union, which enters into force on 1 January 1996.

**December 1997:** At the Luxembourg Summit, EU leaders decline to grant candidate status to Turkey.

**December 1999:** EU Helsinki Council decides on the candidate status of Turkey.

**March 2001:** The EU Council of Ministers adopts EU-Turkey Accession Partnership.

**March 2001:** The Turkish government adopts the National Programme of Turkey for the adoption of EU laws.

**September 2001:** Turkish parliament adopts over 30 amendments to the constitution in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership.

**August 2002:** The Turkish Parliament passes sweeping reforms to meet the EU's human rights criteria.

**13 December 2002:** The Copenhagen European Council resolves that if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU would open accession negotiations with Turkey. In the meantime, EU leaders have agreed to extend and deepen co-operation on the EC-Turkey Customs Union and to provide Turkey with increased pre-accession financial assistance.

**May 2003:** The EU Council of Ministers decides on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions of the Accession Partnership with Turkey.

**January 2004:** Turkey signs protocol banning death penalty in all circumstances, a move welcomed by the EU.

**March 2004:** Council of Europe recommends ending monitoring of Turkey.

**October 2004:** Commission issues progress report on Turkey.

**17 December 2004:** European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 - with strings attached.

**23 May 2005:** Turkey names Economy Minister Ali Babacan as the country's chief accession negotiator.

**1 June 2005:** Turkey's revised penal code, first adopted in September 2004, enters into force.

**17 June 2005:** The Council reiterates the EU's determination to proceed with the enlargement process.

**29 June 2005:** The Commission presents its "rigorous" negotiating framework to Ankara.

**3 October 2005:** Accession talks are opened with Turkey.