

**AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA**



**THE PROCESS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT IN GEOPOLITICAL  
PERSPECTIVE**

**A MASTER'S ESSAY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE  
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**BY  
MIHRAN SAHAKYAN**

**YEREVAN, ARMENIA  
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**SIGNATURE PAGE**

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**Faculty Advisor**

**Date**

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**Dean**

**Date**

**American University of Armenia**

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## **ABSTRACT**

For four decades after the World War Two, Europe was divided into two camps. Security of its western part was, is, and probably will be guaranteed by the USA within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while Europe's eastern part was under the shield of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. The latter has vanished. In sharp contrast, the Atlantic Alliance has admitted and is going to invite some of its former enemies to accede to the Treaty of Washington, while others are left out. Intentionally or not, NATO creates a new dividing line in Europe.

This Master's Essay focuses on several aspects of NATO's move to the East. All phases of enlargement are analyzed in the study. NATO's rationale for the passed and upcoming enlargements is presented. The arguments of opponents for enlargement are weighed up. The Russian views are analyzed in particular detail. However, the Alliance's move to the East has the impact not only on Russia, but also, undeniably, on the Alliance itself. The enlargement of any organization implies the concept of a candidate country. The current and potential candidates are discussed in this study as well. Special attention is paid to the Baltic State's real and Russia's potential candidacies. The cost of enlargement and its possible repercussions for NATO are examined. Finally, the emergence of European military structure, Western European Union, and its capacities, as a potential alternative for NATO are discussed.

## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>CBO</b>	<b>The Congressional Budget Office</b>
<b>CIS</b>	<b>The Commonwealth of Independent States</b>
<b>EU</b>	<b>The European Union</b>
<b>NATO</b>	<b>The North Atlantic Treaty Organization</b>
<b>CST</b>	<b>The Collective Security Treaty</b>
<b>PfP</b>	<b>The Partnership for Peace</b>
<b>UN</b>	<b>The United Nations</b>
<b>USSR</b>	<b>The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</b>
<b>USA</b>	<b>The United States of America</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>The United Kingdom</b>
<b>WEU</b>	<b>The Western European Union</b>
<b>CFSP</b>	<b>Common Foreign and Security Policy</b>
<b>ESDI</b>	<b>European Security and Defense Identity</b>
<b>NSC</b>	<b>National Security Council</b>
<b>AUA</b>	<b>American University of Armenia</b>
<b>ECSC</b>	<b>European Coal and Steel Community</b>
<b>EC</b>	<b>European Community</b>

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## Introduction

The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was the logical outcome of the early Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, by the U.S.A., Canada, France, the U.K, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium, Portugal, and Iceland in Washington D.C. The declared goal of the Treaty has been the preservation of “the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”<sup>1</sup> Article 5 of the Treaty, preserving these common values, promulgates: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”<sup>2</sup> It is unquestionable that NATO, as a military alliance, was primarily set up to safeguard the West Europeans from highly feasible Soviet attack. No doubt, throughout four decades the Atlantic Alliance succeeded in preserving the West Europe from the Soviet threat. However, when NATO became 40-year-old in 1989, landmark changes began to take place on the other side of the “iron curtain.” The anti-communist revolutions of Eastern Europe put an end to the reign of communist rule in these countries. The culmination was the collapse of the mightiest bastion of communism – the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. NATO found itself in an absolutely new international environment: in a new Europe, without the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself.

One can share the position of the Russian President Vladimir Putin that the Atlantic Alliance “has no further reason for being, because it emerged as a counter-weight to the former Soviet Union and its (NATO’s) existence, let alone enlargement, is unnecessary after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.”<sup>3</sup> But the Alliance, in sharp contrast to this view, has already

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<sup>1</sup> The NATO Handbook Documentation. 1999. The Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty.

<sup>2</sup> The NATO Handbook Documentation. 1999. The North Atlantic Treaty.

<sup>3</sup>Russian.Journal.21/08/2001.Available.at: [http://www.russiajournal.com/news/rj\\_news.shtml?nd=339](http://www.russiajournal.com/news/rj_news.shtml?nd=339)

started moving to the East. On its way, NATO admitted three former members of the extinct Warsaw Pact in 1999: Poland, Hungary and the Check Republic (formerly part of Czechoslovakia). Currently, there are nine countries which are waiting the consideration of their applications for membership due to take place next year at NATO Summit in Prague. The formerly-Soviet Baltic republics are among the candidates, though Russia has been strongly against their possible membership in NATO. The Alliance's move to the East, having diverse consequences, becomes one of the most problematic security issues on the international arena, covering the whole Euro-Atlantic area and even more. It means that the enlargement of NATO is a multifaceted and multidirectional process and each part of this Master's Essay will be devoted to a particular aspect of enlargement.

The title of this Master's Essay, "The Process of NATO Enlargement in Geopolitical Perspective," needs some elucidation. Although various aspects of NATO's enlargement will be discussed, the major perspective would be geopolitical. The main dimensions of this study are: power-relations, geography and, to the lesser extent, military capabilities. Geopolitics is an analysis of geographical influences on power relationships in international politics.<sup>4</sup> Geopolitical theorists have sought to demonstrate the importance in the determination of national policy of such considerations as the acquisition of natural boundaries, access to important sea routes, and the control of strategically important land areas. The term geopolitics was coined by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen in his *Staten som Lifform* (1916; "The State as an Organizm").

In the past, a nation's sphere of influence has been determined primarily by geopolitical factors. Such factors have, however, become relatively less significant in the foreign policies of states because of the improvements in communications and transportation that have enabled states to overcome the limitations imposed on them by geographic location or barriers.

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<sup>4</sup> The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Volume 5. 1998. 15<sup>th</sup> edition. Chicago. USA, p. 193.



Nevertheless decrease of significance does not mean the absolute absence of geographical factor in today's politics. That is why the statement of one of the prominent theorists of geopolitics, Sir Halford Mackinder, remains as actual as it was at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century: "Who governs Eastern Europe commands the heartland, who rules heartland reigns world island, who dominates the world island controls the world" (Britannica 1998, 193). This heartland covers "Euro-Asia," and, according to Mackinder, it was vital that the democratic nations control that area. Roughly put, geographically, what is NATO enlargement all about ? It is precisely about the part of these strategic territories.

The Essay has discussed the following research questions:

- Have all four previous phases of enlargement been necessary?
- What is NATO's rationale for enlargement?
- Is a further enlargement of the Alliance necessary ?
- What is the impact of enlargement on NATO-Russian relationship?
- What impact does the enlargement of NATO have on the Alliance itself?
- Do the aspirations of the current and potential applicants have ground and contribute to the security in Euro-Atlantic area?
- Could Russia be considered as a potential member of the Alliance?
- What is financial cost of enlargement?
- Are the 19 current members able and willing to pay for enlargement?
- Can the Western European Union be an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance?

## **Literature Review**

During the 2000-2001 winter I took an internship in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of RA at the Department of Arms Control and Security Affairs. The topic I focused on was North

Atlantic Treaty Organization. As an internee I had to cover the important parts of NATO Handbook Documentation 1999. My interest to the Atlantic Alliance was also explained by the then upcoming visit of Sir G. Robertson, after which the stance of NATO towards the countries of the South Caucasus became more clear.

Throughout the first two quarters of the second year of graduate study at AUA, I continued to deepen and widen my knowledge about the Alliance, its functions, its role in new Europe, and its move to the East. Namely, I covered some of the sources of my Master's Essay: "The Process of NATO Enlargement in Geopolitical Perspective." They are: "NATO at Fifty: Perspectives on the Future of the Atlantic Alliance" edited by Susan Eisenhower and released by The Center for Political and Strategic Studies at Washington D.C in 1999. This comprehensive book devoted to NATO's 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary is unique publication presenting many scholars and former politicians, who have different, at times contradicting views on the Alliance in general, and on NATO enlargement in particular. Another useful and interesting publication is "NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality" edited by Ted G. Carpenter and Barbara Conry and released by the well-known Cato Institute in 1999. This volume contains the clearest and the most comprehensive discussion available of the most faithful foreign issue that the United States will confront in the coming years.

NATO enlargement is not one-time event, but an ongoing and dynamic process. Hence, the Internet, the most dynamic source of information, becomes the invaluable means to keep up with the events taking place within and around the North Atlantic Alliance. The sources found from the Net and used later in this Master's Essay are of various formats and types. They include the statements of the prominent politicians, such as, G. Kennan, D. Eisenhower, G. Bush, M. Gorbachev, V. Putin, T. Blair, G. Robertson, V. Havel and many others. Internet provides also an easy and fast access to dozens of well-written articles, such as Anatol Lievin's "Illuminating the Baltic States, NATO and Russia", M. Mandelbaum's "NATO Enlargement: A Bridge to the

Nineteenth Century”, Barbara Conry’s “Let Europeans Defend Themselves.” Many other useful articles from the popular journals, such as, World Affairs, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, American Spectator, Joint Force Quarterly, Airpower Journal, Survival are also used in this study. Moreover, the official web sites of NATO, the European Union, the U.S. mission to the NATO, Cato Institute, are the most reliable sources of information. The Study on NATO Enlargement of September 1995 and the fact sheet of U.S. State Department named “Top Ten Questions on NATO Enlargement” released by the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office in February 19, 1998 are the official documents which shed light on almost all aspects of NATO enlargement.

To depict or even to mention all sources of information used in this study is infeasible, but one of the authors worthy to emphasize is Lawrence Kaplan, Professorial Lecturer in History at Georgetown University and Director Emeritus of the Lyman.L Lemnitzer Center for NATO and EU Studies. His book “NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance” contains many answers in regard to Cold War phases of enlargement. Kaplan’s “The NATO Enlargement: Article 5 Angle” is one of the best pieces illuminating their pivotal provision of the Alliance. Ted Carpenter and Amos Perlmutter’s “NATO’s Expensive Trip East: The Folly of Enlargement” meticulously outlines the financial cost of enlargement. In short, the collection of sources in this study represents different points, which, through dispute and discussion, elucidate this multi-faceted problem.

## **Methodology**

Historical/comparative analysis is applied in this study. “Historical/comparative analysis is a form of research with a venerable history in the social sciences and one that is enjoying a resurgence of popularity at present” (Babbie 1995, 306). It is a qualitative method, one in which the researcher attempts to master many subtle details. The main resources for observation and

analysis are historical records. To do it, I have looked at the evolution of NATO enlargement since the time of establishment of the Alliance in 1949. At a preliminary stage, I collected relevant literature about this topic in general. These sources consisted of articles written by about 95 different authors. During the second stage of the research, I selected those sources which were directly related to the topic and analyzed them. Finally, my research was arranged into the present MA Essay.

## **Chapter 2. The History of Enlargement**

### ***Comparative Analysis of the Former Phases of Enlargement***

The first phases of NATO enlargement took place during the Cold War. The first wave of it happened in 1952, when Turkey and Greece acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty, which brought the number of member-countries from 12 to 14. From the geopolitical perspective, with the entrance of Turkey, NATO “met” face to face with the object of Kennan’s<sup>5</sup> containment, that is USSR. In 1947, the Communists threatened Western-oriented monarchy in Greece. In light of this, American President H. Truman enunciated the famous Truman Doctrine, the official embodiment of containment. In a message to Congress on 12 March 1947 Truman asked for emergency aid to Greece and Turkey. But he did more than ask for funds; he announced that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and outside pressures” (Kaplan 1994, 40). It must be said that Greece and Turkey sought membership since the commencement of negotiations to set up the

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<sup>5</sup> George Kennan was a distinguished American historian and diplomat. He is considered as the founding father of American Cold War Strategy. As early as in 1946 he published an anonymous article in *Foreign Affairs*, warning the Administration about coming Soviet threat. George Kennan was the Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1950.

alliance. But their applications were rejected in September 1950; the major argument against their membership was the distance from the Atlantic, though Italy, a founding member of NATO, was also far from the Atlantic. The American Secretary of State Dean Acheson acknowledged later that "...Representatives of Turkey had talked with me in considerable agitation over our failure to invite them, once the Atlantic [dimension] of the alliance had been breached by the invitation to Italy" (1969, 279). However, "...NATO's evaluation of their potential role in the reorganisation of the military changed circumstances" (Kaplan 1994, 47). After the establishment of the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe in January 1951, the membership of Turkey and Greece became quintessential for the protection of the southern borders of NATO and at the Lisbon meeting of February 1952 Greece and Turkey acceded to NATO.

The second phase of enlargement brought the Federative Republic of Germany into the Alliance. The memories of Soviet wartime occupation were still very fresh, and millions of Germans, having the experience of living in the Eastern territories of the former German Reich, knew what was the Communist rule. Meanwhile, when the contours of Stalin's artificial division of Europe became visible and the war on Korean peninsula was at its peak, the Western powers, led by the United States, decided to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany<sup>6</sup>. Psychologically it was very hard for other European countries, especially for France, to launch rearmament of its recently aggressive neighbor. But, "in the face of the Soviet menace the old problems of denazification, demilitarization, and decartelization seemed irrelevant, at least to Americans" (Kaplan 1994, 42). For the creation of a new credible defense force in Europe the Alliance urgently needed manpower, space for maneuvers, for bases, for deployment of troops and that space was in the Federal Republic of Germany. No doubt, France or the United Kingdom may have been pivotal members of the Alliance, but German soil would be the front line of any

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<sup>6</sup> See Basic Documents. Welcome to PESC's site. The Council of the European Union and the common foreign and security policy. <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=en>

assault from the East. In the long run, the North Korean attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950, foreseen in the document of U.S National Security Council<sup>7</sup> – NSC 68, was the decisive accelerating factor which “paved the way for eventual admission of West Germany to NATO, rearmed and sovereign, with the occupation statute rescinded” (Hartendorn.1993, 183). With the entrance of FRG in 1955, border between the two German states, alongside with other places, such as Bulgarian-Greek, Turkish-Soviet, Chechoslovak – West-German, Soviet-Norwegian borders, became not only ideological one but it was also boundary between NATO and Warsaw Pact. Indeed, on 9 May 1955 West Germany became the Member of the alliance, and just after nine days - on 14 May - Warsaw Pact came into being.

Spain was the last country to accede to the Alliance during the Cold War, in 1982. But what differentiated its geopolitical significance of membership from the enlargements of 1952 and 1955 is the fact that Spain did not have common border with the Warsaw Pact countries. International political context at the moment of Spain’s accession (1982) was also different from that of the early 1950s. First, the Warsaw Pact did exist 27 years by 1982. Second, Soviet intervention in Chechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and, undeniably, Caribbean missile crisis between these phases of enlargements worsened the East-West confrontation. On the other hand, there were two appalling similarities. While the phases of the early 1950s took place on the background of Korean war, in 1982, the USSR had intervened the neighboring Afghanistan. Also, at the moment of Spanish entrance into the Alliance, Ronald Reagan, American President was not less hostile to the USSR than H. Trumen.

Spain, two adjacent neighbors of which, France and Portugal, are NATO members since the establishment of the Alliance had close ties with NATO for a long time, but it was not up

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<sup>7</sup> In 1950 the U.S. National Security Council had existed for only three years. It was a cabinet-level committee created to advise the president on issues where foreign policy and defense policy intersected. In April 1950 the Secretariat received a seventy-page typescript from the Department of State. It was stamped “TOP SECRET” and was entitled “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security.”

until 1982 when the door of the Alliance was opened to the Kingdom of Spain. Undeniably Spanish membership could not be underestimated, but, from the geopolitical perspective, Spain's entrance should be viewed more as a completion of NATO's ideological map and successful deed of the Alliance to support fragile democracy emerging after Franco's regime, rather than in the context of NATO versus Warsaw Pact struggle.

Napoleon Bonaparte once asserted that the policy of a state lies in its geography. However, while geography alone can not determine foreign policy of a given state, it does provide an important context within which diplomatic exchanges and strategic calculations are made. Adrian Hyde-Price precisely noted that "Mars, the god of war, has cast a long and terrible shadow over the lands between Russia and Germany" (1998, 256). Undoubtedly, throughout centuries the nations of Eastern Europe either were forcefully incorporated into multinational empires or were attacked by their two mighty neighbors: Russia and Germany. From historical perspective, "with the emergence of medieval Christendom, the kingdoms of Poland, Hungary and Bohemia acquired a distinctive role as the bulwark of European civilization against perceived threats from Asia and the East" (Hyde-Price 1998, 257). Based on this historical reality, Polish prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki noted in 1990, "The idea of being the "ramparts of civilization" and, by the same token of Europe, has remained alive in Poland throughout three centuries" (Rotfeld and Stutzle 1991, 131). After the World War Two Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, were dominated by the suppressive communist hand of Moscow and, ironically, exactly these three states of Eastern Europe experienced on their skin the might of the Soviet military in 1956, 1968, and 1980 respectively. However, as the word suggests, geopolitics is the study of interaction between geographical space and politics. While geographical space of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (if not to take into account the velvet disintegration of the latter) remain untouched with the end of Communism, their geopolitical surroundings altered unrecognizably. With the reunification of Germany, which has been less visible, but inescapable

enlargement of NATO, Poland has begun to border with the Alliance in the face of its new Western neighbor – reunified, democratic, and economically prosperous Germany. While on the East, with the emergence of new states, Ukraine, Belorussia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Russia with the exception of the Kaliningrad exclave, both politically and geographically is now more distant from them. After all, the Soviet troops withdrew from all above-mentioned countries and Russia is not the USSR. When all these landmark changes were underway, “President Vaclav Havel of what was then Czechoslovakia expressed his hope for the future of Europe in a speech to the Polish Sejm and Senate: “We wish to belong to a Europe that is an amicable community of independent nations and democratic states, a Europe that is stabilized, not divided into blocs and pacts,” he declared on January 25, 1990. “There is hope that the Soviet Union - in the interests of good relations with its former satellites – will gradually withdraw its troops from our territories...Then both military alliances could be dissolved, and the process of pan-European integration could be finally set in motion” (Kober 1999). Whether the former Czech dissident was naive or extremely cautious, only the first part of his statement became reality - the Soviet Union did withdraw from their territories. Another alliance - NATO, which should have been dissolved, too, according to V. Havel, not only survived, but has been expanding.

In December 1994 NATO Foreign Ministers initiated a study on NATO enlargement which was published in September 1995. After it, the individual dialogue with the interested partner countries accelerated. The Alliance undertook an analysis of necessary factors in respect to the admission of new member countries. In December 1996, at the ministerial summit held in Brussels, it became apparent that the first wave of Post Cold War NATO enlargement would take place soon. Before the NATO’s summit held in Madrid on July 8-9, 1997 there was a strong intention among allies to name candidate states for membership. On June 12, 1997, the US President Bill Clinton, announced that the United States was in favor of the candidacies of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Washington was confident that these three countries



had made a particular advance in reforming their militaries, developing democratic institutions and a free market, and ensuring civilian control of the military. There was also consensus among sixteen members, which is required by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in favor of these candidates. It meant that this “narrow” enlargement had all chances to pass compulsory legislative approval of all members of the Alliance. Designation of candidates by the protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty on 16, December 1997 was the decisive turning point in the process of admitting Central European countries. In 1998, American Senate, along with other legislatures of member-states gave green light to the newcomers of the Alliance. On 12 March 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were admitted into the Alliance, bringing the number of members from 16 to 19.

The NATO enlargement happened despite Russia’s fervent objections. Even Russian democrats, with Atlanticist political perspectives, such as the former Russian Ambassador in U.S V. Lukin, opposed to the latest enlargement: “NATO enlargement is isolating Russia. What is the choice for us? Only to be an outsider. Not a hostile outsider, but still an outsider. It is a danger. We will become stronger, and we are still a nuclear power. It is a danger to us and a danger to you.”<sup>8</sup> After the Cold War there is no military threat for Central and Eastern Europe emanating from the East; the menaces to the European security originate from the Europe itself: Bosnian conflict 1992-1995, Kosovo, Montenegro. To deal with them it is sufficient to cooperate with NATO through Partnership for Peace<sup>9</sup> in which Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had involved actively before 1999. All in all, further elaboration of the negative impact of NATO’s move to the East will be discussed later in this study, but at this juncture it becomes undeniable

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<sup>8</sup> See: The Russian Reaction to NATO Expansion. Global Beat Issue Brief No. 28 February 24, 1998. Press Briefing with Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Russian Duma’s Committee on International Affairs. Available at: <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib28.html>

<sup>9</sup> It is the program signed by 19 members of the Alliance and other 26 countries of the EAPC, with the exception of Tajikistan. Within the framework of PfP 45 countries cooperation both in military and in non-military fields. It is cooperation between NATO 19 +1 individual partner. PfP was initiated by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 11 January 1994. Armenia joined the PfP in October 1994

that the first two waves of the Alliance's enlargement (1952 and 1955) were urgent necessities and were justifiable provided real Soviet threat; the third wave of 1982 was the preservation of a fragile and emerging democracy on Iberian peninsula at the end of the Cold War. And in sharp contrast, the fourth wave of NATO expansion of 1999 was the first harbinger of the continuation of Cold War in our Post Cold War period. It is an exact time to answer the next question: What are the main purposes of NATO enlargement?

### *NATO's Rationale for Enlargement*

Bill Clinton noted that, "NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats, and create the conditions for prosperity to flourish."<sup>10</sup> In the Fact Sheet released by the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, U.S. Department of State February 19, 1998, there are four primary reasons supporting the entrance of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic to NATO; these same motives could be applied to the upcoming enlargement also.

**First**, enlargement will make NATO stronger and better able to address Europe's security challenges. Europe was, is, and will be the region of paramount importance for the American security interest. From the perspective of Washington, three new members would "strengthen our common security, enhance NATO's ability to fulfill its core mission of **collective defense, respond to a range of security challenges, and reduce the possibility of another major conflict in Europe** of the kind that has claimed so many American lives." Indeed, collective defence, embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty still remains pivotal task of the Alliance. But many scholars and analysts claim that NATO territory – including the territory of

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<sup>10</sup> See: 10 Top Ten Questions on NATO Enlargement Fact Sheet released by the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, U.S. Department of State February 19, 1998. Available at: ([http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs\\_980219\\_natoqanda.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_980219_natoqanda.html))

its new members – is not threatened today. Nor is it likely to be in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, according to Karl-Heinz Kamp “the evolutionary expansion of NATO responsibilities has not replaced its key purpose of collective defense and mutual assistance; rather, it provides a rationale for keeping NATO vital so that it remains capable of defending its members in the event a new, serious threat emerges” (Kamp 1995). International stability out of the Alliance’s territory, along with the collective defence, has become additional new mission of NATO. Indeed, this task is absolutely new for the Alliance, because in its fifty years of success, the Alliance in Europe never had to do anything other than provide deterrence and defence of its own members’ territory from the contiguous Soviet threat (Ellsworth 1999). The importance of this new role of NATO was emphasized by Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair, “Together, the United States and a reunified Europe can provide security in an increasingly uncertain world.”<sup>11</sup> And this “uncertain world” goes beyond the territory of NATO. The Alliance’s principal strategic and military purpose in the post-Cold War era should be providing of a mechanism for the rapid formation of militarily potent “coalitions of the willing” that are able to project power beyond NATO territory (William Perry et al. 1999). This shift from the defense of members’ territory to the defense of common interests becomes strategic imperative for the Alliance. What are these common interests? John Kriendler<sup>12</sup>, a senior NATO official, in his speech at American University of Armenia on 18, June 2001 underlined: “our ally nations have gathered together to defend the democratic systems which they all have, as well as the democratic values of human rights, the rule of law and democracy.” However, Robert Ellsworth (1999) emphasized that to carry out successfully this new mission the Alliance should absorb the large strategic changes of our own day and develop a new concept of its purposes, its roles, and its missions. In addition, by inviting new members, NATO makes member-states to cooperate, but not to compete. This

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<sup>11</sup> Interview in the New York Times. November 13, 1998.

<sup>12</sup> Head. Council Operations, Crisis Management and Operations Directorate, NATO. Brussels.

cooperation, supposedly, reduces the possibility of another major conflict in Europe by drawing members together, encouraging them to resolve disputes peacefully, causing them to plan and work with, rather than against one another, and fostering respect for democratic values and institutions. Franco-German cooperation could serve as an example to this role of NATO.

**Second, enlargement will strengthen NATO. It will allow to ease common burden of common security.** The military and strategic assets of these states will improve NATO's ability to carry out its collective defence and other missions. Study on NATO Enlargement published in September 1995 obliges newcomers to contribute to it. The study promulgates that "New members must commit themselves, as all current Allies do on the basis of the Washington Treaty, to maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance by sharing roles, risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits of assuring common security goals and objectives."

**Third, the enlargement creates stability and democracy in Central Europe.** "Partly to improve their prospects for membership, states in the region have settled border and ethnic disputes with neighbors, strengthened civilian control of their militaries, and broadened protections for ethnic and religious minorities." Democracy is advocated in the process of inviting new members. The Study on NATO enlargement declares: "Enlargement should accord with, and help to promote, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN, and the safeguarding of the freedom, common heritage and civilization of all Alliance members and their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. New members will need to conform to these principles."

**Finally, the enlargement is the means to "erase Stalin's artificial dividing line in Europe."** Today, from political perspective, Europe is becoming undivided continent and opening up NATO to additional members does serve to this purpose (Jason Arnold et. al 1998). With the end of the Cold War, an unprecedented opportunity existed to build an improved

security architecture that provides increased stability and security for all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area, without re-creating dividing lines. Allegedly, the Alliance does not create a new dividing line in Europe. It has been eliminating the one set up by Stalin. As it has been said in The U.S Mission to the NATO “If NATO fail to enlarge to take in new members among the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe it would “freeze” the dividing line created by the Cold War.”

By the same token, elaborating arguments supporting NATO enlargement, Paul. I. Gallis, Specialist in European Affairs, in his Report for Congress, stated that: “The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 provides Moscow with “a voice but not a veto,” and ensures that Russia will enjoy consultation on the key European security issues outside NATO territory” (Gallis 1998). Following this line of reasoning, Russia is still potential threat, and the presence of the Alliance’s forces on the territories of new members will diminish Russian influence. Furthermore, based on figures from NATO-study the cost of enlargement is quite modest “because there is little threat” – \$1.3-1.5 billion over 10 years, which I am going to question below. For comparison, P. Gallis said that the U.S.A. alone has spent over \$7 billion to establish stability in Bosnia. And at the end of the list of pro arguments for enlargement P. Gallis noted, “U.S and western defence industries will benefit by securing markets for their armaments in the newly allied states” (Gallis 1998). To sum up, at first sight it seems that the main reasons of the Alliance’s enlargement are healthy for the security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Next chapters will examine the arguments supporting the enlargement of NATO.

## Chapter 3. Necessity of Enlargement

### *The Opposition to Enlargement*

The logic of any alliance implies the possibility of serious threat to the vital security interests of a member-state. If there is no such threat, it means that democracy – one of the most highest values of the Alliance – can and must be preserved by other “means”, such as European Union or Council of Europe. If Vaclav Havel announces that Russia “had no right to oppose NATO enlargement”, is he afraid of the repetition of “Prague Spring” of 1968? Are the Baltic states afraid of occupation by Russia (USSR) as it happened in 1940? Does the security, let’s say, of Slovenia or Bulgaria at stake? Or if the Alliance such an ardent promoter of human rights why it does not respond to the severe violations of these rights in Turkey – the member of the alliance since 1952? Top NATO officials are repeating here and there “security of your neighbour is your security.” Does it mean that theoretically possible clashes between the 300.000 Hungarians living in Voejvodina and the Serbs would result in practically very possible bombardment of Belgrad? All my questions lead to conclude that enlargement of NATO is the creation of new dividing line in Europe. The dislike of the Alliance to the previous dividing line was expressed in “The London Declaration” of the North Atlantic Council of 1990: “The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing” is not in congruence with its today’s policy of enlargement.

On 8 November 1991 in Rome, when the Soviet Union was already “dead”, but not yet “buried”, the North Atlantic Council shaping Alliance’s Strategic Concept acknowledged that, “All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West; they have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy.”<sup>13</sup> In Rome, the Council proclaimed, “The political division of

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<sup>13</sup> The NATO Handbook Documentation.

Europe that was the source of the Cold War period has thus been overcome.” Despite, or probably due, to these apparent changes in Eastern Europe three of the former members of the dismantled Warsaw Pact became the parties of the Atlantic Alliance in 1999. No, the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact should not be regretted, but it must be concern related with the construction of new “Berlin wall”, the length of which is far more stretching. In the words of the “grave-digger” of the Warsaw Pact and the Berlin Wall, M. Gorbachev, expressed in the letter to G.W. Bush: “From the standpoint of the Old World, the post-Cold War period ushered in hopes that now are faded. Over the past decade, the United States has continued to operate along an ideological track identical to the one it followed during the Cold War. Need an example? The expansion of NATO eastward...” Speaking more “regionally”, with the joining of the Baltic States to the Alliance, the Russian enclave – Kaliningrad would find itself exclusively surrounded by NATO countries. Indeed, even the position of early Russian Western-minded democrats, such as the former Deputy Foreign Minister Anatolii Adamishin, was in dissonance with the eastern broadening of NATO: “If people see that we are quiet,...it will be difficult for a democratic government to say: Do not be afraid, these are good people” (Adeed 1995, 101). Moreover, opposition to eastward NATO enlargement, albeit in a more cautious way, is expressed not only in Russia. In his interview to Reuters on 21, December 2000, Armenian President Robert Khocharian admonished “against the appearance of “new military components”- a veiled reference to possible NATO bases in neighboring Georgia or Azerbaijan, which have been more enthusiastic about the alliance.” The latter position is supported by Director of the Atlantic Council’s Program on European Societies in Transition, Mr. E. Wayne Merry, “The idea that Georgia or Azerbaijan could join NATO is *absurd*” and he continued, “If there are other new members, they will be in Central Europe.”<sup>14</sup> It is precisely this region is transforming from bone of contention to the focus of tension. But the most importantly, opposition is also seen in

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<sup>14</sup> EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW TO MEDIAMAX NEWS AGENCY Pan Armenian News 03.08.2000

member-states also. On 7 May 1998, more than 20 British former military officials have expressed their disagreement with the enlargement in their letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair. The letter acknowledges that the newly independent countries of East and Central Europe have legitimate security worries. It goes on: "However, that does not give them the absolute right to become members of the alliance of their choice. We believe that enlargement of NATO is not the right way to give them the security they seek and will diminish the security of existing members."<sup>15</sup>

Frequently, it is said that the Alliance has moral obligation towards East Europeans, because they suffered most being behind of "the iron curtain." Michael Mandelbaum, The Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins University, has asked – Did the Ukrainians suffer less? Or if the "suffering" is the criterion for admission, the Russians, but not the Hungarians or the Czechs are the candidate number one.

Turkey – neither Atlantic nor democratic member of the Alliance – desperately has been trying to become a member of European Union over thirty years. The Turks warned that "if excluded from the EU but called upon to approve NATO expansion, they will want some compensation" (Mandelbaum 1997). But if the Turks are compensated, it is unlikely that all other members of the Alliance will resist the temptation to demand similar treatment. If so, expansion will entail an additional cost, one not accounted for in the administration's estimates. Who will pay it? (Mandelbaum 1997). In other words, it means that all 19 members of the Atlantic Alliance can become the gamblers of the Atlantic Club.

At this juncture, it is time to return to democracy. Establishment and preservation of democracy under the "umbrella" of the Alliance is ridiculous. Without being NATO country, being invaded by the USSR, and with having long border with it, Finland is not less democratic than Poland or Hungary. Furthermore, Greece, Turkey, and Portugal have all had spells of

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<sup>15</sup> Available at Radio Free Europe. <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1998/05/F.RU.980507125020.html>



undemocratic rule while members of NATO. After all, the democratic institutions were established by 1999 in the Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic. Ultimately, European Union, The Council of Europe are more contributing to democracy than the defensive Atlantic Alliance. But U.S State Department humorously noted that “why wait to further integrate Europe until tomato farmers in Central Europe start using the right kind of pesticide?”

One factor of utmost importance is also worthy to note. It is the citizens’ attitude to the Alliance’s membership, because it seems that it was more Vaclav Havel rather than the Czechs who was inclined to join the Atlantic Alliance. “In the Czech Republic, for example, a December 1996 poll revealed that "only 38% of Czechs are in favor of their country joining NATO...Some 35% were opposed, while 27% were undecided"<sup>16</sup> (Mandelbaum 1997). Or the study accomplished by European Commission in the Baltic States and published in NATO review in May-June 1997 does not need any comments. The figures in the Table 1 speak for themselves: (Note: The question was: If there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of your country’s membership of NATO, would you personally vote for or against membership?)

	For	Undecided	Against	Don’t know
Estonians	32	35	11	22
Latvians	31	32	10	27
Lithuanians	28	28	9	35

**Table 1.**

Ironically, among the candidates only the Baltic states have the border with Russia. Given the Western worry about Russian encroachment towards its western neighbours, which indeed happened many times in history, namely the Balts must have been admitted to the Alliance rather

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<sup>16</sup> Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest, December 5, 1996 in Michael Madelbaum’s article “NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century”

than the Hungarians, Poles, Czechs who do not have border with Russia. (with the exception of the enclave of Kaliningrad). Or, as it is sharply noted by M. Mandelbaum (1997), “excluding the Balts would make a mockery of the idea of expansion,” and he goes on, “Thus in excluding the Baltic states, the planned expansion of NATO is either unnecessary or irresponsible.” However, before arriving to this conclusion he emphasised that the inclusion of the Balts is not only costly but also “dangerous” Why? What makes the countries of the so called “grey zone” so dangerous for inclusion is not only their juxtaposition to Russian border, but the Russians living in Ukraine and the Baltic states: 34%-Latvia, 9%-Lithuania, 22%-Ukraine, 29%-Estonia (World Almanac.1999). It is an “ethnic bomb” which fortunately have not “exploded” so far, but it can outburst at any moment. And according to M. Mandelbaum (1997), “NATO expansion will not make such a prospect more remote than it is today.”

Amos Perlmutter and Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice-President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, after looking at the differences in calculations of enlargement’s cost by three different establishments, arrived at the conclusion that numerical differences have strategical implication – Russia. “A crucial premise of the low RAND and Pentagon estimates is that NATO is an alliance without an enemy... Since there is no enemy, it follows that there is no need to build or deploy additional forces, despite NATO’s expanded territorial jurisdiction” (Perlmutter et.al.1998, 21). The logical question is: with the absence of no credible threat, either short term or long term, to the security of the Central and Eastern European nations, why expand NATO? The question becomes more complicated provided that possible members are unable, and current ones, especially European members, are unwilling to carry the cost of enlargement. The ardent proponents of enlargement are assuring that there is no need to deploy sizeable forces on the territories of possible members, because of non-existing Russian threat. They erroneously or deliberately think that mere declaration of, let’s say, Muslim Albania

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as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, which was “encapsulated” over 40 years, will assure, besides security, the preservation of the Western values in that country. “This is not strategy, but a worrisome case of self-delusion that may end up costing the United States more than dollars and cents” (Perlmutter et.al.1998, 21). Or in the words of the distinguished historian and diplomat *George Kennan* (1997) it is “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.” But, still the magnetic might of the Article 5 mentioned supra attracts the attention of the East Europeans, as the light of the Statue of Freedom was, is, and will grasp the gazes of the thousands of emigrants arriving to the shores of Manhattan.

### ***The Russian Factor***

The only country, which is still theoretically and partially able to counterweigh the Alliance, is the Russian Federation. But questionable ability does not entail the willingness to do so. It signalizes that further enlargement of the Alliance is the pressing policy to isolate the Eurasian state from Europe; provided that, in 1997, Russia signed “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.” It has backfire effect also: Russia pressured from the West is fortifying its positions in the South (Iran, Armenia) and in the East (Korean peninsula, China, Central Asia). As noted by some analysts, “Current plans for limited NATO expansion ignore the biggest, future security problem for the West, which is not Russia, but rather the long-term, geo-strategic possibility of a Russian-Chinese alliance” (Stam et al. 1997). Given the complementarity that exists between Russia’s capacity to export military technology and China’s ability to produce marketable consumer goods, there is nothing inherently implausible in this scenario. In the words of John L. Gaddis, Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University, “It would not be the first time Russia and China had linked up out of concern, even if misguided, over American aggressiveness: we know from

Soviet and Chinese documents that this was precisely the reason behind the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance” (1998, 147). The history seems to prove this warning - alliances give birth to new alliances.

P. Gallis also noted: “The key U.S. interest in Europe is ensuring Russia's continued democratization and integration into the community of nations; enlargement will humiliate Moscow and create a "Weimar Russia," vulnerable to Russian nationalists hostile to the West who believe that the country's interests are being sacrificed by weak leadership” (Gallis 1998). In addition, the enlargement will jeopardize co-operation with Russia in “new missions” of the Alliance such as crisis-management or peace operations. Truly, the active participation of Russia and other signatory states of Partnership for Peace program are highly contributing for the creation of real stability in the Balkans. In addition, START 2 Nuclear Treaty and other arms control agreements are impeded by the enlargement of the Alliance.

Many in the West are wondering why Russia is so sensitive to the aspirations of Central Europeans to join NATO. East Europeans are reiterating that for them membership in the Alliance is “a psychological symbol of rejoining the Western civilization that Central and East Europe have allegedly been part of from time immemorial” (Kozyrev 1995). Nevertheless, if for the East Europeans integration into Europe is measured by the membership in the Alliance in which non-European power is a first fiddle, it means a stagnation of European political thinking.

Sergei Karaganov, then chairman of the Russian Council on Foreign Policy and Defense, suggested that Russia should reject both isolationism and the rush to join NATO. Instead, it should seek a limited partnership based on the promotion of Russian interests. According to Karaganov, Russia should oppose to the NATO’s move to the East for the following reasons (this was before the enlargement of 1999):

- It would delay Russia’s integration into Europe and create security subsystems which exclude Russia
- It would erode Russian trust in the West, further isolating Russia and strengthening anti-Western political circles within Russia

- It will increase the tendency within Russia to develop an alternative security system, accentuating the division of Europe
- Expanding NATO before a new security mechanism is in place would limit Russia's ability to participate in the international arena
- Expanding NATO would make the Baltic States and the Ukraine permanent sources of discord with the West (Petro et al. 1997, 163).

The first two points of Karaganov's statement have already been somewhat elucidated. The question is whether Russia is creating "alternative security system". The answer is positive. Treaty on Collective Security of six CIS countries includes; Russia, Kazakhstan, Tagikistan, Kirgizstan, Armenia and Belorussia, and exactly the last two members border with NATO (Turkey, Poland) and have borders with NATO candidates (Lithuania, Latvia as official candidates, Georgia as a potential candidate).

Recently, Russian President Putin emphasized the absence of "a new security mechanism." According to Colin McMahon (2001), "Putin called for the creation of a "single security and defense space in Europe. This could be achieved, he said, by disbanding NATO or by allowing Russia to join it. Or a new body could be created in which Russia would be an equal partner." Truly, the events after September 11 came only to give powerful support for Putin's assessment. Participation of Russia on "international arena" is, indeed, limited due to the absence of alternative mechanism. For instance, NATO's recent move to Macedonia to disarm the Albanian guerillas is taking place without Russia. And a last point of Karaganov's prognosis in regard to the Baltic States and Ukraine as "permanent sources of discord with the West" is an undeniable reality.

Zbigniew Brzezinski noted that a "properly paced process of enlargement should be one that [not] unnecessarily delays Russia's liberation from its imperial nostalgia" (Brzezinski 1999). Rodric Brihtwaite adds to this perspective that there are thawing imperial sentiments in Russia, but even many conservative Russians find that the Stalinist or Tsarist model of their country is the history and nothing more. The Russians realize that NATO enlargement is irreversible. But further expansion of NATO, with the negligence to Russians interests, would make Russians

more disappointed and more hostile to the West. It would damage fragile Russian democracy. “If we want Russia to be cooperative, prosperous, and stable, it is not a very sensible thing to do” (Brithwaite 1999).

Changes that have taken place in NATO’s military operations are also reasons for Russian concern. As it was reiterated supra, common defense was the only mission of the Alliance throughout the Cold War. But as NATO has involved in “out of area” missions, “the alliance now clearly has offensive as well as defensive objectives” (Carpenter 1997, 46). “Out of area” operations, if accompanied with further inclusion of East Europeans into the Alliance, will inevitably be perceived in Russia as a threat (and the first step of a major “geopolitical offensive”) and will thus provoke Russian responses in foreign, defense, and arms control policies. “Out-of-area” operations of the Alliance are reasons of Russian distrust to NATO because they undermine the argument that NATO is a purely defensive alliance and its expansion would be of no concern to Russians. Russian President, Vladimir Putin, has said recently about it, “And when we are told that it is a political organization, that it is being transformed from a military into a political organization, then, naturally, we may ask, why did you bomb Yugoslavia?” (Colin McMahon 2001). So even NATO’s “international behavior” does not create ground for trust in Russia, and it in turn makes expansion less acceptable for Moscow.

On the other hand, each and every collective security arrangement has juridical right to invite any other state(s) to accede to a given basic document (Treaty) of a given organization. No other organization or state can violate an inalienable right of a state to arrange its security concerns by acceding to a military alliance, especially when it is guaranteed in many international conventions. For instance, Helsinki Convention of CSCE of 1975 says that participating states “have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance.” However, as it has been precisely noted by Alexei Arbatov, the deputy chairman of the

Defense Committee of the Duma of the Russian Federation, it is no longer essential whether or not the prospect of NATO expansion represents a threat to Russia. What is really important is that the whole Russian political spectrum is asserting that expansion would not only be against Russian foreign and security interests but would also violate some accepted rules by which the Cold War came to end with the voluntary consent of the USSR (Arbatov 1996). By the same token, according to S. Karaganov, “In 1990, we were told quite clearly by the West that the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and German unification would not lead to NATO expansion. We did not demand written guarantees because in the euphoric atmosphere of that time it would have seemed almost indecent – like two girlfriends giving written promises not to seduce each other’s husbands” (Collins 1997, 63).

No doubt, Russia is not so mighty as USSR. And, the United States and its allies are able to disregard Russian view on NATO enlargement. It was reiterated, not once, by the West that the Alliance is not intending to place nuclear weapons or large numbers of conventional forces on the territories of new members. But, in international politics today’s commitments do not always coincide with tomorrow’s deeds. The worst, Russia has to swallow this political “slap in the face”, but it can remember it. If not treated properly, Russia would likely remember this geopolitical insult of the West to establish “hegemony” throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and even Central Asia. NATO’s move to the East is especially painful for Russian generals. “They, trained like NATO generals to look at capabilities not intentions, are professionally bound to regard it as a potential threat” (Braithwaite 1999). In this situation, NATO’s move to the East gets Russia to move to create its own political-military bloc among those nations that are not included on the roster of new NATO members. This is the worst scenario for both Russia and the West. To include Russia is better and still the best scenario is to stop.

### *The Impact of the Enlargement on the Atlantic Alliance*

What impact does the enlargement have on the Alliance itself? First, further enlargement damages cohesion within the Alliance. Currently, there are 19 countries. And further enlargement means less-speedy decision-making, diminishing possibility of consensus, especially when the military capabilities of the admitted countries are not considerably contributing to the core mission of collective defense. “A properly paced process of enlargement should be one that neither overstretches the Alliance’s cohesion nor...” (Brzezinski 1999). Entrance of the new members means the inevitable diversification of the interests. The Alliance is no longer an organization with one goal. Its today’s missions are out of its territory. There is only limited consensus in the Alliance on security objectives outside the normal NATO collective defense scope of action. Newcomers will not make it easier to do. Secondly, as it was astutely noted by P. Gallis, con argument of the enlargement is the unwillingness of the Europeans “to bear the burden for ensuring security in their own backyard; if instability develops in central Europe, the United States will have to shoulder the financial and military costs of bringing peace” (Gallis, 1998). This unwillingness became apparent after the Bosnian conflict. And by bringing more members into the Alliance, burden of bringing peace on American shoulder will become heavier. Thirdly, Article 5 is still in the Treaty of Washington but its applicability, provided the absence of direct Soviet threat, can be self-destructive for the Alliance. In 1949, it was hard to convince U.S. Senate that an attack on London is equivalent to an attack on New-York, even with the presence of Soviet threat (Kaplan.2001). As Lawrence Kaplan has put forth “convincing today’s Senate to consider an attack on Riga, Latvia, equivalent to an attack on New-York in the absence of a compelling threat, could be equally contentious. Just as the debate of 1948-49 did, putting the enlargement question to the Senate, will probably result through evaluation of the role of the United States in Europe, the extent to which such treaty obligations are necessary, and the extent to which the United States can reasonably make such promises ” (Kaplan 2001, 2). The demand



of being a member of Alliance is high. The Article 5 is an embodiment of American commitment to its old and new European allies. It is a promise. Extending that promise to as many as nine new countries in the absence of an immediate threat, may be met with skepticism, by military planners and members of the Senate. Nevertheless, promises were made in 1999. And the applicant countries do remember them.

## **Chapter 4. Geopolitics of the Upcoming and Future Enlargements**

### *The Current and Future Candidates*

To clarify - Who are the applicant countries? They are three former Soviet Republics: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, three former members of the Warsaw Pact: Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia (as part of Czechoslovakia), two new states emerged out of SFRY: FYR of Macedonia and Slovenia. And the ninth is Albania. Besides, Georgia and Azerbaijan have also expressed their aspirations joining the Alliance. With the further enlargement of NATO, Ukraine will find itself sandwiched by the Alliance and Russia.

To outline the list of possible candidates it is preferable to divide them into four groups. In the first group, all current invitees, with the exception of the Baltic States, are included. To elaborate on each candidate from this group is beyond the scope of this study. However, to examine some aspects of several candidates from this group, identical to all of them, will suffice to question the righteousness of the Alliance's decision to invite them to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Gerald Solomon questioned whether Slovenia and Romania, along with other candidates, satisfy the requirements introduced by W. Perry, U.S. Secretary of Defence in 1996:

- Potential members must be prepared to defend the Alliance and have the professional military forces to do it.

- NATO must continue to work by consensus - new members must respect this tradition and abide by it.
- Military forces of new members must be capable of operating effectively with NATO forces. This means not only a common doctrine, but interoperable equipment – especially communications equipment.
- Potential new members must uphold democracy and free enterprise, respect human rights inside their borders, and must respect sovereignty outside their borders.
- Their military forces must be under democratic, civilian control. (Solomon 1998)

For instance, Romania is far to satisfy the fourth point. In 1996, Bilateral Treaty of Understanding, Co-operation and Good Neighbourliness was signed between Romania and Hungary. It is said that this Hungarian – Romanian rapprochement “was primarily a result of the two countries’ desires to impress NATO and may be more cosmetic and substantive” (Bandow 1998, 217). However, NATO has been unable to decrease the tensions between such member-states as Greece and Turkey. It could be even argued that it is the European Union rather than NATO that have provided a good basis for German-French healthy relations. In case of an attack on either of them (Slovenia and Romania), how is NATO going to defend them is, at least, questionable. Elaborating on indefensibility of these candidates, William Hyland (1998) underlined that, “This is especially true for Romania, which would require NATO to overcome tough logistical problems and great distances to mount a defence on their behalf.” W. Hyland (1998) went on to claim “recent proposals to include Slovenia and Romania, to assume the defence of those areas, which would further enlarge NATO’s defence frontiers, are truly ludicrous.” It is necessary to add about other candidacies from this group. H.Binnendijk (1997) warned that “Balkan states, such as Bulgaria and Albania may need a decade or longer to prepare for membership.”

Austria, Finland and Sweden compose the second group. These non-aligned and neutral countries might aspire to membership in NATO, if they consider their status unacceptable within the newly arranged Europe. However, now this question is not impending, because neutrality is not only their status, but also long-standing and deeply rooted mentality of their populations. It is

worthy noting that precisely these three neutrals, along with Ireland and Denmark<sup>17</sup>, are those five members of the EU that are not members of WEU - defense tool of the European Community. The third group are the Baltic Republics' whose candidacies will be discussed later in this Essay.

The third group in this division can include all CIS countries with the exception of Russia, because the whole sub-chapter, as in the case of Baltic candidates, will be devoted to possible Russian membership in the Alliance. In regard to the South Caucasus, "It is extremely unlikely that NATO will extend security guarantees to any of the states in Central Asia or the South Caucasus or offer prospective membership in the Alliance. Although there is general Western support for the independence of these states, it is hard to make the case that the preservation of their independence, is critical to Western security. Indeed, it would be exceptionally difficult, perhaps even impossible, to garner a consensus within NATO that the independence of any of these states is a "vital" interest."<sup>18</sup> Official position of the Alliance was expressed by Sir. G. Robertson, Secretary-General of NATO, in January 2001, during his visit to Azerbaijan and Armenia, "Not a single South Caucasian country forwarded an application to join NATO, and all talk on this topic is of academic and theoretical nature."<sup>19</sup> The Alliance on July 9, 1997 signed "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the NATO and Ukraine." Nevertheless, "given the Ukraine's economic dependence on Western aid and on Russian energy resources, Kiev's warning about the possible adverse consequences on NATO enlargement is a strong indicator of Ukraine's concerns and opposition" (Udoenko 1996).

Returning to 9 current applicants, what was the point to divide them into two groups: Baltic States and the rest. The point is Russia. The possible entrance of any of the Baltic States is

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<sup>17</sup> Denmark unlike Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Austria is a NATO member, but all five do not have membership status in WEU.

<sup>18</sup> Publication of RAND Corporation available at: <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1074/mr1074.chap7.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> This statement is an excerpt from the text received by Armenian News Network on 17/01/2001. "NATO chief to discuss co-operation with Armenia." by Tigran Liloyan. ITAR-TASS

more sensitive for Russia than the entrance of any from the remaining 6 applicants. Indeed, from geopolitical perspective, geographical location of Estonia makes the issue of NATO enlargement more sensitive for Russia than that of Slovenia. But, it does not mean that the admission of the others is contributing to the international security. As Mandelbaum (1997) pointed out:

The second great and unnecessary cost of expansion, as the Clinton administration envisions it, is the creation of a grey area, a no man's land -- where none now exists -- between what would be the new eastern border of NATO and Russia. Creating such a **grey zone** would increase the vulnerability and potential instability of the countries within it, new democracies that are important to the United States and the West for both strategic and moral reasons: the three Baltic countries and Ukraine.

In geopolitical parlance, it entails not only the isolation of Russia from Europe, but it is also an inevitable "seclusion" of Moldova, Ukraine, Baltic States, Byelorussia. At this point, it is time to evaluate the aspirations of the potentially most troublesome candidates - Baltic States.

### *The Baltic States: A Case-Study*

The Balts realize that they are unable to provide their own security. As a result, their "armies" are minuscule: Latvia has 4.5 thousands, Estonia and Lithuania, 3.5 and 5.3 respectively in 1997. Without belittling the significance of the economic and political ties with Russia, the Balts have reiterated, not once, their aspirations to become full members of the European Union and NATO. The Baltic States were among the first countries to sign up for NATO's PfP program in early 1994. They have tried to escape being isolated from or treated differently from the other Central European candidates. There is a prevailing European view that the Baltic States are faced with a real security problem, unlike other countries unofficially viewed as the prime candidates for NATO membership. This is a dilemma for the Alliance to carry out a credible strategy towards the Baltic Republics.

On the other hand, Russia fervently opposes possible entry of the Balts into the Alliance, which in turn "heats" regional tensions. Membership of any of the Baltic States leads to strong

Russian reaction. Indeed, being one of the most pragmatic world leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced at a news conference in Helsinki during his visit to Finland in September 2001: “I underline that we do not see any objective reason for the Baltic states to become members of NATO. We are not glad about this. We think it is a mistake,” Russian President went on, “only in a sick imagination could one think that some aggressive elements could...emerge from Russia.”<sup>20</sup>

Stephen Blank (1998), MacArthur Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute, proposed NATO to “accept its obligations” and among the components of them is “building a durable framework for Baltic security so that NATO’s enlargement reduces Baltic tensions and includes the region in the evolving European security system lest the Baltic states face strong pressure to rejoin Russia’s sphere of influence.” But, meanwhile, “we should not automatically discount the possibility that the real security concerns of the Baltic States, and of the West in the Baltic region, may not be equally well secured by other means - at least while the present international situation remains unchanged” (Lieven 2000).

A different approach to the Baltic membership in the Alliance maintains, “because of their significantly different circumstances, it may seem appropriate to treat the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia individually rather than as a group” (Simes and Saunders 1999). Lithuania is a more geopolitically suitable candidate than the other two ones. It has good relations with Moscow, does not border Russia, and does border a new NATO member (excluding Kalinigrad). This is not a good option also. It is just a delay of the issue, but not its abolition. With the entrance of Lithuania in the second post Cold War wave, the membership of Estonia and Latvia will become a matter of time. That is why, Simes and Saunders point out, “given their

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<sup>20</sup> *Putin Slams NATO Expansion on Finland Visit.* By JohnAcher.[http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010903/wl/finland\\_russia\\_putin\\_dc\\_3.html](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20010903/wl/finland_russia_putin_dc_3.html)

more complex relations with Russia, it is probably wiser to defer membership for all three nations until the third wave of enlargement” (Simes and Saunders 1999).

Apart from Denmark, which has championed the Baltic cause in Alliance circles, it may be well the United States that has signalled the most public support and sympathy for Baltic concerns and aspirations. However, despite the American leadership, U.S. is not the whole NATO. The Baltic States need the active support of the strongest European powers in the Alliance – Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Below is the elaboration of the main reasons such a limited support for Baltic membership in NATO provided by Ronald Asmus and Robert Nurick.

The first motive is **strategic interest**. “Whereas Poland’s future is widely considered to be vital to the security and stability of Europe as a whole,” they go on, “many in the West – rightly or wrongly – do not see the Baltic States as an area of vital Western strategic interest” (Asmus and Nurick 1996, 122). This means that hasty invitation can be ended by cold rejection. By the same token, in the words of Anatol Lieven, who edits Strategic Comments at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Of course, the Balts have the right to ask for NATO membership, and neither Russia nor anyone else has the *right* to forbid them to ask. But existing NATO members also have the right to say “no” to the Balts, if it is felt that this is sensible and accords with wider and more important interests-or even with the best interests of the Balts themselves” (Lieven 2000).

The second reason is **Russian sensitivities**. It must be taken into account that by “incorporating a former part of the USSR into NATO would undoubtedly touch a very sensitive political nerve in Moscow” (Asmus and Nurick 1996). Anatol Lieven directed attention to the statement of the Estonian President, Lennart Meri, who said that there is no ground to be afraid of Russian negative reaction in response to NATO expansion to the Baltics “because Russia was also opposed to NATO membership for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, but bowed to

the inevitable when the West remained adamant and made clear to the Russian government that it had no choice but to accept expansion.”<sup>21</sup> This statement is either political short-sightedness or deliberate misjudgement because the below mentioned undeniable facts are not in favor of Meri’s point:

With the exception of Poland which borders on Russia's Kaliningrad enclave, none of the three members of the first wave of NATO expansion have common borders with Russia, nor are they anywhere near Russia proper. (The Estonian border is only eighty miles from St. Petersburg.) There is no Russian military transit across their territory. They were never part of Russia (again with the partial exception of Poland). They have made no territorial claims on Russia. Finally, and most importantly, they do not contain Russian minority populations (Lieven 2000).

The third reason is **minority issues and border disputes**. The scholars pointed out that “it is difficult for some in the West to imagine a NATO member-state with a Russian minority – especially since Russian national security doctrine makes the protection of Russian minorities beyond Russia’s current borders a priority” (Asmus and Nurick 1996). Indeed, protecting Russian minorities’ rights in the Baltic remains a long-term policy goal. Russia spelled out the conditions for citizenship that it insists Estonia’s and Latvia’s Russian minorities must receive.

The fourth motive is **defensibility**. Geography, the small size and populations of the Baltic states, and the proximity of the Russian military power underscores the problems that would be involved in extending a credible security guarantee to the Baltic States. It entails that there is a hesitation, and even opposition, among the allies, and especially among the military leaders of them, who “contend that the Baltic states are indefensible against Russian threats and should remain outside NATO” (Blank 1998). So, from military perspective also, the Baltic inclusion is meaningless. Of course, Russian attack after Baltic admission to NATO is impossible. But what is really feasible is a rapid deterioration of West-Russian relations:

It will, however, worsen both relations with the West and the position of pro-Western political forces in Russia, all of whose promises of cooperation with and respectful treatment by the West will be seen as worthless by many Russians (Lieven 2000).

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<sup>21</sup> See *Reuters*, Washington, 15 January 1998, "Baltic Leaders Say Charter is a Step to NATO."

The final impediment of limited support for Baltic candidacies is **Kaliningrad**. Kaliningrad and the Russian military presence there only reinforce these concerns. It is now a strategic military outpost, albeit one of uncertain long term-value. It was mentioned supra that after the entrance of Lithuania this piece of Russian territory will find itself surrounded only by NATO countries. The concern in regard to Kalinigrad is seen from Moscow also. currently Russia has a transit agreement for limited numbers of Russian troops to cross Lithuania (after proper notification and subject to strict conditions). The fear in Russia is that NATO membership for Lithuania would encourage a future Lithuanian government to compel Russia to demilitarize Kaliningrad by cutting off links to the area (Lieven 2000). These claims for demilitarization of the area are raised not only in Lithuania. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997) writes:

Restrictions on the deployment of NATO troops and nuclear weapons on the soil of new members . . . should be matched by symmetrical Russian assurances regarding the demilitarization of the potentially strategically menacing salient of Kaliningrad and by limits on major troop deployments near the borders of the prospective new members of NATO and the EU.

A senior Russian diplomat in an interview with A.Lieven presented Russian reaction to such demands:

What this means is that every time NATO takes in a new country, we have to give up something we already have. What will be the next stage? That because St. Petersburg borders on the Baltic States and they are going to become NATO members, we will have to demilitarize St. Petersburg, and otherwise NATO will put troops in the Baltic States? Because Romania may soon be in NATO, we have to unconditionally withdraw from Transdnistria and Sevastopol? That the United States can arm Turkey to the teeth, but we have to cut our forces in the Caucasus? Where is all this going to end? . . . I know that Brzezinski is not the U.S. Administration, but you can't deny that his kind of thinking is very influential in America.<sup>22</sup>

It becomes obvious that the enlargement of the Alliance is not only sensitive for Russia, but it is also insulting. NATO's further move to the Baltic countries implies the

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<sup>22</sup> Interview by Anatol Lieven.



demilitarization of Russian enclave. Will the Russian Federation – a permanent member of UN Security Council, a nuclear power and a member of G-8 – tolerate it?

### ***Russia as a Potential Member of the Alliance***

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty says: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.” Geopolitically, Russia meets this criterion more than, let’s say, Georgia. So, Russian inclusion in the Alliance does not contradict with the Treaty.

If NATO is to remain open to further expansion, it should be entirely open, not excluding possible Russian membership at some future time, even if that is not in the present interests either of NATO or of Russia. The door of the Alliance must remain open to all European states – Russia included – that “subjectively desire membership and objectively meet the requirements of that membership” (Brzezinski 1999). If the door is really open, it is the exact time to persuade Russia, that as it moves to democratic and free market practices, it really will be welcomed into the Alliance. Even if it chooses not to join, a credible offer of that nature might dampen the incipient feelings among Russians that they are being isolated.

Of course, Russian inclusion would bring enormous changes and pose substantial problems it would, however, offer at least four advantages. According to M. Mandelbaum (1997), firstly, Russian inclusion would serve better to American interests than Clinton administration was planning to do. Secondly, it is in conformity with one of the rules of the game on which the Post Cold War settlement is based: inclusion. Thirdly, it will allow the West and U.S to have, to some extent, control over the one issue that matters most for their

security: Russian nuclear weapons. Fourth and finally, if NATO does expand further to Central Europe, the Alliance would then face a series of unhappy options: retreat to its original form; stop after the next expansion; expand up to Russia's borders; or expand to include Russia. In that case, the fourth of these choices might come to seem, with all its attendant drawbacks, the least worst of them (Mandelbaum 1997). This scenario, however, being better, does not imply that it is best option. With Russian entrance, the Atlantic Alliance has to stretch to the Pacific and meet with the People's Republic of China. But, according to John O'Sullivan (1998), "it is far from fanciful to imagine that in a world in which China, either alone or in combination with Japan or other powers, poses the main challenge to the West, Russia itself would eventually join an enlarged NATO without objection from the East Europeans." After all, it was a very similar motive that forced U.S. and Western Europeans to put aside internal divisions and suspicions and to establish NATO in 1949.

There does exist a dilemma for the Alliance's Russian policy. If there are criteria for entrance that would exclude any European power, then the integrity of the process could be damaged. Namely, for this reason key advocates of enlargement are obstinate about "never saying never" to Russian membership. But, "full membership for Russia, complete with an Article 5 guarantee and Russian participation in the integrated command under a U.S general, does not make much sense for NATO or for Russia" (James Goldgeier 1999). Russia can not be a junior partner in a regional institution, and simultaneously to claim its status of being great power. For many allies, such as the Netherlands, common defense is needed because national defense is not enough to defend a given member-state, but Russia does not need to attach its military might to others to defend itself. Russia can, undoubtedly, protect itself. Moscow's intention to join NATO can be explained mostly by political necessity, rather than military need of collective defense.

There is a political stratum in Russia: “Westernizers”. They are against NATO expansion because it does not include their country. Their goal is to see Russia as one of the senior partners in a pan-Western alliance. Westernizers feel ignored by the current NATO’s move to the East. But the East Europeans see the Alliance as a protector against Russia. It creates a cycle, may be, a vicious one. In the words of O’Sullivan (1998) “What the West can not do is close off the eventual possibility of Russian membership.” This might offend a significant group of Western-oriented Russians and it might be in dissonance with U.S and Western interests in five years time, provided the speed of the changes that have been taking place since September 11.

As Brzezinski (1999) noted, “in politics, one should never use the words “never” or “end.” One simply does not know where Europe will “end”, say, fifty years from now, and hence one can not also postulate that Russia should “never” be considered for membership.” No one ever dreamed a hundred years ago of an Euro-Atlantic community, and no one can stipulate categorically what that community of values and interests will encompass a century from now. The key issue is to keep the historical process of growth open, to sustain it with prudence and deliberation, and to be clear-headed about the shared values it implies.

According to the former Russia's Ambassador to the United States, Yuri Vorontsov, "When the decision [to expand NATO] was originally floated, I came to the State Department and had a long talk with the then assistant secretary of state, Mr. *[Richard C.] Holbrooke*. I said, 'have you thought about Russia while you were putting forward this idea of enlargement of NATO?' And his answer was very honest. He said, 'No, not at all; you have nothing to do with that.' 'Aha,' I said, 'that's very interesting, and what about invitation for Russia to join

enlarged NATO?' He said, 'Anybody but Russia; no.'<sup>23</sup> (Mandelbaum 1997). The world has changed. Sir. G. Robertson and V. Pitin have announced about possible Russian membership. "One day, it may even transpire that Russia itself will decide to join this family, and NATO has never said 'No' to that possibility," Robertson recently said, alluding to a similar idea raised by Putin himself last year.<sup>24</sup> No doubt, both Russian inclusion or further non-enlargement are better options than the further enlargement with the exclusion of Russia.

## **Chapter 5. The Financial Cost of Enlargement**

### ***Burden-Sharing Dilemma***

Member-states of the Alliance have displayed significant lack of cohesion in respect to continued burden-sharing within NATO. Because of the landmark changes in international situation, it is extremely unlikely that the Allies will make constant investments in their militaries and in the Alliance. Indeed, many members have made it clear they have no intention of underwriting the costs of further expansion, believing the United States pushed it on them. Thus, there is a danger that if the enlargement proceeds, some of its members will let others, particularly the United States, to shoulder much of the enlargement's burden. It can lead to the stagnation of the Alliance, and ultimately to its end. There is a temptation among some current and future members to diminish financial support and suggest other sorts of contribution: basing or transit rights.

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<sup>23</sup> Transcript of Panel II, "The Emerging NATO-Russia Charter and Relationship," Conference on Russia and NATO", Washington, D.C., The George Washington University, February 4, 1997.

<sup>24</sup> Agence France Presse February 17, 2001, Saturday Robertson in Moscow to assuage fears over NATO'S future expansion Jerome Bernard BRUSSELS, Feb 17 (Armenian News Network)

For Czech President Vaclav Havel membership in the Alliance is a sense of affiliation with Europe. But membership in any organization implies, besides benefits, also obligations. According to Michael Roskin, “Unfortunately symbols are not enough; they require a commitment of resources few NATO members are willing or even able to make” (Roskin 1998, 4). Hugh de Santis (1998) pointed out that Hungary and Czech Republic have declared their intentions to cut off military spendings. Put differently, they are becoming free riders and this situation makes current allies not to expand further.

There is an assumption that new members should absorb most expenses. But as it was emphasized by Amos Perlmutter and Ted Carpenter:

The CBO estimates that for the new members to bring their military forces up to NATO standards, they would have to increase their combined defense spending from the present 2.2% of GDP to about 3.6 percent of GDP. There is no evidence of public support in those countries for undertaking such a burden, even if it were theoretically affordable. U.S. Information Agency polls taken in 1995 and 1997 found that a majority of respondents in the prospective member countries opposed membership in NATO if it entailed increasing military spending at the expense of social programs (Carpenter and Perlmutter 1998, 6).

Furthermore, partly because NATO enlargement is U.S.-driven idea, key European members are also not fervent to pay for further enlargement. They declared it after Madrid summit in 1997. France went so far as to assert it would not pay a single franc. President Chirac made this assertion within hours of the decision at the Madrid Summit to expand the Alliance. This unwillingness of the European became apparent before the enlargement of 1999 and today the divergence is more acute than at that time. “The parliaments of the Western European members of NATO are not likely to contribute much, if anything, to the costs of NATO expansion. Most are indifferent, at best, to expansion; and they, too, find themselves under pressure to reduce spending, in order to qualify for inclusion in the European Monetary Union that is scheduled to be launched in 1999” (Mandelbaum 1997). So, the question raised by one German defense planner is quite actual: “So, who will pick up the tab? I think that it will have to be the United States.” But, it is unlikely, that U.S Congress or

American people will afford to expand U.S share of Alliance spending. And, the Administration, is not the whole U.S. For ordinary American tax-payers, who are also voters, let's say, upgrading Romanian tanks which can one day be directed to Hungarian minority and force the involvement of Hungary into that conflict, is less paramount than Social Security, Medicare benefits in the U.S. or security of American cities.

### ***Financial Cost of Enlargement***

While M. Mandelbaum (1997) just briefly, touches upon the question of contradicting figures of the enlargement cost by saying “estimates of the economic costs of expansion vary widely, not to say wildly”, another American Professor Amos Perlmutter with Ted Galen Carpenter covered this issue more comprehensively. They has pointed out that “there have been three major studies of enlargement’s cost” (Perlmutter et al.1998, 19). These are the estimations done by the Congressional Budget Office in 1996, by the scholars at the Rand Corporation in the same year, and a February 1997 Pentagon Report to Congress. By that time – 1998 - NATO experts were conducting their own calculations mentioned supra. Preliminary calculations of NATO’s military leaders to accomplish the enlargement spending “a maximum of 2\$billion-and perhaps as little as 1.3\$billion-over ten years.” (Perlmutter et.al.1998, 19). Amos Perlmutter and Ted Carpenter have noted that there are “three prices” for “one product”. CBO has five “optional prices” for this “product” for the period 1996-2010. “Prices” range from 61 to 125 \$ billion, provided that American share lies between 5-19 \$ billion. The scholars at the Rand Corporation concluded, “a spectrum of estimates ranging from 10\$ billion to 110\$ billion, they emphasize that the probable range is 30 \$ billion to 52\$billion over 10 to 15 years” (Perlmutter et.al.1998, 20). Pentagon’s figures of enlargement are for a total of 27\$ billion to 35\$ billion between 1997 and 2009. The professor

smartly noted that “Pentagon report’s total cost estimate, therefore, is the rosier of the three” (Perlmutter et.al.1998, 20). Why? Why do they have “three prices” for “one product”? The scholars’ short, but very precise answer is: “the difference is Russia.” It is much more important to know what stands behind these salient contradictions of enlargement estimations. These apparent differences in calculations could be explained only by strategic assumptions underlying them. A crucial premise of the low RAND and Pentagon calculations is that NATO is an alliance without an enemy.

## **Chapter 6. WEU as an Alternative to the Atlantic Alliance**

### *Brief Outline of Emerging Alternative*

The ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia, war against the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, accompanied with excessively dominant role of the USA, “make it vital for the European Union to develop a foreign and security policy identity.”<sup>25</sup> The Treaty on European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, was signed in Maastricht in December 1991 and came into force on 1 November 1993. Having incorporated three existing European Treaties (ECSC, EC, and Euroatom Treaties), it also has included new provisions on **common foreign and security policy** and on co-operation on justice and home affairs. “The CFSP covers all matters which affect the EU’s security and, in the longer term, will include the framing of a **common defence policy which might eventually lead to a common defence**” (Article J.4 (1) of the Treaty on European Union). The present Union, which has among its members neutral (Austria) and non-aligned

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<sup>25</sup>[http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/publications/brochures/move/relex/pesc/txt\\_en.html](http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/publications/brochures/move/relex/pesc/txt_en.html) Europe on the move. External relations. The European Union’s common foreign and security policy

countries (Sweden, Finland, Ireland), is not, however a defence alliance. “Decisions and measures with defense policy implications are prepared and implemented, at the Union's request, by the Western European Union (WEU) in which Member States of the Union are represented either as members or as observers.”<sup>26</sup> This Western European alliance, which was established in 1954, evolved from the Brussels Treaty Organization founded in 1948. It now forms an integral part of the EU's development. However, among 15 members of the EU, there are 11 members of the NATO, that is why, the Maasticht even explicitly recognizing the possibility of future European military alliance, promulgates:

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. (the Treaty on European Union J.4 / 5 )

So, WEU being an integral part of EU, will serve as the EU's defence component and assume the role of NATO's European pillar. In 1992 the Western European Union confirmed NATO's responsibility for collective self-defence and decided to limit its operations to peacemaking and peacekeeping, crises management and protection for humanitarian operations. However, only in 1999, “lacking European armed forces that could be sent in to Yugoslavia to back up their disapproval, ...the EU watched as the most active initiatives for peace were taken by the United States” (McCovnick.1999, 263). And exactly, after the Kosovo conflict, disappointed by their inability to act decisively, the Cologne European Council and the President of the Commission, meeting on 3 and 4 June 1999 promulgated: “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.,



readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.”<sup>27</sup>

Common Foreign and Security Policy has its framework within which it is operating due to Maastricht (1993) and Amsterdam (1997) Treaties. This legal framework provides the agents and players for decision-making procedures. Besides European Council, Parliament, Commission and Council of Ministers, Member States, there are other agents of decision-making brought by the Amsterdam Treaty. The European Council is assisted by the Political Committee, which comprises the Political Directors, who are senior officials from Member States' foreign ministries, the Commission, and by working parties. More importantly, CFSP of the EU is identifiable with a personality – Mr Javier Solana Madariaga is the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPU). Article 26 of the Amsterdam Treaty stipulates:

that the Secretary-General of the Council shall also be the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Sometimes referred to as "Mr CFSP", the High Representative will assist the Council by contributing in particular to the formulation, drawing up and implementation of political decisions and, where necessary, by acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency and conducting political dialogue with third parties. <sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty has provided the “tools” of CFSP: common positions, joint actions, and declarations. The Amsterdam added to them: common strategies and international agreements. However, to elaborate on the exact functions of players in CFSP of the EU and cover the nature of the “tools” available to them is, unquestionably, beyond the limits of this study. EU needs something more to complement, and later to replace, defensive Atlantic Alliance. It needs Military Structures. Does it have?

At the Helsinki European Council in late 1999 two goals were set:

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<sup>27</sup> Basic Documents. Welcome to PESC's site. The Council of the European Union and the common foreign and security policy. <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=en>

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.,

Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of ensuring humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace making (the so called Petersberg tasks), in accordance with article 17 of the treaty on E.U.;

- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework.

In addition, approved by Nice European Council “new political and military bodies and structures” are emerging. They are: A Standing Political and Security Committee (PSC), The Military Committee (MC), The Military Staff (MS). For instance, The EUMC is in charge of providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. It exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework. So, Europe is, unquestionably, resolute in creating truly European structures to safeguard itself from the scourge of war.

### ***Europeanness of European Security***

US-led Atlantic Alliance put an end to the war in Bosnia, and later US-brokered agreement was signed by the parties of conflict in Dayton in 1995. NATO stopped violence in Kosovo in 1999. Today, in trying to prevent the escalation of ethnic conflict in F.Y. Republic of Macedonia the Alliance is the most active organization. What we have been witnessing in Europe was wisely foreseen by Dwight Eisenhower in 1951. He pointed out that “there should be “clear limits” on how long America stayed in Europe” (Bandow 1997). Furthermore, then American President D. Eisenhower warned a decade later: "Permanent troop establishments abroad" would "discourage the development of the necessary military strength Western European countries should provide for themselves" (Bandow 1997).

Political long-sightedness of Eisenhower was not taken into account either by G. Bush (1989-1993) or Bill Clinton (1993-2001) or G. W. Bush. Namely G. Bush began jealous marathon towards new European initiatives at 1991 NATO meeting: “Our premise is that the

American role in the defense and the affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European union. If our premise is wrong, if, my friends, your ultimate aim is provide individually for your own defense, the time to tell us is today” (Conry 1995). As it has been noted by Barbara Conry, a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute, in her article “Let Europeans Defend Themselves”, “Instead of encouraging America’s West European Allies to develop a new security system that is relevant to the post-Cold War era, Washington insists on maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – an alliance that was designed to defend the West against the Soviet Union and has no other credible mission or rationale” (Conry 1996). But the United States has nothing quintessential at stake in Central and Eastern Europe. It means that, “Washington policy-makers are far too promiscuous in risking the lives of U.S. servicemen, treating young Americans as gambit pawns in a global chess game” (Bandow 1997). The American taxpayers pay 90 billion per year to “maintain” US contribution in NATO (Conry 1995). By the same token, According to D. Bandow (1997), “Although the Europeans remain at greater risk than the United States, they carry a far lighter military burden, America spends 60 percent more on defense than do all of the NATO European countries combined, even though they have a larger economy and population than the United States.” It is also important to look at the common foreign and security policy of EU from the Brussel’s (NATO’s headquarters) perspective. On December 4, 1998 the United Kingdom with France issued Anglo-French Declaration at St. Malo. “In practical terms, the success of the St. Malo declaration implied a shift in emphasis on ESDI from cooperation between NATO and the WEU to cooperation between NATO and the European Union itself” (Jones 1999, 8). However, four days after Anglo-French Declaration, on 8 December, 1998 “Final Communiqué” of the NATO Ministerial Meeting discussed ESDI. But it did not even mention the EU. Surprisingly, on 24 April, 1999 during momentous Washington Summit the Atlantic Alliance acknowledged “the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as

a whole is not engaged” (Jones 1999, 9). Undeniably, this shift in recognizing the EU as an autonomous body in military activities is the turning point in NATO-EU relations. In addition, in July 2000 NATO allies agreed with an EU proposal to establish EU-NATO ad-hoc working groups to co-operate in four specific areas: “security arrangements; developing permanent arrangements for consultation and co-operation between the two organisations; defining modalities for EU access to NATO assets; and EU capability goals” (NATO. Fact Sheet). It must be said also that the Allies emphasized the most possible active involvement in EU-led crisis response operations of the non-EU European Allies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey. But in the words of Secretary-General of NATO, Sir George Robertson “more Europe will not lead to less NATO. On the contrary, a stronger Europe will mean a stronger Alliance” (NATO. Fact Sheet).

Though the transatlantic core of the Atlantic Alliance remains unchangeable, many specialists agree that the Western European Union, the security arm of the European Union, should replace NATO as the primary guarantor of European security. Why? There are three general reasons. First, the views of WEU members coincide in respect to security interests in Europe, while U.S and European perspectives have been diverging more and more (Conry 1995). In regard to this increasing transatlantic incongruence, former British diplomat Jonathan Clarke astutely noted: “If NATO did not already exist, it is doubtful that Washington would now invent it” (Clarke 1993). Bosnian conflict was the incarnation of that transatlantic disagreement. Second, economically prosperous Europe is able to maintain its own defence, without U.S subsidies. And last, but not the least reason: “Moscow is likely to view the WEU as less provocative than a U.S.-dominated NATO--especially an enlarged version that expands to Russia's borders” (Conry 1995).

In addition, the European Union is essentially a political and economic entity, not a military organization. But the security of Europe today has more to do with economic and

political development than with traditional military concerns. EU enlargement, by addressing the economic and political needs of Central and East European countries, would likely provide greater security benefits than would NATO enlargement, which promises only the enlargement of a military infrastructure. It does not promise the political and economic benefits that EU enlargement would entail. The sources of insecurity in Europe these days lie more in the economic than the military realm: disparities in living standards divide the continent, not armies or ideologies. But the European Union (EU), the obvious instrument for dealing with these difficulties, has come down with its own form of *theateritis*<sup>29</sup>, the single-minded push to achieve a single currency among its existing members. “So it has been left to NATO to try to reintegrate and stabilize Europe as a whole, which is roughly comparable to using a monkey wrench to repair a computer” (Gaddis 1998, 147).

In conclusion, for the purpose of clarity, the attitudes of all Western Europe countries to transatlantic link vary. It is a well known fact that the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Portugal are the fervent advocates of the transatlantic link, while France and Germany are Europeanists and Ireland, Sweden, and Finland want to keep their neutrality. All in all, the ability of the Europeans to create truly European defense arrangement becomes obvious and unquestionable. What the Europeans lack is the common willingness to do it. As long as the West Europeans go on to view common foreign and security policies mostly as yard stick to measure progress toward European unity, rather than as instruments for defending Europe, neither the WEU nor the larger European Union will qualify to replace the Atlantic Alliance.

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<sup>29</sup> This term was coined by US General George C. Marshall during the Second World War to refer to the tendency among some of his military commanders to see only the requirements of their own campaigns, not those of the war as whole.

## CONCLUSIONS

The NATO was originally set up to preserve the western European democracies from the Soviet Union. But at the end of the study it is necessary to emphasize that containing Russia, of course, has never been NATO's only role. Its members quickly found it an effective instrument as well for limiting the growth of German power and for ensuring that the Americans themselves stayed in Europe and did not revert to their old habits of isolationism. Today the likelihood of German aggression seems as remote as the US withdrawal from the continent: neither of these old fears from the late 1940s and early 1950s is even remotely credible now. In the words of John L. Gaddis, "If in the effort to ward off these phantoms we should revive another spectre from those years that is a real possibility – a Sino-Russian alignment – then future generations would have a good case for alleging 'theateritis' on the part of our own" (Gaddis 1998, 148). Indeed, NATO expansion has catalyzed a strategic rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. In the spring of 1997 the Russian and Chinese leaders jointly expressed their strategic concern with the world dominated by the United States. They promulgated their intention to work together to counter American preponderance by reviving multipolarity to the international system. NATO expansion has nothing to do with counterhegemony. Neither Germany, nor Russia is likely to emerge as a serious contender for European hegemony, because the Cold War's end has restored a stable balance of power that can be maintained by the European states. Germany's conventional military power and economic prowess are offset by Russia's (and Britain's and France's) nuclear forces. Even if Germany should someday become a nuclear power, the effect would likely be to further enhance Europe's strategic stability. A European security mechanism based on the national nuclear deterrent forces of Europe's major powers (including Germany) is potentially much more stable system than a security arrangement tied to an American extended-deterrence strategy. In light of this, only one goal remains more or less plausible task for the Alliance – regional stability.

Regional stability, not counterhegemony, is the strategic rationale that best explains NATO expansion. However, Eastern and Central Europe historically have been volatile regions. A partial list of potential East-Central European flashpoints include border disputes between Poland and its neighbors (Germany, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine), ethnic conflict between Hungary and its neighbors (Serbia, Slovakia, and Romania); and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. The argument that the United States and NATO have a vested interest in suppressing future outbreaks of national and ethnic rivalry in East-Central Europe signals that the United States must, in the name of European stability, be ready to undertake future Bosnia-type peace enforcement operations in East-Central Europe. The Americans should be skeptical of these scenarios. “The administration has been fortunate that US forces have not suffered combat losses, but it is evident that both congressional and public patience is wearing thin with a commitment that has been proved expensive, has achieved little, and has no definite end in sight” (Layne 1998, 57). Nevertheless, atrocities, which took place in the Balkans, must have been stopped, and luckily, it was the case. US-led NATO was the only international organization which was able and willing to stop massacres in the former Yugoslavia. The operation was US-led not only due to American activity, but also because of European inactivity and inability. Even today, Europe is still unable to provide regional stability in Europe. It tells us only one thing: non-enlargement can not imply sudden dissolution of the Alliance. Europe needs NATO today, even provided American dominance. Non-enlargement should be escorted with the gradual dissolution, or more correctly, incremental replacement of the Atlantic Alliance with the purely European structure, such as Western European Union. It definitely will allow Europeans defend themselves. Americans do not have anything quintessential to their security in Europe, especially in its Eastern part.

As we have seen throughout the chapters of this study the NATO’s enlargement can not bring to its existing and future members, along with non-members, what it intends to bring. On

11 September 2001 the most fervent advocates of enlargement realized that today's threats are not those ones which existed during the Cold War, nor even those emanating from the Balkans. Even the most militarily mightiest member of the Atlantic Alliance, the USA, has been unable to defend itself from an almost invisible enemy. Will the entrance of, let's say, Lithuania protect Washington, London or Vilnius from the insane fanatics ready to blow up themselves and thousands of innocent people? After this human tragedy took place in the USA, the enlargement of the Alliance, from the perspective of this study, has become meaningless political action. In today's Anglo-American strike against the real threats, Russia and other post-Soviet states seem to be as valuable allies as France or Hungary.

As a final remark there is a need to remind the main principles of strategy: treat former enemies magnanimously; do not take on unnecessary new ones; keep the big picture in view; balance ends and means; avoid emotion and isolation in making decisions; be willing to acknowledge error. No doubt, NATO enlargement manages to violate each and every one of these rules.



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