

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA

A STUDY OF CIVIL SERVICE:
CONCEPTS AND ISSUES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO ARMENIA

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Master's Essays that are required to be carried out by the AUA students of the Graduate School of Political Science and International Affairs for partial fulfillment to the degree of Master of Arts is a useful and interesting undertaking.

The students select a topic for carrying out a research. They define research questions, choose appropriate methodology and literature, provide analysis, and, finally, come up with their findings, conclusions, and recommendations. This final part of the research, in my view, is the most interesting part of the work as the students present their own points of view about diverse issues of their topics, hold out the pros and cons concerning the possible ways of solutions to these problems, offer their own versions of answers to these queries.

In my opinion, many of these researches, the provided conclusions and recommendations, could become valuable contributions in the development/resolution of discussed issues if further developed by the authors and considered by relevant institutions.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|---|
| AIDS | Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome |
| ASPA | Armenian School of Public Administration |
| AUA | American University of Armenia |
| CIS | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| EC | European Community |
| EU | European Union |
| FY | For Years |
| RA | Republic of Armenia |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| SPRITE | Social Policy Reforms in Transition Economies |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| US | United States |
| USAID | United States Agency of International Development |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |

ABSTRACT

In this Master's Essay we are going to discuss civil service, its concepts and issues with special reference to Armenia. Here we put forward the following research questions:

1. What are the concepts of civil service?
2. What challenges is currently facing civil service?
3. What are the main problems of civil service in post-communist countries of the Central and Eastern Europe?
4. What are the current issues of civil service in Armenia?
5. What measures should comprise the agenda of Armenian civil service reform?
6. What factors could promote effective implementation of civil service in Armenia?

The study of civil service is of great significance. Throughout most of the history, civil service has been recognized as an important undertaking that contributes to the betterment of society, supported by citizens and politicians alike. In the important matters of our public lives we are more involved with public bureaucracy than we are with parties, elections and legislatures. Civil servants are key factors in foreign affairs, the human services, environmental policy, educational reform, the space program, and an endless variety of other important areas. To understand this important aspect of governmental process so to be able to deal effectively with public issues that directly affect our life is helpful, and sometimes even essential.

The late 1980s and early 1990s saw unprecedented changes in the political and economic systems of the Central and Eastern European states and the former Soviet Union, including Armenia. Following the disintegration of the USSR in December 1991, it became evident that the old regulatory framework and obsolete administrative structures were not capable of resolving the urgent and complicated problems of transition to a new political and economic reality.

The new leaderships of the above mentioned countries faced the immense task of transforming the communist state apparatus, which they inherited from the old communist system, into an efficient state administration capable of meeting the requirements of a market-oriented economy and democratic form of governance and, equally important, meeting the expectations of ordinary citizens. The main impediments to the development of professional and impartial civil service systems in the regions are the classical dilemmas of public administration, such as the politics-administration dichotomy, the definition of the degree of administrative self-management, the creation of a professional human resource management system suitable for the specific situation of the civil service and so on.

It is possible to formulate a checklist for what is yet to be done in Central and Eastern Europe, including Armenia, if coherent high-quality civil service systems are to be created. This includes the development of transparent recruitment and dismissal provisions, a fair remuneration system, and most importantly, the development of personnel management capacities.

The president of Armenia and the parliament must provide the essential environment for effective leadership and public support. The work on the draft Law of the RA on Civil Service should be intensified and carried out as soon as possible.

The consideration and discussion of these issues will provide us with necessary information about civil service, the challenges facing it, and options for achieving effective and responsible public management, which will result in the growth of public confidence in state and civil service.

Introduction

Bureaucracy is not a new phenomenon. It existed in simple forms thousands of years ago in Egypt and Rome. But the trend toward bureaucratization has greatly accelerated during the last century. In contemporary society bureaucracy has become a dominant institution that epitomizes the modern era. In the important matters of our public lives we are more involved with public bureaucracy than we are with parties, elections and legislatures. Public managers are key factors in foreign affairs, the human services, environmental policy, educational reform, the space program, and an endless variety of other important areas. To understand this important aspect of governmental process so to be able to deal effectively with public issues that directly affect our life is helpful, and sometimes even essential.

From the late 1960s through the middle 1980s, the civil service seemed to be under fairly constant attack. Public administrators were criticized as both unresponsive and overly responsive – unresponsive to the common citizen and overly responsive to special interests. Public organizations were assumed of being highly ineffective and inefficient, failing to achieve their objectives and wasting enormous sums of public funds.

Fortunately, the environment of the civil service has changed considerably over the past several years, leading us to be somewhat more optimistic about its future image. In several important areas – notably education, economic development, and environmental concerns – the states were taking positive actions, and at the same time, public confidence in state and local governments was growing. Moreover, with growing national concern about such problems as AIDS, hazardous waste, ocean dumping, the greenhouse effect, drugs, foreign competition, the homeless, and child care for working families, we might even speculate that a new era of action is on horizon.

The development of new civil service systems in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the authoritarian regimes at the end of the 1980s is still in early stages. The majority of them have not completed the development of a new civil service system. One could indicate some patterns in development. For example, the level of priority given to civil service development in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania has been consistently higher than in most of the other states, with the possible exception of Hungary.

Civil service laws are now in place in most of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, but often these are variations on the Labor Code. Civil service laws have so far not had the expected stabilizing effect on the emerging civil service systems.

Obviously the adoption of civil service legislation close to the Labor Code does not pose a problem in principle. States like Sweden and Netherlands have heavily sectorised civil services with employment conditions that are not significantly different from those in the private sector. At the same time, the civil systems in these states are often quoted as an example of a high-quality professional civil service. However, in a situation in which salaries are much lower than in the private sector, and where politicization has been a century-old tradition, an incremental change to the previous system is unlikely to bring out the necessary improvements in the quality of the civil service.

The development of new systems of employment conditions and human resource management in Central and Eastern Europe has been fraught with difficulties, because of the often-contradictory interests at stake. One example is the contradiction between the lack of financial resources to pay civil servants adequate wages and the wishes of politicians to control recruitment and dismissal. The main incentive of the above mentioned governments could offer to civil servants is job security. Yet granting job security would take away the possibility of politicians to 'reward' loyal supporters. Even in states where civil service laws are in place, politicians have often found loopholes to exert their right to divide the 'spoils'.

The problems with the implementation of the Polish civil service law provide a good illustration of this issue. In Hungary this problem has also not been fully addressed.

A second, so far irresolvable conflict is between the need to centrally define and uphold standards and the reluctance of ministers to give up their autonomy in matters related to staffing. Centrally defined and upheld standards are a necessity for a development of a high-quality civil service, but ministers are generally skeptical about transferring powers to set standards to a different institution.

Regardless of the adoption of the civil service laws in a number of states, the same problems have remained on the agenda during the last years: instability, fragmentation, a lack of real personnel management, inadequate salaries or other benefits. The seemingly irresolvable contradictory interests are why the problems at least have remained stable. There has been little movement in salary system, too. Almost no state has as yet found a satisfactory alternative to the archaic models, which remain in place.

The renewed sense of commitment by all citizens to the highest traditions of the civil service – to a civil service responsive to the political will of the people and also protective of our constitutional values; to civil service able to cope with complexity and conflict and also able to maintain the highest ethical standards; to a civil service attractive to the young and talented from all parts of the society and also capable of earning the respect of all our citizens – is urgent and crucial. Yet, there is evidence on all sides of an erosion of performance and morale across government in Armenia. Too many of our most talented citizens – those with the skills and dedication – are ready to leave. Too few of our brightest young people – those with the imagination and energy that are essential for the future – are willing to join.

Meanwhile the need for a strong civil service is growing, not lessening. Armenians have always expected their national government to guarantee their basic freedoms and provide for the common defense. We continue to expect our government to keep the peace

with other nations, resolve differences among our people, provide needed services, and honor the people's trust by providing the highest levels of integrity and performance.

At the same time, we live in a world of enormous complexity and awesome risks. We are assaulted daily by new social, environmental, and health issues almost incomprehensible in scope and impact issues like AIDS, drugs, and global warming.

Faced with these challenges, the simple idea that Armenians must draw upon talented and dedicated individuals to serve us in government is uncontestable. Armenia must have a public service that can both value the lessons of experience and appreciate the requirements for change; a public service that both responds to political leadership and respects the law; a public service with the professional skills and ethical sensitivity Armenia deserves.

Review of the Literature

Civil service has been part of the day-to-day vocabulary of public affairs for over a hundred years. The British first used the term "civil servant" formally in the late eighteenth century to distinguish the civilian from the military personnel of the East India Company (Drewry and Butcher, 1988). In the course of this century, civil service in a British context has come to mean the remunerated personnel, other than those serving in the armed forces, whose functions are to administer policies formulated by or approved by national governments (Bogdanor, 1987). Civil service is differentiated from public service, which also includes civilian personnel working with the armed forces, armed forces personnel serving government in a civilian capacity, the judiciary, employees of local governments and public corporations, school and university teachers, police and other agencies.

Raadschelders and Rutgers (1996) trace the history of civil service systems from the time civil servants were personal servants to the monarch to their present status in professionalized service systems. Several processes were central to the long-term

institutionalization of civil service. Among them were processes of nation-state development, in which the distinction between public and private became important, processes of building a distinct social group of civil servants in society, processes of building a professionalized economic group, and processes of extension of governmental tasks.

Morgan and Perry (1988) define civil service systems formally as mediating institutions that mobilize human resources in the service of the affairs of the state in a given territory. The definition suggests that civil service systems are structures, that is, a combination of rules and authority relationships that act as bridges between the polity or state and specific administrative organizations. The definition implies that the dominant concern of civil service systems involves human, rather than financial or physical, resources.

The definition is intended to “bring the state back” into the study of civil service systems in more than a superficial way. In many jurisdictions, civil service systems are authorized by constitutional rules. In others, civil service is legitimated by political or state traditions, widely accepted by members of society. With the exception of stateless or anarchic societies, formal or informal constitutional rules typically outline the functions and roles of the civil service. The connection between the state and civil service systems merit intensive study.

Wise (1996) in “Internal Labor Markets” develops a theoretical framework for understanding the relationships among the rules of human resource management in civil service systems, the efficiency of government operations, and the organizational outcomes for incumbent and potential employees. She conceptualizes civil service systems as labor markets in which behavior and outcomes are constrained by internal rules. Using the internal labor market approach, she develops a framework for comparative analysis.

Just as civil service systems can be described as internal labor markets reflecting rules and practices associated with classification, deployment, job security, and wage structures, so

too can they be described in terms of external markets. Given the social functions of civil service systems, however, the external market that is important is not economic, but rather demographic and ideological. Meer and Roborgh (1996) argue that representativeness is an important construct for understanding and comparing civil service systems. They focus on the forms representativeness takes in different political and administrative systems and the explanatory variables that determine the forms. They discuss three different ways of looking at representativeness. First, they distinguish between passive and active forms of representation. A second subdivision pertains to demographic, idea or opinion, and interest representation. Finally, they distinguish between equal opportunity and mirror image representativeness.

Representativeness must be viewed against the background of basic ideas concerning the changing relationship between the people and the state. Meer and Roborgh (1996) contend that the starting point for comparative research should be the environment of representativeness. In what cultural, social, and political setting does the phenomenon of representativeness exist? This strategy of inquiry permits the investigator to identify both the descriptive and normative significance of representativeness in a particular setting.

Hojnacki (1996) in his article "Politicization as a Civil Service Dilemma" addresses one of the most vexing dilemmas facing civil servants, the conflict between being politically responsive and professionally responsible. A variety of collective choice mechanisms and operational rules are used to simultaneously integrate and buffer politics and administration in civil service systems. These mechanisms and rules determine the scope and depth of the penetration of political regimes into administrative systems.

Whether or not politicization is a major factor within civil service depends on the values, norms, and traditions governing particular situations. Hojnacki (1996) explores the variations of these factors and their consequences across national systems. He uses two broad

ideal types in his analysis: that of the classical, independent civil service, establishing and implementing an agenda on behalf of the political regime, and that of the civil service dominated by the political regime, carrying out the political agenda of the latter.

Social control is the process by which individuals, groups, and organizations attempt to make the performance and operation of civil service systems conform to standards of behavior or normative preferences. Hill and Gillespie (1996) in “Social Control of Civil Service Systems” assert that apart from political control from above, control of the civil service by the public is important because of the difficulty of discerning policy-making and policy implementation. They focus on formal collective choice mechanisms for facilitating public input and control of civil servants. These mechanisms intersect with structures internal to civil service – such as professional standards, procedural rule systems, and hierarchy – in shaping the civil service control.

Another important contextual factor regulating civil service systems is public opinion – the views held by elites and the mass public about the civil service. Public opinion about the performance and prestige of the civil service is important for its potential to shape governance, and for civil service to function as a mediating institution. Rainey (1996) in his article “Public Opinion Toward the Civil service” tries to sort out what we know about public opinion regarding civil service, how it is shaped, and what effects it has. He addresses several key questions, among them: What are factors upon which the public judges the quality and performance of the civil service? How does public opinion affect the structure and performance of civil service systems?

Rainey’s (1996) approach is largely inductive. He reviews research on public opinion of civil service in developing a general model. He notes that public opinion has received surprisingly little attention in theories of public administration. In the general model, he argues that perceptions of civil service are driven by various factors, including social and

political context, demographics, individual respondent differences, and general political attitudes. His framework reinforces a theme that civil service systems are complex phenomena that must be studied at multiple levels of analysis.

Heady (1996) in his “Configurations of Civil Service Systems” explores the utility, for comparative study of civil service systems, of a holistic approach designed to identify configurations of civil service systems with shared attributes that might enhance comparative research. He uses five dimensions to describe variations in civil service systems: (1) relation of civil service to the political regime; (2) socioeconomic context of the civil service system; (3) focus for personnel management functions in the civil service systems; (4) qualification requirements for civil service membership; and (5) sense of mission of civil servants. These dimensions reflect important aspects of civil service systems from the operational, collective choice, and constitutional worlds of action. His analysis identifies qualitative variations in each of the five dimensions.

More traditional analytic approaches might stop with the five dimensions or cross-classify the dimensions into an exhaustive array of types. Instead, using the logic of the configurational approach, Heady (1996) identifies four common configurations of civil service systems: ruler trustworthy, party controlled, policy receptive, and collaborative. Ruler trustworthy civil service systems are characterized by conformity to ruler expectations, high status, corporate identity, and sense of mission as pivotal policymakers. Party controlled configurations manifest the political party as the primary reference point in the society, downplay professional qualifications, and exhibit a vague sense of mission. Policy receptive systems, the configuration representative of the largest number of countries, are characterized by pluralist and competitive environments, appropriate credentials for entry, and allegiance to constitutional and legal obligations. The fourth configuration, collaborative, is characterized by a sense of mission that is geared toward avoiding the alienation of the political leadership

and toward maintaining their support, competencies for adequate administrative performance, and deference of authority.

Morgan (1996) in his “Analyzing Fields of Change: Civil Service Systems in Developing Countries” also develops configurations, but his construction of types is motivated by an interest in explaining civil service systems in developing countries. He identifies developing countries as those that emerged from colonial hegemony after the mid-nineteenth century, including among them the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union. In Morgan’s (1996) opinion, all such countries adopted a formal apparatus of governance modeled after the former colonial power, whether the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, Japan, or the USSR. The legacy of governance included a centralized civil service and the accompanying legal codes: civil, administrative, and criminal.

The author mentions that civil service is both an arena and an instrument in the simultaneous pursuit of a range of values. Efficiency is only one of these, and it seldom ranks high. He goes on to assert that in countries where patron-client relations dominate and a clearly separate public sphere does not exist, civil society has yet to evolve some organizing principle that mediates the normative and the positivist. In such a situation, what is going on may be more important to the actors than what happens. He maintains that in a patronage society, rules of financial and administrative management are subordinated to a social system based on obligation and exchange.

Morgan (1996) asserts that after independence, many countries expanded considerably the role of a state as a guide to and centerpiece of a national development strategy, arrogating to the state a monopoly of resource allocation in the interests of national integration and economic development. This hegemonic state, whether civilian or military, created a civil service that was supposed to behave as a secular, rational policy instrument in the delivery of development through government agencies or state-owned enterprises.

The author argues that civil service in patrimonial states is not as concerned with actions or outcomes as with servicing patronage networks. Public servants are caught between the instrumental values of their education and professional training on the one hand, and the traditional imperatives of social obligation on the other. Delivering of public goods and services that a position calls for is in competition with, or is displaced by, intraorganizational and interorganizational social and political relationships.

Morgan (1996) describes the contexts for civil service systems in terms of four dimensions: level of institutionalization of the nation-state, aggregated public attitudes toward the state, degree of professionalism/politicization, and tension between process and outcomes. From these dimensions he identifies four macro-institutional environments or fields: pragmatic, patrimonial, positivist, and absolutist. He concludes his analysis with a consideration of the dynamics of civil service systems moving across fields.

Bekke, Perry, and Toonen (1996) argue that the character of civil service systems is highly dependent on the identity and cohesiveness of the state. The institutional perspective employed by them does subscribe to two tenets central to most institutionalist approaches. These are the derivative character of individuals and the persistence of something – behavioral patterns, roles, rules, organizational charts, and ceremonies – over time. An institutional perspective from which they drew explicitly is Kiser and Ostrom's metatheoretical framework for the integration of different approaches to institutional analysis. They distinguish three interrelated, but separate, worlds of action that give rise to distinct analytical questions and levels of theoretical analysis: constitutional choice, collective choice, and operational. These three levels capture the multiple roles civil service systems play in administrative systems. Understanding the roles and their interplay is important for a complete picture of civil service systems.

McGregor Jr. and Solano (1996) claim that at least three critical dimensions capture the roles played by all civil service systems and thus serve as the basis for institutional civil service comparison: first, civil service represents, by definition, a personnel system; second, institutional civil service embodies a set of rules governing joint action in complex administrative systems; third, the idea of “civil service” invokes symbols representing the value sets surrounding public service. The authors go on to assert that at the heart of all civil service systems is the idea of personnel operations characterized by patterned day-to-day interactions, activities, and exchanges that define the employment relationship between employer and employee. All such systems can be characterized by an operating ideology consisting of elements that define the rationale, actions structures, and modes of civil service operation used to view problems and take action.

McGregor Jr. and Solano (1996) maintain that all civil service systems are invariant in the sense that civil service employment and tenure are bound by rules of appointment other than direct election. Thus, civil servants tend to remain at their posts while electoral and other partisan changes occur. This is not to deny that some civil service employment may be contingent on electoral outcomes – for example, in patronage systems – but the effect of partisanship is indirect rather than direct. They assume that in general, however, the employment relationship is defined by three strategic choices associated by selection of labor market, employment system rules, and human resource management designs. Taken together, these three sets of choices characterize civil service as an operating personnel system.

McGregor Jr. and Solano (1996) assert that in essence, civil service is an institution of governance programmed by rules which are, by definition, reasonably stable over time and take on the character of roles, rules, norms, and expectations about civil service attitudes, behaviors, and functions in discharging state business. The connection between strategic

institutional design and the operational exercise of bureaucratic authority has long been noted.

McGregor Jr. and Solano (1996) mention that civil service systems embody public values, representing the fundamental ethical codes – the goals aspirations, and criteria – by which civil service activity can be judged. Ethical codes are established by the constitutional foundation of a society and embodied in the myths and symbols surrounding the civil service institution. The symbolic dimension of civil service cannot be overemphasized, for it defines the values that dominate when especially difficult decisions must be made. In the most formulations, civil service ethics represent what is best about the society and its manner of conducting public business.

The authors argue that public service ethical codes exist both within and without civil service. Internally, civil service as symbol system consists of the service ethic by which the institutional attitudes, roles, and behaviors of civil servants can be defined and judged in the following areas: anonymity vs. visibility; ministerial or departmental responsibility; sense of calling; and feeling of isolation from private sector institutions.

Externally, according to McGregor Jr. and Solano (1996), the idea of civil service embodies the values attached to being a representative of a certain nationality. Thus, the concept of civil service is embedded in constitutional understandings and institutional arrangements, and in the expectations of civil servants symbolically defined in the public mind. Some of the external symbolic dimensions include the following: civil service humility vis-à-vis citizens; sense of service to citizens; public confidence in civil servants; partisanship vs. neutrality; civil service prestige; visibility of personal finances and aspects of one's personal life; and public-private prohibitions and conflicts of interest.

National civil service systems have endured a series of shocks in recent years in countries as diverse as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Guinea, and Chile.

The origins of these shocks have been both internal and external. In some countries they have been delivered by the electorate through democratic elections, in others by international financial agents. In yet others the sources of stress have involved changes in working methods and administrative technology. Ingraham (1996), Hood(1996), and Halligan (1996) have explored the nature of the upheavals that have affected civil service systems in the last decade, the ecology of these upheavals, and the direction of future developments. The three articles oh these authors complement one another in providing insight into three highly interrelated aspects of reform.

Ingraham (1996) in his article “The Reform Agenda for National Civil Service Systems: External Stress and Internal Strains” focuses on three questions about civil service reform: Who or what is that initiates reform and why? What reforms are presently on national Agendas? Are the reforms likely to succeed? She argues that most reforms represent one of two traditions: the governance tradition that devotes attention to civil service as a mechanism for effective governability and political legitimacy, and the management tradition in which civil service is judged mainly in terms of efficiency and economic rationality. The stronger tradition is the management tradition. But there are also efforts to improve relational problems between civil service and government and to strengthen the responsiveness of the civil servant of political officials.

Hood (1996) in his article “Exploring Variations in Public Management Reform of the 1980s” is also interested in understanding the content of reforms. He focuses on new public management, a group of administrative doctrines that were influential in reforms in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. He abstracts seven dimensions along which these reforms vary, including degree of control by output measures, level of disaggregation of public organizations into self-contained units, and amount of competition across units. Many of generic changes he identifies directly influence

civil service rules through the changes to pay systems, level of control by central civil service units, and level of competition for services such as training. Hood (1996) identifies not only the dimensions of new public management but the determinants of change. His aim is to suggest a possible agenda for systematic comparison and to show that some of the common explanations of the rise of new public management are hard to sustain even from a relatively brief inspection of the cross-national data that are available. The author suggests several changes that future research must also incorporate; among them better measures of the independent and dependent variables and multidimensional analysis of causal explanations.

Halligan (1996) in his article “The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform” addresses the question of how the content of reforms may be influenced by the diffusion of ideas across national boundaries. He looks at the diffusion of reforms from two different perspectives. One focuses on how diffusion among countries influenced the reform program in a single national system. The other dissects a specific reform, the Senior Executive Service, as it diffuses among several national systems. The look at diffusion from two perspectives increases the power of the author’s analysis and permits him to draw useful generalizations.

The German social scientist Max Weber (1992) is generally acknowledged to have developed the most comprehensive classic formulation of the characteristics of bureaucracy. He describes three “ideal-types” of authority – “traditional”, “charismatic”, and “legal-rational” - that explain why individuals throughout history have obeyed their rules. He listed in a detailed fashion the major elements of the formal structure of bureaucracy. Three of the most important attributes to his concept of bureaucracy were the division of labor, hierarchical order, and impersonal rules – keystones of any functioning bureaucracy.

Richard J. Stillman II in “The Rise of U.S. Bureaucracy” (1992) offers a perspective on Weber’s ideas from the standpoint of America’s national experience with bureaucracy. Here he discusses the general characteristics of the rise of U.S. bureaucracy – gradualism,

experimentalism, majoritarianism, and complexity, the forms, functions, policies and processes of contemporary U.S. bureaucracy.

A distinguished scholar and practitioner of public administration Frederick C. Mosher in his study “Democracy and the Public Service” (1982) gives a convincing analysis of the character of contemporary American public service. His central argument is that the people who work for government today in appointed positions are increasingly becoming professionalized in terms of their skills and the substance of their work.

Douglas Yates in his article “An Analysis of Public Bureaucracy” (1986) discusses such issues as bureaucracy, democracy, and efficiency. He examines the elements of bureaucratic structure, fragmentation, conflict, and competition.

Dwight Waldo in his essay “Bureaucracy and Democracy: Reconciling the Irreconcilable?” (1986) assesses the present situation and the two major problems concerning this issue. The first of these problems, which is called “the definition of the unit”, discusses the appropriate population or universe for the calculation of the optimum mix of democracy and administration. The second major problem is the status of and weight to be accorded to nondemocratic values designated by such terms as national security, personal safety, productivity, and efficiency.

Dwight Waldo in another article “Public Administration Toward Year 2000: The Framing Phenomenon” (1986) deals with “the framing phenomenon” – the societal forces affecting public administration. Here he claims that the future will certainly bring increased complexity and many challenges for public administration – challenges of legitimacy, authority, knowledge, control, and confidence. The future will not be easy for the public administrator, but it will certainly be interesting.

Gerald E. Caiden (1986) in his article “The Challenge to the Administrative State” revises assumptions on the administrative state. Here he argues that the challenge to public

administration is to demonstrate conclusively whether big government can be controlled, which controls are most effective, and what new controls might be needed. Meantime various suggestions are being made about what should be done immediately to prevent the situation from deteriorating further.

Denhardt and Grubbs (1999) maintain that the challenges that will face those in public service over the coming years are substantial, for they not only require resolving important public-policy problems, but resolving them in a way that restores and then maintains public confidence. The efforts to restore meaning and integrity to the public service are much needed in our society, but they should be accompanied by a clear understanding of several important trends in this field that are reshaping the values and commitments of public service itself.

According to Denhardt and Grubbs (1999), first, a significant redefinition of the public service is now taking place. Our economy is shifting in several ways from a production base to a service base, from a national base to a global base, from a growing public commitment to a limited commitment.

Second, changing economic conditions have combined with technological developments to make the international dimensions of public administration more important than ever. Understanding the activities of political and administrative officials in other countries is important not only for those who will spend part of their careers outside the country, but also for those who will work at home. The impact of globalization on public administration should not be underestimated. However, relating to the internalization process is pattern, which carries perhaps even greater implications: decentralization. Central governments increasingly are handing over new powers and responsibilities to local and regional authorities. Whether triggered by declining revenues at the national level, or the nation-state's diminished power base, the result has been growing demand for services and

decision-making by subnational administrations. And, in many cases, these administrations lack the capacity and resources to deal effectively with their newfound authority. To better understand these trends, the development of more globalized, comparative forms of analysis will be critical. Such analysis serves both as a source of understanding international issues, as well as enhancing the way we deal with issues in our communities. So, as we continue to live in our “global village,” we will be challenged to deal with opportunities and threats that defy national boundaries (Denhardt and Grubbs 1999, 421). Our systems of governance, consequently, will need to reflect our concern for the public interest – both at home and abroad.

As the third area of concern in the changing environment, Denhardt and Grubbs (1999) point out the changing environment in which the public servants work. New people and new values are entering the public workplaces. Great diversity in public agencies has had important and positive impacts on the values of those agencies. Public organizations have taken on entirely new shapes, a feat that would have been impossible with the established, more traditional views of organizing that characterized public bureaucracies in the past. In turn, this diversity has contributed to important changes in the way we understand leadership, as diverse cultural and organizational views become translated into more equitable, power sharing systems of authority. The authors assert that technology may also help us achieve more value-oriented goals of public service. Technology in the form of civic networks and other resources may help us shift the orientation of our public organizations to be more external in nature. Through emerging technology we may be able to enjoy more meaningful forms of engagement with citizens.

Denhardt and Grubbs (1999) maintain that the fourth issue in the current trends of public service involves the participation of citizens in the governance process and the notion of civil society. More and more, public decisions are being made through meaningful

interaction with citizens. This means that citizens are playing an important role not as recipients of government services but as contributors to the policies and programs that affect their lives:

In many ways, this emerging form of citizen participation represents a return to important principles that underlie our system of democracy. It appears that we are becoming more concerned with equity and justice, as opposed to merely efficiency and performance. Yet the change from the more traditional representative to a direct form poses unique challenges for elected and administrative officials. (Denhardt and Grubbs 1999, 424)

The authors go on to assert that many public administrators view citizen participation as a sort of tension. They associate civic engagement with public hearings, legal and administrative arbitrations, and other formal mechanisms that tend to be time consuming and highly confrontational. In turn, public involvement is limited to being a source of legitimation, through hearings and similar forums, of decisions that have already been made through more rational approaches. However, such limited forms of civic engagement not only result in policies which are detached from actual needs of affected populations, but over time create barriers between the local institutions of governance and citizens. People acting as citizens must demonstrate their concern for the larger community, their commitment to matters that go beyond short-term interests, and their willingness to assume personal responsibility for what happens in their neighborhoods and the community. But those in the government must be willing to listen and act in a responsive manner. Denhardt and Grubbs (1999) conclude: “Only by pursuing this two-way street between the citizens and government will the most healthy relationship between government and citizens be brought out.” (Denhardt and Grubbs 1999, 424).

Establishing a proper ethical basis for public service is one of the most important challenges facing the public service. Beyond a view of public administration as a managerial or a political concern, public administration today is increasingly an ethical concern. At the root of every act of every public servant, whether in developing or executive public policy,

lies a moral or ethical question. The definitive policy decisions made by public officials often have at their base conflicting ethical issues, such as whether to give precedence to the public interest or to the narrower demands of profession, department, bureau, or clientele. And the chief qualification of an executive is the ability to resolve these competing ethical codes – legal, technical, personal, professional, and organizational codes.

According to Bailey (1992) the strength and quality of an administrator lies in his or her capacity to deal effectively with the moral complexities of organizations without being broken by the imposed problems of choice. He proves that two institutional safeguards are the best guarantees of administrative morality: the ballot box, and hierarchy:

By means of the ballot box the electorate judges direct the performance of government at periodic intervals. Through hierarchy important decisions are forced upward in the administrative structure where they can receive broader, less technical, and more political. (Stillman 1992, 489)

Stephen K. Bailey (1992) in his essay “Ethics and Public Service” emphasizes three moral qualities of moral behavior in public administration: optimism, courage, and fairness tempered by charity. Optimism, in the author’s view is the ability of a public servant to deal morally with ambiguous situations confidently and purposefully. Courage is the capacity to decide and act in the face of situations when inaction, indecision, or agreement with the popular trend would provide the easy solution. Fairness tempered by charity allows for the maintenance of standards of justice in decisions affecting the public interest. He points out how the varied complexities of public service add enormous complications to moral behavior so that the resolution of public issues can never be black or white, and that public policies rarely lead to a total victory for the “right” and total defeat for the “wrong”.

Alexander Kotchegura (1999) argues that there are a few external factors that could push for continuation of the civil service reform in most Central and Eastern European countries. In his opinion, future membership in the European Union (EU) is a strong incentive to improve their civil service systems.

According to Edward Page and Linda Wouters (1997), there are two main reasons to cast doubt upon the idea that membership of the European Community (EC) will lead rapidly to major reforms in the structure of national government bureaucracies. First, the treaty of Rome has been in force for 35 years, and so far EC membership has had only limited impact upon the domestic administrative structures of even its oldest members. Secondly, there is no clear 'EC model', distinctive and relevant to the national bureaucracies of nation states, that is likely to find its way through contagion, emulation, the demonstration effect or the natural process of adaptation to an important source of political power.

Page and Wouters (1997) maintain that national administrations are becoming 'Europeanized' in the sense that the decisions of the EC, as well as the people who make them, are increasingly becoming part of national decision-making processes, but there is no strong reason to believe that this 'Europeanization' necessarily brings with it any substantial change in the national administrative structure of member states.

Methodology

For carrying out our Master's Essay we conducted quantitative, content analysis, using case studies as well. This is exploratory, explanatory, and descriptive study. It describes current state of civil service in Armenia, analyses its future prospects. A cross-sectional study of ten-year period is applied from 1990 to 2000.

Analysis Part One The Importance of Merit System in Effective Personnel Management

Before anyone can make progress toward administering a public program, the political system must enlist and train a group of public administrators. The emphasis on contemporary research in personnel relations has resulted in an impressive subfield of public administration

that deals with the many ramifications of the individual in public organizations. Today, most scholars and practitioners of public administration are aware that the handling of personnel issues can be one critical key to successful management of any public agency. Public personnel administration concerns the management of and policy-making for people and positions in the government bureaucracy. It long has been a mainstay in the field of public administration; its scholars traditionally have seen themselves as grappling with "people problems" and wrestling with the staff of politics and the public interest. Exploring many points of view on this issue, I consider that in order to have effective personnel, the emphasis in public employment should be more and more on merit rather than patronage, and for achievement of it the appropriate ground should be available.

Bureaucrats as well as any other political elite, bring with them to their jobs "a host of values, predispositions, and operating routines that greatly affect the quality of their performance in bureaucratic setting," as well as the type of decision they make (Putnam 1973, 275). Some of those predispositions are a function of their social, ethnic, and economic backgrounds. Other decisional premises arise out of the academic and professional preparation of the civil servants. Still other influences come from the work experiences, both within and outside the public sector, of these employees. It is therefore very important to understand how governments select their employees, who within the societies seeks to work for government and why they do.

Several conflicting themes have dominated the discussion of administrative recruitment. One of the defining characteristics of Weber's model of bureaucracy was that civil servants should be selected on the basis of achievement criteria and merit, rather than "ascriptive" criteria, such as caste, race, class, or language. This has been referred to as selection by "neutral competence". The criteria used to select the personnel therefore may be either their training and expertise for certain identified positions in the bureaucracy or their

general competence and intellectual abilities. In either case, the assumption underlying merit selection is that bureaucracy must be able to recruit the best possible personnel, and merit recruitment is the logical means of filling the available positions with the most qualified personnel.

It should be remembered, however, that in some instances ascriptive criteria might be important for the achieving the purposes of the organization. An organization that must provide services to members of minority communities can do a better job by using a large number of minority employees in contact with the community than by using members of the dominant community. The idea of "merit" in public office is more complex than it is sometimes assumed to be, and race, creed, color, and gender of public employees may be important in determining how well government delivers its services. As ethnicity, gender and other ascriptive criteria become more dominant cleavages within the politics in both industrialized and developing countries, issue of representation along those dimensions are likely to be even more crucial in the future.

In developmental terms, a second impetus for the adoption of merit recruitment was the desire to remove the appointment of administrative positions from political patronage and to require merit qualifications. Thus, in addition to removing the inequalities and possible inefficiencies of ascriptive recruitment, the merit reforms of civil service were intended to remove the inefficiencies and favoritism of political appointment. As desirable as the idea of employing the best possible person for each job in the public service may be from the point of view of enforcing the achievement norms of a modern society, and perhaps of achieving new goals of societal equality in a developing society, some important inefficiencies may result from merit recruitment.

The potential inefficiencies of the merit recruitment may be especially when contrasted with the alternative: political appointment. Merit recruitment appears to imply the

more mechanistic conception of administrators of bureaucrats as value-free administrators of programs who oversee public policies regardless of their intentions or impacts on society. It is assumed that sufficient technical criteria guide their choices and that commitment to a program or rejection of it has little influence on behavior. This conception of the administrator simply does not conform to the realities. Individuals selected by a spoil system were at least more disposed toward the programs of the political party in power than the supposedly neutral appointees of a merit system who may be hostile to that program. A committed bureaucracy requires that political appointees be selected for some combination of political disposition and administrative talent, however, and not for their political predisposition alone. Thus, “responsive competence” may be more important than “neutral competence” in assuring that the tasks of government are accomplished well.

This point of political versus merit appointment is, of course, one of degree. Virtually all political systems have some level at which appointments are quite clearly political - frequently referred to as “policy-making” positions - and they also have jobs for which appointment is made on a relatively routine basis on some sort of merit system. The question, then is how far up the ladder of an administrative hierarchy merit appointment, is intended to go; and conversely, what are the limits of political appointment? The differences between the US and the UK illustrate the range that may exist. A president in the US has the ability to appoint approximately three thousand people to office, and four or even five echelons of political appointees may stand between a career civil servant and the cabinet secretary. In the UK each minister has only a few political appointments other than the minister or secretary of state in charge - the largest current number is the Treasury, with six appointments - but even then, the major interface between political and administrative leaders occurs between the minister and a single career civil servant, the permanent secretary. According to Peters

(1995), these systems are obviously different, but each seems to function effectively within its own context and own political culture.

What accounts for the differences among countries in the extent to which political appointments are employed as a means of attempting to ensure compliance within an organization? One argument is that bureaucratic structures simply have evolved through history and no one has seen any real reason to alter them. A more rationalist hypothesis would be that the more fragmented the decision-making structures of a government, the more likely it is to provide some integration of political intentions and actual administration. The relative integration of the political elite and policy system in the UK, contrasted with that of the US, could taken to argue, that the UK simply does not need so many political appointees on top to create compliance within the machinery of government. In other systems the minister may be able to exercise some choice over the civil servants who serve him or her, dismissing some and calling others to office. This system, to some extent, combines the expertise of the career civil servant with the commitment of the political appointee.

Just as some scholars have emphasized the necessity of the merit in the recruitment of public administrators, others have stressed the importance of producing a set of administrators whose social and economic characteristics are similar to those of the people with whom they will work. The arguments are two-fold. According to Burn (1992), the first is that narrow recruitment from any social stratum tends to bias programs and policies, because there is a higher probability that these personnel will be working members of minority communities and may tend to impose dominant group values. The second argument in favor of representative “representative bureaucracy” is that the ability of the public bureaucracy to hire personnel should be used as a positive means to alter the social and economic structure of the society. Thus, hiring minority community members can serve not only to attack any prejudices within the society but also to provide a means of economic

advancement for members of the minority community. Sharma (1982) maintains that in India the government is required to attempt to hire members of casts and tribes that traditionally have been discriminated against in Indian society.

The future of collective bargaining, unionization, and the right to strike bode ill for the traditional merit standards of the civil service personnel system. At root, there are two differences between the “collective system” and the “civil service system” (Henry, 1980). One difference concerns the notion of sovereignty. The civil service holds that employees are on an equal footing with employers, and that they have a right to use their collective powers as a means of improving their conditions of employment. The civil service system sees this contention as a threat to the sovereignty of the state. At the same time the collective system views the traditions of the civil service as redolent of worker exploitation. The second difference concerns the concept of individualism. The American civil service long has valued the ideal that the individual workers be judged for a position on the basis of his or her unique merits for performing the duties of a particular job; the collective system argues that the identity of the individual should be absorbed in a collective effort to better the conditions of all workers. Hence, the relations of the individual with his or her government employer are replaced by a new set of relations that exists between the government employer and a collective ‘class’ of employees.

How does one get a job in government? According to merit principles all one should have to do is to possess the proper educational and professional credentials and score well on a test. But more is involved particularly when a personal interview is required. Employees in government (and presumably in private enterprise as well) would rather hire someone who is professionally less able and personally more amiable. However, education and training are crucial things. In general, recruitment to policy-making positions requires some sort of postsecondary education, with the major question becoming the degree of specialization of

that education. This brings us to the standard argument between the advocates of generalists versus specialists in the public bureaucracy. The generalist school, as typified by practice in the UK, selects individuals for the top roles in the civil service largely on the basis of general intellectual abilities and performance in postsecondary education.

Recruitment to the civil service in the majority of continental European countries represents a different form of generalist education. In the majority of these countries the role of the administrator is quite similar to that of the jurist, and a law degree is a requirement for almost all senior positions. As with British civil servants, some training in technical matters takes place on the job, although it is much more common for German servants to take advanced degrees in more technical subjects, especially economics. In addition, in Germany there is a national civil service academy to provide training and education for those working within the career structure so that they can more readily acquire the needed technical education.

The US and France represent two different forms of specialist training for career civil service. In the US people are recruited to many positions in the civil service on the basis of having some particular educational qualifications before entry. Legal degrees are often a generalist qualification for working in government rather than simply law-related positions. Though this occurs far less in the U.S. than in Europe. In France government itself provides the specialized training needed for one to become a top civil servant.

Less developed countries are in a more difficult position when deciding between generalist and specialist recruitment strategies. In the first place, countries that have recently gained independence are frequently left with a civil service trained by former colonial power and thereby trained according to the traditions of that country. Further, most underdeveloped countries lack technical talent and must opt for a more generalist stance in recruitment into new positions. Some countries have attempted to replace an indigenous technical force with

one drawn from Western countries - usually the former colonial power - but the demands of national pride and the need for jobs for their own people frequently require that the jobs be given to individuals from within the nation, even if not always as skilled as potential hires from abroad. At the same time the administrative system may be somewhat deficient in specialized talent from an absolute point of view, it may have a relative monopoly on such talent within the country. A principal characteristic of many developing countries is that the political system is forced to become the major directive force in social and economic reform.

There is, however, no single pattern for recruitment for governments in developing countries. For example, the countries of South and Central America that have been independent for a number of years have had time to develop their own patterns of recruitment. In some instances there patterns are generalist and highly politicized, whereas in others they may be more technical and merit based.

In my opinion, civil service in Armenia is currently based on patronage. While hiring employees cronyism and nepotism greatly overweight expertise. During selection there is less access and transparency. Under patronage system there is also less equity. Skills, expertise, and qualifications are of secondary importance.

In my view, civil service in Armenia should be based on merit system. The hiring of employees should be determined by competitive selection. After certain period of tenure, the employees acquire permanency in their jobs under merit system. It means that they can't be fired arbitrarily as a result of subjective judgments of the supervisors.

In Armenia the leaders face demands for increased production of consumer goods and thus need more investment in capital projects. Those investments should bear greater productive benefits in the long run, but they require a short-term retreat from a consumer-oriented economy toward a more state-directed economy. They face additional pressures from abroad to abandon some state intervention in the economy in order to "let the market

work”. Given these problems and countervailing pressures, it is apparent that Armenia has a pressing need for specialized administrators capable of proposing solutions to these problems and a large number of skilled personnel to manage economic enterprises that may be run by the state.

Part Two Civil Service in Armenia

The revolution of 1920 in Armenia brought about the dismantling of the old system and the governance structures. Many of the old-regime cadres either left the country or refused to cooperate. New servants selected mainly in accordance with criteria of origin and ideological fidelity replaced them. As a result most vacancies in newly created ministries and councils were filled with people whose professional competence and performance were questionable.

The evolution of the Soviet system of governance led to the creation of a rigidly bureaucratic and inward-looking administrative apparatus, performing strictly controlled functions and having a limited capacity for decision making. The whole structure rested upon the Communist party’s Politburo and Central Committee as its policy formulation, decision-making and overall performance review center, with a network of party committees in republics, oblasts, towns, districts right down to the level of a factory, school, office and so on.

A typical feature of the Soviet structure of governance was strict vertical subordination of all levels of authority with very weak horizontal links. There were no possibilities of independent decision making at levels below the Party’s Central Committee or a ministerial board. Decisions were usually taken at the very top and all elements of a ‘pyramid’ were obliged to carry out these decisions. Party ‘functionaries’ were present in every large office and controlled the activities and conduct of employees and the compliance

of management decisions with party directives. Membership of the Communist Party was a minimum requirement for promotion to any post of significance in any state or public organization. In general, the state apparatus in the Soviet Union was inefficient and accountable only to the top Party leadership. It consumed tremendous public resources and lacked the confidence of ordinary citizens.

Various schemes of reforming the administrative apparatus started to be elaborated. However, from the very beginning plans to reform administrative structures encountered resistance in the bureaucratic apparatus. Armenian National assembly hasn't passed the Law on Civil Service yet. The draft law is still under discussion. What are the principal factors that caused these unacceptable delays of Armenian civil service reform? In our opinion, any transformation of the administrative apparatus, which envisaged a more defined role and greater accountability and responsibility of different players at various levels of government, did not fit the plans of the ruling elite. Moreover, resistance of all-powerful bureaucratic apparatus, the bulk of which not only managed to survive transformation of the political and state system, but also appears to have benefited greatly from the years of transition. Limited accountability, a power vacuum, weakness of law-enforcing agencies provides wider opportunities for pursuing vested interests. There is no doubt that the bureaucracy strongly opposed initiatives aimed at promoting more accountable and transparent governance. Furthermore, the tendency towards structural and behavioral conservatism in various organs of public administration is deeply rooted and democratic traditions are virtually absent. Also there is a lack of unity among the political and social forces that could introduce and implement genuine civil service reform. Their current capacity to influence the political decision-making process is also weak. In addition, it should be mentioned the absence of any effective control over the ruling elite by the society. To a considerable extent 'the powers that

be' do not bear responsibility for their actions or lack of actions and hence are under no real pressure to improve their performance.

Armenia lacks an effective mechanism for centralized decision-making. The demarcation of tasks and responsibilities between the president's administration and the government, between central and regional governments still remain in the process of clarification. As a result the lines of authority and responsibility of various ministries and agencies often overlap. Coordination between these institutions is weak, and often substituted by rivalry. The turnover of high-ranking officials in the government is impressive by any standards. It causes instability and contributes to a further deterioration of performance. Very often the arrival of a new head means the replacement of most of his/her deputies. The new deputies, in their turn, replace most of the heads of department. The latter often start to rotate their subordinates. This type of 'renewal' has a very negative effect on the morale, performance and discipline of the staff.

Unfortunately, the overall professional quality of civil service cadres is declining, as most talented and qualified specialists move to the more rewarding private sector. At the same time the dismissal of incompetent, ill-disciplined employees presents a problem, since old Soviet rules still prevail.

Armenia, like most of the countries of the former Soviet Union, is characterized by widespread corruption. Clearly, this corruption is a key constraint to Armenia's economic, political and social development as it interferes significantly in: the efficient and effective creation and growth of a free market economy; the transparent and equitable operations of the government; the implementation of free and fair elections; and the efficient and effective creation of equitable provision of social services.

According to the USAID/Armenia Strategic Plan FY 1999-2003, there is widespread agreement among both Armenians and expatriate observers on the main causes of corruption

in Armenia: tradition; low wages; low risk incurred to those engaging in corrupt practices; weak professional bureaucracy.

It is claimed that corruption in contemporary Armenia is very much the immediate legacy of seventy years of Soviet rule. Deeply ingrained coping behaviors from that era find expression in a society that is very tolerant of corrupt practices. Ordinary citizens are for the most part oblivious of the degree to which corruption undermines the transition to a market economy and democracy.

It is maintained that given the relatively high cost of living relative to the wage rate, it is inevitable that many employees will look for any means to supplement their meager incomes -- and often find those means in illegal ventures, such as bribes. Low wages, of course, do not explain all instances of corruption, but they do help to explain its pervasiveness.

It proves that enforcement of laws and regulations in Armenia is weak. Many government agencies are only recently established, do not have a solid legal basis for their operations, and do not have sufficient staff or resources to do their work. There is a lack of political will to enforce laws and regulations against corruption, since many of those requiring the will are themselves practitioners and/or are closely connected to those who are. The end result is that there is little to no perceived punishment for corruption. Few practitioners are exposed for their corrupt actions and, even if exposed, few receive a punishment that could be seen to either change their behavior or serve as a negative example to other potential practitioners. Moreover, even if the salaries of bureaucrats were to rise substantially, incentives for corruption would remain. Reform of the Civil Service needs to be undertaken in order to push through needed reforms and to reduce the potential for political interference in the process. Systems with low corruption levels coincide with

personnel whose job motivation reflects a more balanced combination of monetary income and job satisfaction/pride.

Given these primary causes of corruption, USAID's actions are considered to fall into benefits (or "carrots") and costs (or "sticks") categories. It is maintained that if low wages contribute to corruption, then higher wages will be needed to help lessen corruption. Just as clearly, this is not so simple or easy as it may sound. Wages will not rise overnight nor will they rise evenly throughout the economy. Wages for productive new private sector jobs may be reasonably good, but it may take considerably longer to achieve a sufficient rise in government tax receipts and a reduction in the government workforce, to realize meaningful wage increases for government employees who may be most susceptible to corruption at present (e.g., tax inspectors, customs officials). Progress can be made, but it should be recognized from the outset that this is a long-range solution that will require patience and perseverance.

It is claimed that USAID's strategic priorities clearly focus on employment generation, with its clear and very direct connection to wages. Not only will many of the USAID interventions -- e.g., economic reforms, direct assistance to small and medium enterprises -- work to create new job (therefore income) opportunities but also to improve worker productivity with the attendant increase in wages that implies. In addition, USAID assistance in tax administration will help in the collection of government tax receipts, which will gradually help to improve the government's ability to pay reasonable wages to its employees.

Higher wage rates will not come quickly or easily. This should not be seen as a short-term solution. Nonetheless, it is one of the most appropriate and sustainable solutions to the pervasive problem of corruption and must be addressed. There is good reason to believe that

some, very modest, progress can be made in this regard -- through both tax reforms and direct and indirect assistance to employment creation -- in the five year strategy period at hand.

It is argued that here is little perceived risk of punishment for engaging in corrupt practices in Armenia despite severe penalties on the books. In addition, the broader public, while disgusted by corruption, has come to expect, perhaps even accept, it. It is rare for the population to witness a high level official being exposed for corrupt practices, much less see him/her actually penalized for it. The obvious solution, then, is to increase the penalties involved in corruption so as to deter it.

It is mentioned that USAID's strategic focus on enforcement and adjudication directly addresses this need to increase the risks involved in corruption. Strengthened enforcement capabilities in tax and customs administration, energy regulations, accounting practices, and bailiff services will all be addressed through USAID activities. At the same time, USAID's efforts to ensure increased circulation of information and to encourage and support greater public advocacy will ensure that the public witnesses enforcement and adjudication as they become increasingly impartial. As public confidence in equitable enforcement increases, public apathy and cynicism toward corruption should begin to decline, i.e., people should become less tolerant of -- and more outspoken against -- corrupt practices.

While immediate, dramatic changes in corruption cannot be expected, within the strategy's five-year time frame, we should expect to see some inroads in combating corruption in Armenia.

It is important to note that there are a number of Armenian enforcement agencies that, on their own and/or with the help of other donors, are beginning to improve their capabilities and thus their ability to deter corruption. Some agencies are focusing on the media as a means of exposing corruption and ensuring transparency in the investigation process. Other

agencies are putting more emphasis on rewarding their staff for honest and effective work ethics, through the use of bonuses.

According to Human Development Report (Armenia 1998) essential steps were not taken in Armenia for the development of a civil service system after the break-up of the Soviet Union, as the importance of civil service institutions was ignored even in Constitution. The absence of an institutionalized civil service system has led to a number of negative consequences:

- Instability in state organizations and their frequent restructuring,
- Arbitrariness in recruitment, promotion, grading, and displacement, and an inflated state apparatus,
- A constant personnel turnover (in some ministries, from 20 to 40% annually),
- Lack of professionalism and qualification of civil servants,
- Widespread corruption.

It is mentioned in the report that in the absence of a clear civil service framework, the solution of these problems depends on the will and interest of individual state bodies. And though the creation of a legal framework for civil service began in 1994, focused reform has been carried out only in 1997-1998: in 1997, the “concept of Civil Service” was developed, which became the basis for drafting the law on “Civil Service” in 1998.

It is proved in the report that Armenia must exploit the opportunities provided by the so-called “Late Economic Development Effect”, which uses the experience of other countries to avoid their mistakes and to develop a more effective model of civil service. It goes on to assert that in most European countries, civil service includes various subsystems: state, state service, territorial state service, and hospital state service, which are regulated by different laws, and civil servants are trained by various institutions. It is argued in the report that taking into consideration their experience, Armenia could benefit from establishing a career service

within a comprehensive system. A comparison of the American model, where trained civil servants enter the civil service system on a general basis, with the European model, where the state trains civil servants for specific positions and then employs them correspondingly, it's made a conclusion that the European model is more suitable for Armenia, since it would allow the state to employ the specialists trained with limited state resources in the civil service and diminish their outflow to the private sector.

It is claimed in the 1998 Human Development Report that civil service in Armenia should be based on a number of important principles, including: independence from changes in political leadership; continuity and stability of personnel; legal, economic, and social security; merit-based promotions, based on competition, classification, qualification, grades, training, and enhancement of qualifications; ensuring the required level of knowledge, management skills, and ethical attitudes, through training and professional development. It goes on to assert that by adhering to these principles, a professional and knowledgeable staff will be created and maintained, and civil service will be based on abilities and qualifications, as reflected in the classification system set by the state (four categories and twelve classes are planned). Competition is the universal criteria for entering civil service.

It is maintained in the report that the provision of civil servants without the implementation of a corresponding training system is ineffective. So a system for enhancing the qualifications of personnel through training must be part of the framework of civil service policy.

To partially fill the gap in the statistical data on the qualifications and professional characteristics of civil servants, the Armenian School of Public Administration (ASPA), looking at various attributes of civil servants and gauging expert opinion on the civil service, conducted surveys.

The first part of the survey was aimed at registering state employees by their social-demographic and status-qualification characteristics. Two typical public administration bodies, ministries and marzpetarans were included in the study. The results show that 88.4% and 84.2% employees have higher education in the ministries and the marzpetarans, respectively. In the ministries, the average age of employees is 30-40 and in marzpetarans, it is 36-50. The percentages of male and female employees in ministries are 60% and 40%, respectively, and in marzpetarans, it is 70% and 30%, respectively.

The second part of the survey examined expert sociological analysis of the civil service, using questionnaires. In general, a negative opinion on the present state of the civil service prevails. According to 80% of the experts, the civil service is far from being optimal and needs to improve to adapt to new conditions. The experts claimed that the current situation of civil servants is a result of structural instability: its frequent reorganization (72% of respondents), personnel mobility (42%), legal-regulatory framework of civil service (60%), as well as the absence of a flexible and fair salary system were cited as factors.

In order of importance, the experts prioritized the adoption of the law “On the Civil Service” (85%) and the introduction of a flexible and fair salary system (78%) as the most necessary changes. Other important factors included enhancing the professionalism and discipline of employees. According to expert evaluations, only every fifth high official is qualified for his/her occupied position by the level of education, and every fourth did not have any work experience in supervision prior to his/her appointment and entered the civil service after independence.

According to Human Development Report, the effectiveness of the civil service can also be increased by a complete and accurate personal database. Unfortunately, this database is currently very poor in the statistical sphere, which renders the evaluation of the quantity and more importantly, the quality of the potential civil servants very difficult. Consequently it

is necessary not only to collect statistical data on the number of current and potential civil servants, as is done at present, but also social-demographic (sex, age, family situation) and status-qualification (education, specialty, work experience, qualification grade) data. Additionally, a registry of the positions available in the administrative sector must be created.

It is proved in the report that a special administrative body with inter-sectoral jurisdiction can regulate these issues. This body, as in many countries, could be created in the office of the president or prime minister. Competition, qualification, and classification must be implemented and dispute-solving committees must be created in the central civil service management body. This body should regulate and provide methodical assistance and leadership to all interested agencies.

It is mentioned in the report that ASPA, which uses elements of the European model in the training program, has provided training courses to 1200 civil servants from ministries, marzpetarans, and communities from 1995 to 1998. A program titled “Social policy Reforms in Transition Economies” (SPRITE) has been implemented by the Institute for Economic Development of the World Bank in eleven CIS countries starting in 1996. Armenia joined the program in 1997, on the basis of a memorandum signed between the Institute for Economic Development of the World Bank and the ASPA. The objective of SPRITE is to train personnel to implement social reforms, such as the creation of effective systems of social security. Sprite training programs include: seminars for high-ranking officials; training for trainers; series of seminars organized for civil servants at various levels of administration. In 1997-1998, seminars for high-ranking officials were organized on the following themes: “Issues of Pension Reform in Armenia”; “Social Reforms in Armenia”; and “Issues of Health Care Reforms in Armenia”. The seminars resulted in an evaluation and analysis of social reforms in Armenia, identification of weaknesses, and development of methods for improving their focus and mechanisms. The SPRITE program is planning to hold seminars on

education and employment reforms. Seminars on pension and health care reforms for other levels of administration will also continue.

It is concluded in the report that important steps towards the improvement of civil service have been taken. Further it is claimed that an effective solution to this complex and multi-dimensional problem could be found if the political, economic legal, social-psychological, and organizational factors influencing the system are taken into account and adequately utilized.

Armenian National Assembly is currently discussing the draft Law of the RA on Civil Service. The draft law defines civil service as professional activity, which aims at the implementation of the objectives and functions imposed on them by the legislation (Article 2, point 1a). A civil service post envisaged securing tenure with the change of political power (Article 2, point 1b).

For the first time the draft law sets a distinction between purely political, discretionary, and administrative appointments. It defines political post as “a post without stability and changing with the change of political power elected or appointed pursuant to a procedure defined by the law; a person occupying it shall make political decisions and co-ordinate their implementation within the scope of authority ascribed to that person by the law” (Article 2, point 1o). Discretionary posts (those of Deputy Ministers, Marzpets, the Mayor of Yerevan, heads and members, included in the regular pay roll, of standing commissions of the RA) is defined in the draft law as appointed pursuant to a procedure defined by legislation; and a person occupying it shall make decisions and co-ordinate their implementation within the scope of authority ascribed to that person by law; it may change with the change of political power (Article 2, point 1p, 2).

Article 6 states that all public positions have been classified into four groups (highest, chief, leading, and junior posts of civil service), and each group is broken down into

subgroups 1, 2, and 3 (subgroup 1 is considered to be the highest one of the given group). It is stated that classification grade of civil servants is the criterion of a civil servant's professional qualification, based on his/her conformity to the requirements of professional attitudes and for work skills (Article 2, point 1h). Thus, the classification system in the Armenian civil service is not as extensive and detailed as the one in the US, France or Canada and appears to be relatively flexible in a sense that it does not enforce formal division of jobs into clerical, technical or professional.

The draft law tries to provide neutrality of the civil servants. It spells out that civil servant shall be denied the right to: 1) enter other paid employment, with the exception of pedagogical, academic, and creative occupations; 2) be personally engaged in entrepreneurial activities; 3) be a trustee of third person's in issues pertaining to the operation of a state body where he/she is employed, or which is under his/her immediate subjection or control; 4) use his/her office and serve benefits in the interests of political parties, non-governmental organizations, including religious associations, through proselytizing in their favor or conducting other political or religious activities (Article 23, point 1); occupy a post of civil service that is under direct supervision of his/her next of kin or in-laws (Article 23, point 2).

The draft law spells out the basic principles of the civil service: stability, transparency, political restraint of the civil service; professionalism, oversight of the work of the civil servants and their accountability; personal responsibility of civil servants for failure to exercise or for improper exercise of their service duties and so on (Article 4). It provides equal opportunities for candidates who apply for a position in the civil service regardless of ethnic origin, race, gender, religion, political or other convictions, social origin, property or other status (Article 10). The restrictions for joining the civil service have been clearly defined and comprise partial or full incapability, deprivation of the right to occupy a civil service post, some disease presence and so on (Article 11).

In my opinion, some changes in several articles of the draft law are preferable. For example, Article 15 states that upon joining the civil service a civil servant takes an oath, or Article 16 concerning the civil service work history. Why we need it in a law?

Article 34 states that the civil servant may appeal the decision on relieving him/her from the civil service post through court procedure. First of all it is not mentioned to whom particularly to appeal. Further, appeal board is preferable to be in the government.

In my opinion, Articles 36 and 37 give much power and authority to the president of Armenia than is necessary. Article 36 states that the Civil Service Council shall implement the uniform state policy in the system of civil service, which shall be subject and accountable to the president of the RA. Article 37 states that the president of Armenia shall relieve the Chairman and the members of the Civil Service Council. But to whom is accountable the president, who should oversee his/her decisions? Unfortunately, we miss this point in the draft law.

According to the executive secretary of Government Commission on Public Sector Reform Armen Khudaverdyan (2000), a lot of works should be carried out in connection with the implementation of the law **after** the adoption of the Civil Service Law: to establish Civil Service Council; to develop legal normative acts of the Civil Service; to define the establishment units of the General secretaries; to make adjustments and amendments in the related laws; to approve the roster and passports of civil service posts, including the ministries, executive bodies, the staffs of the president, government, National Assembly and other executive bodies, the regional administrative bodies, Yerevan municipality and local government bodies of the republic; to recognize the civil servants in the relevant administration bodies; to hold competitions for the civil service posts of the Civil Service Council staff; to carry out the first training of the civil servants of the public administration bodies. The mandate to carry out the first training of the civil servants is with the ASPA. It's

planned that the latter should develop the training programmes, and, according to the Draft Law, the Civil Service Council is recognized as a customer. The problem of training should be submitted to international organizations for technical assistance in the process of development of the Concept Paper of the training system and its implementation. This problem should be solved within the scope of the project including the public administration system. In other spheres this question is missing; to carry out the first attestation of the civil servants; to pay the salaries and social insurance of the civil servants. Particularly, to develop the draft of the Civil Servants Payment Law and the draft of the Law on the Amendments and Addenda to the Pension Law.

The implementation of the civil service in the administration structure is planned to be finished within two and half years; the structural reforms, including the civil service and the services delivered by the government, require a minimum five-eight years.

In view of the amount and complexity of unresolved issues in the area of Human resource management, it is clear that the establishment of the durable structures and principles is a critical element of the civil service reform in Armenia.

The changing nature of work in modern societies, however, is altering the need for many of the specialized skills previously needed in large numbers. So, Armenia will prosper if the emphasis in public employment increasingly would be on conceptual rather than mechanical skills, and the new administrator is one active in policy process, highly sensitive to notions of the public interest, and always mindful of the moral and political context of administrative action.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The nature and status of any civil service is highly dependent on the identity, cohesiveness of the state and the peculiarities of its political system. The Armenian state and

nation are in deep crisis. The evidence can easily be found in any sphere of the country's present-day economic, political, and social life.

Being an integral part of the establishment, the Armenian civil service experiences the adverse effect of the uncertainty of the political situation, an uncertain constitutional order and conflicting legal norms, economic chaos and authoritarian tendencies of the ruling elite. In addition, the inheritance of the past continues to prevail over current practices.

We witness a growing mistrust of citizens towards state and government administration. In view of the overall situation in the country, the issues of legitimacy and performance of Armenian civil service have recently acquired critical importance. A paradoxical situation has emerged. The restructuring of the Armenian economy and resolution of urgent social and political problems requires the injection of millions of dollars. Comprehensive and transparent civil service reform, complemented by respective changes in the constitutional and political environment, does not require such financial investment. If implemented, such changes would save considerable financial, material and human resources, and ensure consistency and irreversibility of the ongoing transformation and facilitate achievement of the ultimate goals of transition.

The agenda of in-depth reform of the Armenian civil service should comprise measures aimed at streamlining its institutional role, enhancing its accountability and efficiency, transparency and responsiveness, political neutrality, adherence to the rule of law, 'de-numeklaturisation' and induction of modern management techniques, complemented by effective anticorruption strategy.

The bureaucratic and undemocratic practices, if they prevail, will continue to feed current negative trends in the country's political and economic development and will spread up the process of 'privatization of the state by bureaucracy'. There is no alternative to a

sweeping reform of the Armenian administrative system. The recognition of this fact and political will to achieve this objective is critically important for Armenia today.

In the sphere of public administration, the civil service reform is one of top governmental priorities in Armenia. The public administration system is inefficient here and does not correspond to the requirements of the present development stage. A revised draft Law on Civil Service is under discussion and a working group is established to formulate the civil service reform strategy and oversee its implementation. The creation of a solid and effective civil service is also important in terms of fighting corruption, which has obtained huge dimensions recently.

In the light of the 1995 Constitution, the government has sought to strengthen the State administration through new laws on territorial administration, providing for decentralized bodies at the community level and deconcentrated bodies of the central executive power at the regional level. The government is committed to increasing both the efficiency and transparency of the State administration through a strong emphasis on fighting corruption. The organizational structure of many ministries has been revised to attain maximum effectiveness and professionalism.

The creation of Armenian School of Public Administration (ASPA) with the support of the European Union was an important contribution for enhancing both institutional and human capacities of Armenia. The ASPA was founded in 1994 and has already trained around one thousand civil servants at central and local levels. The American University of Armenia (AUA) has been an important establishment of capacity building for Armenian professionals, providing different graduate and master courses in various domains, including public administration and business management.

Today Armenia has many highly qualified young professionals in different spheres that have been trained through various exchange programs in the best schools and universities

of Europe and the United States. Yet the majority of these young professionals do not integrate into the Armenian administration because of low salaries. Many of them are employed by international or foreign organizations; others try to find lucrative jobs abroad.

Public service in Armenia requires numerous amendments. Public administrators must demonstrate in their own actions the highest standards of behavior. Public servants should be both active in policy development and responsive to the public interest. Regardless of background or occupation they should be the guardians of a public trust. Public organizations represented with high moral values and commitments should become models for all organizations, at least those involved in the management of public programs.

For the public service to regain its proper role in our society, we will have to establish and maintain throughout government and the public service a true commitment to the values of democracy. Trust in the public service and the public willingness to participate in the work of government will occur only if the public is convinced that those in office, whether political or administrative, seek the public interest (not merely their own) and that do so with skill and responsibility. Only when our commitment to democratic practices and ideals is clear to all will we once again be able to establish public service as the highest calling in our society.

Educational institutions and the agencies of government must work to enlarge the base of talent available for, and committed to, public service. Armenian people should demand first-class performance and the highest ethical standards, and must be willing to provide what is necessary to attract and retain needed talent. The president and the parliament should also take action to rebuild public trust of government; clear away obstacles to the ability of the president to attract talented appointees from all parts of the society; make more room at senior levels of departments and agencies for career executives; provide a framework within which those departments and agencies can exercise greater flexibility in managing programs and personnel; encourage a stronger partnership between presidential appointees and career

executives; develop more student awareness of, and educational training for, the challenges of government and public service; enhance the efforts to recruit top college graduates and those with specific professional skills for government jobs; build a pay system that is both fair and competitive; rebuild the government's chief personnel agency to give it the strength and mandate it needs; set higher goals for government performance and productivity; provide more effective training and executive development.

Commitment to democratic ideals involves concerns such as responsiveness and involvement, but also commitment to equity and justice. They certainly should be able to pinpoint the failures of past policies, to suggest alternatives, and to work actively toward implementation with elected leaders.

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